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Abstract 
 
This work revisits some trajectories of Marxism in Latin America characterized by 
their non-official or critical stance vis-à-vis official versions of Marxism, in order to 
trace and reconstruct a number of attempts to produce a distinctive ‘Latin American 
Marxism’. The theoretical framework of the thesis draws upon the conceptual 
achievements of the authors and currents revisited, based (sometimes wittingly and 
explicitly, sometimes not) on the categories of uneven and combined development, 
plural temporalities, and translation. Chapter I organizes the conceptual framework 
that accompanies the reconstruction, in which the common ground of the selected 
authors lies in to put into question the developmentalist and modernization 
apparatus that characterized official Marxism during the 20th century.  
 
Chapter II and III reconstruct the work of Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui, 
considered as the foremost translation of Marxism into a communal-popular 
perspective with roots in the Andean indigenous community or ayllu. Chapter II 
focuses on the centrality of ‘uneven and combined development’ in his 
confrontation to both the homogeneizing perspective of the Second International 
and the theoretical ‘exceptionalism’ claimed by Haya de la Torre for Latin America. 
Chapter III continues the reconstruction of Mariátegui’s Marxism in a different yet 
related register, namely through the incorporation of the notion of ‘myth’. The 
notion appears as a keystone to comprehend Mariátegui’s incorporation of the 
Andean ethno-cultural memories in the conceptual registers of historical 
materialism. 
 
Chapter IV to VI address some reflections on the concomitances and tensions 
between Marxism and the ‘national-popular’ in Latin America. Chapter IV revisits 
the so-called dependency theory, a heterogeneous ‘school’ which questioned the 
assumptions of modernization theories and desarrollista frameworks. The chapter 
evaluates the extent to which the dependency school was able to disengage itself 
from the notion of development, from a geopolitically-located conceptualization of 
the capitalist world structure. Chapter V revisits the work of Argentinean Marxist 
José Aricó, in particular his reading of the ‘misencounter’ (desencuentro) between 
Marx and Latin America in the midst of the ‘crisis of Marxism’ during the 1970s and 
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‘80s. The chapter argues that the notion of ‘misencounter’ can be read from the logic 
of uneven and combined development and its effects in the development of Marxist 
theory in the sub-continent. Chapter VI, finally, reconstructs the Marxism of 
Bolivian René Zavaleta Mercado, focusing on the characterization of Bolivia as 
‘motley’ society (sociedad abigarrada), and the different temporalities that feature so 
defined social structures. In his attempt to produce local knowledge, Zavaleta 
envisaged a theoretical encounter between the working class and the indigenous 
movements in the midst of the question of democracy.  
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Introduction. Marxism in/from Latin America: Difficulties and Engagements 
 
‘Un pueblo que oprime a otro no puede 
ser libre’ (‘A people who oppresses 
another cannot be free’).  
Inca Yupanqui, ‘Diario de las 
Discusiones y Actas de las Cortes de 
Cádiz’, 1810 
 
This work is a contribution to the reconstruction of Marxism as theoretical 
movement in Latin America, at the same time that it attempts a reflection on the 
conditions of possibility of Marxist theorizing in the sub-continent. It seeks to 
examine some intellectual trajectories characterized by a critical stance vis-à-vis 
official versions of the Marxist theoretical tradition. My aim is to trace those 
conceptual formulations through which a distinctive ‘Latin American Marxism’ has 
been projected – or at least insinuated – as a recognizable constellation of ideas.  
 The first caveat necessary here involves the problem of taking for granted 
what is actually a troublesome formulation: the putative unity of the entity ‘Latin 
America’. The difficulties begin from the very act of naming the region. Following 
the so-called ‘discovery’ of America in 1492, the presence of this ‘new’ region of the 
globe not only disturbed, challenged, and finally transformed the basic certainties of 
the ‘old’ world; it also inaugurated the exercise of naming the newcomer from 
overseas. Henceforth, terms such as América, Nuevo Mundo or Indias Occidentales 
were imposed on the region. Later on, once colonial rule was vanquished during the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, the refusal to maintain the identification 
with former colonizers provoked a sort of semantic availability, an opening up of 
the field of possibilities to rethink the region. However, the defeat of Simón 
Bolívar’s project for a united federation of republics1 was succeeded by the 
                                                          
1  For the clearest exposition of this project, see Bolívar’s ‘Letter from Jamaica’ in S. 
Bolívar ([1815] 2003). 
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conflictive and uneven processes of building national states,2 in which the problem 
of the region’s name drifted in new directions. 
 It was by mid-nineteenth century when the prefix ‘Latin’ was adopted by 
Creole elites so as to differentiate the region from Anglo-Saxon American (i.e., US) 
presence. This reaction was no doubt related to the latter’s expansionist endeavors, 
as they were heralded by the infamous Monroe doctrine in 1823. James Monroe’s 
slogan ‘America for the Americans’ heretofore designated the South of the Rio 
Grande as the US’ ‘sphere of influence’; consequently, his calls for a ‘Pan-
Americanism’ soon demonstrated to be the smiling face of an imperialist vocation. 
In 1846, the US Army invaded Mexico and deprived it of California and Texas; 
between 1854 and 1855, US’s marines invaded Nicaragua, El Salvador and 
Honduras; and in 1898, a war against Spain was initiated in the Caribbean Sea, 
being its main targets Puerto Rico and Cuba.3 These events were accompanied by 
the conflict between England and France as competing world powers, a dispute in 
which the French appellation to Latinidad (no doubt part of its imperial repertoire) 
commenced to seduce the elites of the region.  
 Nonetheless, the choice of Latinidad conspicuously obliterates the complex 
mixture of cultural traditions existing in the region, Afro- and Indo-American 
components in the first place.4 At the end of the nineteenth century, Uruguayan José 
Enrique Rodó (let’s recall, an elitist, aristocratic writer) offered in Ariel what was 
perhaps the most influential argument for the distinction of Anglo-Saxon 
‘materialism’ and Latin ‘spiritualism’. Conversely, Cuban writer and independence 
fighter José Martí chose to speak of Nuestra América (‘Our America’) and explicitly 
included the Amerindian and Afro-American elements in it.5  
 All in all, Latin America exudes a common colonial and post-colonial history: 
the shared histories of colonial subjugation and unified struggles for independence, 
as well as the violent interventions of US armies, diplomats, and policies across the 
                                                          
2  The period after the independence wars is commonly known as ‘period of anarchy’ 
(characterized by military caudillismo and civil wars) in Latin America’s historical literature. 
See for instance A. Cueva (1990, ch. 2) and M. Kaplan (1976). 
3  For a comprehensive account of US imperialism in Latin America since 1898, see J. 
Petras & H. Veltmeyer (2015). 
4  It is worth noting that the currency of the name did not lessen with the (second) 
French invasion of Mexico between 1862 and 1867. See Miguel Rojas-Mix (1991: 343–50). 
5 See J. E. Rodó ([1900] 1967) and J. Martí ([1891] 1977). 
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region, portray a commonality that transcends national frontiers. However, since it 
is not a homogeneous history (be it in terms of geographies, languages, economic 
bases, popular traditions, etc.), its heterogeneous nature prevents any facile 
generalization, or the superimposition of another ‘fictive ethnicity’ (Balibar 1991) 
over the already established set of national identities.  
 The history of America’s names is thus perhaps simply the summary of an 
ambivalent but evident dependence (economic as well as cultural) on the Euro-
American ‘West’. In this regard, and despite the colonial hallmark the term entails, 
Walter Mignolo (2005: 70) points out that Latinidad remains indicative of the 
rearticulation of the imperial/colonial world-system. What is currently known as 
‘coloniality of power’ can be traced to the article ‘Americanity as a Concept’, co-
authored by Aníbal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein in 1992. For these authors, 
America became a model of world-system organization since its very ‘discovery’, a 
model based on four factors: “coloniality, ethnicity, racism, and the concept of 
newness itself” (1992: 550). Coloniality refers to the subalternization of peoples and 
cultures out of the hierarchization of ethnic differences by means of the category of 
‘race’ –itself a modern construct. Race appears thus as the pillar of such a hierarchy, 
insofar as some physiognomic features –predominantly skin colour– are regarded as 
signals of ‘natural’ differences among peoples. This is the central argument behind 
the concept of ‘coloniality of power’, although it was coined some years later. In this 
sense, Mignolo’s consideration of the rearticulation of the colonial matrix as 
registered in the term Latin brings with it the demand to take into account the 
history of the processes of modernization, colonization and coloniality that have 
accompanied Latin America’s nominations and identifications. 
 Mignolo’s argument comes close to Luis Tapia’s (2013, Part II) definition of 
Latin America as a decolonizing epistemological horizon. According to Tapia, this 
horizon has been historically composed out of three layers: first, the formal de-
colonization from Spanish and Portuguese empires; second, the affirmation 
(however precarious) of national states after formal colonial rule. The third moment, 
in turn, remains unaccomplished insofar as Latin America’s decolonzing horizon 
includes – in Tapia’s view – a movement of internal decolonization, that is, of social 
democratization in all dimensions, an issue in which the historical nation-state has 
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fallen short, to say the very least. The prefix ‘Latin’ would thus maintain the 
irresolution or liminar nature of decolonization as a constitutive tension of the 
projected object ‘Latin America’. 
 I follow Naoki Sakai’s (2006: 169, 188) reflections on Asia as neither a ready-
made geo-cultural ‘us’ nor a merely cartographic locality void of content, but rather 
as a fluid and permanent movement of distinction and affirmation within the 
modern-colonial geopolitical landscape. From this perspective, I argue that Latin 
America must be considered as a historical-cultural project, not a matter of fact or a 
purely representational entity. If ‘Latin America’ holds the not-yet of internal 
decolonization as its historical backdrop, then we are dealing with a project or 
projection whose actuality comes from being carried out by real enough social and 
cultural forces, resisted by other equally real ones. From a shared colonial past, 
which turns out to be the moment of self-affirmation within the present, and 
signalled by the not-yet of internal decolonization projecting a possible future, 
‘Latin America’ evokes from the outset a time-lag, a temporal split or break in 
representation that gives form to the ‘post’ of postcolonial experience (cf. Bhabha, 
1995: 136).  
 
*          *          *  
 
In the aftermaths of the 1960s, a series of self-examinations accompanied the Latin 
American left-intelligentsia. Among them, it aroused the idea of ‘Latin American 
Marxism’ as a possible subject of inquiry. During the late 1970s, José Aricó and 
Michael Löwy offered the initial contours of what is now a novel but fairly-
established research field in the region. Löwy ([1980] 1992) compiled and published 
in 1982 the first anthology of Marxist texts written in the sub-continent, which 
contains writings from Juan Bautista Justo and Luis Emilio Recabarren (of 1909 and 
1910 respectively) to late-1970s documents of the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan 
guerrillas.6 In his influential ‘Introduction’ to the volume, Löwy did not explicitly 
                                                          
6  Löwy’s anthology was first published in France by Maspero in 1980 as Le marxisme en 
Amérique latine, anthologie. It was translated into Spanish by Mexican editorial Era for the first 
time in 1982, and later into English by Atlantic Highlands in 1992. A new, extended Spanish 
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differentiate between ‘Marxism in Latin America’ and ‘Latin American Marxism’; 
however, his presentation is traversed by the distinction between a mechanical, 
external application of an allegedly definite Marxist canon, and a concrete-
dialectical adoption and recreation of Marxism within vernacular political 
engagements –the latter constituting a proper ‘Latin American Marxism’, if one 
follows Löwy’s selective usage of the term. Löwy’s implicit demarcation of Marxism 
in and from Latin America arguably derives from the general climate of the epoch in 
which it was formulated, that is, the long-lasting quarrels between ‘orthodoxy’ 
(Stalinism) and its varied ‘heterodox’ challengers.  
 A similar perspective guided José Aricó’s pioneering work on José Carlos 
Mariátegui and the “origins of Latin American Marxism” (1978). Both Aricó and 
Löwy consider Peruvian author José Carlos Mariátegui as the major theoretical 
event for Marxism in the sub-continent. Particularly, Aricó introduces Mariátegui in 
relation to Marx and especially Lenin, explaining that the three were intellectuals 
situated in contexts of evident slippage in the foreseen paths of capitalist 
modernization. This fact was crucial – Aricó goes on – in their theoretical and 
political re-orientation towards subaltern classes as historical subjects. To put it 
differently, Marx, Lenin and Mariátegui were intellectual outcomes of the ‘failure’ of 
classical bourgeois development, evidencing thus the uneven and combined nature 
of capitalism. Nonetheless, shortly after having somehow inaugurated the field of 
studies and inquiries of that name, Aricó concluded (in the voice ‘Latin American 
Marxism’ of Norberto Bobbio’s Dictionary of Politics) that to envisage a Latin-
American reconstruction of Marxism, as proposed for instance by Mariátegui, is 
pointless in the aftermaths the 1960s, concluding that “[it] is worthless to set out the 
question of the existence or not of a Latin American Marxism.” (1982: 956) The 
present moment of Marxism would be one of “disaggregation” (i.e., of 
predominance of national and local varieties of Marxisms), something which makes 
it unthinkable from the viewpoint of regional or global reconstructions.  
 More recently, in an insightful cartography of Marxism in the sub-continent 
Omar Acha and Debora D’Antonio (2013) offer a stimulating reflection that revives 
                                                                                                                                                                    
edition that includes articles of the 1980s, ‘90s and 2000s was published in 2007 by editorial 
LOM in Santiago de Chile. Translations into Portuguese were edited by Sao Paulo’s 
publishing house Perseu Abramo in 1999 and 2012. 
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the debate on the actuality, nature, and contours of ‘Latin American Marxism’. They 
identify in the afterimage of the self-differentiation from an ‘original model’ of 
Marxism (be it explicit or surreptitious) an important element that makes Latin 
American Marxism possible, or at least conceivable. Nonetheless, they rightly warn 
against searching for a unique, exclusive feature that would signal its singularity. In 
other words, Latin American Marxism finds a constitutive moment in the 
suspension or putting-into-tension of any pretended universal validity of the 
Marxist apparatus, but it cannot be approached from a single element or set of 
elements, without running the risk of overshadowing the complexity of both the 
regional diversity and the variants of Marxism it has produced. In a similar vein, 
Ronald Munck (2007: 154ff) highlights the “liminal situation” and “hybridity” of the 
very category ‘Latin American Marxism’, when the plurality of its historical forms 
and narrow relationships with ‘national-popular’ patterns of class consciousness are 
taken into account. Finally, Bruno Bosteels has recovered the category of 
desencuentro (misencounter or mismatch), used before by José Aricó (1980) and more 
recently by Álvaro García Linera (2009a), so as to describe the conflictive historical 
relationship between Marxism and Latin America.  
  An indication of this newer field of inquiries, that contains but is not 
reduced to ‘Marxism’, is the current proliferation of journals such as Argentinean 
Lucha Armada en la Argentina and Herramientas: Debate y Crítica Marxista, as well as 
the research centre CEDINCI and its journal Políticas de la Memoria; the journals 
Materialismo Histórico and iZQUIERDAS in Chile; the research-centre Centro de 
Estudios Marxistas and its journal Critica Marxista in Brazil; and the work of edition 
and publication of Bolivia’s Vice-Presidency 
[http://www.vicepresidencia.gob.bo/?page=publicaciones], to name only the best 
known. Among recent collective works, it is important to mention Militantes, 
Intelectuales y Revolucionarios. Ensayos sobre Marxismo e Izquierda en America Latina (C. 
Aguirre ed. and intro., 2013); El Comunismo. Otras Miradas desde América Latina (E. 
Concheiro et.al., 2007); La Nueva Izquierda en América Latina (D. Chavez et.al., 2008); 
and Alternativas en América Latina: los dilemas de la Izquierda en el siglo XXI (M. Toer 
et.al., 2006). Individual works have also proliferated; see for instance Bruno 
Bosteels’ Marx and Freud in Latin America (2012) and El marxismo en América Latina: 
nuevos caminos al comunismo (2013); Pablo Guadarrama’s Marxismo y Anti-Marxismo 
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en América Latina (1990); Jaime Massardo’s Investigaciones sobre la historia del 
marxismo en América Latina (2001); Isabel Rauber’s América Latina: Poder y socialismo 
en el siglo XXI (2006); and Roberto Regalado’s América Latina entre siglos: dominación, 
crisis, lucha social y alternativas políticas de la izquierda (2006); and Alberto Saladino 
García’s Indigenismo y marxismo en América Latina (1983), among many others that 
will be referred to in this work.  
 
*          *          * 
 
Drawing upon the significant amount of works aimed at reconstructing the regional 
pathways of Marxism, this research is guided by a concern with the tensions and 
displacements that the ‘object’ Latin America has provoked in Marxist elaborations 
of the sub-continent. I argue that, from these tensions, a distinctive ‘Latin American 
Marxism’ becomes visible as a participant, in one way or another, of the political 
imaginaries and conceptual disquisitions that emerged in the region. The notions of 
encounter and misencounter are in this sense instrumental to come to terms with 
the disquieting, non-self-evident matching of Marxism and Latin America. Put 
differently, my work focuses on the conceptual displacements that the troublesome 
consideration of Latin America’s particularities (vis-à-vis ‘classical capitalism’) 
aroused for the kind of Marxism elaborated by a number of intellectuals in the 
region – however marginal they might be considered at theoretical and/or political 
level.  
 I suggest furthermore that these conceptual disquisitions outline the contours 
of an ‘intellectual constellation’. “Ideas are timeless constellations”, Benjamin (1998: 
34) stated in 1925 in reference to the German baroque drama. More modestly, I 
borrow this image-concept to make sense of a conglomerate of intellectuals and 
ideas that, despite of their temporal distance and disparate motivations, share 
similar preoccupations regarding the adoption of Marxism in and for Latin 
America. In this sense, they transcend their particular historical time and project the 
idea of a distinctive Latin American Marxism as a significant moment of Marxist 
elaborations in the region. The image-concept of intellectual constellation suggests 
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therefore a tradition of critical thought populating Marxism in Latin America, 
sometimes in subterranean ways, others more openly. Conversely, Benjamin’s 
insistence on the ‘now-time’ of dialectical constellations7 also affords to stress the 
potential actuality and timeliness of ways of thinking that could otherwise be 
regarded as bygone, to the extent that all of them pertain to the past century.  
 In my view, and notwithstanding the different epoch in which the reflections 
explored in this research were produced, the questions they raised (related to the 
character of our capitalist modernity; the value and function of Marxist theory and 
of socialist projects in this multi-faced region; its dependence on both economic and 
intellectual levels; the ill-resolved national and indigenous questions; the hetero-
temporality of class struggle) are all-too present issues in Latin American societies – 
and elsewhere. In any event, this exercise of critical reading is premised on the 
following hypothesis: despite what official ideologemes assume or affirm, the now-
time is not identical to itself; hence a newer account of previous approaches to prior 
conceptual work and political practice may indeed shed light onto present problems 
and demands.  
 The general orientations of this research demand a sort of ‘Marxism of 
Marxism’. I consider that the particularization of the conceptual events gathered 
under the label of ‘Latin American Marxism’ requires the reconstruction of the 
conditions of possibilities giving way to those formulations. A ‘Marxism of (Latin 
American) Marxism(s)’ implies therefore an engagement with both the historical 
conditions of existence of Latin America and the theorizations thereby produced. A 
historical-materialist framework should then incorporate into the attempted 
intellectual reconstruction the history of class struggles, cultural imbalances, and 
material as well as cultural networks whereby these vernacular conceptualizations 
emerged. Thus understood, the ‘context’ (which I prefer to consider as the 
‘infrastructure’ of Marxist theorizations) might undoubtedly occupy a more 
exhaustive place in this research; my aim is nonetheless to provide a sketch (if not a 
proper account) of these ‘infrastructures’ underlying Latin American Marxism. 
                                                          
7  In Benjamin’s words, “[i]t’s not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or 
what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes 
together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at 
a standstill.” (1999: 462) 
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 As Martín Cortés (2015: 15) puts it, the association of Marxism and Latin 
America is far from being self-evident; therefore, the insistence on this coupling 
requires some extra justifications. These are enveloped in Chapter I in terms of a 
projected theoretical task: Marxism’s deprovincialization. I attempt to make sense of 
the continuous relevance that a subaltern, decolonizing perspective has for a truly 
emancipatory Marxist thinking. I concentrate my argument on the possibilities that 
an engagement with some postcolonial arguments offers to a decolonizing Marxist 
horizon. In doing so, the topics of the crisis of Marxism, capitalist temporalities, 
uneven and combined development, and the translational nature of historical 
materialism are framed in what I call a ‘subalternist hypothesis’. I hope the 
reflections on these elements and dimensions contribute somewhat to the disruption 
of the pervasive, colonialist modes of representation underlying the uneven and 
combined mode of capitalist production, opening hence up the gaze for new 
readings of Marxist conceptualizations. 
 The selected corpus of Latin American Marxisms worked on in this research 
also needs further justification. Part I is compounded by Chapters II and III, in 
which a twofold account of José Carlos Mariátegui’s Marxism is offered. In Chapter 
II, the argument of focuses on the presence of uneven and combined development 
in Mariátegui’s formulation of the dialectics between national and international 
dynamics, on the one hand, and of the autochthonous and the cosmopolitan 
elements of a socialist project, on the other. In doing so, I demonstrate that the 
nationalization of Mariátegui’s Marxism operates through a notion of 
heterogeneous temporalities. Furthermore, I revaluate in Chapter III the role that 
the category of myth plays in Mariátegui’s Marxism, considered as an important 
dimension of the hetero-temporal insofar as it offers an understanding of the work 
of myth informed by Bergson’s work of memory. In doing so, I argue that a definite 
conceptual sensibility towards subaltern temporalities, languages, and modes of 
production qualifies the approach to the ‘national’ for a Latin American Marxism. 
Mariátegui’s political imaginary envisaged the theoretical encounter of Marxism 
with an indigenous revolutionary rationality, an encounter that adumbrated the 
idea of an ‘Indo-American Socialism’. 
  In the second part, three different versions of the subalternist hypothesis are 
reconstructed. In Chapter IV, the question about the possibility for coming to terms 
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with the particular law of (under)development of Latin America’s capitalism – as 
formulated by important exponents of the dependency school – offered an approach 
to critically consider the notion of development. Along with a general survey on the 
context and main events that gave momentum to a ‘dependency hypothesis’, the 
convergences and dissimilarities between the approach of the dependency school 
and the framework of uneven and combined development are conveyed by means 
of the reconstruction of the debate between Brazilians Fernando H. Cardoso and 
Ruy Mauro Marini.  
 A different but related conceptual sensibility can be found in Argentinean José 
Aricó’s reflections on the misencounter between Marx (and Marxism) and Latin 
America. In his reading of Marx’s ‘symptomatic’ text ‘Bolivar y Ponte’, Aricó 
envisaged more explicitly the misleading paths of an all-too Eurocentric conception 
of development. As a response, he articulated an interpretation framed under the 
conception of the autonomy of the political in order to coming to terms with both 
the seemingly exceptionality of Latin America and the main theoretical 
underpinnings of the 1970s’ crisis of Marxism. Therefore, informed by an acute 
awareness (conceptual and practical) about the need of taking seriously into 
consideration the translational dimension when dealing with the relations between 
Marxist theory and Latin America, Aricó aimed to qualifying the crisis of Marxism 
with the need to incorporate the democratic question within socialist endeavours. 
 Bolivian René Zavaleta Mercado offered an alternative approach to deal with 
both the crisis of Marxist theory and the question of democracy, in a certain way 
similar to Aricó’s, but differently premised and leading to dissimilar conclusions. 
The hetero-temporal condition of capitalism and its crisis, and the problems this 
condition poses for a self-knowledge of the working class, constituted a ubiquitous 
concern of his Marxism. Therefore, the term ‘motley’ (lo abigarrado) – which means 
disjointed, non-combined but nonetheless coexistent – becomes the guiding thread 
of Zavaleta’s reconstruction of the Marxist apparatus for Latin America. From this 
reconstruction, a stimulating epistemological (i.e. related to the possibility of 
proletarian knowledge) as well as political (regarding the conditions for the 
working class’ hegemony) discussion is open for the prospects of socialism in a 
‘backward’ society. Zavaleta incorporated the twofold problem of temporalities and 
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of accumulation of popular memories in the midst of the consideration of the class-
consciousness in conditions of uneven development. The democratic register this 
‘nationalization’ of Marxism adopted, finally, affords a consideration from non-
liberal perspectives, envisaging in my view a horizon of non-homogeneizing, non-
reductive encounters between the working class and an emergent indigeneity.  
 Unlike what the organization of chapters might suggest, this research has 
tried to avoid a merely chronologically-sequential plot. On the contrary, I consider 
that each of these theoretical moments is crisscrossed by a plurality of temporalities 
that channel different memories of rebellion and resistance against both capital and 
its long-lasting colonial matrix. The common guiding-thread can nonetheless be 
identified in the colonial historical background that all these versions of Marxism 
sought to bring to the foreground so as to combat it. Their temporal eventuation, in 
turn, situates us predominantly within the decades of the 1920s, ‘60s and ‘70s. This 
is not fortuitous, since these were the moments in which the ‘crisis of Marxism’ (see 
chapter I) made itself felt at an epistemological level. In pointing out these 
continuities within discontinuity, I try to avoid a teleological emplotment that 
would figure a sequence of different ‘stages’ in Latin American Marxist thought, 
preferring instead to outline a constellation that works like a palimpsest. This, 
however, is not to spatialize history in the attempt to avoid a teleological 
temporality; as it shall become clear in the chapters, the spatial coordinates of these 
elaborations are first and foremost (unevenly and jointly) global, that is, trans-
national, however they have been eventuated within national or regional 
frameworks.   
 As it perhaps could not be otherwise in a continent historically haunted by its 
own uneven-yet-combined development vis-à-vis the Euro-American ‘West’, these 
vernacular Marxisms (however felicitous or satisfactory their specific formulations 
might appear to the reader’s eyes) outline a cartography of uneven and combined 
development for Marxist theory itself. Again, the aim is not to sketch any universal 
pathway of Marxism (however heterodox it may be) along Latin American lines, but 
rather to highlight the specificities of the selected intellectual trajectories, pointing 
further to some of the valences of the uneven-and-combined nature of Marxist 
theory itself (see chapter I). 
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 This research attempts in consequence to provide a processual reconstruction 
of the selected theorizations. By processual reconstruction, I mean a way of thinking 
critically with these works rather than merely from them. That is, to critically think 
from within the intellectual spaces wherein they were configured and the 
problematics they elicited. More particularly, I have chosen to focus onto the 
encounters and misencounters between Marxism and Latin America, hence the 
engagement proposed here has to do first with the conceptual tensions and 
displacements these misencounters have brought about, and second with the 
encounters they produced, or at least envisaged. Thinking on and with theoretical 
encounters and misencounters makes it possible to discern the achievements and 
pitfalls of these vernacular Marxisms.8 As Eduardo Viveiros de Castro argues, the 
transformation and even disfigurement of ‘initial’ contents (languages or theories) is 
inherent to any exercise of cultural translation: equivocations, in his words, are both 
the condition of possibility and the limits of any translational exercise (2004: 5). Put 
differently, equivocations cannot be corrected, even avoided, but only controlled by 
means of a sensible attention to the regimes and processes of translation involved in 
the exercise (see also De la Cadena, 2012: 51). 
 To processually reconstruct some of the conceptual tensions that Latin 
America has posed for Marxist theorizations in the sub-continent means to think 
with the history of encounters and misunderstandings between these terms. This, 
however, does not mean adopting a simple Latin-Americanism, as though the 
reference to the sub-continent’s reality were crystal-clear. Alberto Moreiras has 
advocated in this sense for a subalternist, ‘second-order’ Latin-Americanism, an 
anti-representational apparatus of epistemic disarticulation and disruption: “[i]n 
this sense, Latin Americanism works primarily not as a machine of epistemic 
homogeneization but potentially against it as a disruptive force, or a wrench, in the 
epistemological apparatus, an antidisciplinary instance or Hegelian ‘savage 
beast’[…]” (2001: 33). In my research, however, the idea of an anti-representational 
approach to Latin-Americanism is aimed at contributing to the clarification of some 
                                                          
8  Martin Savransky refers to the productivity of thinking with encounters in the 
following terms: “an en-counter is, in the most general sense, a meeting of heterogeneous 
elements. Thus, it designates, first and foremost, a mode of relationality characterised by the 
contingency of a coming into contact of various forms of mattering or patterns of relevance.” 
(2016: 90) 
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of its organic, symbolic and conceptual relations across ‘national’ formations and 
formulations. Accordingly, this work draws on ‘trans-national’ perspectives and 
hence promotes a renewed sensibility towards trans-cultural tendencies or 
experiences, so as to break up with the barriers posed by methodological 
nationalism, but without falling back neither into essentialist, a-critical regionalisms 
nor the temptations of abstract cosmopolitanisms. 
 
*          *          * 
 
 ‘The Misadventures of Latin American Marxism’, the title of this research, directly 
borrows the gesture of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s famous work Adventures of the 
Dialectic. In the Epilogue to that work, the French Marxist phenomenologist says 
that “[t]here is dialectic only in that type of being in which a junction of subjects 
occurs, being which is not only a spectacle that each subject presents to itself for its 
own benefit but which is rather their common residence, the place of their exchange 
and of their reciprocal interpretation.” (1973: 204) And of misunderstandings, one 
might add, in an effort to also take equivocations and mistranslations into 
consideration. The choice to describe the intellectual journeys selected in this 
research as ‘misadventures’ thus stresses the stubbornness of reality itself, that is, its 
refusal to be subsumed into universal grammars of class struggle.  
 Summarizing, the central aim of this research lies in the visibilization of Latin 
American Marxism as a constellation of ideas (concepts, authors, and currents) 
within Marxist elaborations in the sub-continent; an intellectual constellation that 
finds in the (mis)encounter between Marxist theory and Latin America a pathway to 
contribute to the invigoration of Marxism’s critical scope towards its 
deprovincialization. The themes and results of these formulations will be conducted 
by processual reconstructions of the misencounters and encounters that gave them 
life, so as to grasp them as theoretical events bringing to the forefront the questions 
of Marxism’s crisis, uneven and combined development of capitalism, plural 
temporalities, and the tasks of translation. Benjamin’s conception of constellations – 
timeless and timeliness – affords for a reading of Latin American Marxism also 
capable of informing some present-day emancipatory demands, particularly for the 
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Global South. From the interstices and fissures of the matching between Latin 
America and Marxist theory, the problematic envisaged by the question on ‘Latin 
American Marxism’ might contribute to the decolonization of Marxist theory, that 
is, of what Sartre famously called ‘the unsurpassable horizon of our times’ – times 
that, needless to say, have not as-yet come to an end. 
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I. Conceptual Paths in the Deprovincialization of Marxism 
 
‘In 1921 Vilich [Lenin], in dealing with 
organisational questions, wrote and said 
(more or less) this: we have not been able 
to ‘translate’ our language into those of 
Europe. […] It seems that one may in fact 
say that only in the philosophy of praxis 
is the ‘translation’ organic and 
thoroughgoing, whilst from other 
standpoints is often a simple game of 
generic ‘schematisms’.’ 
Antonio Gramsci, Q 11; §46, 47 
 
1.  On Marxism and its Ongoing Crisis 
Besides the difficulties of bringing together Latin America and Marxism, a sagacious 
reader might ask: ‘But... was not Marx dead, and all of his epigones together with 
him? Was Marxism not already unsustainable as historical explanation, let alone as 
a veritable perspective for popular struggles?’ Certainly, much of the reflection in 
the 1990s and 2000s revolving around the ‘crisis of Marxism’ – be it in 
poststructuralist or postcolonial registers – seemed to suggest so. Marx’s 
hauntology, inaugurated by Derrida ([1993] 2006) and accompanied by the echoes of 
Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ ([1992] 2006; cf. Anderson, 1992) as well as by Laclau 
and Mouffe’s post-Marxism ‘without apologies’ (1987; see also Laclau and Mouffe 
1985), marked an epoch in the contemporary reflections about Marx’s legacy. In the 
aftermath of the collapse of ‘actually-existing socialism’, Marxism’s death-
certificates proliferated in academic circles and mass media alike.9 
 Nonetheless, Marxism has arguably lived or survived in a sort of permanent 
crisis since the very outset. Crisis locates indeed at the very core of the ‘new 
materialism’ opened by Marx and oriented to constantly re-turn to and re-
                                                          
9  The point here is not Derrida’s argument about Marx as ‘spectre’ itself, but rather 
some of its broader intellectual effects. Derrida’s Spectres of Marx remains in my view a 
significant hallmark for (Marxist) reflections about the non-identity of present time or, as 
Althusser put it, the overdetermination of temporalities structuring the present of a 
historical conjuncture. 
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inaugurate its commitment to reality.10 This is, in my view, the heart of his 1845 
theses on Feuerbach, in which Marx proposes that the reality of thought is decided 
practically, not theoretically (Thesis 3),11 and where the dialectic of 
interpretation/transformation indicates that a non-transformative thought 
(concomitant of a passive subjectivity) is always partial, incomplete, and at the end 
of the day false (Thesis 11).12 In these profoundly self-critical statements, Marx 
offered a revolutionary way for ‘philosophy’ to come to terms with ‘the world’ in an 
active, transformative manner, at once mercilessly criticising contemplative 
knowledge (as ‘mere’ speculation) and benefiting from the latter’s truth-contents.   
 Following Stathis Kouvelakis (2008), I conceive Marxism’s ‘crisis’ as a 
conjuncture of self-problematization of its core philosophical premises, principal 
hypotheses and analytical tools. These are moments of controversy internal to 
Marxist theory, conceptual crucibles in which the productivity of the paradigm is 
put on hold and critically judged. In a similar vein, Fredric Jameson relates the most 
intense of these moments (from which there emerged various ‘post-Marxisms’, from 
Bernstein’s to post-structuralist endeavours) to world-historical conjunctures 
marked by profound capitalist reorganizations. Jameson highlights the intrinsic 
relation between capitalism’s inherent contradictions and crises, on the one hand, 
and Marxism as its critical “science”, on the other (1996: 1). The Bolivian theorist 
René Zavaleta Mercado (2013a: 608) asked in 1983 about the appropriateness of 
speak of the ‘crisis’ of an idea (Marxism) that has chosen to exist in such a form, 
making thus clear that crisis is not exceptional but willingly constitutive of Marxist 
theories. Contemporarily to Zavaleta, one of the more synthetic descriptions of this 
‘constitutive’ moment of crisis was provided by Althusser: “[t]his is what also 
                                                          
10  As George Tomlinson puts it, “[i]n his transformation of a distinctly epistemological 
problematic, Marx enables the construction of a concept of practice which moves 
dialectically and unevenly between epistemology and ontology.” (2014: 278) For the 
perspective of the ‘young Marx’, see M. Löwy (2005b) and S. Kouvelakis (2003, ch. 5). For the 
‘late Marx’, see T. Shanin et.al. (1984). For a well-informed and thought-provoking survey on 
Marx’s whole trajectory, considering his continuities as well as discontinuities, see K. 
Anderson (2010).  
11  “The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a 
question of theory but is a practical question. Man [sic] must prove the truth, i.e., the reality 
and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or 
non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.” (Marx, 
in Marx and Engels, 2010c, 5:3 original emphasis). 
12  “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to 
change it.” (Marx, in Marx and Engels, 2010c, 5:5 original emphasis), 
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explains the fecundity of Marxism. Stillborn as philosophy, saved as historical 
genesis of the struggle and formation of classes, its whole destiny plays out in this in-
between.”([1982] 2012 original emphasis)  
 From this perspective, the entire history of Marxism during the 20th century 
has taken the form of an ongoing crisis. This long-lasting ‘internal’ problematization 
involved Bernstein, Kautsky, Luxemburg, Sorel, Labriola and many others during 
the early-twentieth century (in the wake of the turn from national to imperialist 
capitalism); and later Lukàcs, Korsch, Mariátegui, Bloch and Gramsci, to name only 
some of the most prominent figures. This status of Marxism was once again 
actualized by Althusser at the end of the 1970s, in the moment of constitution of a 
world-system under the hegemony of multinational corporations. In such a context, 
Althusser provided the contours of a crisis that continues up until our present, post-
actually-existing socialist times. Undoubtedly, the collapse of Soviet bloc has 
contributed to open the field for novel and renewing approaches to ‘actually-
existing capitalism’, released (at least partially or potentially) from the ubiquitous 
presence of a congealed, well-established ‘orthodoxy’, the one Marcuse (1961) called 
‘Soviet Marxism’ and which is broadly identified under the label of Stalinism. 
 In the present conjuncture, it seems to me productive to engage in new 
readings of the heterogeneous Marxist tradition, so as to display the tensions 
constitutive of its alleged doxa. Within the Marxist tradition, similar self-critical 
exercises have often taken the form of a return to some departure-point (be it Marx 
and Engels themselves, Hegel and the Hegelian dialectic as Marxism’s problematic 
background, or Lenin and/or any of the assorted ‘Leninisms’) in order to re-cognize 
what the outcomes and pitfalls of such an intellectual tradition have to teach us for 
present-day demands. In my case, I have chosen to focus on Latin American 
Marxism as an intellectual constellation which (I hope my work helps make visible) 
was traversed by a shared set of questions and perspectives built in permanent 
dialogue with formulations and debates occurring in other sites of the continent and 
the world.  
 Latin American Marxism will be delineated in this work as an intellectual 
constellation – more than as a self-evident tradition – within Marxist debates and 
conceptualizations. The claim for the existence of such geographically-based 
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intellectual tradition is of course troublesome in itself – just like the label of ‘Western 
Marxism’ popularized by Perry Anderson. Anderson (1976a: 1) identifies Western 
Marxism as a “common intellectual tradition”. What I find particularly disquieting 
(and symptomatic) is the unproblematic consideration of the West as identical to 
itself. This is apparent in the treatment of this tradition of thought. When did 
Gyorgy Lukàcs become a distinctive ‘Western’ thinker? Did not Althusser and most 
of his generation draw heavily upon Mao-TseTung and the ‘cultural revolution’, just 
like Sartre did upon Fanon’s anti-colonialism? Was not C.L.R. James a ‘Western’ 
Marxist? If we consider the West as the projected existence of a (modern/colonial) 
centre, in this case of Marxist theory, then a renewed Marxism cannot but recognize 
the locus of power implied in such sort of accounts. However, leaving aside the 
pertinence of some of the readings of the authors dealt with in his account, 
Anderson’s work is important in what, in my view, remains its best achievement: 
the critical reading of a ‘provincial’ version of Marxism. The next step further, the 
deprovincialization of that version of Marxism, is the lost step in his reflections (see 
Harootunian, 2015, Introduction).  
  
2. Towards a Subalternist Hypothesis  
The focus of this research is posed on a ‘provincial’ version of Marxism to contribute 
to the dialogue between putative centres and peripheries within Marxist theory. In 
doing so, I propose to bring to the fore some of the reflections set up by the so-called 
‘postcolonial reason’ in order to clarify what, in my view, is an important dimension 
of the ongoing crisis of Marxism in vast areas of the Global South. Varieties of 
Marxisms – political movements as well as forms of intellectual and theoretical 
resistance (cf. Jameson, 1996: 3) – seem to have developed through similarly 
overdetermined processes in South-Eastern Asia and Latin America. Two 
determinations were in my view crucial in these processes. On the one hand, there 
are those nationalist movements sprung up in most of the then-called ‘Third world’ 
(now Global South) during the twentieth century. On the other, the rapid processes 
of ‘bolshevization’ (a catch-name for Stalinization) of the Communist parties in 
these regions. The latter transformed to an important extent many of these 
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organizations into satellites for the USSR's foreign policies, helping thus to 
disseminate a particular version of dialectical and historical materialism.  
 With significant exceptions, the official ideology of international Communism 
in the Global South was by and large built upon a reduction of the dimensions of 
class struggle to a rigid concept of ‘class’ as an economic subject framed into a pre-
determined, linear conception of ‘national’ development. Stalin’s 1925 decree of 
‘socialism in one country’ as the URSS state-policy certainly contributed to reinforce 
such stage-based ideology of national modernization from feudal to capitalist to 
socialist. For the Latin American case, Löwy points out that the first significant 
polemic within communist organizations revolved around the “nature of the 
revolution”: bourgeois-democratic or socialist (1992: xiv–xv). From the viewpoint of 
official Marxism, a Latin American revolution ought first to accomplish the 
bourgeois and democratic tasks as well as to allow for the consolidation of capitalist 
productive structures. Along similar lines, the Subaltern Studies can be recognized 
by the intense criticism of the predominance of nationalist agendas in bourgeois as 
well as Marxist historiographies of India. In particular, Ranajit Guha famously 
confronted Eric Hobsbawm’s definition of non-capitalist, traditional forms of 
discontent such as social banditry as “pre-political” (Hobsbawm 1999: 5). The Indian 
historian, in turn, read this indication as the pre-supposition of a predominant 
class/nation developmental axis in which the proletariat assumes the role of 
prototype of a ‘national’ class. In other words, Hobsbawm’s definition of ‘pre-
political’ (i.e., devoid of ideology, organization and programme) makes apparent 
the all-too Western division-line that configures the modern political reason. In 
doing this – Guha concluded – Marxist historiography colludes in colonial 
commitments with nationalist-elite historical accounts. Such a criticism inaugurated 
a line of reflection which, by searching for a reading of history ‘against the grain’, 
could free historical accounts of subaltern movements from the modernization 
templates and national narratives that furnished leftist policies during the last 
century.13  
                                                          
13  Guha differentiates between ‘elites’ striving for the building of the colonial state (and 
thus writing state’s history) and ‘the people’ –the subalterns– defined in terms of the 
“demographic difference” (1982: 8) from the latter. For a survey of the displacement from the 
Gramscian category of ‘subalternity’ as relational, historic qualifier adjective, to 
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 Two decades after Guha's intervention, Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing 
Europe brought the subalternist argument forward to a further level. In a reading of 
Marx’s Grundrisse highly informed by Althusser and Toni Negri, yet complemented 
by a Heideggerian lens,14 the author establishes that two different temporalities play 
out in post-colonial capitalism. He distinguishes between living labour or labour-
for-itself and abstract labour or labour-for-capital, each of which pertains to 
irreducible manners of temporalizing history. Therefore, he proposes to distinguish 
History 1 or “history posed by capital”, on the one hand, and History 2 or “histories 
that do not belong to capital’s life process”, on the other (Chakrabarty, 2000: 50) This 
is perhaps an idiosyncratic way to say that there are structures necessaries for 
capital’s reproduction while other are not, as Vivek Chibber (2012: 225) argues. 
Nonetheless, Chakrabarty’s argument is more concerned to identifying the traces of 
a model somehow internal to History 1 in Marx’s own discourse, so that Marxist 
theory is criticized for its commitment to capital’s structure of temporalization and 
historicization. In doing so, Chakrabarty orients his criticism towards the collusion 
of Marxism’s hegemonic version with a conception of history that pertains to the 
dominant classes – namely, historicism.  
 Historicism is defined by Chakrabarty as “the idea that to understand 
anything it has to be seen both as a unity and in its historical development”; from 
this idea derives the projection of a modernity that occurred “first in the West, and 
then elsewhere”, by a process of diffusion and spreading of modes of relationship 
and beliefs that are originally Western (2000: 6). This is what Johannes Fabian, 
discussing the case of anthropology, called “the denial of coevalness” or 
“allochronism”, the operation through which spatiotemporal distance functions as 
an epistemological dispositif of otherness and subalternization. But it is also akin to 
the notion of historicism that Benjamin saw as the main polemical target of the 
materialist historian, for instance, in his notes entitled ‘Paralipomena to “On the 
Concept of History”’: “A conception of history that has liberated itself from the 
schema of progression within an empty and homogeneous time would finally 
                                                                                                                                                                    
‘subalternism’ as a noun or condition, see M. Modonesi (2014: 30). For an insightful re-
reading of the ‘pre-political’ in the Hobsbawm-Guha debate, see A. Toscano (2010: 44–57).  
14  Chakrabarty turns to Heidegger’s notions of ‘fragmentariness’ and ‘not-yet’ in order 
to “find a home for post-Enlightenment rationalism in the histories of Bengali belonging” 
(2000: 21–22). 
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unleash the destructive energies of historical materialism which have been held 
back for so long.” (1996a: 406) Sharing none of his revolutionary urgencies, 
Chakrabarty (2000: 23) recalls Benjamin’s historicism so as to couple the critique of 
‘progress’ with the critique of ‘development’. 
 Chakrabarty contributes significantly to identifying the complicities among 
capital, nation-state narratives, and the teleological version of Marxism 
predominant in vast areas of the Global South. More specifically, from his 
contribution it is possible to problematize the existence of different structures of 
temporality enmeshed in those zones of the world where capital’s subsumption or 
annihilation of traditional ways of worlding remains incomplete. Conversely, the 
interpellation-effects of historicism (“[t]hat was what historicist consciousness was: 
a recommendation to the colonized to wait”, 2000: 8) rings particularly loud in the 
memory of Latin American settle of accounts with its own ‘orthodox Marxisms’. The 
‘first in the West, then elsewhere’ that characterizes capital’s imperial grammars 
(historicism in Chakrabarty) and was adopted by nationalist agendas, was 
mimicked and hence reinforced by Marxist ideology of a stage-led historical course 
from pre-capitalist to capitalist (and eventually, to post-capitalist) phases.  
 I find it productive to re-initiate the (critical) dialogue with those ‘History 2s’ 
that remain partially enclosed in subaltern traditions of resistance and struggle, 
traditions coeval to national formations and imperial or multinational powers. In 
this sense, the value of Chakrabarty’s insights does not rest so much in the accuracy 
of his conceptual formulations but in his resistance to the subsumption of subaltern 
ways of worlding and worldviews into a narrative of national edification and 
integration. What, in other words, becomes visible in his reflections is the necessity 
to bring to the fore the decolonization of knowledge from the prison-house of 
capitalist, putatively Western temporalization of life, as an ineluctable task for our 
times -a task which, in turn, demands piecemeal critical reconsiderations of the 
narrative of development and progress entailed in both national and Marxist 
narratives. John Kraniauskas refers to the task envisaged by the subalternist 
perspective in terms of the “disjunctural critique of the total apparatus of 
development” (2005: 54). This is what I will call from now on ‘subalternist 
hypothesis’. 
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 In my view, one of the dimensions of the current crisis of Marxism, at least in 
the Global South, rests on the dead weights that its formation as a variety of 
development or modernization theory imprinted in the popular grammars of these 
peoples. What arguably framed both nationalism and ‘orthodox’ Marxism in vast 
areas of the periphery was a development narrative built upon the lines of capitalist 
modernization processes; a narrative in which non-capitalist social elements were 
considered archaic, backward, hence predestined to be left behind. Of course, it was 
not only a narrative, but a whole set of policies, mobilizations of resources and 
ideologies. The emphasis on the narrative aspect is intended to highlight the 
ideological moment, that is, the crystallization of an image of historical 
development in the ‘consciousness’ of the working and other popular classes – or in 
what we might call, following Gramsci, the ‘grammar’ of the subalterns (more on 
this below).  
 Inscribing this research in the perspective of Marxism’s deprovincialization, 
my recourse to a ‘subalternist hypothesis’ searches to retain the tensions between 
History 1 – capital’s tempo, historicism – and the fragmentary, disjointed set of 
worlding practices and worldviews implicated in History 2 – temporalities 
subaltern to capital, that is, but not essentially different nor irreducible to other than 
themselves. In doing so, I follow the works that have attempted a critical but 
productive engagement between Marxism and postcolonial inquires.15 Harry 
Harootunian says in this regard that “[d]eprovincializing Marx entails not simply an 
expanded geographic inclusion but a broadening of temporal possibilities unchained from 
a hegemonic unlinearism.” (2015: 2 emphasis added) It is a unilinearism shared by 
various self-declared revolutionary nationalisms as well as orthodox Marxisms. I 
agree with Neil Larsen when he indicates that postcolonial perspectives make “one 
step forward” in identifying this ideological complicity as a critical node of 
emancipator ideologies in the Global South; and – Larsen goes on – these 
perspectives make “two steps back” when the critique conspicuously avoids class-
analysis (2001: 35). The problem, however, seems to me to be precisely whether 
                                                          
15  See for example C. Bartolovich and N. Lazarus eds. (2002); B. Parry (2004); J. 
Kraniauskas (2000, 2005), N. Lazarus and R. Varma (2008); K. Linder (2010). 
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Marxism is still able to offer a non-reductionist and non-deterministic framework 
for the sort of class-analysis needed today.16  
 I propose to seize upon the notion of ‘subaltern’ to give account of the ways of 
worlding, worldviews and structures of temporality whereby a class becomes – or 
not – a distinctive socio-political subject. As the condensation of social (hence 
historical) relations at a highly overdetermined level, a class might be understood as 
shaped by multi-layered experiences of proletarianization and de-
proletarianization, of subalternization, resistance and antagonism (and eventually, 
autonomy) to capital’s rule. This is especially so in the less-favoured areas 
composing the uneven-and-combined developmental landscape of capitalism at a 
world scale, and composes what I figure as hetero-temporal conjunctures through 
which class-struggle is conducted. 
 In what could seem at first glance as a mere coincidence, Harootunian (2015: 
115ff) points out in this regard the contemporaneity of Gramsci’s The Southern 
Question and Mariátegui’s Seven Interpretive Essays, two works in which the 
problems of subalternity were unfolded under the frame of the ‘national question’. 
Having the conceptual coincidences between these two authors been profusely 
analyzed by Mariateguista scholars (see next chapter), this semblance is also 
indicative of the presence of a hypothesis that, within Marxism, has worked to 
destabilize and re-think the Marxist concept of class itself, from the standpoint and 
conditions of the Global South. As the next chapter addresses, the consideration of 
the North-South division proposed by these Marxist intellectuals invites to 
reconsider the geopolitical dynamics of capital under imperialism; at the same time, 
it projects Marxist theory beyond fetishistic formulations ingrained in Eurocentric 
premises, envisaging the conception of a plurality of different temporalities coming 
                                                          
16  I tend to agree with James Martin when, commenting on Marx’s ‘Eighteenth 
Brumaire’, he states that “[t]he problem with class analysis lies in its abstract and reductive 
character. Whilst it is possible to abstractly identify different class positions in relation to a 
capitalist economy, any concrete analysis has to take into account a wider variety of social 
forces that do not easily fall into a ‘proletarian’ or ‘bourgeois’ camp. […] This is not to say 
that ‘class’ is not at times a useful shorthand for a variety of phenomena. But it is an 
imprecise shorthand and fails to fully grasp the character of different social identities and 
antagonisms. Few post-Marxists would deny the class divided character of capitalism. But to 
say that classes are the major social forces upon which the entirety of society is built is a 
different matter altogether. […] We may classify the distribution of certain of the benefits 
and losses of capitalism in terms of classes but this does not make an automatic case for 
political agency.” (2002: 133). 
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together and pressing upon the current situation. Harootunian concludes that, from 
Gramsci and Mariátegui, the idea of a ‘South’ functions less as a geographical 
location of backwardness or belatedness and more as a particular temporal register, 
or set of registers of different nature. In this sense, the appellation to the Global 
South in this thesis is intrinsically tied to the idea of hetero-temporality that 
characterizes capitalist modernity.  
   
3. Marx and the Critique of Capital’s Tempo  
What seems to me at stake in most postcolonial arguments is the misrecognition of 
the fact that Marxism is and has been, at least to a certain extent, an intellectual 
tradition committed to a critique of capital’s temporality and its modes of 
historicization. However, as Althusser recognized as early as in 1965, this topic has 
not been clearly articulated, and sometimes not even fully acknowledged as a 
conceptual problem (cf. Althusser, 2009 Part II. 4). Perhaps one of the most 
accomplished among poststructuralist and postcolonial endeavours has been the 
deconstruction of the conception of a linear, homogeneous time, a mirror-
conception for the ideological time of capital. However, similar procedures can be 
found as earlier as the young Marx, for instance in his reflections on the economic 
and political backwardness but nonetheless philosophical coevalness of Germany, 
when compared to ‘advanced’ England (economically) and France (politically) –that 
is, the first ‘Marxist’ ruminations on the multiple character constituent of modern 
temporality. In the ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. 
Introduction’, of 1843, Marx stated that “Germans have gone through our 
posthistory in thought, in philosophy. We are philosophical contemporaries of the 
present without being its historical contemporaries.” (Marx and Engels, 2010b, 
3:180)  
 Furthermore, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ affords a critical 
reading of the different and uneven structures of temporality that, in their disjointed 
interaction, overdetermined the political conjuncture of post-1848 France, leading to 
the ascension of Napoleon III to power. A conjuncture in which the capitalist order 
appeals to the past (to Napoleon, that is, by means of his farcical projection onto his 
nephew Luis Bonaparte) in order to secure the present and prevent it from its own 
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(proletarian) future. As Massimiliano Tomba puts it, the great innovation of this text 
rests on “the duplication of historiographic registers. Instead of relegating the 
tradition into the past, [Marx] grasped its specific temporality as the past-present.” 
(2013: 43–4) In a similar vein, Bob Jessop argues that perdiodizations and 
chronologies are of different nature:  
[W]hereas a chronology orders actions, events, or periods on a single 
unilinear time scale, a periodisation operates with several time scales. 
Thus the Eighteenth Brumaire is replete with references to intersecting 
and overlapping time horizons, to unintended as well as self-conscious 
repetitions, to dramatic reversals and forced retreats as well as 
surprising turnarounds and forward advances, and to actions and 
events whose true significance would only emerge in the ensuing train 
of events. (2002: 184) 
The main temporalities clashing here are, on the one hand, the conservative-
revolutionary temporality represented by the bourgeoisie alongside the peasants 
(anxious to hold land titles), or ‘temporality of hoarding’, on the one hand, and the 
suspended proletarian-revolutionary temporality of moving-forward self-criticism, 
or ‘temporality of distillation’, on the other.17 The absent subject of this story 
narrated by Marx – the working class– lurks ubiquitously behind the scene, just 
because what is being confronted in this text is the history made against the class-
struggle as aroused in 1847-1848. The Second Empire thereby becomes the spectral, 
phantasmagorical (Tomba 2013, ch. 3) stage in which class-struggle – along with the 
disjointed temporalities that determine it – is (farcically) represented.  
  To break with the bourgeois conception of history was therefore at the centre 
of Marx’s intellectual concerns. As Massimiliano Tomba (2013, 55) explains it, Marx 
“reasons with a plural semantics of history: he counterposes a notion of history 
marked with fractures to the history of continuum. This contraposition is political: it 
grows out of the search for a revolution capable of interrupting that continuum.” In 
turn, Daniel Bensaïd (2009: 80, 77) recognizes that Marx’s Capital is nothing but an 
                                                          
17   Of course, this aggregation implies a complex set of tempralization partially 
converging in a determinate conjuncture. I’m borrowing Amy Wendling’s (2003) 
terminology of ‘hoarding’ and ‘distilling’ to speak of the two main temporalities at stake in 
Marx’s text.  
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exploration into the pluralization of duration through a critique of capital-time. 
According to his reading of Marx’s magnum opus, ‘capital’ appears as a specific and 
contradictory organization of social time based on the appropriation of surplus-
value, that is, non-remunerated work-time. Along the volumes of Capital, Marx’s 
account goes from the mechanical-linear time of production (volume 1) to the 
chemical-cyclical time of circulation (volume 2) to the organic time of reproduction 
(volume 3), the latter permanently menaced by the disruptive-yet-constitutive time 
of crisis. “Marx”, Bensaïd concludes, “deconstructs the notion of universal history” 
rather than reinforces it. And what emerges from the ruins of universal history “is a 
rhythmology of capital” (2009: 32, 35). A rhythmology that, as Tomba points out, is 
not a “mosaic of temporalities” insofar as they do not dwell indifferently to one 
another; rather, “the real problem is their combination by means of the world-
market’s mechanisms of synchronisation.” (2013: xiv) 
 I draw upon Tomba’s notion of synchronization, which itself draws on Ernst 
Bloch’s account of non-contemporaneity and its dialectic, in order to identify the 
structural18 instance in which different, uneven and combined temporalities 
incorporated into the capitalist world market –where the foremost ‘synchronizer’ is 
the law of value. Bloch termed ‘multi-level dialectics’ the methodical recognition of 
contradictions that are synchronous –roughly, capital against living labour– as well 
as non-synchronous ones –capitalism against intermediate elements or ‘remnants’. 
The source of non-synchronous contradictions “is a past which, in places, is not only 
not past in terms of classes, but not even completely redeemed materially” (1977: 
35). Existing along the lines of the synchronous contradiction, those non-
synchronous elements may be driven against either the bourgeoisie or the 
proletariat; the prospect of a proletariat hegemony, therefore, “cannot be managed, 
especially if the hegemony is to be undiluted and secure, unless dialectics also 
thoroughly ‘masters’ the material of nonsynchrononism and its heterogeneous 
contradiction.” To ‘master’ non-synchronicity means, for Bloch, to posses it “in the 
actual heritage of its ends in the Now”, that is, to gain “additional revolutionary 
                                                          
18  I follow here Peter Osborne’s (2015) critical remarks on Tomba’s work. According to 
Osborne, the key caveat to bear in mind when using Bloch’s categories lies in the conceptual 
distinction between the axes of synchronous/non-synchronous (‘structural’ differences of 
temporalities, which is Tomba’s framework), simultaneous/non-simultaneous (rather a 
chronological organizer), and contemporaneous/non-contemporaneous (which corresponds 
to a complex and multi-layered register of the temporal matrix).  
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force from the incomplete wealth of the past, especially if it is not ‘sublated’ in the 
last stage.” (1977: 36, 38) 
 In turn, in Tomba’s argument “capital organises and synchronises different 
temporalities according to the dominant temporality of socially-necessary labour 
time.” (2015: 84, original emphasis) This does not imply the complete subsumption 
of non-capitalist temporalities, but undoubtedly remains a violent form of 
imposition: “the indifferent sociality of abstract labour destroys the previous 
community-relations and the multiplicity of the differences between the particular 
spheres of society, producing a new, radical difference: that between capital and wage 
labour.” (Tomba, 2009: 51) Thus, the violence of what Marx called original or 
primitive accumulation – i.e. homogeneization of populations through 
dispossession – prepares the ground for the rule of the law of value as ‘economic’ 
synchronizer at the level of the world market.  
 Tomba also recognizes a second, extra-economic synchronizer in the nation-
state form; insofar as the value of the socially-necessary labour time is not a given 
but its determination “contains a historical and moral element” (Marx, 1976: 275), 
the more concrete dimension in which capital organizes itself to confront class-
struggle is the nation-state. State ‘extra-economic’ violence, in his view, is the way to 
synchronize the contingent combination of different temporalities “in order to 
produce differentials of surplus value”, and hence to concur to the market’s 
competition so as “to be synchronised to the world-rhythm of socially-necessary 
labour.” (Tomba, 2009: 56). 
 Last but not least, there are the texts (reading notebooks, letters or letter drafts, 
editorial sheets, and the like) written by Marx in the last decade of his prolific life, 
that is, between the defeat of the Paris Commune in 1871 and his own death in 1883. 
By and large unpublished during Marx’s lifetime, they are perhaps the writings in 
which the non-linear conception of development he achieved throughout his work 
is exposed in a more definite form. These texts show the increasing concern with the 
agrarian commune in general, and particularly the Russian obschina. As we will see 
in this research, these texts have been of enormous significance for Latin American 
Marxism, for instance in the surprisingly similar perspective displayed by 
Mariátegui, even when the latter could not be aware of these texts’ existence; or the 
work made by Aricó on this ‘fragmentary’ part of Marx’s work. Regarding the 
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evolutionary possibilities of development for such a communal form, Marx wrote 
(in the Third Draft, never submitted, of his ‘Reply Letter’ to Russian Nardonik Vera 
Zasulich) that it  
occupies a unique situation without any precedent in history. Alone in 
Europe, it is still the organic, predominant form of rural life in a vast 
empire. Communal land ownership offers it the natural basis for 
collective appropriation, and its historical context –the contemporaneity 
of capitalist production- provides it with the ready-made material 
conditions for large-scale co-operative labour organised on a large scale. 
It may therefore incorporate the positive achievements developed by the 
capitalist system, without having to pass under its harsh tribute [...] it 
may become the direct starting-point of the economic system towards 
which modern society is tending; it may open a new chapter that does 
not begin with its own suicide. (1983: 121).  
According to Marx (1983: 124), the destiny of the Russian community was not 
written in the stars; just as it had been the product of specific historical conditions 
and constraints, its future depended on its ongoing success in resisting the 
challenges of a present increasingly characterized by the alliance of large 
landowning and capital. The acknowledgment of the non-inevitability of the ‘harsh 
tributes’ that capitalist development imposes to the prospects of a post-capitalist 
production advances a multilinear perspective on the basis of which the late Marx 
considered the increasingly global capitalist structure in its uneven (multi-layered) 
and combined (coeval) contradictory modes of operation.  
 This brief survey shows that Marx’s original contributions were far from a 
mere unilinear conception of historical time, although of course one could find 
instances of such unilinearism, in the Communist Manifesto as well as other texts 
written by him or co-authored by Engels. The reduction of Marx’s perspective to a 
set of sequential stages led by deterministic forces was grounded in the pervasive 
Eurocentrism of the socialist movement’s politics and worldviews. Insofar as his 
analysis of capital and capitalism became more and more complex, Marx’s image of 
modernity appears as a force-field in which different structures of temporalization 
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are tendentially subsumed by capital’s, as the latter’s pace goes on covering the 
entire world.  
 
4. The Uneven and Combined Development of Capitalist Modernity 
To recall once again Bensaïd’s elegant formulation of the point: from the ruins of 
universal history, what emerges is the rhythmology of capital –and, along with it, of 
its ‘counter-times’. To unveil capital’s self-narrative of progress and development is 
a crucial moment of the critique to capital, a moment in which the nature of 
capitalist accumulation, production and reproduction is revealed as the source of 
unevenness and asynchronies. This criticism opens in turn the analysis towards the 
intersection of different temporalities in permanent tension, negotiation, and 
resistance, to be subsumed by capital-in-development. As Perry Anderson argued, 
modernity itself is no other than an overdetermined configuration at the intersection 
of different historical temporalities (1984: 104). Dialoguing with this and other 
formulations about the subject, Peter Osborne adds that the concept of modernity, in 
both its philosophical discourse (e.g., Habermas’) and as structure of historical 
consciousness, is founded on the colonial experience; in Osborne’s words, 
it was through the temporalization of the founding geopolitical 
difference of colonialism that the concept of modernity first came to be 
universalized, and thereby, thereafter, to subordinate the differential 
between itself and other ‘times’ to differences within a single temporal 
scheme of 'progress', ‘modernization’ and ‘development’. (1995: 21)  
The considerations on Marx’s criticism of capital tempo, its structures of historical 
consciousness, and the colonial matrix from which it derives, seems close to the 
framework of uneven and combined development, as well as to the subaltern 
hypothesis. In this regard, I draw upon Gramsci’s ruminations on subalternity in the 
Prison Notebooks. In Quaderni 3, the heading of §14 reads ‘Storia della classe 
dominante e storia della classi subalterne’. The first feature worth noticing here lies 
in the declared relationship of both histories, and thereby the concomitant nature of 
the categories of ‘subaltern classes’ and ‘dominant class’. The second refers to the 
plurality implicated in the notion of subaltern, as Gramsci explains:  
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The historical unity of the ruling classes is realised in the State, and their 
history is essentially the history of States and of groups of States. [...] The 
subaltern classes, by definition, are not unified and cannot unite until 
they are able to become a ‘State’: their history, therefore, is intertwined 
with that of civil society, and thereby with the history of the States and 
groups of States. [...] The history of subaltern social groups is necessarily 
fragmented and episodic. (2003: 52, 54–5) 
In this passage, Gramsci highlights the heterogeneity and fragmentariness of 
subaltern classes’ history. One could say, first, that the only possible unity for the 
subaltern classes is a negative one, that is, a unity built along the lines of the 
dominants, of the actual ‘state’. But, second, he characterizes the (plural) history of 
subaltern classes as ‘intertwined with’ the history of civil society and through it with 
the international scenario of States’ relations.19 Gramsci indicates, on the one hand, 
that the ‘national’ character of subaltern groups is framed under the ruling classes’ 
unity, in the form of a civil society that corresponds to the unity of a determinate 
state. At the same time, on the other, the ‘international’ stage is incorporated as a 
determinate dimension interplaying within the dynamics of such national society.  
 Elsewhere, in a telling fragment-passage on the ‘History of subaltern classes’ 
(Q 7, § 51), Gramsci interrogates the importance of the racial and colonial question 
in the process of ‘nationalization’ undergone by subaltern classes in France: “[t]he 
element of racial conflict that Thierry inserted into class conflict in France: what 
importance has it had, if any, in France, in determining the nationalistic bent of 
subaltern class movements?” (2011: 197) What this question introduces is the 
concern by the incorporation of the international (e.g., the colonial) into the analysis 
of the national class configurations and class-struggles, the manner and magnitude 
by which the uneven and combined structures of the international setting intervene 
in the formation of ‘national’ classes. I suggest here, in other words, that Gramsci’s 
notion of subalternity demarcates the ‘national’ character of the latter in the dialectic 
of domination and subalternization while, conversely, it brings the ‘international’ or 
                                                          
19  ‘Thereby’ is a rather ambiguous translation for Gramsci’s locution ‘per questa via’ (cf. 
Gramsci 1977b: 2288), which can be more emphatically rendered as ‘in this way’ or ‘through 
which’.  
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inter-state configuration into the picture, as a determinate dynamic factor of the 
‘national’ itself (more on this below).  
 In Quaderni 14, §68, Gramsci returned to the national/international problem 
pointing to one of the main polemics of international communism at that time: the 
possibility of socialism ‘in one country’, as proclaimed by Stalin in 1925 and 
confronted by Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution. According to Gramsci: 
The problem which seems to me to need further elaboration is the 
following: how, according to the philosophy of praxis [...] the 
international situation should be considered in its national aspect. [...] To 
be sure, the line of development is towards internationalism, but the 
point of departure is ‘national’ –and it is from this point of departure 
that one must begin. Yet the perspective is international and cannot be 
otherwise. (2003: 240) 
Recognizing the uniqueness of every ‘national’ configuration (i.e., the particular set 
of dynamics of domination/subalternization) and hence the theoretical and political 
necessity for Marxism to methodologically take it up as departure point, Gramsci 
nonetheless sketched a conception of subalternity that advocates for an international 
perspective. Commenting on this passage, Peter Thomas concludes that Gramsci’s 
“concept of [proletarian] hegemony is the concrete nationalisation of the 
international perspective –which can only be considered concretely in its ‘national’ 
aspect” (2010: 216). All of which seems closely related to the framework of uneven 
and combined development, though Gramsci explicitly questions the ‘political’ side 
of this idea (as formulated by Trotsky in terms of the ‘permanent revolution’) as an 
adequate strategy for proletarian hegemony in the ‘West’. Thomas points out that 
the notion of ‘West’ (like its counterpart, ‘East’) appears in Gramsci not as a fixed 
geographical location but as a complex dialectic between centres and peripheries, in 
which the (absent) place of the West denotes the domain of a robust civil society 
built up by a hegemonic bloc.20 Therefore, when considered in light of Gramsci’s 
                                                          
20  Particularly contesting Perry Anderson’s well-known reading of Gramsci (cf. P. 
Anderson, 1976b), Thomas affirms that “[r]ather than a geopolitical division of the globe into 
qualitatively different historical times, the Prison Notebooks propose the much more difficult 
task of measuring the interpellation by a ‘potential future in the present’ of the ‘pasts in the 
present’; that is, the dominance by one particular present social formation of other social 
formations, a dominant present that threatens to become, at varying degrees of mediation 
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reflections on the subaltern elsewhere (for example, in the concluding passages of 
‘Some Aspects on the Southern Question’, or in the idea of ‘passive revolution’ as 
historical analysis of the Risorgimento in Italy), these methodological remarks on the 
dialectic of domination and subalternity characterizing a ‘national’ configuration 
indicate the need to incorporate the ‘international’ perspective into account.21  
 Despite the well-known animosity of Gramsci towards Trotsky,22 I find it 
productive to read Gramsci as participant of the perspective of uneven and 
combined development. (The perspective itself, of course, has little ‘Trotskyist’ 
about it apart from the primeval formulation given by the Russian Marxist.23) 
Furthermore, recent re-elaborations on the categories of unevenness, combination 
and development can invigorate the historical-materialist attempt to come to terms 
with question of the temporalities and dynamics of subalternization/resistance 
identified –among others– by postcolonial reflections. At the same time, such a 
renewing perspective (since not a theory)24 might also contribute to undermine the 
anxious Western-centrism that characterizes both Eurocentric and postcolonial 
accounts. As Justin Rosenberg (2007: 459) puts it, the notion allows for a 
“reconstellation and reactivation” of the analysis of the geopolitical dimensions of 
accumulation with those of capital’s “laws”, thus making possible the incorporation 
into analysis of abstract tendencies and concrete outcomes.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
and in more or less pure forms, the future of the others. Against all stageism, Gramsci 
proposes that it is the historically more ‘advanced’ centres that allow us to understand the 
‘delayed’ developments in their peripheries. West and East are comparable, just as variations 
in the West itself, because both participate in the dynamic of an expansive political and 
economic order that is fundamentally and essentially internationalist in character.” (2010: 
203). 
21  Actually, Gramsci’s conclusion on the out-of-date nature of the strategy of ‘permanent 
revolution’ in the West was totally informed by a consideration of the ‘modern/colonial’ 
setting: “in the period after 1870, with the colonial expansion of Europe [...][t]he internal and 
international organisational relations of the State become more complex and massive, and the Forty-
Eightist formula of the ‘Permanent Revolution’ is expanded and superseded in political 
science by the formula of ‘civil hegemony’.” (2003: 243, emphasis added). 
22  However, for a less taxative and more comprehensive account on this animosity, see 
P. Thomas (2010: 206). 
23  For a seminal reconstruction (from Marx and Engels to Lenin and Trotsky) of the first 
delineations of the idea of uneven and combined development as imbricated with the 
strategy of ‘permanent revolution’, see M. Löwy (1981). 
24  Anievas and Nişancıoğlu define uneven and combined development as a 
“‘progressive problem-shift’ –within the broader research programme of historical 
materialism.” (2015: 61). 
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 The framework of uneven and combined development implies a rejection of 
stageist conceptions of historical development, by means of the incorporation of the 
world-structure of unevenness as a determinate feature of the social. ‘Society’ is not 
any longer simply understood as a process within an isolated country:  historical 
capitalism is considered as an uneven and combined world structure. As Alexander 
Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu stress, the category of unevenness “posits 
developmental variations both within and between societies, along with the 
attendant spatial differentiations between them.” (2015: 44) It is a conceptual 
descriptor allowing an account of the non-homogeneous manner of totalization of 
capitalist development; capital’s totalization, that is, is inherently uneven. 
Conversely, combination “refers to the ways in which the internal relations of any 
given society are determined by their interactive relations with other 
developmentally differentiated societies”, so that those ‘internal’ structures 
(practices, ideologies, institutions) are always a particular crystallisation of historical 
interactions between “the native and foreign, the ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’” (2015: 
48). In turn, Rosenberg says that uneven and combined development has been 
transformed from a general (e.g. Trotsky’s) into a concrete abstraction, in a mutation 
“from the descriptive factor about human diversity into an active causal structure of 
determinations and pressures.” (2007: 456)  
 The perspective of uneven and combined development makes it possible to 
come to terms with the contemporaneousness of the backward and the advanced, 
the archaic and the modern, that is, of their entanglement in the formation of a 
concrete, ‘national’ reality. It proposes a conception of development as a matter of 
relative comparison, in which the moment of comparability becomes internal to the 
analysis of discrete historical situations. It is hence compatible with the 
consideration of modernity as a universalizing structure of temporalization 
(capital’s) whose outcomes are not homogeneous and linearly determined, but 
uneven, combined and convoluted.  
 Rosenberg provides, in this respect, an insightful redefinition of 
‘development’ informed by unevenness and combination: “in the novel sense of the 
[capitalist] unending techno-scientific rationalization of production [development] 
now becomes, for the first time, a geographically universal imperative of human 
societies, mediated by the abstract universal language of exchange-value, within an 
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empirically universalizing social structure: the world market.” (2007: 456) Of course, 
the imperative of development as the geographically-based demand of capitalism is 
Western-centred, to the extent that the West continues to signal the normative path 
of progress and future. The narrative of development is thus the ‘hegemonic’ 
narrative of capital based on the actuality of its (abstract –but in terms of ‘real 
abstractions’–25 and empirical) universalizing tendencies, tendencies so violent that 
either annihilate, subsume, or become openly confronted by other-than-capital ways 
of worlding, worldviews, and temporal densities.  
 The framework of uneven and combined development provides in my view a 
stimulating momentum to the theoretical sensibility towards the modern-as-
colonial, that is, the Janus-faced global expansion of capitalism in which the 
temporality of the advanced and the backward, its coevalness and the denial of it, 
become co-produced and structured. It makes possible to conceive capital’s 
development as a disparate, heterogeneous, and temporally convoluted process of 
subsumption and subalternization of ways of worlding and productive relations, of 
the emergence of different, antagonistic or confronting temporal matrixes derived 
from the latter, and of the (potential as well as actual) struggles for autonomy 
unleashed by historical capitalism.  
 An orthodox Marxism could still claim at this point that the recourse to such 
subalternist position ends up in de-centring the proletariat as pivotal subject of 
social revolution. Indeed –if this framework makes sense– the image of a well-
defined, by and large subsumed working class as necessarily at the head of socialist 
struggles becomes just a historical modality of class-formation and class-struggle, 
opening the terrain to consider other, dramatically more complex processes of 
proletarianization, semi-proletarianization and des-proletarianization –that is, of the 
concrete, historical formation of subaltern layers, gropus, and classes in which 
international and local dynamics interweave, giving thus form to a ‘national’ 
setting. In the temporalization of North and South that the framework of uneven 
and combined development provides, the provincialization of the West –as envisaged 
by Chakrabarty– can be continued in terms of the provincialization of development 
as such. This, in turn, demands in my view a further step: to deprovincialize the 
                                                          
25  See to this respect D. Sayer (1987). For further elaborations of the idea of real 
abstraction, see A. Toscano (2008; 2010: 190ff). 
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conceptual as well as practical, political achievements of liberation and 
emancipation struggles –be it ‘Western’ or not– against capitalist development, from 
a standpoint now finally relinquished of ideal-types of class-formation, class-
consciousness, and class-struggle.  
   
5. Translation and the Task of the Materialist Historian 
A deprovincializing horizon for Marxism demands hence a conception of historical 
capitalism in which modernity and coloniality are markedly co-constitutive, and 
whereby uneven and combined processes of accumulation, 
subsbumption/subalternization and resistance/antagonism develop in a partially 
de-centred manner (but nonetheless determined by contradictory tendencies to 
concentration and centralization (cf. Pradella, 2013), as well as marked by important 
moments of ‘synchronization’) at global timescale. By these means, we may also 
avoid the conflation of the concept of capital –and its abstract and abstracting 
universal tendency, its development as both concrete process and desideratum– with 
that of historical capitalism –the terrain of uneven and combined development in 
which that and other tendencies are actually performed, confirmed or mutated.  In a 
similar register, Jameson asserts that “what is synchronic is the ‘concept’ of the 
mode of production, the moment of production is not synchronic in this sense but 
open to history in a dialectic way.” For this author, conversely, a social formation 
works as a kind of “metasynchronicity” (2002: 95, 97), the concrete articulation of 
this open and dialectic process.  
  Subalternity, in this sense, corresponds to the set of social relations, 
worldviews and temporalities that remain fragmentary, non-historical from the 
standpoint of official narratives. However, these temporalities are not ‘different’ in a 
merely descriptive meaning, or ‘alternative’ as a sort of indeterminate parallel 
status. They are actually thrown into differentiation and confrontation by the very 
processes of accumulation, production, and reproduction triggered in the sake of 
capital. Thus, understood as a set of social relations –and not a fixed condition– the 
‘anatomy’ of the subaltern classes is located in concrete historical relations (of 
resistance and ‘subsumption’, with all the degrees and forms of 
subordination/antagonism entailed in this dialectic) occurring under capital’s 
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temporalizing logic. The deprovincialization of Marxism provided by the 
perspective of uneven and combined development makes possible, in sum, to 
engage seriously with temporalities other than capital’s, that is, with forms of 
worlding and worldviews partially- or hybridly-subsumed, but which nonetheless 
are part and participant of the fragmentary histories of the subaltern classes.  
 To think the dynamics of subsumption and resistance to capital from a 
subalternist perspective such as that sketched in this chapter implies, in my view, to 
take seriously the problem of ‘translation’ posed by Chakrabarty with regard to 
subaltern temporalities and narratives. Nonetheless, in dissenting with his 
Heideggerian routes, I argue for a coming to terms with subaltern temporalities and 
narratives, but not with the recourse (common to postcolonial endeavours) to its 
epistemologization.26 Holding onto the tension suggested by Fredric Jameson 
between ‘history’ and ‘narrative’ or ‘text’ (a tension whereby the former is never 
utterly reduced to the latter, and nonetheless history is ultimately “inaccessible to us 
except in textual form”),27 the return to Gramsci’s notion of ‘translation’ –informed 
                                                          
26  Benita Parry addresses these critical points in the Part I of Postcolonial Studies: A 
Materialist Critique. Focusing particularly on Spivak’s epistemologization of colonial violence 
and Bhabha semiotization of the coloniality, Parry recognizes the worth of postcolonial 
studies while criticizes the idealist agendas implicated and derived from it; see B. Parry 
(2004, part I. 2 ff). Neil Larsen (2000), in turn, from a similar standpoint considers the 
postcolonial concept of imperialism (e.g. Edward Said’s) as pre-Marxist, that is, pre-
economic in the sense of the critique of political economy.  
 The limits of this research do not afford a balanced criticism on the epistemic idealism 
through which postcolonial perspectives by and large portray a sort of esoteric deep-time 
disentangled from capital (modern) time. To contend this sort of idealism, through which 
capital is reduced to an(other) episteme or epistemological formation, it would suffice to say 
for now that the recourse to epistemologizing temporalities (which draws in turn upon a 
rigid separation of epistemology and ontology, separation which arguably corresponds to 
one of the pillars of the much criticized ‘Western metaphysics’) runs the risk of re-
introducing through the window what has rightly been thrown out the door: namely, the 
kind of essentialization of (de-materialized) ‘cultures’, ‘languages’ or ‘worldviews’. In turn, a 
historical-materialist concept of temporality informed by the critique of capital should 
overcome the (Kantian?) reduction of time to a dimension of knowledge and understand it 
rather as a matter of praxis.  
 I am thankful to Martin Savransky for this and other acute comments and exchanges 
about the postcolonial canon in general, and in particular the ‘Western-metaphysical’ 
gesture of drawing upon the dissection between ontology and epistemology. For a 
preliminary but very thought-provoking approach to this topic, see Savransky 
(forthcoming). 
27  I follow Jameson’s remarks on the relationship between history and narrative, two 
concepts that tend to be conflated in poststructuralist (and, I should add, postcolonial) 
accounts: “History is not in any sense itself a text or master text or master narrative, but that 
it is inaccessible to us except in textual or narrative form, or in other words, that we 
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by that of ‘subalternity’– may indicate more precisely the method chosen in this 
research.  
 In the Prison Notebooks (Q 11, §47-48), Gramsci reflects on the possibilities of 
translation between languages in different registers and levels, for instance, national 
languages, specialized languages (i.e. science, philosophy, arts), or even ‘stages’ of 
civilization. From the standpoint that no language is completely transparent to 
another (1995: 453–54) –which is to acknowledge the necessity of translation and of 
translational apparatuses–, he puts the problem as follows:  
Translatability presupposes that a given stage of civilisation has a 
‘basically’ identical cultural expression, even if its language is 
historically different, being determined by the particular tradition of 
each national culture and each philosophical system, by the prevalence 
of an intellectual or practical activity etc. Thus it is to be seen whether 
one can translate between expressions of different stages of civilisation, 
in so far as each of these stages is a moment of the development of 
another, one thus mutually integrating the other, or whether a given 
expression may be translated using the terms of a previous stage which 
however is more comprehensible than the given language etc. It seems 
that one may in fact say that only in the philosophy of praxis is the ‘translation’ 
organic and thoroughgoing, whilst from other standpoints is often a simple 
game of generic ‘schematisms’. (1995: 451, emphasis added) 
In this passage, Marxism as such (the ‘philosophy of praxis’, in the terminology 
used throughout the Prison Notebooks) dwells at the centre of translational 
endeavours between different temporalities and histories. Commenting on this 
passage, Fabio Frosini points out that “the concept of the unity of theory and practice 
would be reduced to a procedure of mechanical transposition or to a ‘simple game 
of <generic schematisms>,’ if translatability did not coincide with it.” (2010: 174, 
original emphasis) The recourse to the image of stages does not undermine 
Gramsci’s powerful insight, for these are understood more as geological layers than 
as sequential historical ‘phases’ –that is, they are coeval and not linearly sequential. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
approach it only by way of prior textualization or narrative (re)construction.” (1979: 42; see 
also 2002: 20). 
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Yet Gramsci is also singling out the possibilities for the ‘philosophy of praxis’ to 
become a translational field within which diverse subaltern ‘grammars’ (more on 
this below) and ways of temporalization might be put into comparative dialogue 
with ‘advanced stages’ of a class struggle conceived at a world scale.  
 In this research, translation is conceived as a mediating social practice which 
involves several dimensions of social life –actually, the very idea of ‘dimensions of 
social life’ is a (modern) matter of translation, e.g. everyday life vis-à-vis expert 
systems and languages. As Naoki Sakai and Jon Solomon put it, the term “names 
primarily a social relationship whose form permeates linguistic activity as a whole, 
rather than simply comprising a secondary or exceptional situation.” (2006: 9) The 
authors identify the dialogical character of this relation in the fact that it “opens up a 
space of communication and commensurability” in which “the ‘positions’ 
themselves are not prior to the translational exchange, but are rather constructed 
out of it, in posterior fashion, by substituting the spatiality of representation for the 
temporality of praxis.” (2006: 14) Translation is therefore a social practice that 
presupposes a trans-cultural, multi-grammatical space of engagements, a space 
whereby the positions of representational entities, linguistic bodies and 
communities, are always-already mediated by the temporality of praxis. The latter, 
in turn, is the praxis through which regimes of translation are structured and re-
configured according to grammatical and non-grammatical (economic, political) 
forces and tensions. Sakai and Solomon (2006: 78) conclude in this regard that 
translation, rather than as schematic matter of operations, transferences and 
equivalences, must be seen as assuming a significant role in the constitution of the 
social as such.    
 Holding on to Jameson’s tension-distinction between history and narrative, I 
find it suggestive to draw upon Gramsci’s use of the notion of ‘grammar’ in order to 
think the interlaced relations between language (la questione della lingua), national 
unification, and the translatability from the standpoint of the ‘philosophy of 
praxis’.28 Peter Ives (2004: 96–97) points out that Gramsci distinguished between 
                                                          
28  Trained as a linguist in his youth in the University of Turin, Gramsci devoted several 
of his reflections to the questione della lingua, from a perspective that never ceased to be 
politically oriented. In particular, his Quarerni 29, entitled ‘Note per un’introduzione allo studio 
della grammatica’ (Notes for an Introduction to the Study of Grammar), remains arguably a 
laboratory to be dug into for Marxist engagements with linguistic and translation, related to 
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‘spontaneous’ and ‘normative’ grammars, not with the aim of set out a clear-cut 
division but rather an analytical gradational axis through which linguistic structures 
develop in formalization –or in hegemonic orientation– while others remained 
subordinated. By means of this distinction – Ives and Green comment – Gramsci “is 
making an argument for a specific method of transforming ‘spontaneous grammar’ 
into ‘normative grammar’ through a conscious and critical interaction among the 
existing ‘spontaneous grammars’” (2010: 301). These reflections stand in 
contradistinction to top-down models of grammatical homogenization, for instance, 
to the imposition of a determinate normative grammar. But these remarks are also 
useful to make a critical account of the regimes of translation that have 
predominated in Marxist debates during the 20th century. The problem of 
translation is thus at the heart of this research, inasmuch as it corresponds to a 
moment of the adoption of a subalternist perspective as guiding-thread to re-read 
and reconsider Marxist theoretical elaborations in Latin America. 
 The perspectives of uneven and combined development, of the hetero-
temporality of capitalist modernity, and of the multi-layered grammars of popular 
struggles facing capital’s narratives frame the subalternist hypothesis assumed in 
this work, which searches for a strategy of reading Marxist theory in Latin America 
through the lens of the translational regimes established by Marxist authors and 
currents. As Gramsci grasped it, it is only within the structures of language that 
women and men orient themselves and make decisions. These structures, 
conversely, are crisscrossed by international tendencies, both material and 
intellectual, that circulate throughout the uneven and combined development of 
capitalism; they are sometimes adopted and reformulated by local groups with 
dissimilar success, depending on the ‘correspondence’ to (the adequacy, that is, of 
the regime of translatability vis-à-vis) the social structure upon which every 
language and grammatical register is based. In this regard, Derek Boothman offers 
an enlightening reconstruction of Gramsci’s conception of translation, in which the 
structural level is rendered as the cornerstone of translatability:  
                                                                                                                                                                    
the problems of hegemony and the building of a ethical-moral historical bloc. For an 
excellent survey on Gramsci’s politics of translations, with regard to the translationality 
between linguaggio and lingua, see D. Boothman (2010) and F. Frosini (2010); for the relations 
between Gramsci’s treatment of grammar, translation and language in view of the task of the 
‘philosophy of praxis’, see especially A. Carlucci (2013), P. Ives (2004) and P. Thomas (2010, 
ch. 9 and Conclusion).  
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Gramsci regards translation as an act in which, from the propositions 
expressed in natural language 1, one descends through the appropriate 
levels of the superstructure to the ‘base’ or ‘structure’ of a society that 
has or has in the past had a ‘fundamentally similar’ structure, in order 
then to carry out the reverse, ascending, procedure to arrive at the 
‘surface’ constituted by natural language 2. (2010: 123–24) 
Conversely, the comparability and translatability between ‘discourse’ (linguaggio) 
and ‘natural’ language (lingua),29 two grammatical levels entailing different regimes 
of diffusion and translation, provides a pathway through which the historical 
development of Marxism and analyses can be re-evaluated from the perspective of 
different grammars and linguistic levels intertwined in the translational 
‘temporality of praxis’ in which Marxist theory aims to participate. The distinction 
between grammars and grammatical levels, therefore, is part of the tasks of the 
materialist historian or ‘organic intellectual’, in so far as it relates to the questions of 
hegemony, and crucially of the becoming-hegemonic of the subalterns on the basis 
of their ‘spontaneous grammars’. Commenting in the Prison Notebooks (Q 29 §3) on 
the usefulness of language and linguistic debates in consideration to political issues, 
Gramsci asserted that  
[i]t is not correct to say that these discussions were useless [...]. Every 
time the question of language surfaces, in one way or another, it means 
that a series of other problems are coming to the fore: the formation and 
enlargement of the governing class, the need to establish more intimate 
and secure relationships between the governing groups and the 
national-popular mass, in other words to reorganise cultural hegemony. 
(1985: 183–84).  
To put translation among the tasks of the materialist historian summarizes my 
understanding on the necessity to ‘deprovincialize’ the Marxist conceptual 
                                                          
29  The rendering of discourse and natural language as linguaggio and lingua respectively 
is provided by Fabio Frosini. Frosini asserts on this point that “[t]he relationship between 
scientific and philosophical languages [linguaggi], which the Pragmatist recognized, is 
nothing but a particular manifestation of the problem of a national linguistic unity. This 
problem can be dealt with correctly only if actively formulated in terms of linguistic 
“unification.” Yet, given the equivalence of language [lingua] and ideology, this relationship 
is correctly posited only if it is thought of as an active process of ideological unification” 
(2010: 178, original emphasis). 
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apparatus in the wave of its current critical conjuncture, significantly marked in the 
Global South by the burdens of official Marxism as development, modernization 
ideology. In my view, this makes possible, on the one hand, to consider the exercise 
of conceptualization as a question of ‘translation’ from the multilayered and 
fragmentary grammars of subaltern classes into the language of class struggle –the 
politically-oriented and presently-informed language of Marxism. As with any 
translation, there is no guarantee of succeeding in the attempt. Yet, in any event, 
what must be prevented is the illegitimate hegemony of “unilateral regimes of 
translation” (Solomon and Sakai, 2006: 2) – an instance of which was the national-
industrial working class as archetype of the proletariat. On the other hand, the 
incorporation of translation projects the Marxist realm as an uneven and combined 
space of engagements, debates and criticism, striving in variegated ways to 
actualize the transformative moment of theory. In other words, what the 
translational dimension enables us to envisage is Marxism as a trans-cultural30 or 
multi-grammatical field of encounters and mismatches, of commitments and 
polemics, in which the regime of (non-unilateral) translation regulates the 
heterogeneity of grammars and historical practices. A self-critical realm in the 
strongest sense of the term, to be sure. 
 If Jameson is correct in indicating that the “master code” of Marxism’s 
interpretive framework or language (i.e., discourse) is the notion of ‘mode of 
production’ –a synchronic category, as we already saw–,31 then from its 
mobilization, destabilizations, and reconstructions we can trace the contours of 
these strategies of translations that, while subalternized by official Marxism, found 
nonetheless the manner to engage seriously with other modes of production, 
reproduction and temporalizations. In turn, Barry Hindess indicates a pathway to 
                                                          
30  I am once again in debt to John Kraniauskas by the rescue and revalorization of the 
concept ‘transculturation’, a term that, as he puts it (quoting Angel Rama in doing so), 
“‘describes a Latin American perspective’ on the experience conventionally referred to as 
acculturation” (2000: 114), and hence allows a non-unilateral, more plural perspective for 
‘post-colonial’ dynamics.  
31  Cf. Jameson ([1981] 2002). As Dominick LaCapra synthesizes it, Jameson’s perspective 
(as offered in The Political Unconscious and which I will follow in its general lines in this 
research) “contribute[s] to the rebirth of a genuinely political discourse in the study of 
culture and history. [...] For it is Marxism that provides the political master code for the 
allegorical reading and ‘rewriting’ of all cultural history, and it simultaneously reveals the 
coded truth of earlier allegorical modes. Only Marxism can decode the past in its utter 
‘otherness’ and in its bearing of the needs of the present.” (1983: 237). 
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come to terms with ‘theory’ as object of inquiry for the materialist historian. He 
refers to “the moment of theory” as a composite structured by the temporally 
uneven development of its parts (2007: 21). In other words, the components of a 
theoretical moment are also uneven, non-contemporaneous, and nonetheless in 
some instances work in a combined manner. Therefore, the consideration of those 
instances or events giving momentum to theoretical achievements within Marxist 
theory (that is, within the politically-oriented language of class struggle based on 
the mode of production as master code) should take seriously into account the 
uneven and combined temporality of its parts. 
 
6. Towards ‘Latin American Marxism’ 
The framework of uneven and combined development, informed by considerations 
of the hetero-temporal nature of historical capitalism as well as of translation and 
trans-culturation, are indeed part of the strategy of critical reading chosen for 
coming to terms with the intellectual constellation I call Latin American Marxism. 
However, this choice corresponds to the family of themes found in the authors and 
currents considered throughout this work. In other words, what might be read as 
the superimposition upon the selected authors of a pre-determined theoretical 
framework, is rather the evidence of a theoretical sensibility which exudes from 
these formulations and the questions that they channel – what I have chosen to term 
‘subalternist hypothesis’. By means of making visible this hypothesis,  I think 
Marxism can reinitiate the critical dialogue with other perspectives (tangentially or 
directly) critical towards capital, capitalism and its narratives.  In particular, the 
revision of local or regional constellations of thought made up under the name of 
Marxism (in other words, constellations that took up Marxism as their ‘language’) 
might contribute in my view to re-read significant conceptual developments 
somehow subterranean vis-à-vis official versions of Marxism, in the horizon of its 
deprovincialization – which, in my turn, I understand as a decolonizing horizon as 
well.   
 Nonetheless, the recourse to the subalternist hypothesis based on the notion of 
intellectual constellation, while stimulating the clarification of the set of themes and 
approaches brought together in this research, is also oriented to make explicit the 
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differences and contradictions among the authors and currents evaluated here. 
Intellectual constellation, in this sense, is aimed to offer a non-reductive bringing 
together of a common sensibility toward themes and concepts disregarded by 
official Marxism in Latin America and elsewhere. It is, in other words, a cohesive 
but not unified or conflating assemblage that in turn shows, and attempts to 
explain, the differences through which this common sensibility has been actualized 
in the making of Marxist theory in the region.      
 In the following chapters, my research provides a reconstruction of the 
subalternist hypothesis in Latin America by means of surveys of authors and 
currents somehow subterranean to the official versions of Marxism. Although some 
of them were directly committed to official Communist policies of the period, the 
intellectual autonomy achieved in those cases is an important dimension for 
delineating a deprovincialized Marxism. By means of this reconstruction, I think it is 
possible to put into dialogue putatively metropolitan and peripheral versions of 
Marxist theory; conversely, it is also possible to critically evaluate the regimes of 
translation adopted as well as resisted during this period, with the aim to come to 
terms with the (uneven and combined) development of actually-existing capitalism. 
In doing so, finally, the rather ‘underdeveloped’ goal of this research is to provide 
some materials and reflections so as to contribute to the cartography of the uneven 
and combined development of Marxist theory. 
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II. Uneven and Combined Development in Mariátegui’s ‘National’ Marxism 
 
‘The time has passed for ever when the 
cause of democracy and socialism was 
directly tied to Europe’. 
Vladimir Lenin, Address to the 
First Congress of the Third 
International, 1919. 
 
‘We certainly do not want socialism in 
Latin America to be a copy or imitation. 
It should be a heroic creation. We have to 
give birth to Indo American socialism 
with our own reality, in our own 
language.’  
José Carlos Mariátegui, Revista 
Amauta’s 17th editorial, 1928 
 
1. Some Notes on the Inception of Marxism in Latin America 
One of the theses to be problematized through this work corresponds to Aricó’s 
(1999: 13) argument of the tributary character of the Marxist theory produced in this 
region. Tributary here means a non-original and hence derivative relation between 
the concept and his object. If the Marxist conceptual apparatus was since its very 
beginning elaborated regarding the most advanced capitalist regions of the world, 
the nature of its gaze towards Latin America must of necessity project a backward, 
non -scientific reality. The lack of interest displayed by original or classical Marxism 
regarding Latin America, in these terms, is read as the evidence that the value that 
Marxist theory might hold was placed in a future still to be accomplished. In other 
words, for Aricó the partial inadequacy between theory and reality worked thus as 
reinforcement of the evolutionist conception which was apparent in many (if not the 
majority) of Marx’s epigones. 
In the period between the Paris Commune and the First World War, Marx 
and Engels were just part of a myriad of authors that populated the shelves of Latin 
American reformists and revolutionaries. Together with them, there were the names 
of Bakunin and Blanqui, Ferri and Lassalle, Proudhon and Tolstoi, in a list that not 
infrequently included intellectuals such as Spencer or Loria. Raúl Fornet-Betancourt 
(2001, ch. 1 and 2) identifies in this process a preparatory or “blurred” (confusa) 
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diffusion of Marxism in Latin America, a period of inception that will be followed 
by a time in which the elaboration of the canonical Marxist textual corpus (the task 
undertaken by Engels, Plekhanov, Kautsky, Labriola, Bernstein, and Guesde among 
others) operated in the demarcation of socialism from both anarchism and 
liberalism as ideological-political fields. Fornet-Betancourt calls this second period 
the moment of the “conflict among socialisms”, in which in particular the 
spontaneous apolitical nature of the subaltern classes was taken up by anarchism 
and, conversely, the Marxism of the Second International appeared as the 
ideological expression of urban workers and European migrants. 
In the midst of this process, the debate on the theory’s scientific character 
was increasingly populated. However, as Jaime Massardo has correctly indicated, a 
mistranslation played a role in such a debate. Engels’ Socialism: from Utopia to Science 
was no doubt a crucial landmark in the proclamation of Marxism as science of 
history, albeit two precisions are in order here. First, the meaning of the German 
wissenschaft is indeed quite different from both the French science and the Spanish 
ciencia, the former having a wider meaning. As Georges Labica argues in the voice 
‘Science’ of the Dictionnaire critique du marxisme, “Wissenschaft is broader than science 
(inheritor of the Greek epistêmê). It does not only connote knowledge systems, or the 
disciplinary repertoire of the kind of mathematics, physics or biology, or even the 
human sciences; it equally covers the meaning of know [savoir], of knowledge taken 
generally, of teaching method…” (Labica and Bensussan, 1985: 1030, my translation) 
But the German term traversed the Atlantic only after having been adopted as 
ciencia through the influence that German Social-Democracy (socialism’s ‘guide 
party’, in Engels’ famous assertion) instilled, first, over its French counterpart, and 
then over the Spanish Socialist Party.32 The result of this mistranslation in Latin 
America was, as Massardo points out, a conception of socialism based on a 
fetishistic idea of its scientific nature (2001: 30), for which science appeared as both 
the a priori for historical inquiries and the political outcome of human development. 
                                                          
32  Outlining this transit from Social-Democracy to Guesdisme to Madrid’s El Socialista to 
Buenos Aires, Massardo observes that “issues so important as the peasant question and the 
specificity of cultural forms which, conversely, constitute the essence of the political, 
remained outside the Spanish codes through which Madrid socialist represented society.” 
(2001: 17). 
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 The struggle for ideological demarcations that characterized the process of 
conformation of workers’ incipient organizations was a component of the growing 
presence and circulation of socialist literature in Latin America. Marx and Engels 
were thus participants within this cultural fabric in Latin America, albeit at the 
outset in a rather subordinated position. Certainly crucial for the increasing 
prominence of Marxism was the publication of the first complete translation of 
Capital into Spanish, made by Argentinean Juan Bautista Justo (1865-1928) between 
1897 and 1899. Justo can be seen as representing the epochal synthesis of a markedly 
eclectic Marxism and an undisguised evolutionism. In Aricó’s view, he constituted 
“the first attempt in thought and action to establish a politically productive 
relationship between [Marxist] theory and social movement” (1999: 15). The 
significance of Justo in the early history of Latin American Marxism is parallel to the 
importance of the Argentinean Socialist Party (PSA), the first of its kind funded in 
the sub-continent in 1896. Among other reasons, this party held a marked influence 
upon other similar organizations because it exhibited a solid and well-recognized 
leading group, counting some important intellectuals such as José Ingenieros and 
Leopoldo Lugones among them. This group also created the paper La Vanguardia, of 
enormous impact in the diffusion of Marxist debates in Argentina and Latin 
America (cf. Tarcus, 2007, ch. X), for which Justo himself translated articles from 
other European journals such as Die Neue Zeit. 
  Regarding Justo’s intellectual underpinnings, Marx and Engels appear as part 
of an open, progressing debate leading to a scientific, positive knowledge of 
capitalist society. Indeed, for him positive reality worked as the verification instance 
for scientific knowledge. He shared with Engels and Bernstein a marked dismissal 
of the philosophical dimension of Marxism, prioritizing instead its scientific valence. 
In this regard, Justo understood scientific socialism as the refutation of speculative 
philosophy, in what Aricó considers as the foundation of the tradition of 
‘positivistic socialism’ in Latin America. (1999: 37) This amounted to a notion of 
“naïve realism” (realismo ingenuo) placed at the heart of his conception of socialism: 
“[since] popular and scientific movement, in order to be genuine socialism must be 
naïve; to be conscious, it has to be vulgar” (cited in Tarcus, 2007: 382; cf. Justo, 1914). 
This is also expressed in Justo’s reduction of the dialectical method to the notion of 
evolution: “[t]he idea of evolution seems to be the substantial part of dialectics” 
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(cited in Tarcus, 2007: 381). What Jorge Dotti (1990) renders as Justo’s naturalist 
conception of history – based on the ideas of evolution and progress – was therefore 
the framework of a perspective in which capitalism and socialism were placed in a 
linear and ascendant continuity; socialism appears in this view as the highest degree 
of a rational organization of society (cf. Aricó, 1999: 44). 
 This conception was at the centre of both Justo’s reading of Capital and the 
PSA’s political definitions. He believed that “democracy and science are the two 
greatest revolutionary factors of present times” (cited in Tarcus, 2007: 380). 
Consequently, the socialist party must work on both political and the scientific 
terrains. In what Aricó reads as a perspective in which the economic dominion over 
nature is translated into politics in a non-mediated way –hence exhibiting a 
significant contempt for the concrete forms through which the incorporation of 
popular masses to politics takes place– the socialist party held for Justo the role of 
engine for the political modernization of the country (Aricó, 1999: 63, 85; see also 
Tarcus, 2007: 395). Situated in a conjuncture where economic modernization was 
accompanied by political ‘backwardness’ and cultural ‘traditionalism’, Justo 
understood the task of the PSA as the promotion of science within the political, the 
building of a democratic institutional framework based on rational, modern pillars 
mirroring European states, and oriented to reinforcing the evolution from 
capitalism to socialism. 
Largely derived from the hegemonic perspectives within the Second 
International, Justo’s conception of socialism was severely put into question during 
the twentieth century’s second decade. On the one hand, the outburst of the First 
World War provoked a schism famously termed by Lenin as the ‘bankruptcy’ of the 
foundations that working-class politics had been built upon, the thorough collapse 
of the terrain hitherto grounding the socialist movement (cf. Kouvelakis, 2007: 165). 
On the other, the events of the Mexican revolution (1910-1918) questioned the 
generalized belief of peasant masses as incapable of waging their own liberation 
struggle, hence opening a question about the particular infrastructures upo which 
Latin America’s class struggle finds place. As Lenin put it in his 1919 address to the 
First Congress of the Third International, “the time has passed for ever when the 
cause of democracy and socialism was directly tied to Europe” (cited in Kouvelakis, 
2007: 167) Mariátegui also considered that only with the emergence of the new, truly 
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international communist movement –that is, with the Third International- did 
Marxism become equipped so as to translate the analytical categories of Marx into 
non-European realities. 
 
2. Mariátegui and ‘Leninism’ 
In his contribution to Norberto Bobbio’s Dictionary of Politics, Aricó (1983: 950) 
placed Mariátegui as the foremost expression of the “Leninian intuition” (intuición 
leniniana) in Latin America. ‘Leninian’ seems to be used here by Aricó in order to 
avoid the overcodified (and misleading) term ‘Leninist’. Some years before, in his 
already classic ‘Introduction’ to the Peruvian Marxist, he argued that Lenin worked 
in Mariátegui less as a fixed set of principles and more as a “catalyst” of themes and 
methods, observing immediately that “the problem still remains open of which 
Lenin, and to what extent [...]” (Aricó, 1980: xxiii). In this reference to the ‘Leninian 
intuition’, Aricó recalled Lenin’s identification of the relative autonomy of colonial 
situations in the imperialist conjuncture, and the concomitant need to de-centring 
Marxist theory from its Eurocentric bents. In other words, Lenin opened up the 
possibility to think the particularities of non-European societies from a Marxist 
perspective. But this sentence might also be considered from the perspective of the 
primacy of the political over the economic, on the one hand, and of the concrete 
analysis of current situations, on the other –in what György Lukàcs (1972) 
summarized as the orientation towards the ‘actuality of the revolution’. Let us look 
into these two aspects in more detail.  
 
 Imperialism, Colonialism, and the Global South 
Sanjay Seth has argued that Lenin opened up of a conceptual space for the colonial 
world within Marxist reflections (Seth, 1995; cf. also Young, 2001). By means of his 
characterization of imperialism, as well as his insistence on the right of peoples to 
self-determination, Marxist theory encompassed a broader geographical scope for 
revolutionary struggles, well beyond ‘advanced’ Europe. The agreement with this 
perspective is apparent in the first works of Mariátegui after his return to Peru in 
1923, i.e. the articles of La escena contemporánea (‘The Contemporary Scene’, of 
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1925)33, and the set of talks given at Lima’s Popular University González Prada 
(UPGP, in its Spanish acronym) under the heading of ‘History of the World Crisis’.34 
These texts focus on related topics: the crisis of liberal democracy; the social and 
political implications of the war; the revolutionary tide opened by such crisis, 
expressed in the polarization between revolution and reaction; the division of the 
proletarian realm between reformist socialism and communists or ‘maximalists’; the 
emergence of colonial and semi-colonial, non-Western popular struggles on the 
world stage; and the evaluation of intellectual, artistic and philosophical attitudes 
towards the world crisis.  
 The revolutionary emergence of the so-called ‘Oriental’ world is a special 
section of The Contemporary Scene. But before, in the eleventh conference at the 
UPGP, Mariátegui explained to the audience that solutions to the post-war situation 
have attempted to build ‘national pacts’, within which both bourgeoisie and 
proletariat should relinquish to certain demands so as to bring the economy back to 
an allegedly ‘normal’ level. These pacts or ‘civil truces’ are concomitant –he 
continues– with the purpose of further systematizing the exploitation of colonial 
and semi-colonial countries, so that the internal economic adjustments required by 
central powers would not prove too aggressive toward European workers. This is 
the argument about social-imperialism addressed by Hobson ([1902] 1988) and 
Lenin ([1916] 1996), and recast for instance by W.E.B Du Bois from an African-
American standpoint ([1905] 1970). They all insisted on the coupling between 
imperialism and race prejudices, or the entanglement of economic neo-colonization, 
territorial annexation and the ‘colour line’, thus enabling a consideration of the new 
imperialist forces in terms of an economic-cum-racial phenomenon.35 In turn, 
Mariátegui asserts that “European capitalism tries to suffocate Europe’s social 
revolution with the distribution among European workers of the utilities obtained 
                                                          
33  The articles compressed in The Contemporary Scene were written between 1923 and 
1925; most of them appeared in the Lima magazine Variedades before to comprise the book, 
which was launched by Editorial Minerva, later Editorial Amauta and founded by 
Mariátegui and his brother Julio César in 1925. 
34  The 17 lectures (given between June of 1923 and January of 1924) are compiled in the 
Vol. 8 of the Complete Works, Historia de la Crisis Mundial.  
35  Alberto Toscano summarizes the argument about social imperialism shared by 
Hobson, Lenin, and Du Bois as the process which “drives a capital unable to super-exploit 
its ‘own’ working classes beyond its national borders, and pushes the state to promise or 
offer then a rising share of imperialist spoils.” (2015: 241).  
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from the exploitation of the colonial workers. Thus the 300 million inhabitants of 
Western Europe and United States enslave to those 1500 million inhabitants of the 
rest of the earth” (1984: 141). In this sense, imperialism comes to the fore as just one 
side of the Janus-faced internationalism: “[i]n reality, capitalism could not stop 
being internationalist because capitalism is, by nature and necessity, imperialist” 
(1984: 161).  
 The Contemporary Scene describes Marx’s genius through the exposition of “the 
contradiction between the political form and the economic form of capitalist 
society”, which affords the prediction of “its ineluctable and fatal decadence” 
(1965a: 171). The contradictions between formal freedom and actual exploitation, 
socialization of production and private ownership of wealth, are instances of such a 
general contradiction. And the current expression of the capitalist crisis –as defined 
in the conference devoted to internationalism and nationalism– is precisely of that 
nature: “the contradiction of the politics of capitalist society with the economy of 
capitalist society. In contemporary society, politics and economy have ceased to 
coincide, to agree. The politics of contemporary society is nationalist; its economy is 
internationalist. The bourgeois State is built on a national basis; bourgeois economy 
needs to rest on an international basis” (1984: 161–62). The contradiction between 
productive forces and relations of production, as the two terms of a mode of 
production’s contradiction, are linked by Mariátegui (by means of Lenin) to a 
further global perspective. Conversely, this newer element transforms the contents 
and forms of its components: nationalism, in this conjuncture, mutates from a 
conservative to a potentially revolutionary catalyst. As Mariátegui put it elsewhere: 
“the ethical function of the socialist idea is transformed in political or economic 
colonial peoples. In these peoples, by force of circumstances, without absolutely 
denying any of its principles, socialism acquires a nationalist attitude” (1986: 100–
01).   
 The first period of Mariátegui’s intellectual work was concerned with the 
international scene and the introduction of its comprehensive elements in Peru. By 
pointing out the prominence of imperialism and the new conditions that it brings to 
class struggles at the Global South, the perspective thus adopted was able to 
incorporate the racial division as a factor of the new capitalist stage. In both the 
conferences and the book, Mariátegui gives a broad picture of the international 
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scene, whose main drama was being played out in post-war Europe but which 
extended its scope to all the zones of the world under imperialist rule.  
 I argue that Mariátegui’s ‘Leninism’ can be understood in terms of two 
interwoven elements. On the one hand, there is ‘imperialism’ in its fullness as the 
dialectical category of totality in capitalism’s latest stage. In other words, through 
Lenin’s conception of imperialism as the globalization of capital accumulation 
under monopoly capital, Marxism comes to terms with a higher organization of the 
contradiction between productive forces and relations of production encompassing 
the whole planet, albeit in uneven and clashing manners and rhythms. This category 
incorporates the non-Western parts of the world to the scene of the crisis. This 
conceptual achievement allows Marxism to understand the seemingly paradoxical 
proximity of events coming from non-Western realities far away from one another 
such as the Peruvian indigenous movements and ‘oriental’ struggles for 
decolonization. On the other hand, there is the primacy of the concrete analysis of 
concrete situations, that is, the necessity to re-conceptualize categories and strategies 
of approach in view of the present-day conditions of the class struggle. The primacy 
of concrete analysis is what Gramsci understood as the main lesson of the late 
Lenin: to ‘nationalize’ (to translate, that is) the revolutionary experience of the 
Russian Bolsheviks. 
 
The Actuality of Revolution 
Mariátegui’s ‘Leninist’ reading of both Marx and the contemporary crisis is explicit 
in an article published in March 1924 by Claridad’s 5th issue, written as tribute to the 
recently deceased Russian leader and entitled simply ‘Lenin’. The article describes 
his legacy in the following terms:  
[Lenin] has defined the historical meaning of contemporary crisis, has 
discovered a truly proletarian and classist method and praxis, and has 
forged the moral and material instruments of Revolution. (1975: 39) 
As Lukàcs explained, despite the fact that his booklet Imperialism: the highest stage of 
capitalism did not really contain new elements when compared, for instance, to its 
predecessors (such as Hobson, Hilferding, Luxemburg, and also Bukharin), Lenin’s 
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account of imperialism is superior to all these works in its “concrete articulation of 
the economic theory of imperialism with every political problem of the present 
epoch, thereby making the economics of the new phase a guide-line for all concrete 
action in the resultant decisive conjuncture.” (1972: 41) Imperialism – Lukàcs goes 
on – has built up a truly world economy, in a process in which “for the first time in 
history the nations oppressed and exploited by capitalism no longer fight isolated 
wars against their oppressors but are swept up as a whole into the maelstrom of the 
world war.” (1972: 44) As a consequence, the national struggles of the so-called 
colonial and semi-colonial regions of the world are no longer struggles against 
merely local feudal classes, but rather “they are forced into the context of imperialist 
rivalry between the world powers”. (1972: 46)  
 Understood as the dialectical category of totality in the highest stage of 
capitalism, imperialism shifts the perspective of revolution from the national to the 
international setting; in so doing, the problem of the ‘maturity’ or ‘ripeness’ of 
revolutionary conditions is no longer totally defined by national boundaries. 
However, in keeping with Gramsci’s acute reading Lenin’s ‘philosophy of praxis’, 
this question of nationalism and imperialism is also dialectical:  
The international situation should be considered in its national aspect 
[…] the ‘national’ relation is the result of an ‘original’, unique (in a 
certain sense) combination, which needs to be understood and 
conceived in this originality and uniqueness […] the line of development 
is towards internationalism, but the point of departure is ‘national’. It is 
from this point of departure that one must begin. Yet the perspective is 
international and cannot be otherwise. (2003: 240) 
Mariátegui’s classist starting point understands the consequences of this dialectic in 
terms similar to Gramsci, who pointed out that “the leading class is in fact only such if 
it accurately interprets this combination, of which is itself a component and precisely as 
such is able to give the movement a certain direction[…]” (Ibid. emphasis added) 
From this perspective, imperialism becomes a world-system irreducible to its 
national parts; however, the highest stage of capitalism provides an unprecedented 
political ‘autonomy’ to the colonial and post-colonial world, something needed to be 
taken into account for a revolutionary strategy, As it was argued in Chapter I, the 
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clarification of the dialectic between the international and the national determines 
the concrete dynamics of domination and subalternization occurring locally; and the 
framework of uneven and combined development allows a conceptual space for a 
rejection of stageist conceptions of capitalist development, given the focus of the 
coevalness of non-contemporaries. In my view, it is Mariátegui’s insistence on the 
interweaving of international and national forces that oriented his method in a 
direction that would later bring to the forefront the potential synchronicity of 
modern socialism and the indigenous communities, as we will see in what follows.  
 The most canonical periodizations of Mariátegui’s work place the moment of 
the ‘nationalization’ of his thought by early 1925, with the publication of the article 
‘Peru’s Principal Problem’. Jorge Falcón famously declared this article to be the ‘first 
word’ of Seven Interpretive Essays (1978; see also Terán, 1985; 1986, ch. 6) insofar as it 
places the indigenous question at the centre of Mariátegui’s characterization of the 
particular conditions of class struggle in Peru. I contend here that such an idea of 
nationalization needs to be clarified, since the ‘finding’ of this principal problem 
demanded for Mariátegui an extended consideration of the dialectic between the 
international and national dimensions of social reality, far from the one-directional 
‘application’ of abstract conceptions. As he put it elsewhere: “the ethical function of 
the socialist idea is transformed in political or economic colonial peoples. In these 
peoples, socialism acquires by force of circumstances, without absolutely denying 
any of its principles, a nationalist attitude”. (1986: 100–01) The socialism which 
emerges in the imperialist conjuncture from the Global South carries out the 
distinction between internationalism and nationalism out to a higher synthesis. 
Such a synthesis is signalled by the ‘colour line’ as a concrete, worldwide political 
and ideological feature in the division of populations for monopoly capital’s sake.   
 The ‘Leninian intuition’ highlighted by Aricó can thus be read as the necessity 
for Marxism to re-characterize the North-South division, thus signalling a pathway 
to overcome the Eurocentrism that, however unwitting, characterized Marxism 
before the Russian Revolution. Remembering the fact that Mariátegui’s Seven 
Interpretive Essays is contemporaneous to Gramsci’s ‘The Southern Question’, Harry 
Harootunian (2015, ch. 3) argues that the idea of ‘South’ functions less as a 
geographical location captured into backwardness, and more as a particular 
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temporal register. And this interweaving of temporalities is what Mariátegui 
understood to be at the core of Peru’s primary problem.  
 
3. Peru’s Primary Problem 
The country that received Mariátegui when he returned to Lima in March 1923, after 
three and a half years of exile in Europe, was slightly different from the one he had 
left behind. Augusto B. Leguía had ruled Peru since 1919 in a term that will be 
known as the oncenio, that is, eleven years in office. During the oncenio, an initial 
‘honeymoon’ between his government and popular sectors had mutated by 1922 
into a more explicitly authoritarian and repressive attitude. Indeed, important 
sectors of the working class had initially adhered to his promises of true democracy 
and economic development; the students had even proclaimed him as the ‘Master 
(maestro) of the youth’; and in his first year in office the Patronage of the Indigenous 
Race (Patronato de la Raza Indígena) was created as a measn to incorporate 
indigenous issues into his administration –if in a merely corporativist fashion (cf. 
Cotler, 1988: 188).  
 Leguía’s oncenio is considered by historians such as Julio Cotler or Alberto 
Flores Galindo and Manuel Burga as the end of the ‘aristocratic republic’, an 
expression of the oligarchic pact characteristic of many nineteenth-century countries 
in Latin America. This moment witnessed the manifest breakdown of the unity that 
dominant groups had achieved during the previous thirty years. They argue that 
during the 1920s a deep reorganization of Peru’s productive structure began by 
means of the intensification of transference of capital from US, a concomitant 
increase in proletarianization, and an important countryside-to-city migration. 
Cotler (1988: 193ff) situates here the outset of ‘modern Peru’, when a fraction of the 
local bourgeoisie, eager to directly negotiate with imperialist capital, took control of 
the state apparatus through an active centralist policy, largely based on 
international loans.36 The author concludes that “the state became the thorough and 
refined expression of the exporter bourgeoisie” (1988: 186). On the other hand, 
                                                          
36  Flores Galindo and Burga (1980: 230) add that, during this term, the Peruvian public 
debt increased by 1000 per cent, an amount that Cotler (1988: 196) reckons to approximately 
100 million dollars; conversely, the interest of the external debt increased from 2,6 to 21 per 
cent of the national budget between 1920 and 1930. 
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either by cooptation or open repression, the organized proletariat had lost by 1923 
the political initiative displayed during the popular strikes of the biennium 1918-
1919. From those mass-demonstrations demanding the eight-hour working day and 
the lowering of the prices of subsistence goods, the Peruvian working class suffered 
an ebb to more rearguard positions. 
 In this context, the students were perhaps the most active social force, 
particularly with the creation of the UPGP in 1920, in the wave of the University 
Reform movement. The University Reform – whose initial outburst took place in 
Córdoba in 1918 – was a continental movement for democratization of academic 
institutions, at that time a meeting point for a young generation of intellectuals 
committed to politics in a new fashion. As a movement largely based on new 
middle classes arising from within the modernization processes, these social actors 
suffered unprecedented forms of precariousness and marginalization that 
contributed to their engagement with public, political activities in a newer fashion 
(cf. Rama, 1996, ch. 4 and 5). In the discourse of the 1921 First International 
Conference of Students in Mexico City, Gabriel del Mazo (the leader of the reformist 
movement in Argentina) affirmed that “it is mandatory for students to establish 
popular universities, freed of any dogmatic and partisan spirit and that take part in 
the workers’ struggles, inspiring their actions in the modern postulates of social 
justice…”(cited in Melgar Bao, 1999: 44) In Peru, and despite the fact that these 
organizations were – to a certain extent and at the outset – sponsored by Leguía 
himself, they soon became the place where the opposition to his government started 
to ferment. The head of the Peruvian universities at the time was Víctor Raúl Haya 
de la Torre (1895-1979). 
 Soon after his return to Peru, Mariátegui started to collaborate with Haya de la 
Torre, first in the UPGP’s talks and then taking charge of the journal Claridad – the 
organ of the Peruvian Student Union – after Haya’s exile in 1923.37 The increasing 
state repression eventually led to the closing down of the journal, while the UPGP 
went on working but in a semi-clandestine guise. In parallel, a stronger alliance 
                                                          
37  One of the linchpins of the so-called ‘new generation’ in Latin America was the 
proliferation of magazines named Claridad (thereby emulating Henri Barbusse’s Clarté) and 
the foundation of popular universities (universidades populares) in countries such as Cuba, 
México, Puerto Rico, Guatemala, Panamá, Perú, Chile and Argentina. For an account of the 
impact of the University reform during the 1920s in Latin America, see Patricia Funes (2006). 
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between the activists exiled by Leguía and those who stayed in the country began to 
forge a project in which Latin American revolution was placed at the centre of 
Peru’s politics. The confluence between the clarification of the country’s primary 
problem and the continuity of Latin America’s situation in the world setting gave 
life to the American Popular-Revolutionary Alliance, APRA. The conformation of 
this organization was made public in 1925 by Peruvian exiles in Mexico led by 
Haya, with the active participation of Mariátegui and other Peru-based militants.38 
 
The United Front and the APRA Project 
The tactic of the united front was proclaimed by the Third International from 1921 
and corroborated in its 1924 Fourth Congress. In May 1924, Mariátegui wrote the 
short article ‘May Day and the United Front’, saluting the working class on its day, 
and giving a synthetic formulation of the matter: “[b]efore the perhaps inevitable 
hour of division, it is up to us to complete much common work, much shared 
labour” (2011: 342). The main aim of such a common labour – to provide the 
Peruvian proletariat a more definite class consciousness – is decomposed by 
Mariátegui into three general orientations: to distance the working class from 
‘yellow assemblies’, to fight against reaction, and to defend the organs of ‘popular 
culture’ (i.e. proletariat organizations and press). Mariátegui immediately adds a 
more concrete one: “[w]e all have the obligation of sustaining the vindications of the 
enslaved and oppressed Indigenous race” (Ibid.).  These are the elementary 
historical tasks to be embraced by the Peruvian vanguard in the actual stage of its 
formation; elementary means here basic and thus prior to any ideological or 
doctrinaire consideration: 
The united front […] is a contingent, concrete, practical action. The 
program of the united front only considers the immediate reality, outside of 
any abstraction and of any utopia. Recommending the united front is 
not, then, recommending any ideological confusion. Inside the united 
front everyone should keep his own affiliation and his own ideology. 
(Ibid., emphasis added) 
                                                          
38  For an account on the significance of the exile in the formation of APRA, see Martín 
Bergel (2009); see also Ricardo Melgar Bao (2003). 
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Insisting on the ‘concrete’ character of the united front, Mariátegui argues that: “[t]o 
form a united front is to have an attitude of solidarity before a concrete problem, before 
an urgent necessity. […] What is important is that these groups and tendencies 
know how to understand each other before the concrete reality of the day”. (2011: 
343) This emphasis on the concrete might be read as the dialectical unity of 
international and national class solidarity and consciousness. Mariátegui 
enumerates some abstract, very general instances –class solidarity and 
consciousness, defence of workers’ organizations, joint fight against reaction– and 
then introduces what he himself will call some months later Peru’s principal 
problem: the enslaved and oppressed Indigenous race as the country’s central 
conflict.  
 Therefore, Mariátegui understood that without the international perspective 
the Peruvian working class remains blind to its own conditions of possibilities to 
actually and effectively participate in the world revolution; conversely, without an 
attentive and active commitment to the most urgent problems of its own national 
reality and its subaltern subjects, it remains groundless and thus lacking 
‘hegemonic’ ability, to put it with Gramsci. Hence, in the context of the uneven and 
combined development of a capitalist system driven by imperialist forces, the tactic 
of the united front has to be situated in the socio-racial oppression of Peru’s and 
other Latin American indigenous populations. Indigeneity becomes thus the locus 
of an emergent revolutionary politics which needs in turn be nationalized, 
grounded in a concrete terrain under the guidance of anti-imperialist socialism. 
National hegemony, in this sense, functions as the action that synchronizes two 
different but coeval temporalities: the archaic Indian and the modern proletariat. 
 This understanding of the dialectics of the cosmopolitan and the 
autochthonous is apparent in the history of what was perhaps Mariátegui’s most 
ambitious project. As recounted by Fernanda Beigel (2006: 181ff) and Jorge 
Coronado (2009: 26–9), the initial name given to his much-dreamed journal was 
Vanguardia. However, by the suggestion of indigenista painter José Sabogal (who 
would eventually paint its most iconic cover-pages), it was called Amauta, a 
Quechua word which means teacher, poet, or wise person –but also the one who 
transmits a certain worldview, the translator. The choice of this name demanded an 
explanation which was provided in its first editorial sheet: “This title translated our 
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affiliation to the Race, it reflects our homage to Inkaism. But with this journal the 
word Amauta acquires a new meaning. We are going to create it anew. […] we will 
always consider Peru within the world scenario.” (Maria tegui, 1987: 239) In 
consequence, from its very name the journal presents itself as a translational 
endeavour which advocates for the encounter of modern revolutionary classes with 
indigenous traditions –in other words, a translation through a recreated tradition.  
 Such a recreation, conversely, will depend on building a new collective subject 
– a vanguard – through what Mariátegui foresaw as a process of “polarization and 
concentration”. This process – arguably the projected consolidation of the united 
front as such – will partially take place in Amauta itself, at least in its more abstract 
issues: 
The work of the journal will set us in solidarity further. At time it will 
attract other good elements, it will dispel some of the floating and 
apathetic who now flirt with the vanguard […] Amauta will winnow the 
vanguard’s men – militants and sympathizers – until it separates the 
wheat from the chaff. It will produce or precipitate a phenomenon of 
polarization and concentration. (Ibid.) 
The images used by Mariátegui in this passage project forth a kind of chemical 
force-field where, in the process of presenting definitions and their attendant 
polemics, some elements are attracted (concentrated) while others are dispelled 
(polarized). To be sure, the multi-faceted character of Amauta contributed to this 
action-and-reaction process. Among the recurrent themes of the magazine, it is 
worth mentioning: educational issues, in particular regarding to the aftermaths and 
continuing significance of University reform; the nature and function of artistic 
production; the national question in Latin America, related to the nature of 
imperialism and the struggle against it, as well as the forms of struggle in countries 
with massive indigenous populations; and the philosophical implications of 
contemporary discoveries such as the unconscious, spatio-temporal relativity, or 
aesthetic techniques of representation. From its fifth issue the journal included a 
section headed ‘The trial against gamonalismo’, which aimed to denounce situations 
affecting the Indians. It remains to be said that Mariátegui published in Amauta 
more than half of the Seven Interpretive Essays, including significant parts of the 
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essays on Peru’s economy (first), the land’s problem (third), public education 
(fourth), regionalism and centralism (sixth), and literature on trial (seventh). Finally, 
the journal was one of the locates in which the ‘polemic over indigenismo’ took place. 
 
The Polemic over Indigenismo 
This polemic constitutes an important chapter in Peru’s intellectual history. Initiated 
in Amauta’s pages, it brought together a wide range of opinions and statements on 
the nature, current status and possible solutions to the oppressed condition of the 
Indians. The main contenders in the polemic were Mariátegui and Luis Alberto 
Sánchez –the later a promising intellectual at that time, later related to both APRA 
and Haya de la Torre. Among other participants in the polemic, there were Enrique 
López Albújar, Luis Emilio Valcárcel, José Agustín Escalante, Antenor Orrego, 
Ventura García Calderón, Manuel González, and Manuel Seoane.39  
 Yet, what should be understood here by indigenismo? Mirko Lauer (1997) 
asserts that there existed in the period 1919-1940 two kinds of indigenista discourse 
in the Andes. On the one hand, there was a socio-political discourse championing 
the integration of the indigenous population in all aspects of social life. On the 
other, there was an aesthetic-cultural current whose aim was to incorporate the 
main elements of the indigenous cultural traditions (literature, painting and 
drawing, sculpture and weaving, music, archaeology and museography) in the 
country’s cultural landscape. Mariátegui sought to connect both the aesthetical-
cultural and the political-social elements, so as to propose ‘the Indian’ as the central 
element of the national reconstruction.   
 A brief summary of the polemic’s antecedents is in order. In issues 4 and 5 of 
Amauta, Enrique López Albújar’s “On the Indian Psychology” and Luis Emilio 
Valcárcel’s “The Indigenous Problem” were published. At the same time, 
Mariátegui submitted to Mundial the series of articles ‘Indigenism in National 
Literature’ – in three instalments that will later comprise the section of ‘Literature on 
Trial’ that deals with indigenist literature. López Albújar (1976) depicted the Indian 
                                                          
39  A compilation of the main articles and columns written with regard to this debate was 
published in Manuel Aquézolo comp. (1976). See also Gerardo Leibner (1999) and Jorge 
Coronado (2009, ch. 2). 
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as two-faced, that is, she shows one face to ‘civilization’ and mistis (white people) 
and a different one towards themselves. Conversely, in a manifesto-like pamphlet 
Valcárcel represented in turn a ‘mestizo Arequipa’: in the mixture of the Indian and 
the European, the latter constitutes the decadent part, while the former boosts a 
“new social status”. He set together Gandhi’s active non-violence, Sorel’s myth of 
general strike, and Bolshevism (“the dictatorship of indigenous proletariat seeks its 
Lenin”) to advance what he called an ‘Andean doctrine’ (“doctrina andinista”), an 
effort at “aboriginal ideology” (1976: 26). Such a positive account of the indigenous 
character contrasts with López Albújar’s, for whom the external face of the Indian – 
allegedly the only we can see and know – reflects a dishonest, thieving, 
superstitious, materialistic, and potentially treacherous nature; other features 
highlighted by the author are collective spirit, warrior nature, Spinozist-like 
pantheism, and addiction to coca leaf. 
 Mariátegui, in turn, offered in the pages of Mundial a general survey of the 
indigenista ‘literature’ produced over the recent period. In his account, the Indian 
comes to represent not a local or ethnographic colour but the very possibility of 
speaking of the Peruvian nation; the Indian is thus irreducible to a more abstract 
concept of the national, such as literary criollismo: “In Peru, criollismo has not only 
been sporadic and superficial, but it has been nourished on colonial sentiment. It 
has not been an affirmation of autonomy. […] Our indigenism (nativismo), which is 
also necessary for revolution and emancipation, cannot be a simple criollismo.” 
(Mariátegui, 1974: 271) Crollismo had been Luis Alberto Sánchez’s designation for 
the more authentic moment of national letters (1921; 1974; cf. also Costigan, 1994). In 
Mariátegui’s view, the definition of the ‘national character’ derived from this 
attribution only contributes to blur indigenous expressions, by means of an 
amalgamation of elements typical of miscegenation ideologies. Sanchez addressed 
the issue against Mariátegui in unusually aggressive terms, pointing out the absurd 
and barely constructive contours of the polemic and the non-sense in the coupling 
of indigenismo and socialism. Mariátegui’s counter-argument, in turn, expressed that 
from the confluence or amalgamation of ‘indigenismo’ and ‘socialism’, no 
one who looks at the content and essence of things can be surprised. 
Socialism organizes and defines the vindications of the masses, of the 
working class. And in Peru the masses –the working class– are four-
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fifths indigenous. Our socialism would not be, thus, Peruvian –nor 
would it even be socialism– if it did not primarily support indigenous 
claims (1986: 217). 
Sánchez’s reply came in a more virulent fashion, echoing the idea according to 
which socialism operates by means of opportunistically taking up local discomfort 
in order to channel its own power ambitions. Mariátegui’s next intervention was 
thus oriented to further define the socialist content of the claims:  
The vindication that we argue for is that of labour. It is that of the 
working classes, without distinction between coast and highlands, 
Indian or cholo. If in this debate – that is, in theory – we distinguish the 
problem of the Indian, it is because in practice it is also differentiated in 
the facts. The urban worker is a proletarian; the Indian peasant is still a 
serf. […] The primary problem that has to be solved here is, 
consequently, the liquidation of feudality whose expressions are two: 
latifundium and servitude. If we do not recognize the priority of this 
problem, yes it would be right, then, to accuse us of not being tied to 
Peruvian reality (2011: 176, trans. modified; cf. Maria  tegui, 1986: 222) 
In my view, the significance of the polemic lies in the recognition of the ‘colour line’ 
that cuts across Peru’s class struggle, permeating the so-called ‘superstructural’ 
spheres such as literature and linking the Indian cause to socialism. The anti-Indian 
stance characteristic of Peru’s entire history is, in Mariátegui’s view, an index of the 
sensitivity of the country’s superstructures to those of the imperialist conjuncture. 
On the other hand, the amalgamation of national and socialist tasks is a hallmark of 
the intuition of uneven and combined development that informs (albeit implicitly) 
Mariátegui’s Marxism, drawing the lines along which contemporary battles for 
social emancipation were expressed through indigenous, subaltern elements. A 
close attention to vital cultural forces made apparent, in Mariátegui’s account, their 
potential confluence with socialism, a possibility funded for instance in the affinities 
between political and aesthetic vanguards of the time – indigenismo. It is as though 
Mariategui endows the Indian, presented hitherto as a monolithic and singular 
entity, both with the role of grounding and completing the nation, and of sharing 
the socialist paths of the working class.  
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 By means of this debate, the prospects of the united front found a pathway of 
‘concentration’ in the searching for a deeper dialogue between socialism and 
indigenismo, while ‘polarizing’ itself from those positions reactive to comprehend 
such an encounter. Therefore, the polemic over indigenismo constituted a decisive 
step in the maturation of a hegemonic will – understood as the attempt to 
synchronize the temporal lag separating the archaic and the modern. The terms of 
the debate were: the validity of the convergence of indigenismo and socialism in 
political-revolutionary terms; the valuation of the pre-colonial period as source of 
national elements, and the parallel criticism of the colonial and republican epochs; 
the consideration of the indigenous community as traceable back to the pre-colonial 
period; and finally, the possibility for the Indian, as a subject, to be the pivotal 
element of national reconstruction –rather than one of its discrete components and 
hence subordinated to a more abstract representation such as ‘criollismo’ (in 
literature) or miscegenation (in socio-racial terms).    
 
Images from the Inka Empire 
The major part of the 1920s indigenista literature offered a vision of pre-colonial 
times as a period of splendid material and cultural growth, presenting an idyllic 
view of the Inka Empire. Mariátegui and Haya, along with Valcárcel and other 
members of the new generation, upheld what historian Juan José Villarías (1998: 
306) calls the Campanella/Prescott economic model of the Tawantinsuyo. 
Supported upon canonical accounts written in colonial times, this model sustains 
the communist or socialist character of the Inka period. In Villarías’ account, 
Tomasso Campanella’s 1609 La ciudad del sol is the classic work in which the Inka 
people is presented as ‘noble savages’, following Michel de Montaigne’s essays. This 
view will be followed by William Prescott’s 1847 A History of the Conquest of Peru. 
Villarías relates the popularity of such a model to the decline of classic 
evolutionism.  
 There was nonetheless an alternative model at that time: the ‘Smith/Cunow’ 
model, which questioned the apologetic visions of the Inkas and stressed instead 
shortages in livestock for the common population, lack of technological advances, 
and the despotic rule displayed over non-Inka tribes (cf. Sobrevilla, 2005: 301). 
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Based on Adam Smith’s reflections on America’s role in the formation of the world 
market, as well as on the anthropology of Lewis Morgan, Heinrich Cunow’s Die 
Soziale Verfassung der Inkareichs (‘The Social Organization of the Inca Empire’, of 
1896) attempted to demonstrate that the alleged singularity of the empire was more 
related to the agrarian communism that preceded the empire than to the virtues of 
the Inka’s polity (cf. Burga, 2005: 207ff). And nonetheless, the paucity of direct data 
from Inka or pre-Inka ages, and the fact that almost everything of the written and 
said about the topic pertains to post-Conquest times, makes the whole controversy 
seem more a matter of the discussants’ projections than a proper research subject. 
Villarías concludes his survey that the reality of Inka empire has actually turned 
into the reality of the discussion about it.40  
 Peruvian historian Alberto Flores Galindo’s Buscando un Inca (‘Searching for 
an Inka’) offers another register for looking into this subject. Echoing Mariátegui’s 
focus on the indigenous ‘myth’ of the restoration of Tawantinsuyo, he reconstructs 
the formation of an Andean utopia crystallized in the figure of the ‘return of the 
Inca’, named Pachakutec or Pachakuti. Pachakutec, Pachacuti, or Pachakutiq, was the 
Inka ruler Yupanki, the builder of the Tawantinsuyu empire ruling over the Cuzco 
valley and beyond until the Spanish conquest. Yupanki gave himself the name of 
Pachakutiq, which means ‘reverser of the world’. The myth of Pachakuteq or the 
return of the Inka is read by Flores Galindo as the restoration of the Tawantinsuyu.   
 In this sense, “Inka” – Flores Galindo adverts – “means ordering idea or 
principle”, the end of chaos and darkness. This restoration utopia has been forged as 
imaginary reaction to colonial and post-colonial living conditions; “previously, the 
Andean past was reconstructed and transformed in the memory in order to be 
converted in an alternative to the present. This is a distinctive feature of Andean 
utopia.” (1987: 49) The power of such a utopia becomes manifest in the apparent 
contradiction which it generates: “A relatively short period in Andean history, 
during which state coercion was imposed upon peoples and regions, was converted 
into a prolonged time in which starvation did not exist, goods were equitably 
                                                          
40  This implies, as Silvia Tieffemberg (2003) asserts, that the Inca empire becomes “an 
object which begins to gestate from colonial discursive practices, of clear European 
enunciation, in the second half of the 16th century”.  
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shared and epidemic calamities were not borne. An inverted image of the colonial 
world.” (1987: 88)  
 This was indeed the foundational memory of the 1770 Tupac Amaru II 
rebellion, considered by Flores Galindo as the “culmination or highest point of a 
cycle of rebellions” (1987: 109) against the ruling order, and which continued during 
the early 20th century in other historical yet quasi-mythical figures such as Rumi 
Maqui in 1915.41 After the repression of Tupac Amaru’s outburst – Flores Galindo 
concludes – the extent to which this utopian belief spread among Indians across 
regions, ethnic differences and lifestyles remains an index not only of the cultural 
standardization that affected this population, but also the material evenness 
produced once the colonial indigenous aristocracy was made to disappear. From 
then onwards, “Indian and peasant were synonymous; later both terms would be 
equivalent to savages, opposed to civilization and Western world” (Flores Galindo, 
1987: 237) The topic of myth is the subject of our next chapter; let us simply note 
here that the homogeneous condition attributed in Mariátegui’s appellation to ‘the 
Indian’ is grounded on these considerations. 
 Roughly speaking, Haya and Mariátegui shared what Villarías names the 
Campanella/Prescott model of the Tawantinsuyo as a form of primitive 
communism,42 at a time when Marx’s notion of ‘Asiatic mode of production’ was 
not yet widespread. However, when further specified this similar approach 
evidences two different ways in which the image of the Inka Empire is mobilized. 
While Haya pointedly highlighted the state organization achieved during the Inka 
period, Mariátegui sought to stress the communitarian and collective features of its 
people, still present in and acting upon the country’s forms of sociality. Haya 
compared, for instance, the Andean ayllu to the Russian mir saying that:  
                                                          
41  Mariátegui offered an early account on the figure of Major Teodomiro Gutiérrez, alias 
Rumi Maqui (‘stone hand’ in Quechua) in his 1915 article for La Prensa ‘The Condor Passing’; 
a later reference of 1929, in Mariátegui (2011: 320). 
42  This was also the conception of Rosa Luxemburg: “it was not the devotion to abstract 
principles of equality and freedom that was the basis of primitive communism, but the 
pitiless necessities of a less developed human civilization, the helplessness of humanity in 
the face of nature, which forced them to stick closely together in larger alliances, and to act 
methodically and collectively with respect to labor and to the struggle for life as an absolute 
collective condition of existence.” In Peru, Luxemburg concludes, “one communistic 
community established itself as the exploiter of another.” (2004: 78–9) The similarity between 
this approach and Mariátegui’s shall become evident in what follows. 
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In their eagerness to Russify Indo-America, some people opine that ayllu 
is the same as Russian Mir. The parallel is superficial, one-sided, and 
false. In Inka communism there are two fundamental aspects: that of 
primitive communism proper, similar to patriarchal communism of Asia 
and Europe, and the organization of that primitive communism […] in a 
vast political and economic system. (1977b: 206)  
In contradistinction to other developments from collectivism to private 
appropriation, the historical singularity of this social organism rests on the fact that 
Inka’s “primitive communism becomes an economic and political system. The Inca 
system does not base itself on private property” (Ibid.). In Haya’s account, the stage 
of primitive communism was elevated by the Inka state to a superior category. 
 Mariátegui’s attention, on the other hand, focused not so much on state-
communism but rather on ayllu communities. In the first part of Seven Interpretive 
Essays, the pre-colonial period is described as a state that basically allowed, even 
fostered, the relative economic autonomy and self-subsistence of these 
communities.43 To have sustained its own vigour on the ayllu appears for Mariátegui 
as the Inkas’ central virtue: “The ayllu –the community– was the nucleus of the 
empire. The Incas unified and created the empire, but they did not create its 
nucleus. […] The Incas did not disrupt anything.” (1974: 75–76) I argue that 
Mariátegui’s was the attempt to make visible the indigenous affinities to socialism 
from the point of view of the cultural memories embodied in the collective forms and 
taking the form of ayllu communities. Alberto Flores Galindo (1991: 76) and Miguel 
Mazzeo (2009 ch. 1 and 2) argue that the Essays’ hallmark lies in the 
acknowledgment of the ‘elements of practical socialism’ present in Peru’s social 
structure. The concept appears in the third essay (‘The Problem of Land’) when, 
dismissing liberal solutions to the agrarian and Indian questions, Mariátegui asserts: 
“Aside from reasons of doctrine, I consider that our agrarian problem has a special 
character due to an indisputable and concrete factor: the survival of the Indian 
                                                          
43  Mariátegui’s image of the Inka Empire exalts the features already mentioned by the 
historical evidence at hand: people there “… lived in material comfort. With abundant food 
their population increased. […] Although the collectivist organization directed by the Incas 
had weakened the Indians’ individual initiative, it had instilled in them the habit of a 
humble and religious obedience to social duty, which benefited the economic system. The 
Incas derived as much social utility as possible from this trait. […] Collective work and 
common effort were employed fruitfully for social purposes.” (1974: 3–4) 
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‘community’ and of elements of practical socialism in indigenous agriculture and 
life.” (1974: 33)  
 Peruvian sociologist Hildebrando Castro Pozo’s Our Indigenous Community 
(1924) is profusely used in Mariátegui’s examination of the present status of such 
social form. Castro Pozo did not pretend to trace its origins or to answer whether or 
not the nature of this community has been altered from pre-colonial times; rather, 
his intention is to hold a systematic account of its present-day status. The still 
existing ayllu exhibits in this account two main features: collective property of land, 
and kinship bonds that tie different families that belong to it. Mariátegui further 
enumerates the myriad of forms that correspond to those features: “First –
agricultural communities. Second –agricultural and livestock communities. Third – 
communities of pasture lands and watering places. Fourth –communities that have 
the use of the land” (1974: 57), all of which amounts to the following conclusion: 
These differences have developed not through the natural evolution or 
degeneration of the ancient ‘community’, but as a result of legislation 
aimed at the individualization of property and, especially, as a result of 
the expropriation of communal land for the latifundium. They 
demonstrate, therefore, the vitality of the Indian ‘community’, which 
invariably reacts by modifying its forms of cooperation and association. 
The Indian, in spite of one hundred years of republican legislation, has 
not become an individualist. And this is not because he resists progress, 
as is claimed by his detractors. (Ibid.) 
The vitality exhibited by these associative ways of worlding is associated here to the 
contemporary entanglement of social elements that have survived to liberal state 
policies as well as to extra-legal appropriation of land by large landowners. The 
ayllu embodies their historical continuum: “in Indian villages […] hardy and 
stubborn habits of cooperation and solidarity still survive that are the empirical 
expression of a communist spirit. The ‘community’ is the instrument of this spirit” 
(1974: 58). The contemporaneous character of such ‘spirit’ makes the ayllu a living 
organism supplied with “unmistakable potentialities for evolution and 
development.” (1974: 56) It is worth noticing the similarity of this formulation with 
77 
 
Marx’s evaluation of the future of the Russian commune, as displayed in 
unpublished texts that could not be known at Mariátegui’s times (cf. Marx, 1983).  
 In consequence, Flores Galindo correctly concludes that the contrast between 
Haya de la Torre and Mariátegui puts into evidence two different strategies of 
mobilization of the Inka images: what appears in the former as focus on the state 
organization, let’s say, from above, becomes in the latter the grassroots constitution 
of a society of producers that remains actualized in present times, at least in its 
crucial components (in ‘spirit’). This difference was indeed mirrored in the 
progressive divergence of political strategies that Haya and Mariátegui displayed, 
as we will see immediately. What this account shows is a strategy in which past-
images are instrumental in legitimizing a state-based political project (Haya’s), and 
a different one in which the past is read from present-day demands, that is, from the 
urgencies of the actuality of revolution. In a 1924 article, Mariátegui explained that 
“the ability to comprehend the past is in solidarity with the ability to feel the present 
and to disquiet of the future. The modern man [sic] is not only who has further 
progressed in the reconstruction of what already was, but also who has most 
advanced the forecast of what will be.” (1986: 33) This is the guiding perspective of 
his examination of the potential synchronization between Indian memories and 
socialist horizons. 
 
4. Haya and Mariátegui: On the Rhythms of Capitalist Development   
 
Modern Feudalism… or Semi-Feudalism? 
Haya and Mariátegui also shared the consideration of feudalism as a social model 
imported to Latin America by Spanish conquest, superimposed upon and 
eventually spoiling the former setting of primitive communism. In Haya’s terms, 
“[t]he conquest brings a new system, but cannot extinguish the former. Imported 
feudalism does not accomplish a task of integral evolution. It is juxtaposed to the 
autonomous system and becomes coexistent with it.” (1977b: 200–01) By means of 
the independence revolutions, the emancipated feudal class captured political 
power by economic reasons, mirroring the capitalist classes of central countries; 
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however, it “preserves the feudal type of social organization, adds free trade to it, 
and adapts republican regimes –copies of the European revolutionary methods of 
the period– to its new autonomous organisms.” Feudalism is thus the social system 
that characterizes Latin America well until current times, when imperialist 
capitalism comes to reinforce the it: “British imperialism first and North American 
[…] have more and more heavily laced up the feudal apparatus of our countries.” 
(Ibid.) 
 Conversely, Mariátegui in the Essays uses the term ‘semi-feudalism’ along 
with, and perhaps confusingly with, that of feudalism. I argue that the idea of semi-
feudalism is here not so much an analytical category, but rather a form of 
relativizing or suspending the meaning of the notion of ‘feudalism’ itself, so as to try 
a new usage. In other words, the reference to semi-feudalism is projected upon the 
“feudalism of the gamonales” (1974: 22), a very specific and concrete phenomenon, as 
we will see immediately. Consequently, it should not to be translated into any 
general category. This is implicitly asserted in the following comparison: “Within 
European feudalism, the elements of growth –the factors of town life– were, in spite 
of the rural economy, much greater than within Creole semi-feudalism.” (1974: 18, 
trans. modified) Although unsystematically, Mariátegui tried to keep distance from 
straightforward usages implying similarities among evidently dissimilar processes, 
taking instead into consideration the concrete particularities of each situation.  
 One of the most particular features of Peru’s social system at Mariátegui’s 
time rested on ‘gamonalismo’. Flores Galindo explains that the etymological root of 
the word comes from gamonito, a plant that lives parasitically from other plants and 
trees. Flores Galindo goes on to explain that “The term ‘gamonal’ is a Peruvianism 
coined during the last [i.e., nineteenth] century, which searched to establish a simile 
between a parasitic plant and the landowners. […] The term designated the 
existence of the local power: the privatization of politics, the fragmentation of 
control and its exercising at the town- or province-scale.”  In this vein, Mariátegui 
gives the term a broader analytical meaning:  
The term gamonalismo designates more than just a social and economic 
category: that of the latifundistas and large landowners. It signifies a 
whole phenomenon. Gamonalismo is represented not only by the 
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gamonales but by a long hierarchy of officials, intermediaries, agents, 
parasites, and so forth. The literate Indian who enters the service of 
gamonalismo turns into an exploiter of his own race. The central factor of 
the phenomenon is the hegemony of the semi-feudal landed estate in the 
policy and mechanism of the government. (1974: 30) 
Gamonalismo as social phenomenon lasted in Peru until well into the second half of 
the past century. Jesús Chavarría (1979: 115) has argued that it corresponds to the 
point of intersection of class and race in Peru. Jorge Oshiro points out in turn that it 
was a practice at once oppressive and integrative, and that in this ambivalence rest 
its importance. On the one hand, gamonalismo is the tyrannical exercise of power 
upon the Indian, either by the landowner or by one of his foremen –  not 
infrequently an indigenous person. The latter, a sort of “second-type gamonal” 
(Oshiro, 2013: 435) – the subaltern who nonetheless oppresses his fellows – appears 
on the other hand as “the true nexus for the oligarchy to control the indigenous 
masses” (2013: 436). This second-type gamonal was affectively tied to the indigenous 
culture; not only that: the more the gamonal identified himself with the Indian, the 
more he was eager to oppress him or her.  
 Gamonalismo can be seen in consequence as a form of integration and 
subalternisation at the same time; for Oshiro, it was paradoxically “the only social 
instance where Hispanic and indigenous cultures were relatively integrated, which 
is why it enjoyed a sort of consent by those it exploited themselves.” (Ibid.) As one 
might say today, it was a form of biopolitical power – not just an economic or social 
subjection – insofar as it performed and was performed by corporal and subjective 
dispositions of the agents, beyond their class or ethnic adscription.44  
 Given the dominance of landowners and gamonales, both Mariátegui’s and 
Haya’s accounts consider the nineteenth century’s revolutions of independence in 
Latin America as events close to what Gramsci termed ‘passive revolutions’, that is, 
revolutions from above, without popular participation.45 In the Essays, Mariátegui 
                                                          
44   José María Arguedas’ novel Todas las Sangres, published in 1964, remains perhaps 
the best literary representation of this institution.  
45  In reference to the Italian process, Gramsci explained that “the historical fact that 
popular is missing from the development of Italian history, as well as the fact that ‘progress’ 
occurs as the reaction of the dominant classes to the sporadic and incoherent rebelliousness 
of the popular masses –a reaction consisting in ‘restorations’ that agree to some parts of the 
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explains that the independence war “was another political event. It, too, did not 
bring about a radical transformation in the economic and social structure of Peru: 
but it initiated, notwithstanding, another period of our history.” (1974: 29) The 
period initiated by these independence wars took the form of a revolution from 
above which did not radically alter the economic structure of these countries, and 
that has implied in Latin America the postponement of national and democratic 
demands. The non-resolved tasks supposedly attached to a bourgeois revolution – 
the liquidation of large land estates, the liberation of the peasants from bondage, 
and the consequent democratization of the nation – remain for both Mariátegui and 
Haya the most urgent issues to be solved in these countries. 
 
Haya de la Torre: Imperialism as ‘Arrhythmic’ Capitalism 
Passive revolutions are thus the historical background for imperialist penetration in 
Latin America. In Haya’s account, imperialist forces acquire in these countries the 
role of class-interests and impulses, thus replacing a proper bourgeois class. 
Therefore, under imperialism the bourgeoisie remains “an ‘invisible’ class. It is the 
same big bourgeoisie of powerful distant countries”. Consequently, “imperialism 
fulfils in them [Latin American countries] the function that the grand bourgeoisie 
does in the economically more highly developed countries.” (1977a: 152) Local 
oligarchies, largely embedded in feudal strata, take up the interests of imperialist 
capitals and match them with their own. As a consequence, Latin American 
productive forces are arrested in this imbalance, brought to a standstill, with no 
ability to unleash the enormous wealth of the continent, thus retarding the 
development of its peoples. If capitalism – Haya goes on – is the rule of the anarchy 
of production, imperialism represents such anarchy but exacerbated a fact that 
amounts to slowing down the Latin American economic structures. 
 This perspective is not far from a certain evolutionist Marxism, in which a 
stageist succession of economic phases is required for a country to be ‘ripe’ for a 
socialist revolution. Arguing for the historical necessity of capitalism, Haya declares 
that “the proletarian, socialist revolution will come later. It will come when our 
                                                                                                                                                                    
popular demands and are therefore ‘progressive restorations’, or ‘revolutions-restorations’, 
or even ‘passive revolutions’” (2011: 252; see also Thomas, 2010: 145–46) 
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proletariat is a distinct and mature class, able to lead by itself the transformation of 
our peoples. But this will not occur until much later.” (1977b: 154) Nonetheless, 
Haya distances himself from Marxism, particularly from its Leninist version, setting 
out instead a ‘neo-Marxist’ thesis: imperialism would be not the last but the first 
stage of capitalism in Latin America. In a decisive passage, he explains that “what is 
in Europe ‘the last stage of capitalism’, in Indo-America proves to be the first one. 
For our peoples, the immigrated or imported capital sets the initial stage of their 
modern capitalist age”. The central critical reference here is, of course, Lenin’s 
Imperialism (1996 [1917]). About that pamphlet, however, Haya seems to be only 
concerned with the image of a sequential order cast by Lenin’s work, and barely, if 
at all, with the argument about imperialism’s global mechanisms (cf. 1977b: 18–9). 
‘Imported’ by imperialism to Indo-America in a process that combines economic 
exploitation and national subjugation, capitalism has been the source of distortions 
in what could otherwise be a ‘normal’ development: imported capitalism provokes 
“the dual character of our economy, which imperialism splits in two intensities, two 
rhythms, two modes of production –the backward national one and the accelerated 
imperialist one” (1977b: 24).  
  Haya proposes a sui-generis perspective on capitalist development while 
claiming the necessity of what Marx called its ‘harsh tributes’. The Peruvian leader 
explains that “the capitalist system, of which imperialism is the highest expression 
of plenitude, represents a mode of production and a degree of economic 
organization superior to all the rest the world has known before, and in 
consequence the capitalist form is a necessary step, an inevitable period in the 
process of contemporary civilization” (1977b: 16) The crucial problem for Latin 
American countries is situated in the non-linear and therefore ‘uneven’ 
development, evident in what he suggestively calls the violent juxtaposition of 
economic systems. (1977b: 155) The conclusion drawn from this perspective is worth 
citing at length:  
Two kinds of economy –two speeds, two economic intensities– interplay 
in Indo-American social life. One forming part of the system of big 
capitalism, subject to a more intense rhythm, whose origin and 
command are alien to us; and the other forming our own slower and 
incipient kind of national development. Within the large capitalist 
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system, the latter represents the distant stage of the initial paths; the 
former, the culminating and powerful forms of modern plenitude and 
overflow. Thesis and antithesis which impose a synthesis of equilibrium 
and freedom within the plan of a new Indo-American economy, not 
excluded from the worldwide economic-social evolution, but capable of 
halting forever imperialism’s subjugation and oppression. 
In order to achieve such a synthesis of equilibrium and freedom, a 
double and simultaneous task is mandatory –to boost and accelerate the 
evolution in those backward zones of our economy; to vigorously and 
definitively stop and reject imperialism’s progresses. (1977b: 215)  
Robert Paris (1984: 5) has acutely noted that this ‘first stage’ thesis brings to mind 
the ongoing rapacity of capitalist forces in the ‘periphery’, putting into evidence the 
present nature of an everlasting process of primitive accumulation – what Roger 
Bartra called “permanent primitive accumulation” (1993: 33). Primitive 
accumulation does not represent a stage of capitalism left behind in time, but its 
present time in so-called backward zones of the globe, notably in the Global South. 
However, I contend that the sentence has also another meaning in Haya’s 
perspective, one which refers to the necessity of a certain degree of foreign capital as 
a salutary, even necessary fact in order to boost the productive forces in these 
countries. “Let’s repeat” – Haya says – that “within the dialectic of the world 
capitalist system, our countries have no possible liberation. Imperialism is a stage of 
capitalism –as I have already repeated, it is the culminating one. Our countries are 
in the first stages of capitalism or going toward them.” (1977b: 156) Therefore, in the 
political discourse of Haya de la Torre there lies a manifest deep ambiguity about 
the role of foreign capital as capital, something which conversely undermines his 
criticism to imperialist capitalism: “it is necessary to combat imperialism, but certain 
doses of it seem to be required…” (Ibid.) 
 This ambiguity was transferred into APRA’s political program. Such a 
program made the case for an ‘anti-imperialist state’ able to counteract (first in a 
defensive moment, later as a ‘war state’) imperialist forces. Later on, this new 
nation-state will be the ‘proxy’ of local, developing capitals at the international 
markets. Insofar as these national capitals are incipient, Haya goes on, to postulate a 
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definitive delinking from foreign capital is an unreal policy. That is why the anti 
imperialist state must be strong enough so that to limit the amounts of, and the 
branches in which, foreign capitals are invested, safeguarding thus national 
interests (cf. Haya de la Torre, 1977a, ch. VII; also 1973, part III). As it was seen, the 
proletariat is deemed to suffer a similar process: given the precociousness of the 
working classes in this continent, “an Indo-American anti-imperialist party cannot 
be of an exclusive class […] it must be a national party of united front, grouping all 
social classes threatened by imperialism.” (Haya de la Torre, 1977a: 96) As soon as 
the anti-imperialist state has been stabilized, “the three classes oppressed under 
imperialism – our young industrial proletariat, our vast and ignorant peasant and 
our impoverished middle classes – will constitute the normative social forces of this 
state.” (1977a: 23)  
 In sum, from the viewpoint of Latin America’s condition as composed by a 
retarded capitalist development and an immature proletariat, Haya promoted a 
multi-class party under middle class hegemony as the organization capable of both 
seizing power and driving a state so as to channel the immature capitalist economy 
to its higher stages, within the frame of a more harmonized and fairer world market. 
We will return in the next chapter to the theoretical grounds of this perspective. 
Suffice to highlight by now the fact that Haya seems to combine in his account a 
noticeable sensibility towards different developmental rhythms with a stark 
economic determinism. In doing so, he envisaged the hetero-temporality of world 
capitalism at the same time that he blocked this insight by means of a linear 
temporality in which the sequence of primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism, 
and socialism was considered as one linking inevitable historical phases. In other 
words, the plurality of tempos or rhythms that the experience of uneven and 
combined development arguably yielded in his more analytical works as well as his 
political projects becomes something of an arrhythmia when imperialism is 
considered as a mere transposition of phases disturbing a normal, spontaneous 
capitalist development.  
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Mariátegui and the Formation of a ‘Post-Colonial’ Class Consciousness 
Mariátegui held an understanding of imperialism in contradistinction with Haya’s 
and closer to what Lenin called the ‘superstructure’ of capitalism in its highest stage. 
Right after the APRA division in which both Peruvian leaders inaugurated the 
polemic between Aprismo and Marxism (a polemic whose presence in Peru’s politics 
lasted until well into the second half of the past century), in September 1928 the 
editorial of the 17th issue of Amauta expressed the difference in the following terms:  
The epoch of free competition in the capitalist economy has ended in all 
fields and all aspects. We are in the age of monopolies, that is to say, 
empires. The Latin American countries arrived too late to capitalist 
competition. The first positions are already definitively assigned. In the 
capitalist order, the destiny of these countries is that of simple colonies. 
(Mariátegui, 2011: 129)  
Denying the possibility of a harmonious capitalist world market from which an 
‘anti-imperialist state’ could benefit, Mariátegui adopts Lenin’s conception of 
imperialism as the stage in which competition shifts from the national to the 
international setting. The end of competition means more precisely the end of ‘free’ 
competition; heretofore, capitals unfolded through larger unities (trusts, cartels), 
taking the state over and orienting it towards the rest of the world by means other 
than ‘economic’ – i.e. political and military. This stage of inter-state competition 
builds itself up as the ‘superstructure’ of the world system, thus determining 
regional and national conjunctures. In this sense, revolutionaries must deal with a 
superstructure which is no longer ‘just’ national. And this is precisely the problem 
faced by the so-called colonial and semi-colonial nations. Despite the apparent 
rigidity that the idea of the ‘colonial and semi-colonial’ achieved in the Communist 
discourse of that time, in Lenin’s Imperialism the term functions as a way to 
distinguish formal (political) colonies from nations that, while formally 
independent, display varied forms of economic dependence and extra-economic 
fragility.46 Accordingly, Peru – and Latin America broadly speaking – was 
                                                          
46 A partial account on the idea in the Comintern debates, with particular references to 
Latin America, can be found in Manuel Caballero (1986: 45–6; see also Part Two), in which 
the author enumerates the Comintern’s outline of semi-colonial condition as a specific form 
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understood by Mariátegui as part of this semi-colonial world; yet the specificity of 
this region’s history should not be eclipsed by such a status: Latin America’s 
trajectory of coloniality needed to be closely considered in order to derive a political 
strategy from its post-colonial condition.  
 In a well-known and much-discussed statement of Seven Interpretive Essays, 
Mariátegui depicted the Peruvian economic structure, asserting that  
elements of three different economies coexist in Peru today. Underneath 
the feudal economy inherited from the colonial period, vestiges of the 
indigenous communal economy can still be found in the sierra. On the 
coast, a bourgeois economy is growing in feudal soil; it gives every 
indication of being backward, at least in its mental outlook (1974: 16). 
This assertion is only superficially akin to Haya’s image of juxtaposed economic 
rhythms: what the latter reckons as an overlapping of different stages (times) in a 
single place (space), in Mariátegui becomes the coexistence and mutual co-
belonging of the ‘archaic’ and the ‘modern’, whose interplaying defines a concrete 
totality. There are thus three different kind of productive relations –modern waged 
labour, serfdom, and communal work. The latter corresponds to the ‘elements of 
practical socialism’ embodied in still-alive ayllus. Conversely, waged labour had 
been largely deployed by foreign capitals, mainly in the export sector such as the 
northern coastal agriculture (cotton and sugar), the extractive sector in the 
highlands (coal) and the coast (oil), railway building, and banking and commerce. 
Finally, feudal gamonalismo exhibited a presence which extends even into allegedly 
modern industries such as coastal haciendas, thanks to hook-indenture (enganche) 
and yanaconazgo.47 In an illuminating passage, Mariátegui describes those forms of 
semi-proletarianization: 
Through hook-indenture and yanaconazgo, the large proprietors block 
the appearance of free-wage contracting, a functional necessity to a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of dependency to foreign capital, a rigid idea of feudality, and a correspondent uniform 
political tactics. 
47  Yanaconazgo, was a residual element coming from the economic and social structure of 
the late Tawantinsuyu, preserved by the Spanish empire, a form of serfdom in which the 
Indian was attached to land and served directly to the ruler. As Mariátegui and Castro pozo 
demonstrated, yanaconazgo was transformed in the Republican period, however it did not 
disappear. 
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liberal and capitalist economy. Indenture, which prevents the labourer 
from disposing of his person and his labour until he satisfies the 
obligations he has contracted with the landlord, is unmistakably 
descended from the semi-slave traffic in coolies; yanaconazgo is a kind of 
servitude in politically and economically backward villages that has 
prolonged feudalism into our capitalist age. (1974: 63, trans. modified)  
In this sense, forms typical of slavery and serfdom are incorporated into capitalist 
industries, preventing from the outset the development of a ‘normal’, liberal 
capitalism. In this consideration, the colour line intersects the composition of class 
and, consequently, of class struggle. As the third of the Essays profusely indicates, 
for Mariátegui the political content of a proper national revolution has first and 
foremost to solve the semi-feudal condition of the country – the ‘consubstantial’ 
issues of large landowning and servitude exhausting indigenous ways of worlding. 
However, and in contradistinction with Haya’s project, in Peru semi-feudalism and 
capitalism go hand in hand and determine together, first, the concrete shape of the 
country’s economic basis, and second the contents and forms that class 
consciousness and class interests assume. In other words, the consubstantiality of 
imperial capitalism and gamonal semi-feudalism defines for Mariátegui the form and 
contents of Peru’s class struggle.      
  In the document entitled ‘The Problem of Races in Latin America’48, 
addressed to the First Latin American Conference of Communist Parties held in 
Buenos Aires in 1929, the Peruvian delegation insisted that the ‘racial’ factor plays a 
role difficult to underestimate in the region’s class conflicts: “The problem is not 
racial but rather social and economic. But race has a role in it and in the methods of 
confronting it.” (2011: 325, trans. modified) Not an abstract role to be sure, for it 
depends on the historical conditions and particular assembling of its constitutive 
elements. In Peru, the racial factor has drawn a permanent and ubiquitous division-
line between owners and producers, dominant and subaltern: “In these countries, 
the race factor is compounded by the class factor, which revolutionary politics must 
                                                          
48   Harry Vanden and Marc Becker translate the document’s title in the singular (i.e., 
‘race’); I prefer instead to keep the plural (razas) that Mariátegui gave to the article. Cf. 
Mariátegui (2011: 305; 1987: 21). 
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take into account.” (2011: 314). Therefore, the indigenous factor crosses any rigid 
division line of peasant and worker, of seemingly motionless and regressive 
‘autochthonous’ elements and active and progressive ‘external’ forces such as 
modern techniques, as this decisive remark of ‘The Problem of Races’ evidences: 
“Indians are in no way inferior to the mestizo in their ability to assimilate with 
progress, with modern production techniques. On the contrary, they are generally 
more able to do so. […] In the mines and factories of the Peruvian highlands, the 
Indian peasant confirms this experience.”(2011: 311, trans. modified)  
 In this passage, the scalability of pre-capitalist social forms to cope with and 
develop modern capitalist techniques is confirmed by the activity of peasants, 
indicating that the hybridity which features the process of labour subsumption into 
capital projects a role for indigenous peasants (as well as workers) in the country’s 
class struggle and in its socialist solution. As the concluding remarks from the same 
text points out: “among ‘backward’ populations, no one like the Inka indigenous 
people brings together such favourable conditions for their primitive agrarian 
communism, which survives in concrete structures and in a deep collectivist spirit, 
to be transformed under the hegemony of the proletarian class into one of the more solid 
bases for the collectivist society heralded by Marxist communism.” (1987, 68) The 
reference to the indigenous population as ‘Inka people’ and its roots in agrarian 
communism is synchronized by Mariátegui with the prospects of collective work, in 
a manner which contrasts (and might in consequence be read as an implicit critique 
of) the processes of forced collectivization of land undergone in the URSS since the 
late-1920s (cf. Webber, 2015: 593). 
 Read from a materialist viewpoint, what Mariátegui and most of his 
contemporaries called the ‘racial’ question comes to play a role in the class struggle 
and is irreducible to any abstract set of policies. Albeit not formulated in explicit 
terms, Mariátegui’s understanding of imperialism includes racism as a constitutive 
part of the capitalist ‘superstructure’, in terms close to Lenin’s. This is not to say that 
imperialism produces racism in a one-sided deterministic way; rather, racism is re-
created, re-defined and ‘overdetermined’ (to borrow Althusser’s term) by capital’s 
uneven-and-combined organization of social practices and conflicts. To be 
subsumed within the international frame built up by monopoly capital gives racism 
a form to re-operate upon the economy. (That is the reason why Seven Interpretive 
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Essays – a work which situates itself at an ‘economic’ level of analysis49 – includes 
four essays that, from a non-dialectical standpoint, give the appearance to deal with 
‘cultural’ topics.) Mariátegui not only comprehended ’economy’ in a non-narrow 
sense; for him, moreover, the crux of Peruvian reality rests precisely on the affinity 
of the particular colonial and racist superstructure it has developed with that of 
imperialism. In doing so, Mariátegui’s Marxism became nested in a conception of 
‘racialized class struggle’.50   
 This affinity of post-colonial Peruvian structures and imperialism finds its 
dialectical counterpart in the kinship between the socializing tendencies of 
capitalism and the collectivist inclinations displayed by indigenous people. Lenin 
considered imperialism as a stage in which, along with the further exploitation of 
labourers worldwide, the socialization of production has also expanded in scope 
and profundity. Based on this perspective, Mariátegui draw a parallel between this 
socialization with the cooperative forms of production exhibited by Peru’s 
indigenous peasantry.51 The tenacious survival of the communitarian forms 
embodied in ayllu invites us to consider the elements and grounds it shares in 
common with the socialization of production accomplished under capitalist roads.  
 
5. Uneven and Combined Development and the National Question Reframed 
Framed under the experiential perspective of uneven and combined development – 
if not explicitly in terms of its theoretical concept – Mariátegui projected the actual 
combination of national and socialist tasks demanded by a racialized class struggle. 
This qualification of Peru’s class struggle exhibited gamonalismo and imperialism as 
                                                          
49 This is the most general reading of Mariátegui’s remarks in Essays’ ‘Author’s Note’: “I 
intended to include in this collection an essay on the political and ideological evolution of 
Peru. But as I advance in it, I realize that I must develop it separately in another book.” 
(1974: xxxiii)  
50  I owe the notion of ‘racialized class struggle’ to Jeffery Webber (cf. 2011: 29fn; 2015: 
310). 
51  Although stated in several documents, Mariátegui wrote in 1926 an important article 
for Mundial (‘The Future of Cooperatives’) where the focus is put precisely on these 
affinities. He explains that cooperatives take place only when first a capitalist and then a 
syndicalist/union basis have been established; consequently, the cooperatives’ development 
in Peru must be subordinated to those processes. “And yet”, Mariátegui asserts, “Peru is one 
of the Latin American countries where cooperation finds more ingrained spontaneous and 
peculiar elements […] in the indigenous peasant centres, the communitarian traditions offer 
elements of an integral cooperativism.” (1987: 195–96) 
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partaking of the dominant bloc, while the proletariat and the indigenous peasants 
stand on the subaltern side. The stress put on the colour line was – if my reading is 
correct – a consequence of his understanding of imperialism as the superstructure of 
capitalism in its contemporary stage, and of the affinities between it and the post-
colonial tendencies of the country. Conversely, the confluence of anti-feudal and 
socialist tasks is the dialectical entanglement in which Lenin envisaged the potential 
‘acceleration’ (at the economic as well as the ideological levels) of revolutionary 
processes in the so-called colonial and semi-colonial world (cf. Lukàcs, 1972: 45).  
 In a similar vein, Trotsky (1967, I: 23; cf. Davidson, 2006: 21) referred to this 
acceleration as “the privilege of the historically backward” under conditions of 
uneven and combined development. In Mariátegui’s account, in turn, the 
consideration of the Indian as an object of socialism because of his alleged 
backwardness is transformed into a viewpoint in which the ‘backward’ element 
itself displays an anticipatory momentum for a socialist project. Considered as both 
remaining of past modes of productions and present-day factors in the country’s 
class struggle, the features of the Andean indigenous traditions, ways of worlding, 
and forms of resistance to capital are expressive of a form of communism that is 
contemporaneous with modern socialism. It is therefore the very nature of Peru’s 
socio-economic structure – and not any abstract, mechanical dictum of fate – which 
lays down the material basis for the alliance of workers and peasants set out by the 
tactics of the united front. Yet in order to achieve this conclusion, Mariátegui ought 
to locate his reflection in what György Lukàcs considers to be the core of Lenin’s 
theoretical achievement: the ‘actuality of the revolution’ under imperialist 
capitalism.  
 As Lenin understood it, imperialism corresponds to the epoch in which the 
bourgeoisie overtly renounces to its progressive, revolutionary character at the 
global scale. The bourgeoisie becomes reactionary, which implies that the 
progressive character of world history passes thereby to the other, antagonistic 
world power: the proletariat. In the identification of this “dialectical transformation 
of the bourgeois revolution into the proletarian revolution” Lukács (1972: 48–9) 
situated Lenin’s genius. And it is arguably a similar consideration that led 
Mariátegui to consider that the revolutionary epoch opened up by the world crisis 
drifts into one of these paths: ‘passive revolution’ or ‘socialist revolution’. During 
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Leguía’s time in office, the strengthening of economic bonds with North American 
capitals seemed to lay the foundations for a process of capitalist modernization by 
means of ‘passive revolution’, with only rhetorical or patronizing roots in popular 
groups and demands. Similarly, a middle-class overthrown of the ‘oligarchic 
republic’ as envisaged by Haya’s APRA was also considered by Mariátegui as 
devoid of the decisive initiative of subaltern groups. Its ambiguous opposition to 
imperialism, added to Haya’s inclinations to an authoritarian leadership, portrayed 
a mirror-like image of Leguía’s project.  
 To put it otherwise: is not that ‘national’ and ‘socialist’ revolutionary struggles 
simply look alike, nor that certain elements of the former might just 
opportunistically be taken up for the prosecution of the latter. On the contrary, the 
revolutionary content of the national question displayed in ‘colonial and semi-
colonial’ countries (that is, in the Global South understood as the location of 
different temporalities) finds its truth, so to speak, in socialist revolution, in a 
revolution of proletariat hegemony capable of accomplishing the non- or ill-
resolved bourgeois-democratic tasks. Otherwise, it will become another passive 
revolution. Dialectically, the proletariat envisages its own very potential as a 
progressive hegemonic force in the demands of the other subaltern classes, notably 
the peasants, as a living image of its own historical composition. Insofar as the 
‘Indian problem’ weights thoroughly upon Peru’s social structure, such a ‘national 
deficit’ exerts a material and symbolic influence upon subaltern classes as a whole, 
affecting its ideological configuration. For, if Marx’s claim that any nation that 
“oppresses another people forges its own chains” (2010: 120) is generally valid, it is 
so first and foremost when this occurs within a determined ‘national’ conjuncture. 
Accordingly, Mariátegui expressed in the Essays that “Peru has to choose between 
the gamonal and the Indian; it has no other alternative.” (1974: 171) 
 This is the ‘national’ departure point acknowledged by Gramsci, who 
nonetheless advises that ‘the perspective is international and cannot be otherwise’. 
Mariátegui understands the consequences of this dialectic in terms similar to 
Gramsci, who also points out that “the leading class is in fact only such if it accurately 
interprets this combination, of which is itself a component and precisely as such is able 
to give the movement a certain direction…” (2003: 240, emphasis added) This 
historical fact presents the need to dialectically relate the indigenous conditions 
91 
 
(their alleged ‘out of sync’ with the capitalist ‘now’) and potentialities (to become 
synchronized to the proletariat) to the international setting in which ‘race’ plays an 
important role in the colonial enterprises of imperial powers; and then to bring it 
back to the national conjuncture characterized by a colonial history. From a 
‘national’ (i.e. indigenous-based) departure point, and through ‘international’ 
(proletarian) perspectives, Mariátegui’s analysis brings to the forefront a particular 
sort of encounter envisaging the potential synchronicity between the old communist 
spirit and modern socialism.  
 In Mariátegui’s reading of the national question from the standpoint of the 
subalterns, I find a strong indication of the subalternist hypothesis. The crisscrossed 
roads of imperialist racism and local colonialism, on the one hand, and of 
international socialism and autochthonous communism, on the other, opened in his 
Marxism a pathway to coming to terms with a materialist dialectics of a very 
specific kind. In it, the temporal dimension (past and present) overlaps with the 
geographical one (international and national) at the eve of the actuality of 
revolution. The Indians’ potential inclination to communist worldviews and 
collective practices (‘elements of practical socialism’, that is) demands an approach 
capable to take up the Inka image of the Pachakuteq – the restoration of 
Tawantinsuyu – not as any dream of restoration of the past; rather, it ought to be 
‘translated back’ to present demands imposed by worldwide contemporary 
tendencies. The manner in which this translation was outlined within Mariátegui’s 
Marxism is the subject of Chapter III. 
 To recapitulate, Mariátegui understood the entanglement of non-
contemporaneous elements under  capital’s rule, accompanied by conflicts and 
forms of struggle never seen before, as part of the processes intensified by the 
uneven imperialist expansion in both its economic (capital and commodity exports) 
and non-economic (wars, annexations) roads. One of the outcomes of this process 
was, in Peru, the so-called ‘resurrection’ of the indigenous race, which I prefer to 
call emergent indigeneity.52 The re-appearance of the colour line under imperialism 
                                                          
52  I draw here upon Harris, Carlson and Poata-Smith’s definition: “Indigenous identities 
are emergent; a process of becoming rather than being. Indigenous identities not only 
develop from the constant ebb and flow of interactions between individuals and others, 
those interactions are frequently sites of contestation.”(2013: 5) 
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signalled a sort of re-ethnicization of class struggle that, for Mariátegui, was visible 
all over the non-Western world. Of course, one might add to this that class struggle 
was already racialized, in Latin America as elsewhere. And this is why the Peruvian 
Marxist constitutes a key strand of the integration into Marxism of a non-
Eurocentric and hence deprovincializing perspective. 
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III. The Work of Myth and Memory in Mariátegui’s Marxism 
 
‘Socialist materialism embraces all 
possibilities for spiritual, ethical, and 
philosophical ascent. And we never feel 
ourselves more fiercely, effectively, and 
religiously idealistic than when putting our 
ideas and our feet on the ground.’ 
José Carlos Mariátegui, Revista 
Amauta’s 17th editorial, 1928. 
 
1. Marxism and Irrationalism: Mariátegui and his Readers 
In the previous chapter, we saw that ‘Peru’s Principal Problem’ has been widely 
considered the beginning of Seven Interpretive Essays; consequently, the text has been 
regarded as signaling the initial moment of ‘nationalization’ of Mariátegui’s 
Marxism. This nationalization, as we have begun to see a sui generis one, was 
characterized not (or not merely) by a project of modernization and assimilation of 
different cultural vestiges into a single national unity hegemonized by a mestizo 
ideology; rather, it was informed and grounded on the contemporary affinities 
between modern socialism and the communitarian ways of worlding and 
worldviews sustained by Indian practices and relations, and it projected on the basis 
of these affinities the image of an ‘Indo American Socialism’.  
 ‘Peru’s Principal Problem’ was written and published in December 1924; a 
month later, the article ‘Man and Myth’ appeared in the same journal, Mundial, and 
with it the intellectual bonds of Mariátegui’s conceptions with the work of Georges 
Sorel began to be evident. Indeed, in his later writings (collected in Defence of 
Marxism) Sorel is still acclaimed for being one of the true Marxist revisionists (cf. 
Mariátegui 2011: 180) alongside none other than Lenin. In my view, to re-read these 
seemingly paradoxical couplings (namely, Marxism’s nationalization vis-à-vis myth 
and Lenin alongside Sorel) may turn out to be critical to further clarifying the 
underpinnings of the sort of Marxism elaborated and promoted by the Peruvian 
thinker. 
 Such a coupling, nonetheless, has been only partially addressed by 
Mariateguista scholars. The canonical explanation of the place and role that myth 
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plays in Mariátegui’s Marxism has by and large been an instrumental one (as we 
will see in what follows). The notion appears in such accounts as the compensatory 
force that fills a gap: the lack of a true, material catalyst for revolutionary 
subjectivity. The absence of a ripe working class – meaning an ideologically and 
politically mature social force – remains for such a perspective reason enough to 
explain the correlation of materialism and irrationalism, in a problematic dyad that 
stands evidently at odds with a more coherent historical-materialist rationalism. 
However important the contributions of authors committed to such a view, this 
reading misses the crucial point of the centrality of cultural and subjective elements 
in Mariátegui’s Marxism, particularly in his understanding of past memories which, 
in a sort of ‘colonial unconscious’, have become present-day elements of Peru’s class 
struggle.  
 This chapter approaches Mariátegui’s Marxism in terms of the category of 
‘myth’, and offers a re-reading of Mariátegui’s use of this category that connects it to 
Henri Bergson’s ideas about memory and the work of the past in the present. 
Drawing upon the clarification of the work of myth through the work of memory, 
the concept of myth will be oriented to further enlighten the Mariátegui-Haya de la 
Torre debate, with reference to the problem of multiple temporalities, as well as to 
its epistemological consequences. Finally, I introduce the outline of a Marxism that 
envisaged the incorporation of non-modern elements into the socialist project, -thus 
re-considering the mythical and religious motives in their affinity, and potential 
synchronization, to the world revolution. 
  
Illusion, Imagination and Myth: Mariátegui’s Early 1925 Articles 
The first positive engagement of Mariátegui with the notion of myth comes from a 
set of articles written in early 1925 –namely, ‘Two Conceptions of Life’, ‘Man and 
Myth’, and ‘The Final Struggle’. He had nonetheless already advanced some 
remarks on the relationship between reality and ideals, actuality and imagination, 
and the like. ‘Imagination and Progress’, for instance, paid attention to the 
importance of strong ideals in the maturation of historical forces. In remarks that 
evoke Hegel’s labour of the negative as the determined negation of the actual, 
Mariátegui asserts that imagination is not an arbitrary irruption within reality, but is 
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rather deeply dependent on the latter: “just when [imagination] reacts against 
reality, is when it is more dependent on it. People struggle to change what they see 
and what they feel, not what they ignore. Hence the only utopias that are valid are 
those that could be called realistic.” (2011: 400–401) The article goes on to say that 
“[i]dealists need to rely on the concrete interests of a broad and conscious social 
stratum. The ideal does not prosper unless it represents a vast interest. [...] When a 
social class becomes an instrument for its realization.” (2011: 401, trans. modified)  
 This reconsideration of the role of imagination and ideals in history (which 
echoes Marx’s early statements on the encounter between classical idealist 
philosophy and the emerging working class) advances the hypothesis that such 
ideals must perforce be embodied by social classes –that is, fully embedded in 
reality– so as to compose ‘realistic utopias’ capable of redirecting reality towards 
new forms and goals. Though he does not provide a clear definition of any of these 
terms, the dialectic of imagination and reality takes in Mariátegui’s discourse the 
form of a mutual transformation: reality offers a ready-made organization of facts 
and elements; imagination in turn strives –sometimes unsuccessfully, sometimes 
not– to mould such organization into new forms. Ideals are hence valid precisely to 
the extent that they demonstrate adequacy to reality not only in its actual form but 
likewise in its potential tendencies.  
 In ‘Man and Myth’ Mariátegui further states, in a Nietzschean fashion, that 
“man, as philosophy defines him, is a metaphysical animal.” (2011: 384) The claim is 
not so much to get rid of science, but to make the case for its compatibility with 
metaphysical speculation, a relation denied and obscured by positivism as well as 
by the dominant Marxist conception of materialism. What for Mariátegui has been 
undermined by contemporary philosophical currents is not reason tout court, but 
rather its validity as ‘absolute’. The contemporary philosophies accounted here are 
relativism, pragmatism and vitalism, inasmuch as they played down absolute 
conceptions on truth; hence “[i]t is useless, according to these theories, to search for 
an absolute truth. The truth of today is not the truth of tomorrow. A truth is only 
valid for a period of time. We should be content with a relative truth.” (2011: 385–
86) But, as we will see later, this judgment is not a plea for simple relativism; 
instead, the reference to these philosophical currents was proposing to dig into the 
interplaying of forms of subjectivity that pertain to different historical levels and 
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registers. Mariátegui embraces Sorel’s argument on the compatibility of mythical 
images with the prospects of the socialist revolution, an idea famously compressed 
by the latter in the ‘myth of the proletarian general strike’. In this adoption, he 
identifies the key ‘spiritual’ difference between bourgeoisie and the working class in 
the presence or absence of a mythical force, as long as rationalism, liberalism and 
faith in progress (for Mariátegui, the core of nineteenth century capitalism’s myth) 
seemed abandoned by bourgeois intellectuals in the aftermaths of the First World 
War: This passage condenses the argument: 
What most clearly and obviously differentiates bourgeoisie and 
proletariat in this era is myth. The bourgeoisie no longer has any myth. 
It has become incredulous, skeptical, nihilist. [...] The proletariat 
possesses a myth: social revolution. It moves toward that myth with 
passionate and active faith. The bourgeoisie denies; the proletariat 
affirms. The bourgeois intellectuals entertain themselves with a 
rationalist critique of the method, theory, technique of the 
revolutionaries. What a misunderstanding! The strength of 
revolutionaries is not in their science; it is in their faith, in their passion, 
in their will. It is a religious, mystical, spiritual force. It is the force of 
myth. [...] Religious motives have been displaced from the heavens to 
earth. They are not divine; they are human, social. (2011: 387, trans. 
modified)  
The passage continues by making explicit the presence of Bergson in Sorel’s 
conception of the affinities of myths and revolutionary projects: “Bergson has taught 
us that not only can religion occupy the region of the inner self; revolutionary myths 
can equally have their place with the same credentials.” (2011, 387) In this sentence, 
an opaque distinction between religion and myth is implicitly is suggested (we shall 
return to this point in section 3.1 of this chapter). Summarizing, ‘Man and Myth’ 
assembles elements of Marx’s ‘Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right’ (the criticism of heavens turns into the criticism of earth), of Nietzsche’s and 
Bergson’s approaches to humanity in metaphysical terms, and of Sorel’s myth of the 
general strike, redefined by Mariátegui in terms of the “myth of social revolution” –
all of this addresses an understanding of revolutions as mystical, mythical and 
passionate mobilizations of a will to act.  
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 ‘The Final Struggle’ continues ‘Man and Myth’ by means of a relativist 
position which returns back to the remarks of ‘Imagination and Progress’: 
“[r]elativism [...] starts by teaching that reality is an illusion, but it concludes that 
illusion is, in turn, a reality. It denies that there are absolute truths, but it realizes 
that people must believe in their relative truth as if they were absolute. [...] 
Relativistic philosophy proposes, therefore, to obey the law of myth.” (2011: 389–90) 
And this relation of absolute and relative is situated in terms of the dialectic of the 
concrete and the abstract: “the revolutionary proletariat [...] lives the reality of a final 
struggle. Humanity, meanwhile, from an abstract point of view, lives the illusion of a 
final struggle.” (2011, 390 emphasis added) Thus, on the one hand, there is the 
abstract plane of indeterminateness whereby discrete relative truths succeed one 
another along history, in a movement for which no ‘final struggle’ can be asserted. 
On the other, there is the concrete, experiential plane of certainties that social groups 
carry, a plane that is built upon determinate struggles against reality as it is actually 
given. Enlightening this difference, philosophical relativism provides Mariátegui a 
pathway beyond the deadlock of a reason all-too pleased with a present identical to 
itself. 
 
 On ‘Irrationalism’ in Latin America 
In these articles from early 1925 Mariátegui did not offer a conceptually balanced 
definition of myth, metaphysics or religion, nor does he elsewhere. This is arguably 
the source of those lasting debates on the meaning and function of these notions 
among Mariateguista scholars. The debates on this topic, as on Mariategui’s work as 
a whole (cf. chapter 1.2 in this work), can be distributed into three phases: the 
conflict between Marxism and Aprismo (and, broadly speaking, national populism); 
the phase of reaction against Marxist ‘orthodoxy’ and the rescue of ‘heterodox’ 
Marxists in Latin America; and the current phase of ‘open Marxism’ or of rich and 
varied ‘Marxisms’. In the first phase, Aprista intellectuals such as Luis Alberto 
Sánchez and Eugenio Chang Rodríguez read the presence of mythical and religious 
elements as the confirmation of Mariátegui’s failure to come to terms with a 
consistent Marxism. Sánchez (n.d: 14) argues that his conversion to Marxism was 
more verbal than effective, evidence of which is the value that religion –concretely 
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Catholicism– occupies in his reflections. In a similar vein, Chang Rodríguez (1983: 
108) identifies religiosity with Christianity and Catholicism as such, in an argument 
that presents Mariátegui as forerunner not only of Aprist doctrines as such, but also 
of Theology of Liberation –at least in the version given to it by Peruvian priest 
Gustavo Gutiérrez. 
On the Marxist side, Adalbert Dessau attempted in 1965 to secularize 
Mariátegui’s notion of myth. For this author, myth corresponds to what sociologists 
call ‘models’, collective mental structures that foreshadow a future social order and 
allow classes and social groups to look beyond the satisfaction of immediate 
interest. More crucially, the recourse to myth works in his account as a kind of 
compensation for backwardness, introducing “a historically justifiable metaphysics 
within conditions that cannot produce a scientific conception of the world.” 
(Dessau, [1965]1971: 89) The appealing to myth and other concepts borrowed from 
irrationalism, therefore, is for Dessau a necessary outcome of the material grounds 
in which Mariátegui’s Marxism is embedded: a non-rational society and culture 
which prevented both scientific reasoning and the application of the classic works of 
Marxism-Leninism.  
 Regarding the second phase of quarrel between orthodoxy and heterodoxies, 
Robert Paris’s influential reconstruction of Mariátegui’s thought evaluates the 
presence of myth in similar terms as Dessau: it reveals the absence of “objective 
sustain of the invoked values, the verification, to say it otherwise, of the near 
inexistence of the proletariat.” (1981: 143) Paris further specifies that myth functions 
so as to fill a material gap, the concrete lack of maturity of the industrial workers; in 
consequence, the legacy of irrationalism becomes an instrumental detour so as to 
provide Peru’s population with a subversive ground. He  concludes that “‘[m]yth’, 
the irrational or mystical element, inherited from Sorel or Nietzsche, appears here as 
the symbol and the instrument of a dialectic that invites to unify the present and its 
ends and to proclaim this unity, and likewise as the translation of all which can be 
problematic and indemonstrable for the socialist project in the Peru of the 1920s” 
(1981: 145) Since the proletariat is regarded as the prototype of a modern, rational 
subjectivity, myth is conversely considered as an instrument that reveals more 
about the primacy of pre-modern craft-workers than what may enlighten about the 
actuality of social revolution in Marxist terms.  
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 Later on, in his contribution to José Aricó’s influential collection on 
Mariátegui, Paris indicated that in his thought “all happens as though from myth to 
logos or rationality a permanent communication was effected, with neither frontiers 
nor closed compartments.” (1980: 132) Oscar Terán will repeat the point when 
dealing with the nature of the ‘nationalization’ of Mariátegui’s Marxism: together 
with saying that “[i]n the very gesture of localizing the indigenista object, Mariátegui 
turned into visibility the problem of nation”, he points out the same displacement 
identified by Paris, albeit in a more nuanced way: 
In order to be able to communicate his socialist proposal, he had to 
totally refuse classist reductionism, for which to each social class there 
corresponds a defined ideology – being socialism what needs to be 
naturally the proletariat’s outcome. It is precisely there where 
Mariátegui’s analysis notoriously recurs to the Sorelian category of 
myth, which allows him synthesize an economic, class content with an 
historical-cultural component. (1986: 117–18)  
Terán does not go on to explain the nature of that historical-cultural component; 
and while his insight leads towards the right direction by pointing out the 
proximity of myth and nationalization in Mariátegui’s Marxism, he shares with 
Paris the conception of myth as an instrumental conceptual device/dispositif whose 
function rests on filling the gap between the all-too modern imaginary of socialism 
and the all-too pre-modern reality of gamonalismo, economic backwardness, lack of 
integration, and so forth.  
 Paris and particularly Terán acknowledge in their respective works the 
burdens of positivism in the making of Latin American states and institutions 
during the 19th century. In Terán’s (1986: 13–14) words, positivism spoke from and 
for these states, in a foundational and strategic ‘alliance’ at the basis of the nation-
states. In other words, for Terán positivism was a close ally for Latin American 
dominant classes in both managing internal control of territories and populations 
and projecting them as ‘modern’ states. Fabio Moraga stresses in this respect that 
“liberalism contributed the political bases to the social order, and positivism had a 
fundamental influence in structuring the knowledge” of such an order. (2002: 180–
81) It is thus surprising that these scholars dismiss so quickly Sorelian, Nietzschean 
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and other philosophical currents as ‘irrationalism’, without an adequate 
contextualization of the concrete realms where such ideological battles were waged.  
 By neglecting the active and progressive role that Nietzscheanism, vitalism 
and other non-rationalist currents accomplished in the emergence of an oppositional 
consciousness from within the crisis of the Oligarchic republic, Paris and Terán still 
seem trapped in the ‘positivistic effect’ characteristic of a certain version of 
Marxism. The problem with Paris’s and Teran’s readings, as we shall see, lies in the 
fact that they isolate and abstract Mariátegui’s notion of myth –along with other 
‘irrationalist’ ideas– from its very operational field, the Kulturkampf of Peru and 
Latin America in the 1920s. Nietzsche was not only read but largely adopted by 
leftist intellectuals in Europe and Latin America. In Russia, for instance, Anatoli 
Lunacharsky is presented by Ofelia Schutte (1988: 73) as advancing one of the most 
coherent perspectives within a sort of ‘Nietzschean Marxism’. In Argentina, student-
leader Deodoro Roca (1918) put the Nietzschean opposition against Catholicism as 
‘religion of slaves’ at the centre of the ‘Liminar Manifesto’, the battle-cry text of the 
Cordoba University reform movement.  
 Conversely, Nietzsche and other ‘irrationalist’ philosophical tendencies 
counted affiliates in Peru as early as 1900. Alejandro Deustúa, a former positivist 
philosopher and part of the civilista intelligentsia, was the first to systematically 
introduce Henri Bergson both in seminars at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de 
San Marcos and books on aesthetics.53 Some of the most important Peruvian 
intellectuals of the period, such as Francisco García Calderón, Víctor Andrés 
Belaúnde and Mariano Ibérico, were also part of this Peruvian association with 
vitalism.  
 Therefore, philosophical currents characterized by Paris and Terán as 
‘irrationalism’ were indeed important vehicles of the struggle against the positivist 
and rationalist pillars of Latin America’s oligarchic orders. Rather than 
irrationalism, these philosophies were adopted and adapted in their ‘non-rationalist’ 
stance, for they provided elements and ways of reasoning allegedly capable of 
                                                          
53   Augusto Salazar Bondy (1965a: 184, 188-9) points out that the most decisive element 
in Deustúa’s reception of Bergson was the intuition of freedom as a way to have access to the 
sources of being; thereby, from a politically and pedagogically aristocratic standpoint, he 
was able to overcome positivism without returning to the old speculative metaphysics. 
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challenging and overcoming the positivist hegemony. These non-rationalist 
elements did not achieve fixed valences across their adherents; rather, they 
circulated among diverging intellectual groups and orientations. Whereas Roca and 
Cuban Marxist Julio Antonio Mella resorted to Nietzsche in order to combat 
oligarchic institutions inherited from the nineteenth century, there were others who 
took the vitalist wave up in order to restore an aristocratic and elitist concept of 
culture. As inspired by José Enrique Rodó’s influential Ariel (1900), the latter 
intellectual trend was labelled arielismo and counted many important followers in 
the continent, such as Mexican José Vasconcelos, Argentineans Alfredo Palacios and 
Manuel Ugarte, Peruvians Francisco García Calderón and Víctor Belaúnde, all of 
whom were interlocutors of Mariátegui. In this sense, we might suggest that in Latin 
America there cohabited both an aristocratic and a ‘popular’ – in the Gramscian 
sense of ‘of the people’ – version of Nietzsche. Mariátegui was situated in the latter 
(cf. Von Vacano, 2004). 
 
Some Conceptual Remarks on Irrationalism and Romanticism  
We must place Mariátegui within what Michael Löwy has labelled ‘romantic 
Marxism’. Understood not as a school but as a counter-cultural movement against 
modern capitalism, Löwy explains that it corresponds to one of the main 
contemporary constructs of sensibility, expressed in the project of ‘re-enchanting the 
world’. The author has offered elsewhere significant accounts of Marxist 
intellectuals from the viewpoint of their romantic leanings (cf. Löwy, 1979; 2005a). 
He highlights that Mariátegui’s case has the peculiarity that, in contradistinction to 
Lukàcs, Gramsci or Benjamin, he continued to employ Sorelian themes even when 
totally committed to official communism in the 1920s. I argue that Mariátegui’s 
understanding of both myth and the metaphysical nature of human being’s owes 
more to Nietzsche than to Sorel, notwithstanding the fact that the immediate form 
of the idea was borrowed from the latter.  
 Nietzsche postulated that human beings are always not-yet determined 
animals, that is, incomplete species thrown to nature – to ‘reality ’– as a partially 
stranger alien to it. This is the source of that mythical instinct peculiar to mankind 
and which works essentially by images and not concepts. Mariátegui follows 
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Nietzsche’s conflation of metaphysics –speculation on reality and its relation to the 
spirit– and myth – orientation which ‘helps to live’ – when he defines it as 
‘metaphysical animal’ and grounds in this definition mankind’s deep necessity of 
myths. Conversely, Nietzsche found in myth means of spiritual regeneration in the 
midst of the crisis of liberal and positivist precepts. The Birth of Tragedy,54 in 
particular, offers three different meanings of myth. First, myth is an image or story 
that connects the temporal flux of appearances to an underlying ontological ground, 
which in turn is not fully accessible to reason. It is, second, a narrative relating 
transient human experiences to a purposeful, time-transcending order of reality. 
Finally, it is an illusory, erroneous or untrue story. (cf. Poellner, 1998: 64–5; Daniels, 
2014) I consider that Mariátegui’s idea of myth lies between the third –when applied 
to the old liberal myth– and the first –regarding the emerging revolutionary myth– 
of these meanings. Myths often include a varied plurality of contents and shapes, 
something which goes hand in hand to Nietzsche’s perspectivism.  
 As Chiara Bottici (2009) has pointed out, contemporary political philosophy 
has dismissed myth altogether, thereby reducing political reason and missing 
myth’s particular intervention and function in politics. However, important 
contemporary research on political myth has corrected this lack. Roland Boer (2009, 
11), for instance, argues that political myths are irreducible to the distinction 
between reason and motivation, stressing the fact that they are unverifiable. They 
are indemonstrable and undeniable at the same time, since its value rests on the 
effects they produce on reality. Myth embodies a pragmatic and not an analytical or 
logical truth. In other words, myths are ‘fictitious’ in the sense that they do not fully 
participate in the present-based distinction of true nor false; they are not-yet images 
of the future that motivate people to act in the present according to such future-
images. Myths are ‘not-yet’ images, and still they are already ‘facts’ to the extent 
that they are grounded in people’s minds and serve as potential operators to action.  
 Political myth, accordingly, is defined by Boer as “an alternative language, 
one that is figurative and metaphorical, one that projects [...] stories of better worlds. 
                                                          
54  There is no evidence of Mariátegui’s access to Nietzsche’s book. However, the 
influence of this work in Latin American writers was profuse; for instance, as early as 1908 
Dominican essayist and literary critique Pedro Henríquez Ureña (very influential in 
Mariátegui) provided a way-out from positivism with his essay ‘Nietzsche and pragmatism’, 
where The Birth of Tragedy is read from pragmatist lens (cf. Rojo, ch. II). 
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In its own figurative way, political myth throws such worlds out from human 
desires and wishes” (2011: 47). Together with being motivating fictions of future 
worlds, Boer distinguishes two other general features of political myths: while they 
open up certain possibilities, they foreclose others in a potentially repressive way; 
they are, that is, liberating as well as oppressive. The third feature is that they 
contain a constitutive exception or repression, an element that makes it possible and 
impossible at the same time, (2009: 22–26) something contained in their polysemic 
and plural nature. Bottici proposes to understand myth not as a mere composite but 
as a process, for which she borrows Hans Blumenberg’s concept of “the work on 
myth”: a process that is at the same time a saying and a doing. The work on myth, 
that is, describes a narration (the work of myth) as well as a mythologeme or a set of 
mythologemes (the work at myth) in a continuous re-working. This work takes 
place, finally, in a network of symbols and figurative means, which in turn makes 
possible the organization of narrative sequences. (2007: 99–113)   
 These considerations might help understand the relevance of myths for 
political discourses and movements. I argue that Mariátegui’s was a ‘popular’ 
reading of Nietzsche, particularly of his conception of metaphysics and of myth. 
Along the lines of a romantic Marxism, he adopted a critical distance from a 
rationalist understanding of science in the comprehension of history, class struggle 
and revolution. The Peruvian Marxist understood the mythical, the mystical and the 
religious as pertaining to the same dimension of life, the metaphysical realm, as we 
will see below. In his version of Marxism, enriched by Sorel’s and Bergson’s ideas, 
such a dimension worked as the idealist side of materialism. 
 
2. The Presence of Sorel and Bergson in Mariátegui’s Marxism 
 
Sorel’s Marxism: Myth as Anti-Utopianism 
As early as the lessons on the world crisis, Mariátegui (1984, 198–200) refers to Sorel 
as an important figure who antagonized the fin de siècle dominant Lassallean 
tendencies within the European socialist movement. There has been wide-ranging 
discussed of the extent to which the French intellectual can be considered a Marxist 
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(cf. Horowitz, 1961; Kolakowski, 1978, ch. 7; Lichtheim, 1971 ch. 6; Llorente, 2012; 
Stanley, 1981). One of the reasons of this ambiguity, to be sure, lies in Sorel’s own 
disregarding of ready-made standards for coherence as well as of restrictive labels.55 
His was, nonetheless, an intellectual endeavour at least partially aligned with some 
of Marxism’s core theses: namely, history as a dynamic led by class struggle; the 
centrality of the proletariat’s moral and intellectual preparation to wage and 
triumph in such a struggle; and the necessity to wipe out state oppression. What is 
more, Sorel was a protagonist of important Marxist, socialist and syndicalist debates 
ever since his commitment to the proletarian cause in 1894-1896 until his death in 
1922.    
Sorel’s challenge to his moment’s official version of Marxism pursued the 
task of socialism’s moral reconstruction (Stanley, 1976: 30). This was addressed by 
means of the idea of ‘praxis’. This idea had been rescued from oblivion by the Italian 
philosopher Antonio Labriola, whose 1896 Essays on the Materialist Conception of 
History was prefaced by Sorel in its 1897 French translation. Labriola emphasizes 
‘labour’ understood as the active and conscious transformation of matter, as the 
specific human praxis and, in consequence, as the ground of history as science. 
Modern industry is considered as the model of praxis: “by experiments we become 
co-workers of nature” (1912: 65), concluding that, by means of modern labour and 
industrial experimentation, thought has ceased to be a hypothesis and become 
instead a pivotal productive force, with no a priori limits. Peter Thomas comments 
in this regard that “Labriola [...] defined the ‘philosophy of praxis’ as ‘the heart and 
soul of historical materialism. This philosophy is immanent to the things on which it 
philosophizes. From life to thought, and not from thought to life; this is the realistic 
process.’” (Thomas 2015: 101) In this sense, Labriola’s rescue of praxis restored what 
Etienne Balibar (2007: 23–7) reminds us is the idealistic side of Marxism, rooted in 
the positive consideration of the acting subject –Hegel’s ‘labour of the negative’.56  
                                                          
55   See to this respect his ‘Letter to Daniel Halevy’, published as the Introduction of 
Reflections on Violence (1999); also his Introduction to the Materials for a Theory of the Proletariat 
(1976). 
56   Labriola’s reading of Marx, while still compromised with some deterministic tenants 
that characterized the Marxism of the Second International (such as Kautsky’s or 
Plekhanov’s), was nevertheless a sort of ‘soft’ determinism, allowing for some degree of 
autonomy to the moral and spiritual dimension. For instance, solidarity in work was for him 
a truly spiritual achievement derived from, but not utterly determined in its consequences 
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Sorel’s political thought, albeit uneven and shifting throughout his lifetime, 
developed within similar premises. However, he understood the volitional aspect of 
praxis as corresponding not to thought but to struggle and violence. He considered 
that the moral preparation of the working class must imply an ongoing 
preoccupation with violence, to the extent that it actualizes the ‘spirit of scission’ in 
which socialism finds its grounds. The idea of proletarian violence, however, is used 
by Sorel in contradistinction to bourgeois ‘force’, understood as the coercive 
organized violence of the rulers. Therefore, labour and violence were the two 
dimensions of praxis outlined by Sorel, which amounts to say that, in his view, 
praxis was understood as the psychological and moral preparation for the battle 
plus the technological and organizational improvement of labour.  
A matter in which Sorel is at odds with most forms of Marxism, approaching 
rather to the anarchist tradition, rests on the issue of its involvement in practical 
politics. In particular, Sorel rejects the possibility to assign pre-defined orientations 
to myths. In his view, mythical forces are spontaneously creative, hence 
unpredictable in its consequences and directions.57 However, he acknowledges that 
they are malleable by political and social forces and discourses, hence easily 
mutable into ideologies – that is, into abstract, intellectualized utopias. Sorel’s 
explicit aim was nonetheless to invigorate the Marxist notion of praxis meanwhile 
confronting the utopian diversions this critical tradition has produced. For, in order 
to be instrumental for the working class’ moral reconstruction, Marxism must 
confront and surmount what Sorel considers its ‘utopian’ side. Utopian are those 
images of social transformation compounded by fixed ends and linear stages in the 
road toward their achievement. Accordingly, he criticized Marxism’s deterministic 
overtones, especially the image of a world ineluctably driving to socialism – an 
image used and abused by the Marxist orthodoxy, but which can be certainly found 
in Marx’s and Engels’ writings.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
by, capital’s organization of labour. This version of Marxism was influential for both 
Mariátegui (cf. Oshiro, 1996; Massardo, 2001, 16–7) and Gramsci (cf. Haug, 2000). 
57   This aspect was criticized in Gramsci’s reflections on the myth of ‘modern prince’, in 
an otherwise appreciative approach to Sorel’s notion of myth: “In Sorel’s case it is clear that 
behind the spontaneity there lies a purely mechanistic assumption, behind the liberty (will–
life-force) a maximum of determinism, behind the idealism an absolute materialism.” (2003: 129, 
emphasis added)   
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Sorel also considered Marx’s theory of value as particularly problematic in 
this sense, to the extent that surplus-labour as unpaid labour entails a utopian 
concept of justice: “As society is transformed by Marx into a correlation of masters 
and servants, we can say that the first part [of labour, considered as a general 
activity of society and divided up into costs and profit] is paid labour while the 
second is unpaid labour; but these obscure formulas are equivocal and should be 
banished from science.” (1976: 153)58 Renzo Llorente thus appropriately describes 
Sorel’s thought as “a fairly coherent, if idiosyncratic, variety of anarcho-Marxism.” 
(2012: 79) 
The anti-utopian concept proposed for Marxism is the ‘myth of the 
proletarian strike’. Myth is defined as the construction of a future undetermined in 
time, formed by images that bring and activate, by intuition, dispositions already 
virtually present to wage the class war in order to bring it to a veritable end –for the 
cause, in the mythical composite, is “certain to triumph” (Sorel, 1999: 20). Reflections 
on Violence explains that these constructions can possess great effectiveness in the 
socialist struggle: “a body of images capable of evoking instinctively all the 
sentiments which correspond to the different manifestations of the war undertaken 
by socialism against modern society.” (1999: 118) This composite is defined as 
“expressions of a will to act” oriented to an unforeseeable future. Therefore, the true 
content of Marx’s doctrine rests in Sorel’s view on his revelation of a catastrophic 
revolutionary exit from capitalist exploitation and moral subjugation, and not on the 
utopian projection of a peaceful transition from it towards socialism.  
In a Nietzschean fashion, intuition, sentiment and instinct form in Sorel’s 
discourse a bloc of ideas that, given its metaphorical composition, prevents its 
reduction to a rationalist ‘analysis’ or critical refutation: “[a] myth cannot be refuted, 
since it is, at bottom, identical with the convictions of a group, being the expression 
of these convictions in the language of movement; and it is, in consequence, 
unanalysable into parts which could be placed on the plane of historical 
descriptions.” (1999: 29) Bottici, in turn, argues that Sorel himself discusses the myth 
                                                          
58   In this matter, Sorel shared Benedetto Croce’s consideration of the theory of value as 
a ‘logic’ (and not an ‘actual’) fact; in this view, surplus-value would be not a real but a logic, 
intellectual construct,  hence smuggling an abstract and utopian ideal of justice. Cf. Croce 
(1915: 50-9). 
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of the general strike, particularly against the criticism it aroused from parliamentary 
socialists. (2007: 162) In other words, despite Sorel’s rejection of the possibility to 
analyze and discuss myth, he opens the path for doing so.  Be this as it may, for 
Sorel to comprehend a social force such as the proletariat means to understand not 
only its economic nature and composition, but also its psychology or ‘spirit’, that is, 
the moral conceptions and images which it expresses – or, in other words, the 
metaphysical dimension of social life, in which science and reason play little part.59 
Mariátegui understood Sorel’s contribution to Marxism in terms of a much-
needed emphasis on the moral contingency in history. What is missed in Paris’s and 
Terán’s accounts is the fact that, for Mariátegui, ‘myth’ is as an actual component of 
the ‘superstructures’, that is to say, the ‘expression’ of a socioeconomic 
infrastructure, an expression which in turn reacts and gives a certain dynamic to its 
‘base’. As Walter Benjamin put it, by referring to the “doctrine of the ideological 
superstructure” in his Arcades Project, “[t]he superstructure is the expression of the 
infrastructure. The economic conditions under which society exists are expressed in 
the superstructure –precisely as, with the sleeper, an overfull stomach finds not its 
reflection but its expression in the content of dreams, which, from a causal point of 
view, it may be said to ‘condition’.” (1999, 392) I consider that Mariátegui held a 
similar, non-deterministic understanding of the ‘expression’ of socioeconomic 
factors by superstructural manifestations, and that he consequently situated myth 
within such a framework. 
Two recent Mariateguista scholars have approached to the subject of myth 
from a more refreshing and thought-provoking perspective. Miguel Mazzeo (2009, 
86ff.), on the one hand, reads Mariátegui’s myth as a constitutive part of the 
ontological reality of human beings. By appealing to myth – Mazzeo continues – 
Mariátegui did not perform an instrumental shortcut, but rather he gave account of 
a part of reality with the potential to liberate revolutionary energies. This theoretical 
                                                          
59   Sorel agreed with Henri Bergson and William James that modern science is of little 
help in the comprehension of religion, belief or myth. These authors shared the widespread 
fin-de-siècle negative attitude towards the increasing rationalization of life and thought, 
derived from processes such as the mechanization of work, the bureaucratization of civil life, 
and the concomitant epistemological hegemony of positivism –all of which was regarded as 
amounting to the impoverishment of ‘experience’. ‘True experience’, conversely, was a 
matter of speculation, desire and no scant anxiety in this context (cf. Jay, 2004, particularly 
ch. 7 and 8).  
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sensibility was also apparent in his long-lasting commitment to and continuous 
monitoring of contemporary experimentations or innovations in the artistic terrain, 
first and foremost avant-garde movements (particularly the surrealism in Europe 
and indigenismo in Peru as well as other Latin American countries such as Mexico) 
as well as in trans-cultural artistic phenomena such as the cinema of Charles 
Chaplin (cf. Kraniauskas, 2004: 370-75). On the other hand, Jorge Oshiro (2013: 285–
86) considers Mariátegui’s myth as the conceptual operating mediator of the 
dialectic between a revolutionary elite-vanguard and the ‘multitude’ or ‘masses’, in 
a fashion similar to Gramsci’s myth of modern prince (i.e. revolutionary party). Both 
sides are indispensable in revolutionary endeavours, since the latter provides the 
former with a mystical environment and mythical contents, which in turn make that 
vanguard act according to these contents and forms. 
 Mazzeo and Oshiro are no doubt closer to Mariátegui in this respect than 
Dessau, Paris and Terán, to the extent that they recognize the productivity that the 
metaphysical realm has in his version of Marxism. However, while Oshiro’s 
account, if not implausible, in my view overestimates the influence of Spinoza in 
detriment of Bergson, Mazzeo seems simply to assume the continuity of the ideas of 
‘elements of practical socialism’ and ‘myth of social revolution’ – that is, he takes for 
granted the actual existence of mythical elements potentially oriented to socialism 
among indigenous communities. What in my view is missing in these accounts is a 
closer consideration of Bergson’s role in the formation of Mariátegui’s Marxism. 
 
The Work of the Past into the Present: Bergson (and Benjamin) on Memory and Myth 
In drawing upon Bergson, Mariátegui displayed a remarkable interest in the 
speculative grounds of social praxis. Sorel himself had asked whether “it might not 
be desirable to study this theory of myths more thoroughly, utilizing the 
enlightenment we owe to the Bergsonian philosophy.” (1999: 46) Bergson’s thought 
was actually proclaimed and spread from the pages of the Italian journal Il Divenire 
Sociale and its French counterpart Le Mouvement Socialiste as a strong antagonist to 
positivism and social Darwinism. In so doing, the ‘new socialism’ which emerged 
from a ‘syndicalist’ generation at odds with the determinism of the 2nd 
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International found in Bergson’s philosophy a fellow-traveller in the journey to 
overcome the metaphysical edifice of official Marxism.  
 By means of the concept of duration (durée) Bergson proposed to redefine 
standard notions of space, time, and causality. Duration is defined by the French 
philosopher as the prolongation or preservation of the past into the present –as the 
intuitive perception of a thing being identical to itself through the flux of time comes 
to show. The problem with the mechanistic and mathematical conception of time 
comes from its definition as a geometrical and extensive continuum, divisible at 
will, which amounts to reducing time to another dimension of space. Bergson 
explains that geometrical extension is the nature of space, not of time.  The currency 
of illegitimate translations from the extended into the unextended leads Bergson to 
propose the notion of ‘pure duration’: 
Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states 
assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its 
present state from its former states. For this purpose it need not be 
entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea; for then, on the 
contrary, it would no longer endure. Nor need it forget its former states: 
it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside 
its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past 
and the present states into an organic whole ([1888]2001: 100). 
In Matter and Memory Bergson attempted to transcend the psychological leanings of 
Time and Free Will in order to bring his argument to an ontological level; hence the 
first section (‘Perception’) discusses the reification of brain as well as the common 
understanding of consciousness as grounded on body-operations. Contending 
against Kantian philosophies, Bergson argues that perception is not oriented to 
knowledge but to action; accordingly, both body and brain are centres of action 
rather than as receivers of information. The disposition to act is in turn explained as 
directly proportional to the degree of ‘affection’ a body is subjected to. Therefore, 
perception is defined in terms of the measure of our possible actions upon bodies 
and vice versa, so that “[t]he greater the body’s power of action, the wider is the 
field that perception embraces.” ([1896]1991: 56–57) Matter, in turn, is defined as an 
aggregate of images, and by images Bergson means “a certain existence which is 
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more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the 
realist calls a thing, an existence placed half-way between the ‘thing’ and the 
‘representation’.” (1991: vii–viii) This is arguably a non-substantial conception of 
matter, which certainly affords a consideration of the work of perception in the very 
modulation –and not only in the knowledge– of the material,  
Matter and Memory distinguishes in turn between two different kinds of 
memory. On the one hand, there is habit, the quasi-automatic replaying and 
repeating of past actions and behaviours so as to react according to present 
demands. There is memory involved here but as a mere utilitarian deposit. On the 
other, there is ‘true memory’ made up by registers of a past represented as such in 
the form of ‘image-remembrances’. In Bergson’s words, memory works as follows: it 
“imports the past into the present, contracts into a single intuition many moments of 
duration, and thus by a twofold operation compels us, de facto, to perceive matter 
in ourselves, whereas we, de jure, perceive matter within matter.” (1991: 80) 
Memory enables therefore to contract, into a single intuition, multiple moments of 
time, multiple durations. It is important to notice that, in Bergson’s account, the 
memory-past is in its entirety always ‘there’, that is, ‘here’, as virtual existence which 
coexists with the present: “the whole of our past psychical life conditions our present 
state, without being its necessary determinant.” (1991: 148) Only by habituation or 
familiarization – passive memory, that is – we accustom to select some parts of the 
past, sometimes so automatically that it seems that the reaction to the stimuli 
pertains to the body, to matter itself.  
 More specifically, memory works for Bergson in a twofold way: by 
recollection-translation and by rotation-orientation:  
Memory, laden with the whole of the past, responds to the appeal of the 
present state by two simultaneous movements, one of translation, by 
which it moves in its entirety to meet experience, thus contracting more 
or less, though without dividing, with a view to action; the other of 
rotation upon itself, by which it turns toward the situation of the moment, 
presenting to it that side of itself which may prove to be the most useful. 
(1991: 168–69) 
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For a work of memory to be activated, it is necessary to relax the inhibitory powers 
of the body so as to allow the recollection of those memory-images coming out of 
relaxation. The translational character of this process means, in Deleuze terms, the 
“coalescence” (1988: 65) of the past with the present, coming from the fact that a 
present-demand needs to be situated at a certain level of the past in order to be 
properly acknowledged back into the present. Rotation, on the other hand, is the 
process of selection of the portion of the past that best suits to the present demand 
for action. It serves, as Deleuze explains, to present the union of past and present in 
its useful facet, which means the provision of a pathway from the past events in 
order to solve present tasks.  
Memory needs therefore to be actualized to become real; but it conserves its 
virtual existence at all times. The complete actualization of memory-recollection 
occurs when a memory has become an ‘image’. As the body (and matter as such) 
was already defined as an assemblage of images, the becoming-image of a memory 
means for Bergson that it has become embodied: “when the recollection thus 
brought down is capable of blending so well with the present perception that we 
cannot say where perception ends or where memory begins. At that precise 
moment, memory, instead of capriciously sending in and calling back its images, 
follows regularly, in all their details, the movements of the body.” (1991: 106) The 
ontological status that the past achieves in Bergson’s philosophy is summarized by 
Deleuze: 
[W]hile the past coexists with its own present, and while it coexists with 
itself on various levels of contraction, we must recognize that the 
present itself is only the most contracted level of the past. (1988: 74)  
The coalescence of past and present, and the reason why present-perceptions need 
to dig into the past through the work of memory, lies in the fact that the past has not 
ceased to exist. Whenever it is not actualized, that is, contracted as a memory-image, 
is because it has ceased to be useful (cf. Bergson, 1991: 193) Nonetheless, this does 
not mean that it cannot recover this capacity again in the future. Memory-images, 
those entities half-way between things and representations, must be addressed from 
this perspective as materialization or actualization of memory insofar as the latter is 
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bound to a perception and hence provided with an actual, action-oriented 
embodiment.   
 
A ‘Benjaminean’ Marxism in Latin America? 
Borrowing Menninghaus’s (2013: 28–31) reading of Benjamin’s notion of myth, I 
consider that Mariátegui oriented his Marxism along similar lines, that is, in an 
exercise of translation of the discoveries on the unconscious from the individual into 
the collective. However difficult this translation may be, and regardless of the 
rudimentary status that the conception of collective memory – or of dream – 
achieved in these authors, the fact is that they shared the preoccupation about the 
historical significance of collective mythical images. In Benjamin’s case, myth 
confrontes the quasi-theological dignity with which rationalism awarded truth and 
logos, although the romantic underpinnings of the notion were supplied by the 
Enlightenment motive of the ‘destruction of myth’. Stathis Gourgouris asserts in this 
regard that “Benjamin’s investment is dialectical through and through: myth is 
destroyed by means of the myth; myth is rescued by means of its destruction.” 
(2006: 224)  
Andrew McGettigan has argued that Benjamin’s metaphysical commitments 
can be traced upon Bergson’s Matter and Memory and the role of the past into the 
present. As the German thinker understood it, the energies of revolution come from 
particular, repressed past-times which return, as ‘images’, under particular 
conditions of collective, historical experience (2009: 26; cf. Supra, Introduction, fn8) 
Accordingly, McGettigan reads Benjamin’s dialectical image as “the involuntary 
memory of redeemed humanity” (2009: 31). In Benjamin’s words, “while the 
relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation 
of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is not progression but image, suddenly 
emergent. Only dialectical images are genuine images (that is, not archaic); and the 
place where one encounters them is language.” (1999: 462) The crucial aspect of 
Benjamin’s quote here is, of course, the non-archaic (that is, coeval) status of 
‘genuine’ images coming out of the dialectical relation of the past with the now. 
McGettigan concludes that the German thinker adapted Bergson’s topology so as to 
come to terms with the work of memory, an adaption expressed in his consideration 
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of the messianic ‘irruption’ as the interruption provoked by a specific conjuncture of 
charged past time and the present. By means of Bergson, finally, it is possible to re-
evaluate Benjamin’s anti-evolutionist philosophical attitude, as expressed for 
instance in Konvolute N2 of The Arcades Project regarding historical materialism: “its 
founding concept is not progress but actualization.” (1999: 460)  
 Of course, favourable approaches to Bergson were not the rule among 
Marxists during the first half of the twentieth century. Max Horkheimer (2005), for 
instance, criticized the conception of durée (and, by extension, the whole of his 
metaphysical apparatus) because of its estrangement from ‘actual’ history. Duration, 
Horkheimer argued, remains a merely contemplative, interior account of time, 
incapable of come to terms with the social realm, that is, with human praxis. This 
evaluation comes to undermine the translational attempts from consciousness and 
the individual into the socio-historical dimension. Meanwhile, in Latin America and 
unlike Mariátegui, Argentinean Marxist Aníbal Ponce displayed a strong negative 
view towards those philosophical currents that questioned reason and science. 
Commenting on the Nobel Prize received by the French philosopher in 1927, Ponce 
stated that “no most favourable moment for a philosophy of so seductive intimacy 
than the final third of the last century, when it begun to take shape –in more and 
more solid contours – a vigorous reaction against triumphant democracy and the 
flourishing sciences”. In the praises for the instinctive, he found nothing but “an 
excuse for not to think” (1983b: 84–85)  
These considerations indeed evoke what is perhaps the strongest and best-
known Marxist criticism of irrationalism in general, and of vitalism in particular: 
The Destruction of Reason. In it, Lukàcs explains that Bergson’s concept of intuition 
“was projected outwards as a tendency to destroy the objectivity and truth of 
natural scientific knowledge; and it was directed inwards as the introspection of an 
isolated parasitic individual divorced from the life of society during the imperialist 
period.” (1980: 24–25) This account was grounded on an utterly negative judgment 
of irrationalism as an intellectual phenomenon pertaining to the hegemony of 
monopoly capital and hence akin to fascism: “the possibility of a fascist, 
aggressively reactionary ideology is objectively contained in every philosophical 
stirring of irrationalism." (1980: 32)  
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 At the antipodes of Lukàcs, Horkheimer and Ponce, in Mariátegui’s Marxism 
the ideas of Bergson and Sorel important vehicles to come to terms with the 
affinities between mythical elements present in social life and the awakening of 
revolutionary forces. In my hypothesis, Bergson’s metaphysics lies in the 
background of Mariátegui’s understanding of the interplay of past and present –in 
historical terms, of archaic elements or ‘traditions’, on the one hand, and modernity, 
on the other. And whereas Sorel instilled in him the myth of the general strike, 
through Bergson the Peruvian Marxist was able to elaborate a more definite model 
of the work of myth: the work of memory. One might say that while Sorel’s idea of 
praxis reduced the idealistic side of Marxism to the ‘spirit of scission’ captured 
within the myth of proletarian strike, Mariátegui located the idealism in Marxism 
within a broader concept-image of myth that, coupled with religion and faith –the 
‘metaphysical dimension’ that is– served as a means to approach the communitarian 
traditions and worldviews apparent in Indian ways of worlding. What is important 
to bear in mind is that Bergson’s work of memory helped clarify Mariátegui’s 
understanding of the work of myth as the image-projection of the past into the 
present. 
 
3. Thinking the Hetero-Temporal: the Mariátegui-Haya Debate Revisited 
 
Myth, Religion, and Tradition in Mariátegui’s Marxism 
In Mariátegui’s discourse, myth is usually conflated with religion and faith. The 
metaphysical realm constitutes, in this sense, a crucial dimension not to be 
abolished as Marx and Engels envisaged, but rather vitalized in and for the 
revolutionary process. Concretely, Mariátegui explained the dismissal of the 
founding fathers of Marxism towards myth and religion as the rather necessary 
outcome of a thought that emerged in capital’s ‘classical era’, that is, at the height of 
the bourgeois order. This amounted to a widespread faith in progress, reason and 
science, an ideology in which Marx could not but partake, at least partially. Yet 
Marxism –Mariátegui thought– cannot be reduced to this aspect (as we will see in 
reference to Defence of Marxism). It is only in a romantic era, or in the era of twilight 
of the capitalist order – an epoch of crisis as well as awakening of other historical 
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motivations – that the scope of Marxism can be re-evaluated in more-than-
rationalist terms.  
In this regard, it is important to evaluate the fifth section of the Essays, 
entitled El Factor Religioso (‘The Religious Factor’). This essay provides crucial 
indications to comprehend the aspect of religion that Mariátegui sought to 
incorporate into Marxism. From the essay’s title, it is evident that the religious 
dimension is considered as a social ‘factor’ – and not an epiphenomenal ‘fact’ – of 
Peru’s social formation. This perspective, however, needed an explanation: “the 
concept of religion has become broader and deeper, going far beyond a church and 
a sacrament.” (1974: 124) Some further remarks are provided at the end of the essay. 
First, Mariátegui says that “[s]ocialism, according to the conclusions of historical 
materialism, considers that ecclesiastic forms and religious doctrines are produced 
and sustained by the socio-economic structure. Therefore, it is concerned with 
changing the latter and not the former.” And further, closing the essay, it is asserted 
that nineteenth-century rationalism  
sought to explain religion in terms of philosophy. More realistically, 
pragmatism has accorded to religion the place from which rationalism 
conceitedly thought to dislodge it. As Sorel predicted, the historical 
experience of recent years has proven that present revolutionary myths 
can occupy man’s conscience just as fully as the old religious myths. 
(1974: 151-52) 
The tandem of historical materialism and Bergson’s based Sorelian pragmatism60 is 
therefore oriented to comprehend the religious factor. More concretely, Bergson’s 
intuition – the internal and emphatic understanding of life incorporated by Sorel’s 
notion of social myths – is mobilized towards historical explanation so as to come to 
terms with the continuities of ‘old religious myths’ and ‘present revolutionary 
myths’. But Mariátegui observes that to do so, the term ‘religion’ needs to be 
relieved of its assimilation to institutional forms (church and sacraments). And this 
is arguably the main feature of the essay: in it, Mariátegui establishes a permanent 
contrast between the popular religiosity characteristic of Indian ways of worlding 
                                                          
60   This matching of Bergson and North-American pragmatism was addressed by Sorel 
in L’utilite du pragmatism (1976, ch. 8). An account on the similarities and differences between 
Bergson and William James can be found in H. Kallen (1914) and K. Ferguson (2006). 
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and worldviews, on the one hand, and those institutional- or state-forms within 
which the former have been framed and subjected –however partially–, on the 
other. The essay establishes the distinction of popular and institutional religiosity in 
the three main epochs of so-called Peru. During the pre-colonial period, Inka 
religion was marked by “its collective theocracy and its materialism”. Drawing on J. 
G. Frazer’s The Golden Bough, Mariátegui distinguishes religions based on a 
metaphysical communion of soul and God, from those characterized instead by a 
public moral function, inscribing the Inka theocracy among the latter: “it had 
temporal rather than spiritual ends and cared more about the kingdom of earth than 
the kingdom of heaven” (1974: 127). Therefore,  
[t]he religion of Tawantinsuyo [...] did not violate any of the feelings or 
customs of the Indians. [...] All its roots were nourished on the instincts and 
customs of a nation made up of agrarian tribes that had a healthy, rural 
pantheism and that were more inclined to cooperate than to wage war. [...] 
Therefore, the natural elements of the religion of the ancient Peruvians – 
animism, magic, totems, and tabus – are more interesting to investigate than 
the mysteries and symbols of their metaphysics and very rudimentary 
mythology. (1974: 127–28) 
“The Inka people” – Mariátegui concludes this section of the essay – “knew no 
separation between religion and politics” (1974: 130). This assertion is significant for 
it holds in a nutshell Mariátegui’s own conception of the affinities of politics and 
religion, as he himself explained in his comment on Miguel de Unamuno (cf. 
Maria tegui, 1977: 120; see also Löwy, 2008: 72–74).  The Spanish conquest, however, 
initiated a new period in this relation, one in which the alliance of religious and 
politics was instrumental in the subalternization of the Indians: “[t]he Catholic 
religion was superimposed on indigenous rites, only partially absorbing them.” 
(1974: 125). Grounded in large-landowning and the encomienda system, the colonial 
rule appears as a new theocracy. Religious colonization is explained by Mariátegui’s 
(1974: 135) more as the instillation of a system of worship rather than a new ‘faith’, 
an ecclesiastic more than a truly religious endeavour. The Indians’ seeming lack of 
resistance to this process is explained by Mariátegui in terms of the flexibility that 
the Catholic Church displayed regarding their ceremonies, rituals and images, in 
contradistinction to the intransigence showed in the doctrinaire and theological 
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order. Finally, the Republican period behaved in religion as in economics and 
politics: with the continuation of Catholic policies by the new state, it exhibited its 
blatant absence of liberalism.  
  ‘The Religious Factor’, fifth in the Essays’ definitive order, was the last part of 
the book to be written. Its publication – in Mundial, as usual – began in September of 
1927 and went on until January of 1928 in eight installments. Mariátegui published 
in the same journal two articles that preceded these reflections (namely, 
‘Heterodoxies of the Tradition’ and ‘The National Tradition’) and that are in my 
view pivotal in this reconstruction. ‘Heterodoxies of the Tradition’ opens with 
prospect of a “revolutionary thesis of the tradition” (1986, 161) which serves as a 
contestation of the notion of tradition as a fixed and ‘already-past’ past. The 
revolutionary thesis addressed by Mariátegui indicates that “[t]radition [...] is 
characterized precisely by its resistance to be apprehended in a hermetic formula. 
As the result of a series of experiences –that is, of successive transformations of 
reality under the action of an ideal, which overcomes it consulting it and moulds it 
obeying it– tradition is heterogeneous and contradictory in its components.” (1986: 
163) Tradition, this thesis declares, is ‘contradictory’ and hence alive and mobile, not 
a petrified fact of the past. Accordingly, for Mariátegui there is no contradiction 
between revolutionaries and tradition; there is, however, between revolutionaries 
and traditionalists.  
A week later, ‘The National Tradition’ expands such a thesis asserting first 
that “outside tradition, there is nothing but utopia.” (1986: 169) The idea of utopia 
does not hold a univocally negative meaning in Mariátegui’s work; however, this 
assertion seems to follow Sorel in the dismissal of the utopian from the standpoint 
of historical transformation. Peru’s revolutionaries, Mariátegui affirms accordingly, 
dig into a farther-reaching tradition than traditionalist accounts (molded on Spain 
and Rome) in order to achieve the real contents of the national project. Through 
Indian memories, these contents have access to a deeper timescale into the past. The 
end of the article comes to reinforce the image of a heterogeneous and mobile 
tradition: “When we are spoken of the national tradition, we need to previously 
establish what tradition we are dealing with, for we have a threefold tradition.” 
(1986: 170)  
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 What Mariátegui denominates as the living, mobile and heterogeneous 
tradition is in my view tied to Bergson’s idea of the past – of memory, that is – as 
virtual multiplicity which is nonetheless contemporaneous to the present now. Like 
memory, tradition is the result of ‘experiences’ which are considered by Mariátegui 
as social and historical. These experiences are defined in terms of the dialectical 
interplay of ideal and reality, in a process that becomes impressed upon the social 
body and remains there, so to speak, furnishing the collective unconscious. Thereby 
embodied, memories or traditions cannot be erased –“Indietro non si torna”, 
Mariátegui (Ibid.) states in Italian. Yet it is precisely the cumulative series of 
socially-embodied experiences which assigns the national formation a difficult task. 
These experiences are the traces of the would-be nation’s metamorphoses –
traumatic metamorphoses, to be sure – and as such they constitute the elements of a 
motley, heterogeneous tradition. This way of thinking seems to me to akin to 
Gramsci’s arguments about popular and subaltern cultures as fragmentary and 
dispersed; and like the Italian communist, the Peruvian socialist understood 
revolutionary practice as the organization of such heterogeneous popular 
substratum. 
 I find it apposite to read Mariátegui’s account of popular tradition, 
communitarian religiosity, and the work of memory-myth from a Benjaminian 
position. The task of the materialist historian, as Benjamin understood it, is to read 
history against the grain of the victors’ narrative, which in Mariátegui’s case meant 
against the oligarchic ideology whose pillar is a mixture of Catholicism and 
positivism. Furthermore, the Indian communitarian traditions, the memories of 
defeated past generations embodied in the myth of Pachakutec, come into view as a 
virtual motivator for revolutionary, socialist activity. Peter Osborne argues that, for 
Benjamin, historical materialism is the doctrine of which communism is the 
tradition (2000: 68). At a more practical or intuitive –i.e. pre-conceptual– way, 
Mariátegui proposed to read Peru’s communist traditions embodied in the practices 
of the still-alive ayllu and projected back to the myth of agrarian communism from 
the framework of present-day tasks of historical materialism –the actuality of 
revolution.  
To point out the affinities between agrarian and modern communism, 
however, does not amount to conflating them in a trans-historical fashion, for “[t]he 
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two communisms are products of different human experiences. They belong to 
different historical epochs”, and therefore “[a]ll that can be compared is their 
essential and material likeness, within the essential and material difference of time 
and space.” (1974: 74) Under a Marxist framework, the force-ideas of 
communitarian tradition, popular religiosity, and memory-myth are offered so as to 
indicate the possibility of creating a new Peruvianness which includes and is based 
on Indian ways of worlding and worldviews. In doing so, Mariátegui envisaged an 
ecumenical, trans-cultural socialism deeply rooted in the oppressed cultural 
memories and aimed to their ‘redemption’. Historical materialism, in his view, 
provides the sort of relativism that makes possible to comprehend both the likeness 
and differences derived from the despair coevalness of the archaic and the modern. 
Now, what Mariátegui meant by ‘historical relativism’ needs to be reviewed so as to 
differentiate both his socialist programme as well as his adoption of Marxism from 
Haya de la Torre’s. The latter, in fact, famously justified the necessity of a 
vernacular theoretical perspective based on Latin America’s singularities (an Aprista 
doctrine,  that is) by the recourse to Einstein’s ‘spatio-temporal relativity’. 
The Mariátegui–Haya de la Torre debate was characterized in Chapter II in 
terms of their divergent perspectives on uneven and combined development, 
imperialism and historical evolution. This debate, I argued, was motivated by 
political differences and reached a rather sociological level. In the next section, I will 
present the debate from a more epistemological viewpoint. 
 
The Spatio-Temporal Relativity for Indo-American exception 
Haya’s challenge to Marxism was based upon a consideration of the divergent 
nature of Indo-American historical trajectory as compared to Europe’s, and hence of 
the incommensurability of the former with the latter’s ideas of progress and 
evolution. During the 1920s, his initial approach to communist politics sustained a 
discourse somewhat internal to Marxist and communist debates. However, from 
1927 onwards, on the basis of political differences made explicit in that year’s Anti-
Imperialist League meeting held in Brussels, he started to consider Marxism as 
another Eurocentric conception of the world, later defining the task as that of 
‘dialectically overcoming’ Marxism. The linchpins of this task were, first, the 
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appropriation of a notion of dialectics derived from Hegel and Engels,61 and second, 
its association to Einstein’s theory of relativity. In Anti Imperialism and the APRA, 
such an overcoming is defined as the “dialectic negation of Marxism in its 
deterministic form”, a conceptual movement performed through the “philosophical 
projection” of Einstein’s relativity onto the historical realm (1977b: 55–56). 
Translated into historical sciences, Einstein’s theory would produce the 
dialectical negation and overcoming of Marxism inasmuch as it challenges and 
supersedes Euclidean and Newtonian conceptions of matter. The transformation of 
the concept of matter – Haya goes on – amounts to a thoroughly reconceptualization 
of gravity, space and time, so that “if such a revolution embraces the concept of 
matter itself” we are before a “revolutionary conception of philosophical materialism, that 
is to say, before a new system of relations between thought and matter” (1977: 119). 
What has been challenged is the static and motionless notion of matter which 
Marxism’s determinism derives from. In doing so, Haya introduces relativity theory 
into Indo-American political ideology. 
Among liberation theories –Haya states– Marxism proved to be a useful step 
forward thanks to the prominence given to class struggle. The awakening of non-
European peoples, however (marked in Latin America by the Mexican revolution) 
has made evident Marxism’s pitfalls in terms of its roots into European experiences 
and viewpoints. Dismissing Marxism as a doctrine capable of enlightening the 
conditions of social struggle in Latin America, hence of politically contributing to 
the continent’s social transformation, the APRA doctrine is presented as the 
“methodical confrontation” of the Marxist thesis from the standpoint of “Indo-
American reality” (1977b: 148). Relativity theory introduces the observer’s point of 
                                                          
61   It is worth quoting at length Haya’s definition of the dialectical method: 
“Philosophically, Aprismo departs from Marx’s determinism and the Hegelian dialectic 
adopted by his worldview. Inspired by Hegel’s principle: [d]ialectics is the compelling force 
by means of which nothing is firmly maintained; it is the progressive determination inherent 
to thought, as well as the outcome and negation of it (Logik); and, in Engels’ more specific 
definition: dialectics is nothing but the science of the general laws of movement, and of the 
evolution of human society and of thought (Anti-Duhring), Aprismo funds itself in the 
philosophical methodologization [metodización], in the dialectical statement of the negation 
of the negation. [...] it also recognizes Marxism as a philosophical school subjected to this 
very law discovered and developed by it. [...] From this viewpoint, historical determinism is 
not a law enforced on every latitude.” (1977b, 19) Haya’s definition of dialectics owes more 
to Lassalle than to Marx. Conversely, as we will see in next section, Mariátegui held a 
marked anti-Lassallean Marxism, which is coherent with his adoption of Lenin’s and Sorel’s 
Marxisms. 
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view into account, which in Haya’s view amounts to asserting that what in Europe 
the ‘last’ instance of capitalism, in Indo-America becomes the ‘first’: “[t]here is here, 
among many, two viewpoints, two angles, two different and relatively parallel 
planes; hence the laws and propositions conceived for a certain historical space-time 
does not correspond to the other” (1977b: 26).  
The multiple and relative spatial-temporal trajectories are approached by 
Haya in terms of the integration of the geographical setting, the “objective field”, 
and “subjective time”, which is the product of the conceptions made by peoples 
within such a space. The objective field is the historical space that determines (in the 
Marxist sense of the ‘determination in the last instance’) subjective time. The 
interplay of these dimensions gives birth to a singular rhythm or “objective time”, 
which thus becomes an individual “historical space-time” (1977b: 23). In turn, the 
development of the productive forces and techniques is defined as the material 
content of historical space-times: “the degrees of ‘historic time’ are measured by the 
steps of peoples in the evolution of their development of the mastery over nature” 
(1977b: 25)  The development of productive forces determines the civilization stages 
of peoples and their historical space-time, so that one can only speak on retardation 
or backwardness “in relation to the rhythm of evolution marked by the conditions 
of life and work of the most developed peoples” (1977b: 24). 
Therefore, what Aprista ideology conserves from Marxism is this precise 
deterministic explanation of development by the forces of production, 
technologically and instrumentally considered. Such a deterministic element, in 
turn, is complemented with the relativistic principle carried out to its extreme 
“[w]hat is important to establish and always bear in mind is that historical time is 
not chronological time [...] and that [...] it is non-transferable from space to space.” 
(1977b: 41, emphasis added) Imperialism, as it was already seen in Chapter I, 
corresponds to this sort of illegitimate transference of civilization stages, an 
‘arrhythmia’ disrupting the otherwise Indo-American normal historical space-time, 
hence negatively determining the developmental path of this region. This is what is 
implied in the following sentence: “When social phenomena are ‘logically’ 
produced, there is no artifice in History; but when the observation is ‘imported’ this 
is diverted, and hence the historical view turns out to be ‘illogical’ and the political 
procedure becomes immoral...” (1977b: 89, original emphasis) Of course, not only 
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imperialism but also Marxism pertains to this sort of observation imported or 
transferred from different geographies –the former being the actual process through 
which what in Europe is the last stage of capitalism (product of successive 
development stages) turns out to be the exportation and colonization of “incipient 
economies” (1977b: 89; see also Castro-Arenas, 1979: 56).  
Fredrick Pike (1986: 86ff) has reconstructed Haya’s conceptions not only 
from their sources in Einstein, Spengler and Toynbee (explicit in his texts) but also 
in Count Hermann Keyserling, a German mystic-philosopher who achieved a 
certain influence among some Latin American intellectual circles in the inter-Wars 
period. Keyserling – Pike says – explained that the contemporary world suffers from 
the tensions provoked by the clash of different historical rhythms: that is the source 
of its decadence. Only the emergence of a world-rhythm will restore the integrative 
power characteristic of ancient civilizations and lost in modern times. This restored 
world-rhythm will imply the return of the human kind to mystical and spiritual 
values, all of which would foster the recovery of lost harmony as achieved in less-
materialist epochs, but only insofar as the nations are able to integrate into higher, 
more synchronized unities.  
The self-consciousness of this harmonization process signals the awakening 
of what Haya called “continent-people”, that is, the ability of peoples to turn their 
quantitative, material experience (which arguably means their technical 
development) into qualitative ‘spiritual’ aptitude. In a bizarre but telling passage, 
Haya defines continent-people as “the coordination of space- and time-history, 
determined by the conscience of a people that, before the demand of world 
equilibrium, aims further to an expansion – another topic pointed out by Relativism 
– compelling us to situate our own gravitational field within determinate historical 
limits [...] This peculiar Relativism applies to Modern States.” (1977b: 86, original 
emphasis) This baroque justification for a larger, expanded Latin American state is 
coherent with Haya’s outlined alternative trajectory of Indo-America within a 
capitalist world eventually undermined in its imperialist tendencies. In this post-
imperialist world, a progressive harmonization of the world market – conducted 
and supported by strong anti-imperialist states across the colonial and semi-colonial 
world – will readdress these ‘continent-peoples’ into more suitable, balanced forms 
to transit through capitalism. As we can see more clearly now, imperialism is 
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considered by Haya as an ‘arrhythmia’ distorting the individuality of Indo-
American timeline, which does not put into question the necessity of capitalism, but 
instead signals its future by means of a (cultural?) relativistic – but, at the end of the 
day, deeply deterministic – detour.   
 
A Necessary ‘Defense’ of Marxism 
The initial indictments of the Aprista doctrine were contemporaneous with the final 
instalments and publication of Seven Interpretive Essays (the first version of Haya’s 
Anti Imperialism and the APRA appeared in the same year, 1928). It is no surprise 
then that Mariátegui attempted to contest these formulations immediately: the 
article ‘The Revisionist Attempt of Beyond Marxism’ –the first article of Mariátegui’s 
Defense of Marxism in order of composition, the second in the final arrangement– 
appeared in July 1928 in Mundial. In it, the explicit target was the Belgian socialist 
Henri de Man’s 1926 Zur Psychologie des Sozialismus, translated into French in 1927 
with the title it will come to be known by: Au-delà du Marxisme or Beyond Marxism. 
This book soon achieved a great popularity among heterodox Marxists and non-
Marxists alike,62 and its foremost claim was the ‘liquidation’ of Marxism. As we will 
see, however, one might read Mariátegui’s Defence as implicitly oriented to Haya de 
la Torre and his alternative doctrine. 
The Belgian scholar and socialist politician (some years later allied to the 
Nazi invasion and finally judged and executed after the 1945 liberation for the same 
reasons) claimed in his book that a movement of ‘spiritualization’ of socialist theory 
was needed, so as to contribute to the regeneration of the socialist movement. His 
endeavour was therefore grounded in what he called a ‘theory of motives’ able to 
confront Marxism’s ‘psychological rationalism’ and hence to come to terms with 
passions and irrational human behaviours. Accordingly, the author indicated what 
in his view corresponds to the methodological failure of Marxism: monocausal 
economic determinism, expressed in the conceptual divorce between ‘interests’ and 
‘ideas’ as well as in the consideration of capitalism’s inability to overcome its own 
economic contradictions By means of elements borrowed from social as well as 
                                                          
62  Count Keyserling, for instance, considered it the most important Marxist book since 
Capital. Cf. P. Dodge (1966: 68). 
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physiological psychology, De Man identified what he considered to be the kernel of 
Marxism’s pitfalls amounting to the inevitability of the socialist overthrow of 
capitalism (cf. Dodge, 1966: 72, 75–83). 
 Mariátegui explicitly formulated his reflections on De Man’s and similar 
endeavours such as Emilio Vandelverde’s or Max Eastman’s. I argue, however, that 
such a settling of accounts with this sort of Marxist revisionism held Haya de la 
Torre as its implicit target.63 De Man’s work appears as a symptom of sorts of the 
doctrinal crisis within socialist theory, and although Beyond Marxism was aimed at 
confronting and correcting the course of the European workers’ movement, 
Mariátegui envisaged the worldwide scope of such an effort, which compromised 
historical materialism tout court – and of which the Aprista doctrine itself was an 
example (cf. Fernández, 2010: 176).  
At a methodological level, Mariátegui accuses De Man of eclectically 
(mis)translating elements of psychology and ethical philosophy into class struggle –
which can also be said of Haya’s extrapolation of the relativity theory into history. 
But the epistemological challenge remains: Is there a form of truth in subjectivity 
that fatally compromises Marxism as both theory and practice? A positive answer to 
this question had been launched by a renewed revisionism emerging from within 
the socialist movement in the aftermath of the First World War, the Russian 
revolution, and the defeat of other revolutionary upheavals between 1919 and 1921. 
Mariátegui, in turn, chooses to briefly outline the history of Marxism’s revisionism 
in order to shift the coordinates for approaching these debates. He proposes the pair 
of ‘dogma’ and ‘heresy’ –a theological polarity– as an alternative approach to the 
more common one of orthodoxy and revisionism/heterodoxy. “Dogma” – 
Mariátegui says – “is here understood as a doctrine of historical change. And as 
such, while change happens, it is so only while dogma is not filed away in the 
archive or becomes an ideological law of the past; there is nothing like dogma to 
guarantee creative liberty, the germinal function of thought.” (2011: 179)  
Heresies, on the other hand, are productive only to the extent that they are 
oriented to internally contributing to the expansion and invigoration of a dogmatic 
                                                          
63  Not less important, Osvaldo Fernández (2010: 182–83) indicates that Defence was 
motivated in part by Mariátegui’s settling of account with his own previous political 
consciousness.  
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body: “the fortune of a heresy depends on its elements or its possibilities to become 
dogma or to be incorporated into a dogma” (1976: 125); otherwise, they remain 
individual, fruitless endeavours. Mariátegui declares in consequence that the ‘true 
revision’ of Marxism, “in the sense of the renovation and continuation of the work of 
Marx” (2011: 189, emphasis added), has been accomplished by intellectuals with 
motivations quite different than De Man’s, coupling here Sorel and Lenin. Sorel 
represents –Mariátegui goes on– the return to an active, dynamic and heroic 
conception of socialism “and its insertion in the new intellectual, organic reality” –
namely, imperialism. Through Sorel, conversely, “Marxism assimilates the 
substantial elements and acquisitions of philosophic currents after Marx” (2011: 
190). Therefore, the rectification of the tension between Marxism and revisionism by 
means of that between dogma and heresy allows Mariátegui to give an account of 
what he considers a twofold open path for the contemporary vitalization of 
historical materialism: the theory of imperialism and the theory of myths informed 
by Bergson’s reflections on memory and the metaphysical dimension of life.  
In these remarks, Mariátegui throws back at De Man what the latter had 
presented as Marxism’s incomprehension of contemporary philosophical 
achievements, particularly in psychology and ethics: “it would be more appropriate 
to accuse the latter [contemporary philosophy] of a deliberate and fearful 
incomprehension of the class struggle and socialism.” (2011: 197) There is here an 
implicit definition of historical materialism as historical because of its ability to 
incorporate scientific and philosophical advances into its own revolutionary horizon 
–‘spirit’ and the metaphysical dimension included. To assert this, however, requires 
a sharp differentiation from the sort of ethics, such as those derived from De Man, 
based on the criticism of a politics (that of the German Social Democracy) of 
Lassallean more than Marxist bent (cf. 1976: 20). The conclusions drawn by 
Mariátegui from this distinction outlined a renewed understanding of the ‘ethical 
function’ of socialism: “The ethical function of socialism [...] should be sought not in 
grandiloquent Decalogues, nor in philosophical speculations that by no means 
constitute a necessity in Marxist theorizations, but in the creation of a producers’ 
morality for the very process of anticapitalist struggle.” (2011: 201) Elaborating more 
on this, he asserts that 
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the proletariat must elevate itself to a ‘producers’ morality’, quite distant 
and distinct from the ‘slave morality’ that its gratuitous teachers of 
morality, horrified by its materialism, officiously attempt to provide it. 
[...] The proletariat only enters history politically, as a social class, at the 
moment it discovers its mission to build a superior social order with 
elements gathered by human effort [...] And it has not gained this ability 
miraculously. It has won it by situating itself solidly on the terrain of the 
economy, of production. Its class morale depends on the energy and 
heroism with which operates on this terrain [...] (2011: 212-13) 
This class morality will depend thus on the ability to master  production, that is, on 
the capacity to revolutionize its own material ground – on the capacity, in other 
words, to turn a socialized-but-still-capitalist economy into a socialized-and-
socialist form of production. However, there is an active role for consciousness in 
the leap or ‘elevation’ to a producers’ morality. As Labriola recognized, the 
formation of a sentiment of co-belonging – class solidarity – determine what 
Marxism has understood as the passage from class-in-itself to class-for-itself. Such a 
passage is accomplished, however, in a mythical form – and that is the content 
Mariátegui considers so important to Marxism’s philosophical ‘updating’: “The 
theory of revolutionary myths, which applies to the socialist movement the 
experience of religious movements, establishes the ground of a philosophy of 
revolution deeply impregnated with psychological and sociological realism.” (2011: 
196) Historical materialism, on the other hand, is not hindered from making this 
philosophical updating; to believe so it is, for Mariátegui, to confuse historical and 
philosophical materialism. In a decisive passage, Mariátegui summarizes the point: 
Historical materialism is precisely not a metaphysical or philosophical 
materialism, nor is it a philosophy of history left behind by scientific 
progress. Marx had no reason to create anything more than a method of 
historical interpretation of modern society. [...] Marxist criticism studies 
capitalist society concretely. As long as capitalism has been transformed 
definitively, Marx’s canon remains valid. Socialism or, rather, the 
struggle to transform the social order from capitalist to collectivist, 
keeps this critique alive, continues it, confirms it, corrects it. Any attempt 
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to categorize it as a simple scientific theory is in vain since it works in history 
as the gospel and method of a mass movement. (2011: 194, emphasis added) 
Marxism is thus defined as fundamentally a method of historical interpretation, 
whose ideas are nonetheless “radically different from the mutable fortune of 
scientific and philosophical ideas that accompany or immediately precede them in 
time” (2011: 195). The surprising element that emerges from Mariátegui’s words is, 
of course, the consideration of Marxism as ‘gospel and method’. The question arises: 
What does it make Marxism not ‘just’ a scientific method for interpreting capitalism, 
but also a gospel of the masses? What is the ‘dogmatic’ core of Marxism that 
becomes invigorated by the productive heresies that update it to the new 
philosophical and scientific horizons? Let us recall here the 1852 letter to Joseph 
Weydemeyer in which Marx made the following clarification: 
[N]o credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in 
modern society or the struggle between them. [...] What I did that was 
new was to prove: 1) that the existence of classes is only bound up 
with particular historical phases in the development of production, 2) that the 
class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, 3) 
that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition 
of all classes and to a classless society. (2010a: 62–5) 
If we read this assertion from the viewpoint of myth, the Marxist method-become-
gospel can be considered as the transformation of its own discoveries – namely, the 
historicization of class struggle – into the myth of social revolution. For Mariátegui, 
despite Marx and Engels’s own debts to nineteenth-century rationalism, the myth of 
social revolution is totally derived from the historicization of modern society and 
class struggle made possible by the work of the founding fathers of historical 
materialism. The Marxist ‘dogma’ – the dialectics of a method becoming myth, that 
is– assumes the form of an explanation that ‘reveals’ its own solution with the force 
of a historical necessity. This is also Gramsci’s definition of the mythical in his 
account of Machiavelli and Sorel (cf. Gramsci, 2003: 130). In Mariátegui’s Marxism, 
‘myth’ is not opposed but intimately engaged with science, to the extent that the 
former brings scientific truths to a higher level, that of being actual motivators for 
historical action. The dialectics of myth and science suggested in the description of 
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Marxism as a method-become-gospel works like those ‘ideals’ embodied in social 
classes described in the late-1924 article ‘Imagination and Progress’.   
Mariátegui thus reconciles Sorel and Lenin by reading the latter back from 
the ‘revisionist’ moment of Marxism, a moment in which Sorel’s heresy was 
instrumental and “indispensable to the confirmation of dogma’s health.” (1976: 20). 
Lenin, theoretician of imperialism and leader of the Russian revolution, is explained 
in terms of the urgency to ‘spiritualize’ Marxism under premises quite different than 
the ‘ethical socialism’ proposed by De Man. What is required, in Mariátegui’s view, 
is a more attentive consideration of the complexity and multidimensionality of the 
revolutionary phenomenon, spiritual factors included. The dominant event of the 
recent history of socialism is, without doubt, the Russian revolution: “[i]t is to this 
accomplishment, whose historical reach cannot yet be measured, that one must go 
in order to find a new stage of Marxism.” (2011: 190, transl. modified) Marxism 
must thus be read back from the standpoint of this contemporary event, which 
marks its positive, creative actualization; conversely, only this sort of historical 
events give full meaning to their own previous history. De Man’s endeavour, at the 
end of the day, can be fairly considered an internal criticism of reformist socialism; 
but precisely because of its own reformist commitments, the revisionist attempt 
remains blind –or, better, ‘resistant’, in the Freudian use of the term– to the actuality 
of revolution. 
  
Coloniality on Trial 
‘Literature on Trial’ is the concluding and more extensive of Mariategui’s Seven 
Interpretive Essays. Following the above line of reasoning, I will argue that in this text 
we can find an example of Mariátegui’s ‘work of myth’. This account will be 
pursued following the previous framework and putting it in dialogue with Neil 
Larsen’s important comments on the essay. The passages we will review here are 
part of the final versions of Mariátegui’s intervention in the ‘polemic over 
indigenismo’, so we should link this argument with the previous chapter’s section. 
The essay presents a balance-sheet of Peruvian letters, seeking to indict the civilista 
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version of Peru’s literary history.64 It is the very existence of a literary national 
tradition that is denied and unveiled as ideological by means of Mariátegui’s 
‘examination of evidences’. But before (and in another instance of his kinship with 
Gramsci) he draws upon Francesco de Sanctis’s ruminations on the conceptual 
status of “national literatures” in Teoria e storia della letteratura, in order to assert that 
“[t]he nation itself is an abstraction, an allegory, a myth that does not correspond to 
a reality that can be scientifically defined.” (1974: 188) What is more, the inorganic 
development of the entity called ‘Peru’, expressed in the historical extra-social status 
of the Indian, is brought to the front as the material basis to evaluate the likewise 
inorganic character of the literature produced therein.  
Tracing the coordinates of his endeavour, Mariátegui points out that 
“[l]anguage is the raw material that unites literature.” By reason of its colonial 
history as well as “[t]he Quechua-Spanish dualism in Peru, still unresolved” (1974: 
184, 188), Peruvian letters require to be distinguished from those cases of organic 
literature such as the French, Italian or Spanish: it prevents our national literature 
from being studied with the methods used for literatures that were created and 
developed without the intervention of a conquest.” Peruvian literature, therefore, 
cannot be studied from within the framework of classicism, romanticism and 
modernism as a temporal continuum; In what is considered as the most significant 
contribution made in this essay (cf. D’Allemand, 1994; see also Melis, 2007), 
Mariátegui offers a method (“literary, not sociological”) by means of which a post-
colonial country can be examined; this method distinguishes between “three 
periods: colonial, cosmopolitan, national. In the first period, the country, in a 
literary sense, is a colony dependent on its metropolis. In the second period, it 
simultaneously assimilates elements of various foreign literatures. In the third 
period, it shapes and expresses its own personality and feelings.” (1974: 191) In this 
sense, Mariátegui questions the assumption of an already defined national 
literature. In Riva Agüero, the exclusive emphasis on Spanish-based currents 
implies both a neglect of Inka oral literature as well as an insufficient consideration 
                                                          
64   The central accused in this ‘trial’ is José de la Riva Agüero, Peruvian historian, 
literary critic and politician, whose 1905 Character of the Literature of Independent Peru was the 
first modern attempt to give an account of the literary history of the ‘nation’. 
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of the contemporary currents striving to revitalize the field by introducing an 
indigenista element.  
Riva Agüero, among others, considered indigenismo as an exotic, Western-
mirroring avant-garde, something that is re-evaluated by Mariátegui as the concrete 
adoption of the cosmopolitan in the making of the national character. Indigenismo 
appears in this account as the literary current heralding the coming national 
period.65 The proto-national grounds of this otherwise ‘exotic’ literary tendency are 
placed in the social rather than the literary dimension. In other words, what is 
crucial in this critical consideration is its commitment with the Indian social struggle 
and not so much its achievements in the representation of an ‘indigenous’ literature. 
In a crucial passage, the essay points out that “[i]ndigenista literature cannot give us 
a strictly authentic version of the Indian, for it must idealize and stylize him. Not it 
can give us his soul. It is still a mestizo literature and as such is called indigenista and 
not indigenous. If an indigenous literature finally appears, it will be when the 
Indians themselves are able to produce it.” (1974: 274) 
 This passage has been acutely commented upon by Neil Larsen. The 
indigenista literature, portrayed as an ‘untrue’ version of the Indian insofar as it 
makes use of artificial (i.e., avant-garde) techniques and resources, is approached 
nonetheless as an historical necessity, a prelude to self-representation. Self-
representation, or indigenous (indígena, and not indigenista) literature, will arrive 
when the Indians unfold all their social potentials. For Larsen, Mariátegui shows 
himself here to be at odds with the more accustomed idea of progression from 
‘content’ to its self-accomplished ‘form’ – in Hegel, for instance. On the contrary, 
Peru’s ‘national’ literature, like its nationhood itself, has developed by ‘mere’ forms, 
either in the form of civilista Peruvianness, or in the ‘artificial’, untrue representation 
of the nation provided by indigenismo. These forms correspond respectively to the 
colonial and cosmopolitan periods, all of which indicates for Larsen the project of 
creation of a proper ‘true’ content, a direct and reliable Indian self-representation 
“as it were, ex nihilo” (2001: 88–9).    
                                                          
65   César Vallejo’s first book Los Heraldos Negros is highlighted in Mariátegui’s account, 
for it “ushers in the dawn of a new poetry in Peru. [...] In Vallejo, for the first time in our 
history, indigenous sentiment is given pristine expression.” (1974: 250)  
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From this perspective, Larsen points out rightly that Mariátegui’s paradox 
lies in the tension between cultural nationalism (“fallacy of essentialism”) and 
postcolonialism (“fallacy of textualism”) in the explanation of the nation – in other 
words, the consideration of the nation as an immediate content versus the nation as 
an illusion, a mere narrative (2001: 87). Yet Mariátegui has already defined nation as 
myth, an unscientific reality. Larsen concludes that “those very same socio-historical 
conditions that have render the allegorical, abstract myth of the nation transparent 
to the anti-colonial intellectual are, for Mariátegui, conditions that demand an act of 
faith in the national myth itself.” (2001: 87, 90) What Larsen seems nonetheless to 
miss is precisely the politics of myth engaged in Mariátegui’s political imaginary. It 
is, in my account, first a politics grounded in those “spiritual elements of labour” 
conceptualized by Sorel (1974: 283fn, trans. modified; cf. Mariátegui, 1965b: 345fn) 
and carried out by communitarian practices; and not in ‘forms’ imposed in a top-
down fashion, such as the still-colonial Republic or Leguía’s project of Peru’s 
Westernization. As we already seen in Chapter I, for Mariátegui in post-colonial 
countries both the national and the socialist projects are transformed by the 
imperialist conjuncture, a transformation which entails the intersection of national 
and socialist projects. (cf. Maria tegui 1986: 100; and chapter I of this work) In this 
sense, the evoked ‘national’ myth is only capable of being achieved through the 
intermingling of socialism and anti-colonialism.   
Second, and more significant for the current argument, the resort to the 
mythical –as Larsen indicates– is oriented to filling the historical gap between ‘form’ 
and ‘content’. However, this is not merely because of its (formal) affinities with “a 
tribal culture” (Larsen, 2001: 91), but rather by the connections established between 
these cultural elements and their own past memories. The Indian life, Mariátegui 
highlights, conserves an individual and recognizable ‘style’ (arguably, the basis of 
the projected indigenous literature) despite its history of oppression; this style, in 
turn, rests on the continuity of its past: “[i]t is evident that he [the Indian] is still not 
incorporated into the expanding, dynamic civilization that seeks to be universal. Yet 
he has not broken with his past. His historical process is at standstill, paralyzed, 
however he has not lost individuality because of this.” (1965b: 345, emphasis 
added). The colonial unconscious working behind Andean communitarian 
traditions (the myth of Pachakuteq, that is) appears thus as the kernel of the 
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national-cum-socialist project of Peruvian re-foundation. However, this will occur 
only on the condition that these mythical memories are brought over their potential 
synchronicity to the myth of social revolution.  
There is a complex interplay of temporalities at stake in the consideration of 
the function that the ‘myth of nation’ plays in a country typified by a colonial and 
post- (but as-yet semi-) colonial history. The coexistence of communitarian elements 
of production characteristic of uneven capitalist development brings to the forefront 
a conserved Indian religiosity characterized as collective and materialist –that is, 
with earthly and not other-worldly orientations. From capital’s viewpoint, these 
memories and practices are backward, already-past elements remaining out-of-sync 
with modernity. Indigenista literature, in turn, comes to envisage –in an ‘artificial’, 
avant-garde and hence still cosmopolitan fashion– the potential actualization of 
these memories. Itself another ‘form’, the commitments of this literature to the 
Indian social struggle for liberation nonetheless projects the potential synchronicity 
of the autochthonous and the modern in a mythical image. “[A]n autochthonous 
society can rapidly find its own way to modern civilization and translate into its 
own tongue the lessons of the West”, Mariátegui (1974: 283) asserts regarding the 
feasibility of this synchronization.  
The work of myth, in other (Bergsonian) terms, functions as the work of 
memory in the actualization of a virtual reality by means of its 
recollection/translation; one may say it is an ‘avant-garde’ recollection that meets 
past experiences, and ‘socialist’ rotation/translation situating the former in its 
usefulness for the present. Mariátegui’s politics of myth, consequently, achieves its 
form neither by a trans-historical essence of the nation nor by the mere efficacy of a 
fictional narrative, but through the affinities between a (autochthonous) virtual 
reality and an actual (socialist) historical movement.  In other words, the politics of 
myth is comprehended as the politics of the united front in Mariátegui’s 
programme, a programme of remaking the nation that is outlined in a communist 
and communitarian (not state-based, that is) perspective. In doing so, Mariátegui’s 
‘subaltern’ standpoint envisages and helps to disclose the heterogeneous 
temporalities involved Peru’s (and, by extension, Latin America’s) participation of 
the actuality of world revolution. 
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4. Conclusions: Hetero-Temporality and Indo-American Socialism 
The mythical entanglement of Pachakutec and socialist revolution envisaged the 
affinities between those subversive ethno-cultural elements and the prospect of a 
worldwide classless society. Adumbrating the synchronization of motives which 
pertain to different temporalities, the indigenous standpoint achieved by 
Mariátegui’s Marxism presaged something of a century before what Álvaro García 
Linera (2009, Introduction; cf. Kraniauskas, 2015) called socialism as a renewed, 
universalized ayllu. This is what, in my view, is expressed in Mariátegui’s projected 
image of Indo-American socialism: 
Socialism is certainly not an Indo-American doctrine. But […] although 
socialism, like capitalism, may have been born in Europe, it is not 
specifically or particularly European. […] Indo-America can and should 
have individuality and style in this new world order, but not its own 
culture or a singular fate. […] Socialism, finally, is in the American 
tradition. The most advanced primitive communist organization that 
history records is that of the Inkas. 
We certainly do not want socialism in Latin America to be a copy or 
imitation. It should be a heroic creation. We have to give birth to Indo 
American socialism with our own reality, in our own language. (2011: 
129–30) 
It seems to me that all the elements of Mariátegui’s political imaginary are present 
in this 1928 editorial of Revista Amauta’s 17th issue, where the break with Haya de la 
Torre was made public. It is, first, the critique of the relativistic ‘multiplicity’ of 
continent-peoples and ‘rhythms’, a geographical-cultural relativism, the standpoint 
upon which the epistemological incommensurability of Latin America vis-à-vis 
Western theories and politics was based. The becoming-ecumenical of the socialist 
idea, premised by the world capitalist integration characteristic of the imperialist 
age, affords an understanding of temporalities that are neither homogeneous or 
homogenizable nor simply ‘multiple’, different or alternative. Rather, they are 
violently turned into synchronization by the critical tendencies of capitalism in its 
worldwide expansion. Combining Bergson’s philosophy with an understanding of 
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capitalism as a temporal entanglement, one might say that the acknowledgment of 
the virtual multiplicity of temporalities does not imply a simple arithmetical 
difference of individual ‘times’, but rather a diversity in degree – not in kind – of 
what is otherwise the unity of duration. Translated into the socio-historical 
dimension, ‘duration’ is considered by Mariátegui as the continuous, rebellious 
presence of communitarian, collectivist relations in the midst of the actual now, as 
well as a tendency internal to capitalism, disclosed in the expanded socialization of 
production. 
It is beyond the scope of this work to give account of the Mariátegui-Haya 
debate in terms of the discussion between Bergson and Einstein. It is not clear, 
moreover, whether Mariátegui had access to this discussion, and to what extent – 
i.e. first- or second-hand readings. However, the methodological remarks made in 
Defence of Marxism – the alleged autonomy of scientific methods – could be 
considered to this regard in the following terms: Einstein’s relativity theory requires 
the absolute independence of the systems of reference, a fact that is missed in all of 
Haya’s ‘philosophical projection’ upon the socio-historical dimension. In Bergson’s 
terms, the validity of this sort of translation depends in the last instance on an 
appropriate redefinition of matter, so as to distinguish in a more accurate way 
objects which differ in kind from those which merely differ in degree. For only two 
objects that differ solely in degree and not in kind could be appropriately 
considered through a similar scientific method. What from this perspective is 
invalid in Haya’s (and De Man’s) account is precisely the conception of the 
metaphysical dimension of matter – the durational unity of the real. And that is 
precisely, in my hypothesis, what Mariátegui finds in Bergson’s metaphysics so 
capable of reinvigorating philosophical disquisitions within historical materialism.  
By unleashing its own constitutive crisis, imperialism (that is, monopoly 
capital’s division of the world economy across the colour-line cum an expanded 
socialization in production) generates in Mariátegui’s view the material conditions 
for the synchronization of these spatially and temporally divergent memories of 
struggle within the actuality of world revolution. In this sense, political 
synchronization signals the horizon in which the united front comes to terms with 
the hetero-temporal condition of capitalist modernity in a non-Western-centred 
perspective. The unevenness-in-combination of capitalist development is translated 
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into Bergson’s language of creative evolution so as to envisage a revolutionary 
conception of tradition, in which the Andean communitarian ways of worlding and 
worldviews could perform a distinctive role within the socialist revolution. In doing 
so, the partially-repressed Andean memories striving to survive in ethno-cultural 
practices and worldviews – what one might risk to call a ‘colonial unconscious’ – are 
brought to the fore in their mythical forms, in order to make sense of the 
“consanguinity of the indigenista movement with the world revolutionary current” 
(1963: 11). This consanguinity demands in turn a consideration of socialism in its 
more-than-scientific dimension, that is, as the modern myth as well: “The strength 
of revolutionaries is not in their science; it is in their faith, in their passion, in their 
will. It is a religious, mystical, spiritual force. It is the force of myth” (2011: 387), 
Mariátegui observed in one of his later writings. 
If my reconstruction of Mariátegui’s Marxism is correct, he found (perhaps 
‘intuitively’) a pathway to deal with what Bloch regarded as a much-needed 
multilevel dialectics: a dialectics in which the non-synchronous – the ‘archaic’ 
elements – are reintegrated into the ‘modern’ synchronic dialectics of class struggle 
from a materialist viewpoint. Drawing on Bergson’s understanding of the work of 
the past in the present, Mariátegui did not offer a systematic account of his 
perspective – but he did arguably pursue this theoretical horizon from a coherent, 
essentially political-practical orientation. Barely a ‘philosopher’, more acquainted 
with the alchemy of politics and of cultural organization, Mariátegui provided a 
translation – which was at the same time a stream of actualization – of Marxism 
from and for Indo-America. What emerged through this ‘intuitive’ multilevel 
dialectics are those ‘elements of practical socialism’, a ground of rich and plural 
ethno-cultural elements populating the Andean memories of struggle under 
mythical forms; a ground upon which historical materialism may be invigorated in 
both its historical and materialist dimensions. 
As the above account has attempted to demonstrate, Mariátegui stands as 
the forerunner of a subalternist perspective in Latin American Marxism in two 
interwoven senses. On the one hand, he sustained a conception of communist 
politics deeply rooted in communitarian, popular and subaltern grounds, and not in 
ideal state-forms. In this sense, he opposed mestizaje or miscegenation ideologies as 
well as separatist national projects. As a grassroots, creative process, communism 
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must perforce be ecumenical so as to shelter and embrace the heterogeneous, 
uneven and combined forms of anti-capitalist – and potentially (virtually) socialist – 
emancipation struggles. On the other hand, he found in Bergson’s philosophy of 
memory and duration the topological model for the work of myth. By means of this 
non-rationalist but intuitive perspective, he disclosed a pathway to deal with the 
contemporaneous nature of non-contemporaneous memories and structures of 
temporalization – with the hetero-temporal condition of capitalist modernity and its 
present-now. In doing so, Mariátegui projected Marxism as the trans-cultural space 
of engagements through which the virtual synchronicity of the myths of Pachakutec 
and socialism makes the room for the indigenous participation in the actuality of 
revolution; as John Kraniauskas (2012: 52) has elegantly put it, Mariátegui found a 
pathway to Indianize the proletarian, post-capitalist world.   
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IV. The Dependency Hypothesis: Dependentista School as Theoretical Moment 
in Latin American Marxism 
 
‘Depending on the level of analysis, more 
abstract or more concrete, the emphasis 
displaces either to the form in which 
general laws are actualised through [a 
través de la] class struggle, or to the form 
in which class struggle acts upon these 
laws’ actualization.’ 
Ruy Mauro Marini, Dialectic of the 
Dependence, 1973 
 
Fernando H. Cardoso presented in 1977 a sort of balance-sheet about the reception 
of ‘dependency theory’ in developed countries. By means of the article ‘The 
Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States’, he separated waters 
from other well-known dependentista authors. Cardoso used the idea of 
‘consumption’ to refer to such reception, described as the over-simplification of a 
complex set of debates and arguments into a ready-made theoretical ‘article for 
consumption’. Thus constructed, the reigning version of dependency theory also 
reflected the triumph of one particular account of dependentismo; the others – 
included his own formulation – have been overlooked by this consumable product. 
However, Cardoso prevented, “dependency cannot be consumed as a ‘theory’, 
implying a corpus of formal and testable propositions”; in doing so, one would run 
the risk of forming a straw man easily digestible so as to gain academic currency, 
but also to be destroyed readily (1977: 15). Cardoso’s cautions about the construct 
being consumed under the label of ‘dependency theory’ or dependency thought 
introduced the question of the theoretical status achieved by the group of categories, 
analyses and hypotheses forged under such an umbrella.  
Most of the best-known surveys on this intellectual current have pointed out 
the difficulties in attempts to present ‘theory of dependency’ in a single label, if such 
a label comes to imply a systematic and coherent set of principles, concepts and 
hypotheses.66 On the contrary, references to the dependency school encompass a 
                                                          
66  For well-informed surveys on ‘dependency theory’, see G. Palma (1978); J. Larraín 
(1989, ch. 4 and 5); R. Packenham (1992); F. Beigel (2010); and C. Kay (2010, ch. 6). 
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heterogeneous variety of approaches and conceptual elaborations that gave life to 
intense debates and polemics. In turn, this heterogeneity went beyond the 
boundaries of the social sciences, also reaching governmental decision-making 
offices and strategic debates in political parties and organizations.  Hence, the label 
of dependency embraces a political as well as theoretical and methodological 
versatility. In this chapter, what I have chosen to term the ‘dependency hypothesis’ 
will be considered not as a ‘theory’ but rather as a ‘theoretical moment’, that is, an 
eventful intellectual moment in the history of Marxism in Latin America. This 
moment comprised useful concepts and crucial insights and arguments, but also 
carried out misleading formulations and came to end prisoner of its own conceptual 
‘dependencies’.  
I ought to circumscribe the scope of this critical account, since it is clearly 
impossible to embrace every aspect of this lively debate in a single chapter. I will 
concentrate my argument on the concept of ‘dependence’, insofar as it contains the 
heart-core of the debate at both its conceptual and political dimensions. In doing so, 
this survey will leave less room to otherwise important authors such as Aníbal 
Pinto, Celso Furtado, Florestan Fernandes, or Osvaldo Sunkel. In one way or 
another, all of them participated in and fuelled the dependentista debate; 
nevertheless, as far as they do not focus on the concept of dependence, their 
contributions will be considered here as secondary. In this sense, and based on a 
pertinent selection criteria, my argument will revolve, first, around the formulations 
given to the concept of dependency, and second on its relations with development. I 
will refer therefore to the works of Raul Prebisch, Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando 
H. Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Ruy Mauro Marini, and Theotonio Dos Santos, and to a 
lesser extent, Vania Bambirra, Franz Hinkelammert, and Enrique Dussel.  
 
1. Antecedents and Development of the ‘School of Santiago’ 
The VI Conference of the Comintern, held in 1928, was an event famous by two 
reasons that concern us here. On the one hand, it was the moment when the ultra-
leftist strategic line of ‘class against class’ was sanctioned, after having been in 
circulation since 1925 within communist circles. This radicalization, known as the 
Third International’s ‘third period’ and which lasted until 1935, was partially 
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occasioned by the failure of the alliance between the Chinese Communist Party with 
the Kuomintang, the national-popular party of that country. The Shanghai massacre 
– that is, the violent purge of April 1927, in which the Kuomintang suppressed its 
Communist counterpart – led the communist officers to re-evaluate the united front 
strategy pursued early in the 1920s. Added to this, the diagnoses about a coming 
capitalist crisis of catastrophic proportions stimulated an orientation to boost a 
‘classist’ offensive against both right-wing parties and rising fascism, on the one 
hand, and reformist sectors of the working class, on the other; the latter, (socialist 
and social-democratic parties and fractions of the working movement) will be 
widely called ‘social-fascists’ in these days. This new orientation was accompanied 
by the ‘proletarianization’ of the communist parties, in a process that amounted to 
an increasing incorporation of working class sectors into the political apparatus as 
well as to a more active participation in trade unions and other organizations of the 
working class.   
On the other hand, the VI Congress was also the first time when this 
declared internationalist organization addressed Latin America as a specific terrain 
of struggles, beyond the homogeneizing reference to the ‘colonial and semi-colonial’ 
world. The increasing participation of delegates from this region was certainly 
important to this acknowledgment; moreover, the relatively secure control that 
Moscow held over many of them was likely of further help.67 Not without irony, 
some authors have called it the Comintern’s ‘discovery of America’ (cf. Caballero, 
1978, Ch. 4). Thus, in continuity with the strategic turnaround, the meeting resolved 
that in Latin America communists must actively participate of revolutionary mass-
movements directed against the landlord regime and against imperialism, so as to 
secure their place in the leadership of the proletariat. The ultra-leftist strategic line 
was also parallel to the process of internal purges that gave Stalin complete control 
over the Russian party and most of its ‘satellites’; it lasted until the 1935 VII, final 
Congress of the International, when the strategy of popular and anti-fascist fronts 
(which will endure until the dissolution of the organism in 1943) was sanctioned. 
                                                          
67  For references to the creation of the Comintern’s Latin American Buro, see Chapter X 
of this work; see also Caballero (1978) and Gómez (1986). For the Argentinean case, see the 
Introduction to Aguirre ed. (2013). 
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The foreseen catastrophic crisis came up indeed, starting in the New York 
stock market in 1929; the ‘great depression’ rapidly engulfed the entire capitalist 
world. Such a world economic crisis had a massive impact on Latin American 
countries. As a consequence, the prospect of a long-lasting depression, accompanied 
with the partial closures of North-Atlantic markets and aggravated by internal 
social uheavals and pressures, eventually propelled local bourgeoisies to try to gain 
national control over these economies by means of fostering economic 
industrialisation. An important element that gave momentum to these processes 
was the emergence of ‘middle classes’ as a political actor. These groups had by and 
large been incorporated into political participation during the years prior to the 
bursary crack. In some countries, they formed political parties with national and 
popular discourses and platforms: that was the case of Mexican Partido Nacional 
Revolucionario (PNR, National Revolutionary Party, the direct precedent of the 
current PRI) and Peruvian APRA, among others. Early-populist leaders such as 
Chile’s Alessandri or Argentina’s Yrigoyen had already opened the doors of 
political participation for middle-classes and other urban sectors.  
By 1934, many of the economies of the region begun the creation or 
strengthening of national industrial sectors, allegedly the most secure road to 
development. President Getulio Vargas in Brasil as early as 1930, and then Lázaro 
Cárdenas in Mexico in 1934, Pedro Aguirre Cerda in Chile in 1938, Rómulo 
Betancourt in Venezuela in 1945, and Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina in 1946, 
promoted national industrialization, agrarian reform, and invigoration of the 
internal market. Consequently, during the late 1940s and the 1950s development 
through industrialization was established in state agendas, and the perspective of 
desarrollismo (developmentalism) reached primacy as a conception of development. 
Desarrollismo’s main recommendation was the ‘import-substitution 
industrialization’, popularly known as ISI model. It was a strategy oriented to the 
substitution of imported goods, their gradual replacement by internal production, 
and the consequent invigoration of internal markets in order to build a proper 
capitalist economy. In its main outlines, it contemplated a first phase of substitution 
of essential, non-durable goods; next, stages envisaged the replication of the 
procedure for intermediate (durable) and capital goods. The ISI model had its main 
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intellectual pillar in the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean ECLAC (CEPAL, by its Spanish acronym). 
 
Cepalino thought: Development, Structuralism, and World Economy 
In 1948 the UN Assembly created the ECLAC and gave it headquarters in Santiago 
de Chile. The aim of this organism was to contribute to economic development in 
the region through the combination of high-standard analysis and strategic 
provision of intellectual and technical advice to Latin American governments. 
Mainly composed by economists of Keynesian leanings (cf. Grigera, 2015), the most 
important inputs for the analysis and evaluation of ISI’s developmental ‘model’ or 
‘style’ (two terms broadly used in the literature of the time) came from ECLAC. 
Argentinean economist Raul Prebisch was appointed in 1950 as its executive 
director. He had submitted in 1947 the text ‘The Economic Development in Latin 
America and its Principal Problems’. In a context of post-war emergence of popular 
struggles for decolonization in the Third-world, Prebisch’s theses commenced to be 
officially adopted into Latin American public policy in a short time.  
 Considered as the ‘ECLAC’s manifesto’, Prebisch’s text portrays an 
international capitalist system composed of centres and peripheries, in which the 
former are ‘developed’, that is, with a large industrial sector based on technological 
innovation, while the latter remain ‘undeveloped’, with minimal or no industrial 
sector. From this perspective, central countries could build integrated economies 
with a balanced, organized participation of the labour force. Conversely, peripheral 
nations face ‘dual economies’, largely heterogeneous due to the parallel existence of 
pre-capitalist sectors of low productivity, on the one hand, and of incipient 
industrial sectors, on the other. Prebisch popularized the idea of “deterioration in 
the terms of trade” (1969: 18), stressing the fact that, in the long term, the same 
volume of exports allowed peripheral countries to import less and less industrial 
goods. Prebisch supported his hypothesis with statistics and data in order to 
demonstrate that, in the long term, the international tendency for industrial prices is 
to increase, and for raw materials and foodstuffs to decrease. Therefore, 
international trade is a factor of not just perpetuation, but constant aggravation, for 
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Latin American economies.68 In his ‘manifesto’, Prebisch undertook for the first time 
the task of understanding the mechanisms of the transference of value from 
underdeveloped to ‘developed’ economies.  
 Due to its focus on ‘structural’ conditions yielding or hindering development, 
the ECLAC approach was labelled as estructuralista (structuralist), desarrollista 
(developmentalist), or simply Cepalino thought, interchangeably. In this approach, 
the industrial gap between central and peripheral economies – which explained the 
transference of value towards the former – indicates the necessity of further 
diversification of the national industry. In a post-hoc explanation, this was 
conceived as the passage from a soft- or easy-phase of substitution (the import of 
non-durable consumer goods) to a hard- or difficult-phase of substitution in the 
import of intermediate (durable consumer) goods and of capital (machinery, 
technology). Improving the aggregate value to be exchanged was considered, in 
consequence, as the way to secure control of the national economy and the surplus 
generated therein. All of which ought to be backed up by the active role of the state 
and other strategic institutions, and with the key help of foreign inversion. 
 
Marxist and Neo-Marxist Approaches to Underdevelopment 
During this period, the conceptual matrix of the Communist parties in Latin 
America seemed to offer nothing but a replication of certain slogans from Moscow. 
The consideration of Latin America as feudal or semi-feudal was the main 
characterization made by communist parties. This conception projected, first, a 
national-bourgeois and democratic revolution waged against local oligarchies and 
imperialism; then, in a temporality in which the productive forces – labour included 
– mature and become ripen, a socialist revolution. Based on this dichotomy of 
feudal and capitalist and the consequent need to overcome the former, this official 
version of Marxism was popularized by means of manuals for the working class 
(see Kohan, 2003: 50–60). Conversely, the literature produced by the party-
intellectuals was more oriented to historiography than to political or economic 
analysis. In consequence, there was a strong command from Moscow, addressing a 
                                                          
68  By means of this analysis, Prebisch was contesting the Ricardian thesis of the 
“comparative advantages” that each country possesses in the international trade – thesis 
profusely uttered at the time as argument against the industrialization of the periphery. 
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markedly stageist political line centred on the dichotomy among feudal and 
capitalist modes of production. Few notable exceptions confirm the Stalinist rule: 
Caio Prado Jr. in Brazil, Sergio Bagú in Argentina, and Luis Vitale in Chile.  
 Dependency approaches were, in contrast, oriented to provide an alternative 
understanding to these linear and evolutionist conceptions of development. They 
drew largely upon the school of neo-Marxist economy articulated among Monthly 
Review, of considerable transcendence in the making of dependentista concepts. The 
work of economist Paul Baran was pivotal for Andre Gunder Frank’s influential 
writings. Baran’s The Political Economy of Growth (1957) contained an important 
contribution to Marxist theories of imperialism, contemporaneous with Prebisch in 
the focus on the underdeveloped world as object of analysis. Baran argued that 
imperialism and monopoly capitalism assure the polarity of developed and 
backward nations. The ‘backwardness’ of some underdeveloped areas corresponds, 
indeed, to a type of development fostered by capitalism and deepened by 
imperialism. The central mechanism of this structural unevenness is in Baran’s 
argument the drain of ‘economic surplus’69 from peripheral to central economies, a 
mechanism which reinforces the places already assigned in the world division of 
labour. Summarizing, Baran describes an imperialist system tending not towards a 
homogeneous capitalist world, but to the simultaneous and correlative processes of 
development at one pole, and underdevelopment at the other. 
 Monthly Review contested the ‘endogenous’ conception of the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism. Paul M. Sweezy was another collaborator of the journal, 
very influential in Frank’s conceptions, and the debate he held with Maurice Dobb 
remains canonical on the matter: whereas Dobb put emphasis on the contradictions 
internal to feudal mode of production (the endogenous explanation of the transition 
from feudalism to capitalism), Sweezy stressed instead an external dimension – 
world commerce – as explanatory factor for the emergence and consolidation of the 
capitalist mode of production. Also influent for the dependency school was Baran 
                                                          
69  Theodore Edwards summarizes Baran’s argument on economic surplus: “Baran 
shows how the systematic export of their economic surplus to the advanced areas of the 
world contributed to rapid accumulation in the West and resulted in so-called 
‘underdevelopment’ in the rest of the globe.” (1957).  
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and Sweezy’s Monopoly Capitalism, particularly in the idea of stagnating economies 
(more on this below; see however Astarita, 2010, ch. 1). 
Andre Gunder Frank drew largely upon the neo-Marxism of Monthly Review. 
He adopted the framework of a single and interconnected world system wherein a 
chain of metropolises and satellites were unequally distributed. The historical 
process of capitalism is therefore depicted as the combined ‘development’ of 
metropolises and ‘underdevelopment’ of satellites. The hypothesis of a ‘structural 
dependence’ hindering development comes from this account; from it, a twofold 
conclusion was in order: 1) underdevelopment does not correspond to an early 
stage in the capitalist ‘normal’ process, but a stable form of participation in the 
international market; 2) underdeveloped countries cannot ‘develop’ properly, due 
to their subordinate place in the world division of labour. The title of Frank’s article 
(appeared in Monthly Review in 1966) became a slogan of dependentismo: “The 
Development of Underdevelopment”. Two years later, his book Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America formulated a critique to the conception of Latin 
America as ‘dual’ and ‘feudal’. For Frank, America was from the very beginning 
attached to the capitalist market: “the expansion and development of capitalism 
incorporated the Indian population into its exploitative monopoly structure 
immediately upon conquest” (1968: 126–27); they should be considered as capitalist 
economies at large.70  
Frank’s work was influential for a perspective-shift to approach economic 
development as a matter of two interrelated levels: on the one hand, the 
international patterns of accumulation and transference of value in benefit of the 
metropolitan centres, and on the other, the conditions preventing development in 
the periphery – engendering ‘underdevelopment’, that is. This is the characteristic 
framework of dependency analyses. Frank’s ‘theory of underdevelopment’ allowed 
an approach to backwardness not as ‘lacking’ capitalism, but in terms of a 
structurally subordinated position within the capitalist system. In Jaime Osorio’s 
                                                          
70  Frank (1978) would later relativize this assertion, acknowledging the coexistence of 
capitalist and pre-capitalist structures throughout the underdeveloped world. However, his 
notion of capitalism as founded in both the orientation to the market and the profit-
motivation of economic agents have remained the source of strong criticism among Marxist 
authors. Robert Brenner (1977) famously coined the idea of “neo-Smithian Marxism” to 
characterize this approach. 
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terms, his work was “supported more in brilliant intuitions than in a rigorous 
theoretical background” (2004, 137). Simplifying a convoluted, complex moment, 
but also rescuing from oblivion to those 1940s dissenters (Bagú, Vitale, Prado Jr.), 
Steve Stern describes this period in the following terms: 
As the 1950s and 1960s unfolded, several experiences – import-
substitution  industrialization, the cold war, the Cuban revolution, 
intensified political polarization –contributed to a context in which the 
initial dissents of the 1940s were taken up and debated extensively. The 
result was a complicated series of dialectics: between CEPAL-oriented 
intellectuals and policy makers and the mainstream West; between 
‘moderate’ Latin American advocates of development, influenced by the 
CEPAL idea and the promise of import- substitution, and their more 
"radical" Latin American critics and associates; among CEPAL-oriented 
colleagues, as part of a healthy process of self-evaluation; and between 
the orthodox left, inclined to see the necessity of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ 
to transform a Latin America still encumbered by feudalism, and an 
innovative left, increasingly convinced that it was the historic spread of 
international capitalism, beginning in the Age of Discovery, that 
explained Latin America's poverty and apparently anachronistic 
economic structures. (1988: 834) 
The same author reminds that the originality of Frank’s intuitions has been 
overestimated, since authors such as Sergio Bagu, Luis Vitale, or Caio Prado Jr. held 
similar perspectives as early as in the 1950s. In the Caribbean area, the redefinition 
of the role of colonialism in the making of capitalism had a parallel in the influent 
work of C. L. R. James, chiefly his 1939 Black Jacobins (1980). Be this as it may, both 
the developmentalist perspective of Cepalino thought, and the approaches that 
questioned the feudal thesis in Latin America, were of great help for the formation 
of the dependency hypothesis; the typical modernization template of 
feudal/traditional and capitalist/modern was challenged by a perspective in which 
an actually global capitalism works through an inherently unequal structure of 
centres and peripheries. The notion of dependency was associated with those of 
periphery and underdevelopment, and the clarification of the particular dialectics 
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among these positions and conditions became a leitmotiv of dependentista 
approaches.  
 
2. The Making of a New Question 
The key ideas of Cepalino thought were: a conception of capitalism as a global 
economic system; the international division of labour as structuring that system; the 
existence of large industrial centres, on the one hand, and periphery zones on the 
other. The thesis of deterioration in the terms of trade served as explanation of the 
dynamics of this world structure. And the concern on the extent to which the global 
economic transformations occurring after the II World War will impact Latin 
American countries, was followed by a period of optimism regarding the success of 
ISI policies. As Fernando H. Cardoso and Enzo Faletto put it, “[t]he implicit general 
presupposition of this conception was that the historical bases of the Latin American 
situation pointed to a kind of eminent national development”. However – they go 
on – “[t]his optimistic perspective has been vanishing since the late 1950s.” (1978: 6) 
The period invited to put into question ECLAC’s core thesis, as the substitution of 
imports had hardly advanced from non-durable to intermediate and capital goods, 
with some exceptions in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. Alone, this stimulus to 
industrialization seemed powerless to conduct the ‘ripple effect’ in the consumption 
patterns. The growth of real wages did not seem enough stimuli for the invigoration 
of internal markets, and unemployment showed unprecedented levels as well as 
dramatic manifestations, such as the rise of a massive ‘informal sector’. Further, the 
exacerbations of the problems in the balance of payments ran in parallel to the rising 
of direct investments of foreign capital in the industrial sector, both indicative of the 
aggravation of the dependence condition.  
 Therefore, dependency analyses emerged as a response to the exhaustion of 
the developmentalist roads undertaken by Latin American countries, and also as a 
critique of desarrollista or Cepalino conceptions of development. It can be also 
considered as part of the intellectual and political energies unleashed by the Cuban 
revolution (cf. Stern 1988). This is not only true in relation to the overcoming of the 
linear stageism promoted by the Marxism of Communist parties – the two-phases 
strategy to socialist revolution. Further, the active solidarity displayed by the Cuban 
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revolutionaries, chiefly in the struggles for national liberation in Africa and Central 
America, was arguably part of the transformation of a commonly considered 
‘national’ problem into a Third-World orientation.  
 
The School of Santiago: the Disenchantment with Development  
The dependentista perspective was not least the outcome of an encounter produced in 
a definite intellectual milieu. In 1962, the Latin American and Caribbean Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning (ILPES in its Spanish acronym) was inaugurated in 
Santiago as ECLAC’s “sociological complement” (Love, 1996: 191). Two years later, 
the military coup against Joao Goulart in Brazil was the first of a series of political 
takeovers that led many leftist intellectuals to exile, Chile being one of the preferred 
destinations. At that time, this country was under an increasing climate of reforms, 
first under the government of the Christian Democracy since 1964, and more 
decidedly with the coming into power of Marxist politician Salvador Allende and 
his Popular Unity bloc in 1970. The ‘Chilean road to socialism’, an unprecedented 
process of social mobilization and political radicalization fostered from below 
(forms of popular power) and above (a declared Marxist president and political 
coalition) gave further shape to a type of intellectual committed to political projects 
and their urgencies – the compañero intelectual. ‘Intellectual comrades’ were, in 
varied forms, political organizations and degrees of involvement, Frank, Marini, 
Bambirra, Dos Santos, Faletto and Cardoso. 
 The ‘school of Santiago’ bound together a variety of intellectuals and scholars 
from different countries and academic backgrounds; it was not a single-voiced 
perspective, but rather a realm of debates wherein the concept of ‘dependence’ was 
advanced from various viewpoints, leading to dissimilar conclusions. There are 
numerous attempts to classify the perspectives gathered together in Santiago under 
the label of ‘dependency theory’. Gabriel Palma (1978: 898), for instance, proposes to 
consider three major approaches in this school. There is a group formed by Frank, 
Marini, Dos Santos, and Hinkelammert, who attempted to construct a “theory of 
Latin American underdevelopment”, tracing a causal relation between dependence 
and underdevelopment. A second group is composed by Furtado, Pinto, and 
Sunkel, who tried to reformulate ECLAC’s analyses from a critique of the “obstacles 
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to national development”. And a third group was premised by the avoidance to 
build a mechanic-formal theory, aiming instead to the analysis to “concrete 
situations of dependency” to draw conclusions about developmental possibilities. 
Conversely, Jorge Larraín (1989: 111-14) recognizes the value of Palma’s 
classification, but proposes to consider the notion of capitalism conveyed as the 
central qualifier.  
 In my turn, I will borrow Fernanda Beigel’s (2010) institutional classification 
in order to introduce what, in my view, was more a assemblage of ways of 
reasoning, questions, and categories in debate than a discussion organized in stable 
frameworks. A centripetal assemblage to be sure, as it revolved around 
‘dependence’, and it took place in institutional locales and academic niches. Beigel’s 
classification is thus instrumental to account for the diversity of perspectives 
comprised in the dependency field, facilitating the delineation of three main 
institutional frames: ECLAC; ILPES (and subsequently the Latin American Faculty 
of Social Sciences, FLACSO); and the Centre of Socio-Economic Studies (CESO) of 
the University of Chile together with the Centre for Studies of the National Reality 
(CEREN) of the Catholic University. There were of course transferences of positions, 
but above all of ideas, among these locales – something which turns this 
classificatory exercise into only a reference in the later reconstruction of the 
‘dependency moment’. 
ECLAC was the paradoxical place of the early criticism (say, from within) of 
the Cepalino theses. For this reason, some commentators prefer to talk of the authors 
of this version of dependency analysis as “transitional intellectuals” (cf. Grosfoguel, 
1997: 493). Brazilian Celso Furtado, and Chileans Aníbal Pinto and Osvaldo Sunkel, 
represent a desarrollista radicalisation of ECLAC’s approach. Furtado (1964), for 
instance, was one of the first to argue that the ISI model has increased, and not 
reduced, the dependency to foreign capital; by taking over local industries 
(expression of which will be latter termed ‘new dependency’), multinational 
corporations had concurred to reinforce underdevelopment. Sunkel (1972), in turn, 
diagnosed a twofold process of ‘transnational’ capitalist integration which resulted 
in ‘national disintegration’ for Latin America, expressed in popular marginalization 
and a permanent tendency of the salaries to decrease. Focusing on the Chilean case, 
Pinto (1959) offered the metaphor of a head-body unbalance, where the head 
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(representing the political and social institutions) has been developed, but this was 
not reflected in the maturity of the body – the economic structure, that is, does not 
coincided in time with its own head. He offered the notion of ‘structural 
heterogeneity’ as explanatory concept to account for the combination and 
connection of a primitive, quasi-colonial sector, a modern sector linked to the world 
market, and an intermediate sector which defines the average national incomes. 
 Conversely, ILPES hosted the collaborative work of Chilean sociologist and 
historian Enzo Faletto and Brazilian sociologist Fernando H. Cardoso. Having the 
latter arrived to Santiago in 1964, it is noticeable that as early as 1965 the draft of 
Dependency and Development in Latin America commenced to circulate among 
dependentista scholars. Once published in 1968, this work was immediately regarded 
as an indisputable landmark in the debate. Its methodology combined a Marxist 
consideration of the ‘structures’, productive relations in particular, with a more 
Weberian focus on the capacity of ‘agency’ that social and political forces display 
within a system of domination.71 In their own words, the method stressed “the 
socio-political nature of the economic relations of production” (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979: ix). What is more, the authors disqualify the construction of abstract, formal 
‘theory’, preferring instead to talk about concrete historical situations of 
dependence. On the concept of dependence, they used it as a “causal-significant” 
concept (1978: 20), meaning the consideration of a historically determined social 
relation as related to subjective meanings of action, rather than as a causal-
mechanic, external determination. 
 University of Chile’s CESO was the place of the more radicalized approach to 
the subject. CESO was formed in 1965, and was rapidly taken over by dependentista 
themes at different levels of analysis, particularly since Theotonio dos Santos 
created the Group of Dependency Research. A list of some titles published under 
the ‘CESO-Notebooks’ (Cuadernos del CESO) is indicative of the themes and 
orientations of this research collective: Theotonio dos Santos’ The New Character of 
Dependence (1968) and Dependence and Social Change (1970a); and Orlando Caputo 
                                                          
71  The influence of Max Weber in ILPES and FLACSO was significant, chiefly due to the 
presence of José Medina Echavarría. He was a Spanish-born sociologist exiled in Mexico 
during the Civil War, where he was the first translator to any language of Weber’s 
posthumous Economy and Society. Later, since 1952 Medina Echavarría took residence in 
Santiago de Chile, where he was first part of FLACSO, and then of ILPES from 1960.  
150 
 
and Roberto Pizarro’s Imperialism, Dependence and International Relations (1971). 
Other important publications of CESO’s members were Vania Bambirra’s Ten Years 
of Insurrections in Latin America (1971), Gunder Frank’s Lumpenbourgeoisie: 
Lumpendevelopment. Dependency, Class and Politics in Latin America (1971), Marini’s 
Underdevelopment and Revolution (1969) and the first drafts of Dialectic of Dependence 
([1973] 1977), Dos Santos’ Socialism or Fascism: a Latin American Dilemma (1969), and 
Tomas Vasconi’s Dependency, Superstructure, and Other Essays (1970).  
In 1971, CESO co-organized the symposium ‘Transition to Socialism and the 
Chilean Experience’, in collaboration with CEREN; an event in which the majority of 
dependentista intellectuals located in Chile gathered together. In CEREN, an 
intellectual circle working on themes of cultural imperialism and ideological 
dependence was established. In it, Belgian sociologist Armand Mattelart worked 
with Chilean playwright and essayist Ariel Dorfman, a collaboration whose 
outcome was the influential work How to Read Donald Duck (“Para Leer el Pato 
Donald”, of 1971). The cartoon is analyzed in this work as Disney’s ideological 
naturalization of the relations of subjugation and exploitation imposed by the US 
over Latin America and the rest of the ‘Third World’. In another register, German-
born economist, philosopher and theologian Franz Hinkelammert worked to re-
incorporate the ideological realm into socio-economic analysis. In works such as 
Ideologies of Development and Dialectic of History (1970) and Dialectic of Uneven 
Development (1972), he provided a critical account of the economic reduction that the 
idea of development suffers in the capitalist mode of production. He explains this 
‘functional reduction’ as part of the necessary ideologies that contribute to 
‘functionalize’ social structures and behaviours towards the maximization of profit. 
Michele Mattelart, Pablo Freire, Hugo Zemelman, Tomás Moulián, Jorge Larraín, 
Rafael Echeverría, Manuel Antonio Garretón, Norbert Lechner, and René Zavaleta 
Mercado were also part of CEREN in different moments. 
It is beyond the possibilities of this research to consider all these works 
properly. However, it is convenient to distinguish three possible different meanings 
of the idea of ‘dependence’. First, it may be considered as a historically- and 
geopolitically-situated realm of debates with a centripetal character – a ‘school’. 
Second, it deals with the structure of exploitation-cum-domination characteristic of 
the relationship between central and peripheral, ‘underdeveloped’ economies. And 
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third, it is a renewing interpretation of the history of Latin America, that is, a critical 
revisionism of historical accounts produced under evolutionist frameworks, that 
laid the ground for a reconsideration of the question about this region’s ‘belated’ 
character.  
Since not a well-centred ‘paradigm’ or a systematic ‘theory’, what this brief 
survey shows is rather a heterogeneous intellectual assembling gathered around 
some questions: Is it possible to overcome underdevelopment, given the situation of 
structural dependency that Latin American countries hold in the capitalist world 
system? How to account for these processes at both its ‘external’ and ‘internal’ 
dynamics, that is to say, from the dialectic interplay of international constraints and 
national structures and agencies? What are the particular political dynamics 
brought forth by these (‘a-typical’) structural arrangements? What role does the 
ideological-cultural realm play in these processes? What level of generality is 
possible to reach from the dependentista approach? Can this approach be considered 
as a sufficient explanatory theory of Latin America underdevelopment? And, last 
but not least, does the category of ‘dependency’ correspond to a Marxist theoretical 
framework, or can at least be coherently situated within it?    
 
Dependency Analysis: Minimal Definitions and Common Grounds 
In the 1970 article “The Structure of Dependence”, Theotonio Dos Santos 
summarized more than half-decade of reflections about the matter: 
By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain 
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another 
economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of 
interdependence between two or more economies, and between these 
and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries 
(the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other 
countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that 
expansion. (1970b: 231). 
Albeit it has been criticized because of its formalism, i.e. lack of historical content 
(cf. Palma, 1978), this definition brings to the fore the basic analytical commitments 
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of dependency analysis. First, the refusal to consider underdevelopment either as a 
‘belated’ stage in the capitalist road or merely as ‘lack’ of development. Therefore, 
underdevelopment it is not a ‘condition’ or ‘stage’ but a particular form of the 
process of global capitalist development. In a similar vein, Hinkelammert (1972: 33) 
coined the formula of “the structural presence of development’s absence”. This, in 
turn, displaces the consideration of development from the historical unilinear model 
of advanced and backward economies to the geographical and geo-political 
structure of centres and peripheries. Consequently, both development and 
underdevelopment are redefined in terms of relational and combined processes 
whose foremost dynamics are situated at the level of the international division of 
labour.  
Second, and as a critique of Frank’s formulations, Dos Santos indicates the 
need of a deeper analysis of ‘internal’ social structures that these relations of 
dependence bring about: “the unequal and combined character of capitalist 
development at the international level is reproduced internally in an acute form” 
(1970b: 234). Therefore, the process under consideration is not purely of 
‘satellization’ – Frank’s hypothesis – but encompasses the formation of domestic 
structures of a particular kind. The condition of dependency involves the 
interwoven formation of external positions and internal dispositions; and the 
correction of Frank’s schemes help to clarify the notion of capitalism at work in 
dependency analysis, amounting to the specification of the dialectical – not causal-
mechanical – relations between global forces and local arrangements; a dialectics 
that demands to take into account the local, class-based actors, their interests and 
political orientations. Frank had gone as far as to assert that Latin America has been 
capitalist since the sixteenth century, when the region was incorporated to 
commercial capitalism. The ‘dependency school’, conversely, established that the 
formation of the modern capitalist system occurred not before the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries, with the consolidation of the industrial revolution in 
North-West Europe. This was also the moment of political independence for most 
Latin American countries. Thus, the breakdown of colonial ties with the metropolis, 
and the prevailing hegemony of laissez-faire policies found newly politically-
independent countries in a position to assure the provision of raw materials and 
foodstuffs necessary to maintain the industrialization process, as well as new 
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markets for selling off non-durable industrial products. (Marini, 1977, ch. 1 and 2) 
The formation of national societies is thus approached as a breakthrough signalling 
the passage from a situation of colonialism to a condition of dependence. Such a 
distinction refers to the organization (or not) of ‘national capitals’, and consequently 
to their role as intermediate negotiators between the new-born economies and the 
international market. Thus, what Frank considered as the continuation of centre-
periphery relations existing from colonial times will be grasped by the dependency 
analysis in terms of the re-articulation of such a relation. 
In this re-articulation occurring during the 19th century, some countries 
gained certain control over internal production, while others were not able to cope 
with foreign companies and became thus ‘enclave’ economies. For Cardoso and 
Faletto (1979: xviii; see also ch. 3), two different forms of dependent societies 
emerged in Latin America in this period: 1) enclave economies, and 2) nationally-
controlled productive system economies. Although both types shared an export-led 
orientation, the circuits which capital goes through are divergent, even opposed, in 
each case. In enclave situations, the capital is foreign-owned to begin with, then 
invested and transformed within the dependent country into wages, taxes and 
commodities, and finally realized in foreign markets where these commodities are 
consumed and profits are retained. For nationally-controlled economies, conversely, 
the starting point is internal, capital valorization is local, but its realization still 
occurs elsewhere. Being both export-oriented and dependent, the internal structures 
of exploitation and domination that emerge from each case were nonetheless 
markedly different.  
 The export-orientation that characterized the first decades of independent life 
in Latin America entered a transitional period at the end of the nineteenth century, 
due to the transformation of capitalism from ‘competitive’ to ‘monopoly’ (Lenin, 
1996). The Latin American economies suffered from these adjustments in a double 
manner. On the one hand, the decrease of the dynamic impulses of external demand 
helped to accentuate the transference of surplus through unequal exchange, for the 
export needs compelled to sell cheaper. On the other, dependence of foreign capital 
was reinforced by means of the intensification of foreign credits, monopoly 
inversion in large infrastructure projects such as roads, railroads, bridges, and ports, 
as well as the technological mediation of central economies. The long-term 
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deterioration in the prices of raw materials and foodstuffs, added to the instabilities 
of the world market (the 1914-1918 war; the 1929 crack), led Latin American 
oligarchies to a crisis of dominance marked by the incorporation of so-called 
‘middle classes’ into the economic structure and, concomitantly, to the political 
arena (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979, ch. 4; see also Bambirra, 1978: 68). These sectors 
will be the political bases of the projects of national industrialization promoted 
during the 1930s under desarrollista premises.  
 For Cardoso and Faletto, the existence of key conditions for development was 
apparent in countries such as Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and 
Mexico: 1) a sufficiently large internal market that might be further expanded; 2) an 
incipient industrial base producing light-consuming goods; 3) abundant foreign 
commerce derived from agricultural and mining sectors; and 4) incentives to 
economic growth, by the strengthening of either the exporting sector or 
domestically invested capital (Cardoso and Faletto, 1978: 5). 
 
The New Character of Dependence: Cardoso and Faletto 
As a commentator notes, dependentista authors shared similar approaches about the 
processes of Latin America about the previous stages of Latin America’s history (cf. 
Henfrey, 1981: 27); the differences come to the fore when they approach the 
industrialization process (chiefly in its ISI-phase) and the character of the ‘new 
dependence’. For Cardoso and Faletto, the shortcomings derived from the economic 
reductionism of Cepalino analysis motivate the necessity to undertake an integrated 
analysis of development, meaning the integration of ‘economic’ and ‘sociological’ 
factors into the analysis; not as aggregation of facts but as an exercise of 
redefinitions of perspectives oriented to capture the “particular historical conditions 
– economic as well as social – underlying the processes of development” (1978: 17). 
The differences of the patterns and degrees achieved by industrialization processes 
are indicative of the socio-political nature of economic relations. Marx himself – the 
authors go on – conceived capital as a social relation. Dependence can thus be 
conceived in the following terms: “a system is dependent when the accumulation 
and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic component inside the 
system”, due to the coercive international framework (1979: xx). Nevertheless, the 
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variability within this broad and abstract definition is explained as the product of 
particular political arrangements that cannot be fully explained merely from 
economic factors.  
These methodological premises point to the fact that the international system 
of domination “reappears as an ‘internal’ force, through the social practices of local 
groups and classes which try to enforce foreign interests” (1979: xvi). The concept of 
dependence, in this sense, 
tries to give meaning to a series of events and situations that occur 
together, and to make empirical situations understandable in terms of 
the way internal and external structural components are linked. In this 
approach, the external is also expressed as a particular type of relation 
between social groups and classes within the underdeveloped nations. 
For this reason, it is worth focusing the analysis of dependence on its 
internal manifestations. (1979: 15) 
Therefore, dependence is conceived as the ‘expression’ of these external constraints 
within the economic and social structures of peripheral societies. Particular 
trajectories forge particular “situations of dependence” (1979: xxiii). The focus on 
the concrete historical processes advocates for a comprehensive social science in 
terms of the integration of different levels of analysis. The authors refer to the 
proposed methodology as ‘historical-structural analysis’, a perspective able to 
overcome the mere structural perspective so as to come to terms with concrete 
situations of dependency (1979: x). Historical means here idiographic, the 
interpretative reconstruction of cultural orientations and significations embedded in 
the political. As a category, dependence becomes a ‘causal-significant’ one, in 
contradistinction to ‘causal-mechanical’ explanations. In doing so, a Marxist 
approach based on structural and class analysis amalgamates the Weberian focus on 
subjectively meaningful actions.72 
  What this perspective seeks to open to the dependentista analysis is the non-
deterministic nature of dependence, which amounts to comprehending the 
mechanisms of self-perpetuation as well as the possibilities of transformation 
                                                          
72  See Cardoso and Faletto (1978: 20). For Weber’s idea of significant causality, see R. 
Swedberg (2005: 29-31). For an account on Weber’s importance in the formation of the 
Cepalino thought, and of the role of Medina Echavarría in it, see Faletto (2005). 
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comprised in dependent societies. Cardoso and Faletto (1978: 104) argue that the 
kind of national-populist project waged from the 1930s relied on the type of political 
agreement accomplished in the previous transitional phase. What has given 
physiognomy to the existent industrial bourgeoisies, therefore, is the state as the 
place of force-condensations through which the national orientations are defined. In 
their own terms, Latin America has witnessed the seemingly paradoxical process 
through which “the formation of an industrializing [industrializadora] bourgeoisie 
[has] depend[ed], in varying degrees, on the State.” (1978: 101)  
 Dependency and Development in Latin America offers two main reasons for the 
limitations and final failure of the ISI model. The first is the contradiction between 
mass participation and the consolidation of the private sector, that is to say, the 
pressures for further participation in the sphere of distribution and consumption 
versus the needs of investment derived from capital’s logic of accumulation, which 
in turn took singular forms depending on the class-politics giving frame to the 
process (cf. 1978: 115, 121, 139). The second is the new transformation of the 
relationship between centres and peripheries, in a moment in which capitals from 
the former began to be directly invested in the productive systems of the latter, a 
fact addressed by the authors in terms of the “internationalization of [national] 
markets and the new character of dependence” (1978: 130ff). The new character is 
determined by the articulation, at the level of the productive process, of foreign 
monopoly capital, local private enterprises, and state economic unities (see also 
Cardoso, 1972: 89).  
 Contemporarily, “the unification of the productive systems leads to the supra-
national determination and organization of internal markets” (Cardoso and Faletto, 
1978: 150). This helps to explain the paradoxical presence of a relative yet unequal 
economic diversification together with an increasing loss of control over the key 
internal economic dynamics – that is, industrialization-cum-heteronomy. This 
paradoxical developmental road is conveyed as a pattern of “associated 
development”,73 the association of local and foreign capitals. The critical meaning 
with which the term is used at the end of the book is evident: “Thus, what could 
have been a modernized social and political development, ended to run into the 
                                                          
73  Marjory Urquidi (1979: 153) translates desarrollo asociado as “development with 
association”.  
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same seemingly dead-end street: modernization is achieved to the cost of a crescent 
authoritarianism, without reducing the typical profile of poverty of the 
‘development with marginality’.” (1978: 135) 
One of the foremost problems Cardoso saw in the more conceptual (in the 
sense of abstractly theoretical) treatments of the subject is the conflation of 
dependence and economic stagnation, something that the ideologeme of 
‘development of underdevelopment’ had raised to the status of a theoretical 
certainty. The rejection of the generalist theoretical pretensions of dependency 
analysis will be made clearer by Cardoso in his article dealing with the 
‘consumption’ of dependency theory: structures of dependence – it is argued – are 
historical relations of contradictory historical social processes, not the abstract 
unreeling of forms of accumulation originated elsewhere (cf. 1977: 13). The crux of 
the dependency analysis is, therefore, to unfold the coincidences in interests that exist 
between local dominant classes and external capital, and not alleged ‘laws of motion’ of 
dependent capitalism. 
Conversely, the ‘dependent-associated development’ was considered by 
Cardoso as the historical outcome of the ISI period. It is, as the term makes explicit, 
a form of development within – that is, without overcoming – structural 
dependence. For the author, Mexico and Brazil more recently put into evidence that 
dependency and development are not incompatible. Cardoso further argues that the 
association of foreign and local capitals with the state, far from the perpetuation of 
economic stagnation or retardation, has stimulated the internal market and set the 
basis for the diversification of production, signalling thus the road towards a 
transition from absolute to relative surplus-value. Therefore, Cardoso (1977: 24) 
concludes, dependent-associated development demonstrates the compatibility of 
development and monopoly penetration, showing also that there are more dynamic 
forms of dependence that those of enclave or quasi-colonial situations. 
 
Marini’s Dialectic of Dependence 
The stagnation thesis entailed in the ideologeme of ‘development of 
underdevelopment’ discussed by Cardoso, was coined and popularized by Frank. 
However, it was Ruy Mauro Marini who gave it a more systematically Marxist 
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framework. In a certain sense, the latter’s version of the dependency hypothesis is 
the exact reverse of Cardoso’s. First, it was theoretical in the strong sense; that is, 
oriented to comprehend the ‘laws of motion’ of dependent capitalism. Marini 
understood the shortcomings of Frank’s thesis (to which he nonetheless adhered in 
its more profound meaning) not in economic reductionism, but rather in the lack of 
conceptual density at the level of political economy. For Marini, Frank focuses 
merely on the circulation level, without considering the determinant role of capital’s 
production and reproduction. In contradistinction to Cardoso, the economic side of 
the formula ‘political economy’ is emphasized in Marini’s account. Outlining the 
encounter of Marxism with a dependentista perspective, he asserts that “the 
fundamental task of a Marxist theory of dependency is to establish the specific 
legality by means of which the dependent economy is governed” (1977: 62). 
According to Jaime Osorio (2004: 138), Marini’s most important work, Dialectic of the 
Dependency, set the bases for a political economy of dependence, culminating the 
transition of the category from its inception in a conceptual realm alien to Marxism 
to assume a Marxist theoretical status.  
 Marini distinguishes two central mechanisms in the formation of a structure of 
dependence. The first, more commonly acknowledged, is the transference of value 
from peripheral to central economies by means of international trade – namely, 
unequal exchange (1977: ch. 2). In this sense, he engages with the overcoming of the 
notion of terms of trade by that of unequal exchange, as Arghiri and Bettelheim’s 
L'échange inégal ([1969] 1972) advanced.74 The Brazilian Marxist explains that this 
detrimental flow is at the basis of the specialization of labour in metropolitan 
economies, for the availability of cheap aliments and raw materials provided by 
Latin America worked as a decisive factor in the transit from absolute to relative 
surplus-value. The latter, understood in terms of the combination of increasing 
productivity and the loss of labour-power’s real value, is explained by Marini as a 
consequence of the diminishing of basic-goods prices fostered by Latin American 
exports (1977: 14). The superiority in labour productivity gave Western countries a 
central position in the international division of labour, composing thereafter the 
structure by means of which the surplus-value transference to the metropolis is 
                                                          
74  I am thankful to Juan Grigera for this and other extremely helpful comments on this 
matter. 
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channelled through international commerce. The channels of this unequal exchange, 
explains Marini, are two: to sell above the value (something possible within the laws 
of exchange, according to Marini’s reading of Marx), and to apply monopoly 
policies that break these laws in order to purchase raw materials for under their 
value (1977: 18–20).  
 Nonetheless, unequal exchange is only the most apparent feature of the 
dependence. In Marini’s account, the structure of dependency only becomes fully 
expressed in its last, most fulfilled stage, once Latin American countries have 
created their own spheres of reproduction for capital’s accumulation and 
production.75 Marini’s central hypothesis is that, as a compensatory mechanism for 
the flow of surplus value from periphery to metropolis, Latin America ought to 
pursuit a form of capital accumulation founded “on the super-exploitation of the 
labourer” (1977: 30). This means that the loss of surplus-value is compensated by 
means of the “intensification” (1977: 22) of the labour process. He defines super-
exploitation as a combination of three different mechanisms: intensification of the 
labour process, extension of the working day, and expropriation of part of the 
socially-necessary labour of the worker. Therefore, super-exploitation “tends to be 
expressed in the fact that the labour-power is remunerated for under its value” 
(1977: 58). (Marini does not clarify whether this entails a structural prevention for 
the extraction of relative surplus-value, or we are before a sui generis form to do so.) 
By means of the under-payment of labour, which seems to be the key mechanism in 
Marini’s argument, the appropriation of part of the worker’s fund of consumption is 
transformed into a fund for capital’s accumulation.76 Super-exploitation lies at the 
basis of the possibility to build an industrial sector in the periphery. 
In order to realize its expanded reproduction, capital depends on the 
formation of its own mode of circulation. Hinkelammert (1972: 21) recalls Marx in 
                                                          
75  In this sense, it is only partially fair to consider Marini’s theorization as a mere 
repetition of Rosa Luxemburg’s schemes of expanded reproduction of capital (which are in 
the basis of her theory of imperialism), as G. Palma (1978: 901) does.  
76  Marini draws upon Marx’s (1976: 747–48) passage in Capital, Vol. I, Ch. 24: “In the 
chapters on the production of surplus-value we constantly assumed that wages were at least 
equal to the value of labour-power. But the forcible reduction of the wage of labour beneath 
its value plays too important a role in the practical movement of affairs [...]. In fact, it 
transforms the worker’s necessary fund for consumption, within certain limits, into a fund 
for the accumulation of capital”. 
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this sense, since “the premise of simple reproduction is incompatible with capitalist 
production”. As oriented to external markets, the commodities produced by 
peripheral economies do not depend on the internal capacity of consumption in 
order to realize the exchange-value they contain. Put otherwise, the dislocation is 
produced as the actualization of the exchange-value (the requisite for the 
appropriation of surplus-value) is realized elsewhere. For Marini, this amounts to a 
fundamental dislocation between production (within) and realization (out) 
characteristic of dependent economic structures. The processes of industrialization 
wherein super-exploitation is preponderant as a mechanism of capital production 
and accumulation, generates the internal reproduction of this divorce between 
production and consumption: 
The [industrial] production based on the labour’s super-exploitation 
engendered thus once again the mode of circulation which corresponds 
to it, at time that divorced the productive apparatus from the masses’ 
needs of consumption. The stratification of this apparatus in what has 
been called ‘dynamic’ [...] and ‘traditional’ industries is reflecting the 
inadequacy, proper to dependent capitalism, between productive and 
circulation structures. (1977: 47) 
Super-exploitation is declared, in consequence, as the “foundation of dependence” 
(1977: 64) inasmuch as it discloses the main form of surplus-value extraction, and 
hence helps explain the dislocation between production and reproduction of capital 
characteristic of dependent societies. In this sense, the “new dependence” – that is, 
monopoly capital directly invested in industrial production, or in Cardoso and 
Faletto’s account, the “internationalization of the conditions for internal markets” 
(1978: 60) – only invigorates this tendency. The workers’ consumption does not 
intervene but secondarily in the realization of the commodities produced in the 
periphery making the divorce of spheres more dramatic. In the highly-dynamic 
sectors of production localized in some areas of the underdeveloped world, capital 
employs a small amount of workers; conversely, this production is chiefly oriented 
to middle-class consumption and to external markets, a type of demand from which 
the masses are largely excluded. In consequence, economic diversification does not 
result in a more coherent articulation of production and circulation; on the contrary, 
its outcome is the formation of large sectors of non- or under-employed urban 
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proletarians, a marginal population overexploited and underpaid, for whom to 
survive means to overwork, to incorporate more members of the family into the 
labour market, and to recur more and more to the pre-capitalist sectors of 
subsistence. The dislocation between experience of exploitation and consumption 
capacity is considered also as the source of important political consequences. 
 
The Dependency Hypothesis: between Bourgeois Reformism and Ultra-Leftism 
The exchange between Cardoso and Marini was the summit of the dependency 
debate (cf. Sotelo Valencia, 1994: 292). This peak moment was also the outset of a 
partial decline in the currency of dependentista categories throughout intellectual and 
socialist circles in Latin America.77 The 1980s witnessed a shift in the concerns of 
left-wing intellectuals towards the nature of the state transformations under military 
regimes; circa 1985, it was overwhelmingly focused on transition to and 
consolidation of democratic regimes. We will return to these topics in the next 
chapters. Meanwhile, I shall note that the discordant points of this exchange are less 
clear and definite than what has been often assumed (cf. Palma, 1978; Chilcote, 1982; 
Larraín, 1989). I tend to agree with Ramón Grosfoguel (1997) in considering the 
continuities of the dependentista framework as more significant than the differences, 
despite the overtones and passionate arguments through which the exchange was 
carried out. Therefore, the debate can be read as a determinate debate, the deployment 
of contrasting positions in what arguably was a shared (but neither pre-fixed nor 
monolithic) analytical and discursive realm.  
In a virulent text co-authored by José Serra, Cardoso opened the attack to 
Marini’s positions in ‘Las desventuras de la dialéctica de la dependencia’ 
(‘Misfortunes of the dialectic of dependence’), appeared in Revista Mexicana de 
Sociología in 1978. The main substantive aspects of Marini’s theory questioned by 
Cardoso and Serra are, first, what the authors consider the confusion between 
                                                          
77  In this polemic, nonetheless, a large number of Marxist authors participated, coming 
together from analytical perspectives as diverse as ‘mode of production analysis’ (cf. 
Chilcote, 1982; see also Chilcote and Johnson, 1983), ‘theories of unequal exchange’ (cf. 
Emmanuel, Furtado, and Elsenhans, 1982; see also Amin, 1976) – not to speak of ‘world-
system analysis (Wallerstein, 1976 and specially 1980, 1989; see also Frank, 1978, 1983; and 
Frank & Gills, 1993). All of them were certainly influenced, positively or negatively, by 
dependency analysis. 
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‘unequal exchange’ and ‘deterioration in the terms of trade’; second, the causal 
relation assigned to the decreasing of the rate of profit for periphery capitals for the 
growth in productivity of central economies. The third and crucial point under 
criticism lies in the, for them, untenable nature of the category of ‘super-
exploitation’. Regarding the former two points, the authors hold a perspective that 
once again turn the argument to ‘internal’ or ‘endogenous’ factors. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the terms of international trade do deteriorate against the periphery – 
Cardoso and Serra argue – this does not prevent the increase of productivity or the 
expansion of demand, insofar as “unequal exchange refers to the relations between 
productivity and prices, as well as to the evolution of these relations [...]. The 
concept of deterioration in the index of the terms of exchange refers only to the 
variations of the price relations, without direct consideration to productivity.” (1978: 
27) Clarifying this distinction, the diminishing of the rate of profit by means of the 
deterioration of the terms of trade occurs only to the extent that the flow “is not 
caused by the unequal exchange in itself, but by reasons related, for instance, to 
supply and demand.” (1978: 25) 
From these premises, the need for a compensatory mechanism for local 
capitals in order to maintain a minimal rate of profit – the hypothesis of super-
exploitation – demonstrates to be untenable: “[t]he whole analysis of the ‘necessary 
super-exploitation’ is based on a gratuitous presupposition: that there was an 
increase of export production in the periphery under necessary conditions of 
decreasing (or stagnant) productivity” (1978: 25–6). What these authors find 
particularly misleading is the reduction of exploitation mechanisms in Latin 
American to the extraction of a “surplus-value that is never relative”, i.e., absolute 
surplus-value alone (1978: 42). The tendency to the intensification or lengthening of 
the working day (under constant wages and without pressures towards 
technological innovation) is disclosed as Marini’s way to reaffirm the stagnation 
hypothesis, the basis of the ‘development of underdevelopment’ ideologeme. His 
critics, conversely, present figures, tables and data to demonstrate that what 
happens is precisely the opposite: expansion of demand, growing labour 
productivity, economic diversification – that is, classical capitalist development. 
The vehement criticism displayed in “Misfortunes...” closes as it opened up: 
by pointing out the political consequences of Marini’s perspective: “economic 
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reductionism [...] kills the nerve of political analysis, grounding it in a catastrophic 
standpoint that is never accomplished [catastrofismo que nunca se cumple].” (1978: 27) 
This kind of theorization (and here the explicit target is Marini, but Cardoso had 
arguably also in mind Dos Santos, Bambirra, and others – not to mention Frank 
himself) amounts to a “politically suicidal voluntarism” (1978: 27) of the kind of 
guerrilla armed-struggles. In the terms provided by Colin Henfrey (1981), the radical 
version of dependency theory tried to fill the theoretical void of the post-Stalinist 
era by means of the image of a mis-centred, unconformable (lumpen)proletariat, the 
social subject appealed to by armed-vanguards pursuing its own lumpenrevolution. 
Cardoso and Serra conclude that the main source of error rests on the confusion 
between the contradictory nature of capitalism and the presence of obstacles that 
temporarily hinder it: what Marini conflates is the historical non-viability of the 
‘nacional-desarrollista’ project, a particular modality of capitalist development, with 
the exhaustion of capitalist development as such. Cardoso and Serra stress the 
usefulness of the notion of ‘dependent-associated development’ to understand 
concrete processes of development-in-dependence, dismissing the formula of 
‘development of underdevelopment’.  
Marini’s counter-attack, entitled ‘The reasons of neo-developmentalism 
(reply to Fernando H. Cardoso and José Serra)’, appeared in the same volume of the 
Revista Mexicana de Sociología. There are two main claims in this response. The first is 
the intellectual dishonesty of the critique.78 The second and more substantive point 
is the lack of rigour exhibited by the critics in dealing with Marxist categories and 
method. The conception of the labour theory of value becomes the kernel of the 
debate, as the critics refuse to consider the transference of value through 
international conference insofar as “not having mobility of the labour power, is 
difficult to establish the concept of socially-necessary working time [...] crucial for 
the operation of the law of value” (Cardoso and Serra 1978: 23–24). Marini, in turn, 
indicates his critics’ confusion between values and prices: the fixed character of the 
                                                          
78  The authors of “Misfortunes” proceed by mutilating, taking out of context, and even 
adding sentences and terminology attributed to Marini, something which is profusely 
indicated in the latter’s response. This procedure, I must add, goes on without a minimal of 
critical rigour, something which is evident for example in the arbitrary use of quotation 
marks all along Cardoso and Serra’s text. Last but not least, Cardoso and Serra’s article 
appeared in Brazil in the journal of CEBRAP, the centre of studies which the authors 
belonged to; they never agreed to publish Marini’s reply. 
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labour power only affects production; however it is commodities that, through their 
value, compare the different socially-necessary working times contained in their 
exchange-value, through a relation of prices (1978: 175). 
Dussel has offered an argument similar to Marini in which dependence is 
related to the distribution of value via international trade, where ‘total national 
capitals’ of different organic composition are put into a relation of competition. 
Dependence is, therefore, a social relation between capitals which occurs exclusively 
within international market relations: “dependency, in its essence, is strictly the 
extraction of surplus value through industrial capitalist competition.” (2001: 228) 
‘Extraction’ here does not mean creation but transference. What is at stake in both 
Marini’s and Dussel’s view is the mechanism of equalization of prices (the passage 
from value to price) occurring in the international market as the source of unequal 
exchange. As Dussel explains: 
Where there is an international exchange of commodities which are 
products of total national capitals of different levels of development [i.e. 
different organic compositions] [...], the commodities of the more 
developed country will have a lower value. Competition, however, 
equalises the price of both commodities at a single average price. In this 
manner, the commodity with a lower value [...] obtains a price greater 
than its value, which it realises by extracting surplus value from the 
commodity with a higher value. Therefore, the commodity of the less 
developed capital, although it may realise a profit [...], transfers surplus 
value because the average international price is less than the national 
value of the same commodity. (2001: 225)  
Dussel’s formulation of the argument is concordant with Marini’s reasoning. In the 
Post Scriptum of Dialectic of Dependence, the Brazilian Marxist offers a sort of 
methodological clarification, for which the need to privilege the conditions of 
realization of capital, rather than the productive level alone: “[i]t is only to the 
extent that the dependent economy as such becomes an actual centre of capital 
production [...] that incorporates its own circulation phase – and which achieves 
maturity when an industrial sector is constituted – that its laws of motion are 
thoroughly manifested, expressing every time a particular expression of the laws 
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that rule the overall system.” (1977: 53) Once this industrial sector is built, it 
becomes evident that, in international competition, capitals of different organic 
compositions are confronted, which means the integration of diverse forms and 
degrees of exploitation into a single relation of prices; hence the importance 
(neglected by Cardoso and Serra) of a correct understanding of the transformation 
of values into prices (1977: 176).  
Conversely, it is only under conditions in which a ‘mature’ sphere of capital 
circulation is established that super-exploitation reveals its centrality in a dependent 
structure. Marini affirms his core-thesis once again: dependent capitalism, based on 
the super-exploitation of the working class, “divorces the productive apparatus 
from the masses’ consumption needs, aggravating thus a general tendency of the 
capitalist mode of production” (1978: 189). This is not to say (as Cardoso and Serra 
conclude) that the workers’ unproductive consumption does not play a role in the 
internal market; rather, Marini affirms that “due to the restriction of popular 
consumption, super-exploitation does not transform [this consumption] into a 
dynamic factor of realization, leading the branches oriented to popular consumption 
towards ‘stagnation, even to regression, or to become expanded but based on the 
world market.” (1978: 188) This clarification implies that the productive units 
oriented to the internal market are those inclined to stagnation – not the system as a 
whole.  
Finally, Cardoso identified the thesis of super-exploitation with the exclusive 
presence of absolute surplus-value. Marini, in turn, maintains a conceptual 
ambiguity in this regard. He sometimes maintains super-exploitation in opposition 
to relative surplus value; in other moments (for instance, in the Post Scriptum), he 
conceptualizes super-exploitation not as a form of exploitation as such but rather as 
combination or integration of different forms and degrees of exploitation: 
“combinations of forms of capitalist exploitation are carried out unequally in the 
system as a whole, engendering different social formations according to the 
predominance of a determined form”. (1977: 59) Furthermore, “super-exploitation 
does not correspond to the survival of primitive modes of capital accumulation, but 
it is inherent to such accumulation and grows correlatively to the development of 
labour’s productive force.” (1977: 59) What is suggested here is that super-
exploitation is concomitant to capital accumulation, but it does not correspond to its 
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ideal form. The Brazilian case – the exemplification of ‘dependent-associated 
development’ for Cardoso and Serra – is re-read by Marini as the dramatic 
reduction of real wages, the lengthening of the working time necessary for the 
labour force’s reproduction, and the incorporation of more members of the family to 
the labour market – in a nutshell, the central tendencies underlying the so-called 
‘Brazilian miracle’, so cheered under the presidency of Cardoso himself. 
 
3. A Critical Balance of the Debate 
The advance of the dependency hypothesis during the decades of the ‘60s and ‘70s 
was the intellectual outcome of elaborated responses to ECLAC’s desarrollismo as 
well as to orthodox Marxism’s conceptions of Latin America as feudal. The 
incorporation of the global dynamics of centralization and peripheralization in the 
analysis reinforced the comprehension of the economic and political structures of 
the region; hence, this hypothesis comes into the scene amidst the tensions between 
desarrollismo and different versions of the Marxist theory of imperialism, and was 
developed in Santiago de Chile (the seat of ECLAC). However, by the mid seventies 
the diagnoses about the fall of dependency theory began to gain currency (cf. 
Camacho, 1979), a process accompanied by the proliferation of military regimes 
which generated a partial shift of concerns from questions related to development 
and dependency to themes dominated by political concerns, in particular by 
democratic restoration. Therefore, the profuse presence of dependency analysis in 
Latin American intellectual and political circles, evident until mid-1970s-1970s, was 
eclipsed during the second half of this decade; the ‘death certificates’ casted upon 
the dependency hypothesis were accompanied by a shift in the themes and topics 
that since then occupied the intellectual agendas of Latin American intellectuals. By 
and large, these scholars turned from political economy to political science, focusing 
now on the character of the authoritarian regimes proliferating everywhere in that 
period. The political claim for autonomous development was thus replaced by the 
concern for the conditions of transition from authoritarianism to democratic 
regimes, as well as the possibilities of the latter’s consolidation –in which was 
known, not without ironic rings, as the sciences of ‘transitology’ (transitología) and 
‘consolidology’ (consolidología) (Vitullo, 2001). In this regard, and although Cardoso 
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had made his case ariund the ‘consumption’ from the US of a version of 
dependency theory closer to his opponents than to his own, what became evident in 
Latin America was that the intellectual topics were increasingly closer to his own 
side; in Cardoso’s own titles, the mid seventies were the moment of passage from 
Dependency and Development to Authoritarianism and Democratization (Cardoso, 1975; 
see also Fernando H. Cardoso, 1979). 
 Despite what the large number of ‘death certificates’ might indicate, it seems 
to me that the ‘dependency hypothesis’ was buried alive. The neoliberalization 
processes that in some cases accompanied, and in others followed, military and 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America were based to a great extent on certain 
structural tendencies predicated by the dependency school. ‘Adjustment measures’ 
was the euphemism incubated by the ‘Washington consensus’ and promoted by the 
IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury Department, in order to label the package 
of structural reforms for ‘developing countries’, including: privatization of public 
goods, state enterprises and social security systems; devaluation of the currency; 
intensification of the working day and introduction of new forms of labour 
flexibility (such as home-based work); reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers to 
external companies –all of which rings like ‘super-exploitation’. These measures 
were further accompanied by the increasing presence of foreign capital and the 
trans-nationalization of some local capitals –not to mention the revitalization of the 
extractive sector by means of renewed forms of “accumulation by dispossession”, 
constitutive for Harvey (2009) of the “new imperialism”. What seems incredible is 
the dismissal of the dependency hypothesis at the very moment that the 
dismantling of the whole social edifice that, however precariously, had been built 
during the industrializing period was taking place –i.e., when the non-viability of 
the historical project of national development (the core thesis of the dependency 
analysis) was becoming more and more apparent throughout Latin America. 
 Despite what the large number of ‘death certificates’ might indicate, it seems 
to me that the ‘dependency hypothesis’ was buried alive. What seems telling here is 
that the progressive (and never full-fledged) dismissal occurred in the period of 
rollback of the social edifice that, however precariously, had been built during the 
industrialization period – i.e. when the historical project of national development 
was being dismantled all over the region. The neoliberalization processes that in 
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some cases accompanied, in others followed, authoritarian regimes, were the 
material content of the grounded on structural tendencies already observed by the 
dependency school. ‘Adjustment measures’ was the euphemism coined by the so-
called Washington consensus, a coinage that packed the economic reforms 
promoted by the IMF, the World Bank, and the US Treasury Department for 
‘developing’ countries. This package included: the privatization of public goods, 
state enterprises, and social security systems; devaluation of the currency; 
intensification of the working journey and introduction of new forms of labour 
flexibility such as home-based work; reduction of trade barriers to external 
companies – all of which rings like ‘super-exploitation’. These measures were 
further accompanied by the increasing presence of foreign capital and the trans-
nationalization of some local capitals, not to mention the revitalization of the 
extractive sector.  
 Apart from the displacements in the intellectual topics and political 
motivations oof the period, there are also theoretically internal reasons to be 
considered so as to understand the decline in momentum of dependency analysis. 
In the debate Cardoso-Marini debate, in particular, what one considers 
‘development’ is seen for the other as ‘underdevelopment’. Cardoso sees capitalist 
development in the economic diversification, the invigoration – within limits – of 
internal markets, the growing of middle classes, and the integration to mass-
consumption of working class segments. With the notion of development associated 
with dependency, nonetheless, he stresses two points: that development and 
dependency are compatible; therefore, we are dealing with form of capitalist, that is, 
of conflictive and non-harmonious development. Talking about dependent capitalist 
development, he argues that “one speaks necessarily and simultaneously of 
socioeconomic exploitation, unequal distribution of income, the private 
appropriation of the means of production, and the subordination of some economies 
to others.” (1977: 17, original emphasis) Marini, in turn, sees in Cardoso’s allegation 
nothing but underdevelopment – expressed in the tendencies of the payment 
balance, the structural difficulties for local capital to accumulate and reproduce 
itself in a ‘progressive’ form, and the recourses to super-exploitation, 
marginalization, and lack of minimal integration at the level of capital’s expanded 
reproduction.  
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 From a terminological standpoint, Cardoso is right to render the economic 
diversification established – however with consequences opposed to the desarrollista 
expectations – during the ISI period as a form of capitalist development. 
Consequently, his conclusion (i.e. there is not irreducible contraposition between 
development and dependence) is also correct; the latter must be seen as a particular 
form of the former, within a rank of variation subjected not only to economic laws 
but also to conjunctural instabilities, social upheavals, and political decisions. 
Nonetheless, in my view Marini’s emphasis on underdevelopment is expressive of 
the refusal to endorse with the rank of ‘development’ the processes underwent by 
Latin American countries during the 1970s and ‘80s. The stress he puts in under-
consumption and marginalization, the increasing of a proletariat’s reserve-army 
(instrumental to the perpetuation of the tendencies in the international division of 
labour), the consolidation of conditions of heteronomy, and the reinforcement of the 
divorce between spheres of capital – all this made him cautious (and for good 
reasons) to use a term highly semantically charged with future-images of fulfillment 
for the post-colonies. This is implicated in Marini’s accusation of Cardoso as an 
apologist of dependent capitalism, in the blurring of important structural 
differences between advanced economies and Latin American societies. 
In these terms, the abusive codification of the notion of development, based 
on a particular image of capitalism, overlapped the conflation of levels of analysis 
and the indeterminacies in the use of national and class analyses, all of which 
conspired against the vitality of the dependency hypothesis. John Kraniauskas 
(2005: 54) indicates that the conception of “development as more development” 
became the most salient adoption of development ideology in the post-colonies. In 
the case of dependency analysis, either in its version of further diversification or in 
the claim for further coherence in capital’s cycles, the common ground lies is a given 
standard for determining the ‘more’ of the formula: Western capitalism as Latin 
America’s ‘developed’ mirror. More concretely, the dependency school was 
prisoner of the ‘national’ narrative of capital development, either in affirmative or 
negative stances.  
Given this ideological straitjacket, and perhaps inevitably, the continuum 
which goes from ‘less’ to ‘more’ development – and the stageist conceptions derived 
from it – contributed to occlude the basal hypothesis emerging out of dependency 
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analysis: the multiplicity, unevenness, and combined character of the capitalist 
paths of development. However, once divested of this narrative in which a typical, 
normal, autonomous, and integrated ‘national’ capitalism is the central analytical 
reference, the dependency hypothesis comes close to the idea of uneven and 
combined development. It underlies the multiplicity of societal development, the 
interconnections between societies unfolding unevenly, the combined forms of 
structuring of these connections, and the diverse social dynamics emerging out of 
these intersections (cf. Anievas and Nişancıoğlu, 2015). These forms of development 
have sometimes taken ‘national’ paths; this, nonetheless, does not imply that 
individual nation-states are the sovereign subjects of development. Or, to put it 
differently, the logic of the nation is internal to the logic of capital, which is fiest and 
foremost global. As Marx put it in the 1874 French edition of Capital: in the age of 
mechanical industry, the dynamics of international trade – that is, of capital as 
global capital – achieve precedence over domestic production and trade.79 
Conversely, Lenin seems to complement these indications about ‘so-called 
development’ in his notes on Hegel’s dialectic, affirming that 
[t]he two basic (or two possible? Or two historically observable?) 
conceptions of development (evolution) are: development as decrease 
and increase, as repetition, and development as a unity of opposites (the 
division of a unity into mutually exclusive opposites and their reciprocal 
relation). [...] The first conception is lifeless, pale and dry. The second is 
living. The second alone furnishes the key to the ‘self-movement’ of 
everything existing; it alone furnishes the key to ‘leaps’, to the ‘break in 
continuity’, to the ‘transformation into the opposite’, to the destruction 
of the old and the emergence of the new. (1961: 358) 
                                                          
79  Kevin Anderson (2010, 188) quotes Marx’s further remark on the ‘Law of General Law 
of Capitalist Accumulation’ (explaining precisely the interplay of forms of surplus-value 
extraction) in the French edition: “only after mechanical industry had struck root so deeply 
that it exerted a preponderant influence on the whole of national production; only after 
foreign trade began to predominate over internal trade, thanks to mechanical industry; only 
after the world market had successively annexed extensive areas of the New World, Asia 
and Australia; and finally, only after a sufficient number of industrial nations had entered 
the arena – only  after all this had happened can one date the repeated self-perpetuating 
cycles, whose successive phases embrace years, and always culminate in a general crisis 
[...]”. 
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To conceive development beyond its restrictive, ‘national’ narrative, means to take 
into account capital’s inherently contradictory trends at a global scale, which turns 
out to help explain the outcomes of these trends upon domestic dynamics. On the 
one hand, there is those unbalances derived from capital’s tendencies to 
competition; such unbalances are evident not only in geographical variety of 
performances, but also in the comparison of branches of production and productive 
units. On the other hand, a combined structure becomes visible out of all these 
uneven ‘aspects’, ‘sectors’, and ‘locations’, a system of relations in which some of 
them ‘develop’ (in the one-sided version of the concept, in Marx’s and Lenin’s 
terms) at the expense of the others. And this is precisely what I consider the kernel 
of the ‘dependency hypothesis’, as expressed in both Marini’s insistence about the 
Latin America’s pivotal participation in the consolidation of metropolitan, industrial 
capitalism, and in Cardoso and Faletto’s parallel persistence in considering local 
realities as inscribed at the core-logic of capitalist development.  
 Put differently: stripped of the ideologeme of the ‘development of 
underdevelopment’, specifically of its generalizing pretensions, what becomes 
evident is the combination of (uneven) development and dependency conditions. 
What is more, it is necessary to conceptually relate political control over local 
economies to the formation of domestic dynamics of partial centralization and 
concentration of capital. In doing so, Marxism’s ‘determination in the last instance’ 
of the political by the economic helps to prevent one of the dependentista’s dead-
ends: the consideration of politics as the determining instance by default, that is, by 
the apparent lack of economic ‘centre’.  
Neither considered as an absolute special law of motion nor as a matter of 
incidental political engagements and effects, and above all de-fetishized from its 
bourgeois-nationalist narrative, the dependency hypothesis attains a field of 
questions that arguably go far beyond the assertions of those who formulate it. 
Based on a multi-linear, non-deterministic but nonetheless determined conception, 
the dependency hypothesis was the intellectual pre-text opening up the questioning 
(once again, albeit under new frameworks) of both Latin America’s ties to the 
‘modern’ world and its particular conditions of existence in such a world; this time, 
from a viewpoint about social revolution that can be fairly called as ‘des-centred’ – 
de-centred from both Stalinist and nacional-desarrollista historical narratives. In what 
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became an inconclusive debate, the category of ‘dependency’ condensed a 
theoretical-political moment of Latin American Marxism. The ‘dependency 
moment’ emerged thus as an endogenous process of scientific paradigm-building in 
Latin America (Beigel, 2010a process which, I add, ‘developed’ under political 
commitments and vital urgencies (exile, secrecy) involving the common destiny of a 
continent. While some dogmatic Marxists accused ‘dependency theory’ of narrow 
petit-bourgeois nationalism, a fairer criticism may suggest to recognizing in this 
perspective the traces of an incipient, and unresolved, Third World discourse. 
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V. Marxism in Dialogue: Aricó and the Translational Task of the Materialist 
Historian 
 
‘Just as the history of the Church is not 
identical to the history of Christianity 
and does not wholly define its 
boundaries, the history of Marxism is 
rather more than the vicissitudes of the 
vulgate and the ‘deviations’ from it. 
Apart from its specific history as an 
institution and as a dogma, the history of 
ideas and intellectuals, it is undeniable 
that it also has another discontinuous 
and decentred history, full of hidden 
expressions, lost paths and diverse 
temporalities; an esoteric and pluralist 
history expressing the multiplicity of 
initiatives, goals and results of the 
struggle waged by the subaltern classes.’  
José Aricó, Marx and Latin America,  
Epilogue to the Second Edition, 1982 
 
1. ‘Wandering Behind the Political Subject’: the Argentinean Gramscians 
During much of the twentieth century, Mexico held a remarkable policy of open 
doors aimed at sheltering a significant number of politicians, artists, and 
intellectuals expelled from their homelands. Trotsky is perhaps the more illustrious 
among them, yet this was also the case of the Peruvian Víctor Haya de la Torre and 
the Cuban Julio Antonio Mella during the 1920s; of the Spaniards Luis Buñuel, 
Adolfo Sánchez Vásquez, Wenceslao Roces, José Medina Echavarría, and Leon 
Felipe, and the Argentineans Aníbal Ponce and Arnaldo Orfila (among many 
others) during the rule of Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s. Therefore, it does not seem 
a pure matter of historical chance that the Mexican Communist Party (the first of its 
kind in Latin America) had been founded in 1919 (i.e., in the aftermaths of the 
Mexican revolution) by individuals of so diverse a provenance as the Indian M. N. 
Roy, the Japanese Sen Katayama, the US-American Charles Phillips, or the Russian 
Michel Borodin.  
 Later, a significant group was received during the late-1960s and ‘70s, in a list 
that counted the Argentineans José Aricó, Enrique Dussel, Juan Carlos Portantiero 
and Oscar Terán; the Brazilians Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, and 
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Vania Bambirra; the Ecuadorians Agustín Cueva and Bolívar Echeverría; the 
Chileans Hugo Zemelman, Orlando Caputo, and Jaime Osorio, the Peruvian Aníbal 
Quijano... and the list could go on. They were largely recruited by universities and 
academic institutions, as well as in other cultural spaces such as editorial houses 
and journals.80  
 Mexico was an ‘exceptional’ place in its own right.81 For almost seven decades, 
but with particular intensity during the 1960s and ‘70s, the country paradoxically 
combined those open doors policies which helped the leftist intelligentsia of the 
continent and beyond, on the one hand, and the highly-institutionalized rule of the 
single party, on the other. During its long-lasting reign of almost eight decades, the 
PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party, the organization that claimed to be heir of 
the Mexican revolution) conveyed a quite effective combination of co-optation (of 
opposition parties, trade-unions, cultural agents, intellectuals, and peasant-voters), 
repression (the Tlatelolco massacre in 1968, the Guerrero massacre in 1974), and 
redistribution (namely of land). In this regard, Peruvian right-wing writer Mario 
Vargas Llosa famously (and misleadingly) coined the idea of the PRI’s Mexico as 
“the perfect dictatorship”.82 
 This post-68 exile-generation was thus situated in a country where a far from 
democratic state sheltered intense and prolific debates within Marxism and other 
leftist currents. Considerations about the meaning of the defeat and the pitfalls of 
political strategies and tactics that ushered it, the structural and ideological 
consequences of military regimes, along with more theoretical disquisitions such as 
concerning the particular conditions of Latin America’s capitalism and class 
struggle, or the value and pertinence of Marxism vis-à-vis the evidence of such 
particularities, were among the topics of the debates that marked this period. José 
                                                          
80  For a panoramic survey of the waves and trajectories of the Mexican exile during the 
twentieth century, see P. Yankelevich coord. (2002). 
81  For a brilliant and inspiring account on the Mexican contemporary history, based on 
cultural processes and focused on sovereignty – and its constitutive ‘exceptions’ –, see G. 
Williams (2011). 
82  Vargas Llosa’s intervention took place in a Mexican TV set, in the context of a 
colloquium of Latin American intellectuals entitled ‘XXth Century: the experience of liberty” 
and organized by Revista Vuelta. See Vargas Llosa (n.d.). As a response to Octavio Paz’s plea 
for democracy, the idea of ‘perfect dictatorship’ was put forth to brackets the differences 
between political systems and regimes across Latin American countries – in my view, this 
was already part of his neo-liberal campaign for president of Peru, in a rally he would 
eventually lose to Alberto Fujimori.  
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Aricó is perhaps the name that better expresses the intersection of these themes 
along with the polemics they conveyed, given his crucial, tireless activity as editor, 
translator, and columnist in his more than 40 years of dealings with Marxism. As we 
will see, the Marxism he advocated was grounded in a long-lasting (yet shifting) 
encounter with Gramsci. The Italian communist supplied Aricó not just with 
concepts and methods but, perhaps more significantly, with questions and 
problematizations on the basis of which it was possible to reinvigorate Marxism’s 
commitments with social transformation. As I will concentrate my argument on the 
part of Aricó’s work produced in Mexico, a brief survey of his pre-exile trajectory 
might be in order. 
 
The Group Pasado y Presente: On Gramsci’s (Many) Uses 
Aricó’s first engagements with Marxism began with his affiliation to the Cordoba 
section of the Argentinean Communist Party (PCA) during his high-school years in 
the late 1940s.83 Influenced by Héctor Agosti, Aricó embraced at that time a Marxist-
Leninist reading of Gramsci. Agosti was an intellectual of the PCA who translated, 
for the first time into Spanish, the edition of Quaderni del Carcere prepared in Italy by 
Palmiro Togliatti. The PCUS’ XX Congress was no doubt significant for Aricó’s 
generation, particularly regarding the prestige of Marxism-Leninism in the context 
of the recognition of Stalin’s rule as a dictatorship based on the cult of personality. 
Soon after, this dissatisfaction was accompanied by the positive impact of the Cuban 
revolution across the continent. All of this was coterminous with the falling of Perón 
in 1955, an event that made evident the incapacity of Argentinean communism to 
come to terms, conceptually as well as politically, with the new features of the 
Argentinean working classes and other subaltern groups.  
 At the time of his expulsion from the PCA in 1963, Aricó already possessed a 
reading of Gramsci that can be fairly considered as ‘heterodox’, that is, oriented to 
putting Marxism beyond the framework of Soviet DIAMAT and HISTOMAT, by 
                                                          
83  For an auto-biographical account of his (and of the group that came together in the 
journal Pasado y Presente, by extension) Gramscian influences and orientations, see J. Aricó 
(1988). Two excellent, well-informed reconstructions of Aricó’s Gramscian influences are R. 
Burgos (2004) and M. Cortés (2015). For a more critical survey, see D. Gaido and C. Bosch 
(2014). 
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means of a focus on what the Italian Marxist called the task of ‘organizing the 
culture’. Aricó’s initial reading of Gramsci, accordingly, was premised on attention 
to the cultural tasks neglected by the party. In this context, the appearance of the 
journal Pasado y Presente, whose Gramscian echoes are apparent in the very choice of 
its name, marked a young, promising generation’s rupture with official 
communism. The publication in 1963 of this independent (not directly affiliated to 
the party, that is) journal by the Cordoba-based communist militants Aricó, Óscar 
del Barco, and Héctor Schmucler ushered their expulsion under the charges of 
revisionism. Conversely, the Cordoba-based core-group rapidly incorporated other 
ex-communists and youthful leftist such as Juan Carlos Portantiero and José Carlos 
Chiaramonte from Buenos Aires. The fact that the journal Pasado y Presente could 
constitute so quickly a distinct, identifiable group in the landscape of the 
Argentinean left might be considered as a signal of the increasing dissatisfaction 
with the Marxist discourse offered by communist parties at the time –something not 
exclusive to Argentina but true of Latin America more widely (and beyond).  
 The lack of interest in dialoguing with other philosophical and theoretical 
currents, on the pretext of the ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘autonomy’ of Marxism, was no 
doubt one of the acknowledged touchstones of official communist orientations. In 
the image given by this discourse, the theory appeared as a fixed and closed 
doctrinaire body (namely, DIAMAT and HISTOMAT) ready to be applied to any 
given reality, geography, or realm of knowledge. In contradistinction, the editorial 
of the journal’s first issue –written by Aricó himself– addressed in nuce what will be 
a permanent preoccupation of his work: namely, to put Marxism into dialogical 
relationship with other intellectual currents and worldviews. In his own words, the 
task consists in “do not leave aside, because of immediate political considerations, 
diverse aspects of human knowledge [...] abandoning [thus] to bourgeois ideology 
realms that Marxism claimed as its own as early as in 1844” (cited in Cortes, 2015: 
41). In this sense, Aricó identifies this open, dialogical disposition as part of 
Marxism’s attitude towards reality from the very beginning. 
 For these reasons, the Gramscianism displayed by the group Pasado y 
Presente can be considered as a ‘Marxism in dialogue’. This dialogical orientation 
implicated, in a nutshell, a strategic openness towards other theoretical traditions 
and cultures in order, first, to inform Marxism about contemporary debates, angles 
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and events, and then to invigorate its own critical scope. In words that pertain to the 
inaugural 1963 editorial, this dialogical dimension was defined as coextensive with 
the consideration that “the autonomy and absolute originality of Marxism is also 
expressed in its ability to comprehend the exigencies to which other worldviews 
[concepciones del mundo] respond.” (cited in Cortes, 2015: 41) The journal therefore 
established a space for cultural-political interventions and exchanges, with the aim 
of invigorating revolutionary theory by means of dialogue with contemporary 
debates and contenders. 
 During its lifetime, Pasado y Presente’s ‘Marxism in dialogue’ adopted 
shifting, perhaps eclectic conceptual stances and political orientations. In its first 
epoch (1963-1965), it was informed by a combination of Castro-Guevarismo or 
‘foquismo’, Maoism’s ‘cultural revolution’ (mainly by means of its Althusserian 
reception), and Italian Operaismo. To begin with, during 1963 and 1965 the group 
collaborated in a semi-clandestine manner with the Argentinean guerrilla-foco 
Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo (‘People’s Guerrilla Army’), which had established itself 
in the border province of Salta (allegedly under the command of Ernesto ‘Ché’ 
Guevara himself) in a short-lived political endeavour (cf. Burgos, 2004: 106). The 
relation with Althusser and ‘Althusserianism’ was more lasting but equally 
conflictive, for the latter’s anti-historicism evidently clashed with Gramsci’s 
perspectives and arguments. Amidst of this tension, Althusser was welcomed by 
the group (chiefly by Del Barco, and to a lesser extent by Portantiero) insofar as the 
prospects of Lire le Capital and Pour Marx helped to consider the non-transparency of 
Marxism, that is, the internal tensions that constitute it, and hence the possibility of 
taking it up as a theoretical object (cf. Del Barco, 1982). The claims made by the 
French philosopher about the scientific status of Marxist theory –intimately 
interwoven with its political status– as well as his consideration of the science of 
history –historical materialism, that is– as a new problematic field, were part of the 
elements adopted by the group (cf. Starcenbaum, 2011).  
 Furthermore, the new radicalism that emerged with the Turin-based Quaderni 
Rossi, the germ of Italian Operaismo, afforded a re-reading of Gramsci’s Ordine Nuovo 
period. The Pasado y Presente group turned to contemporary Italian debates as a 
way of elaborating a fresher perspective about the workers movement in the 
‘advanced’ sector of the Argentinean economy. This movement reached a climax in 
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the events popularly known as the Cordobazo, the Cordoba uprisings occurring 
between 1968 and 1970 concentrated in the automobile industry, in what constituted 
the country’s ’68 moment (cf. Petra, 2013: 125–29; see also Gago and Sztulwark, 
2015). Finally, during Pasado y Presente’s second phase in 1973, once again the 
orientation of the journal shifted; now towards Montoneros, a mixture of urban 
guerrilla and mass-front organization formed by the fusion of grassroots Christian, 
former guerrilla and socialists, and university groups engaged with Peronismo. 
Within a dialogue with national-popular perspectives, the ‘national question’ re-
emerged as a central theoretical motif in Aricó’s writings and editorial efforts (cf. 
Burgos, 2004: 169–230). 
 A programmatic summary of the critical motivations behind the group 
appeared as early as the 1964 editorial ‘Examen de conciencia’ (‘Self-examination’) of 
Pasado y Presente’s fourth issue:  
The facts have demonstrated the historical weakness of a leading group 
incapable of appropriately resolving the task of expressing Marxism 
within national life, of knowing the country’s reality, of structuring an 
organization that actually brings out the proletariat’ organized 
consciousness, of solving the past within the present, the historical 
experiences with current requests, the old with the new revolutionary 
generations, through a permanent adaptation to global fluctuations. 
(2005: 243) 
In a Gramscian fashion, the historical weakness of the PCA is formulated as the 
inability to translate Marxism into national life, to elaborate it as a veritable 
language that can speak to Argentinean struggles. Two tasks were derived from 
such a historical weakness: first, to provide the foundations of a revolutionary class-
consciousness; and second, to adequately incorporate the concrete history of the 
country and the continent in contemporary demands. These tasks, in turn, were 
assumed by the group –and by Aricó in particular– by means of the merciless 
criticism of Marxism understood as an ecclesiastic orthodoxy, in an endeavour 
characterized by the reformulation of Marxism as a dialogical, translational space of 
commitments, learning and exchanges.    
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 Perhaps the best way to explain the shifts in orientation derived from these 
motivations is by recalling Aricó’s retrospective remarks on the matter: “I think the 
life of the journal was marked by this wandering behind [deambular detrás de] the 
political subject.” (cited in Cortés, 2015: 59) In a country in which official 
communism seemed to be disqualified theoretically and politically from coming to 
terms with the complexity that class struggle and the organizational forms-cum-
contents of the popular masses –a country, moreover, in which a national-popular 
movement was taking place by other-than-socialist means–, these intellectuals-
without-a-subject were at pains to uphold and unfold the hegemonic energies of 
Marxism. However volatile their energies might seem today, these leaps and shifts 
were the expression of the actual gulfs between theory and subject. In turn, these 
gulfs demanded a patient consideration of aspects of reality as apparently 
disconnected as the workers’ councils, the prospects of a cultural revolution, the 
guerrilla-foco tactics, the idea of national-popular will, and so on. All of which –I 
must insist– was driven by the demand to enlarge and enhance Marxism as a 
worldview able to take up and respond to the challenges posed by contemporary 
capitalism.  
  Be that as it may, the focus on the ‘organization of culture’, along with the 
mobilization of the notion of ‘organic intellectual’, were perhaps the most important 
hallmarks of the group. Indeed, its contribution to the diffusion of Marxism and 
other critical perspectives in Latin America is hard to overestimate. Led by Aricó, in 
1968 they started the book series Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente (heretofore CPyP) 
with the publication of a critical edition of Marx’s ’Introduction’ to the Grundrisse. 
From then on, CPyP published 98 books during its existence in Argentina (first in 
Cordoba and then in Buenos Aires) and Mexico, until it closed in 1983. Aricó also 
took the responsibility of a new translation of Marx’s Capital, made by Pedro 
Scaron,84 as well as the first Spanish translation of the Grundrisse. Both publications 
were published by Siglo XXI, with which Aricó collaborated to the point of taking 
                                                          
84  Pedro Scaron was also responsible of a book that, in Horacio Crespo’s view (2014, xxiii 
fn), was highly influential for Aricó’s Marx and Latin America. Scaron translated in 1968 a 
complete collection of Marx’s and Engels’ passages on Latin America, entitled Materials for 
the History of Latin America and published by Cuadernos en Marcha in Uruguay in 1968. In 
1972, the second edition of this work was published by CPyP. 
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charge of its book series ‘Biblioteca del Pensamiento Socialista’ during his exile in 
Mexico.85  
 
Translation: The Task of the (Peripheral) Materialist Historian 
In Aricó’s tenacious work of translation and publication of a significant body of 
literature pertaining to the Marxist tradition, Martín Cortés identifies the kernel of 
his intellectual efforts. Together with the organization of culture displayed through 
editorial enterprises, the practice of translation appears as the unifying thread of 
Aricó’s Marxism. In this sense, one can say that translation becomes his 
characteristic contribution to Latin American Marxist theory. Accordingly, Cortés 
defines Aricó’s Marxism as, “first of all, the unfolding of an immense strategy of 
translation that has as its objective to introduce into the Latin American debate 
diverse problems, texts, debates, and translations, always under the sign of the 
theoretical-political relevance of this exercise” (2015: 40).  
  As I noted in Chapter I, the task of translation was a major concern of 
Gramsci’s Quaderni. The Italian Marxist considered translation as a pathway to come 
to terms with the question of the comparability between national and regional 
realities within the world capitalist framework, as his reference to Lenin’s 1921 
organizational questions demonstrates (cf. Gramsci, 1995: 451). It is this world 
capitalist civilization that makes possible the dialogue among cultures; however, 
these dialogues are considered by Gramsci and Aricó not in terms of an already-
given fact, but rather as the ground through which a patient work (of translation) 
must take place. For there is no ‘perfect’ translation among languages –no language 
is completely transparent to another, that is–, the mere application of an allegedly 
definitive set of principles to every culture was considered as part of the 
mechanistic illusions of dogmatic Marxism.  
 Reflecting in The Devil’s Tail (‘La cola del diablo’) on the value of Gramsci’s 
Marxism for Latin America, Aricó wrote in 1988 that “if the same idea transferred 
from the theory’s centres of production into our own periphery, it turns out to be of 
                                                          
85  Siglo XXI was founded in Mexico in 1966 under the direction of Argentinean-exiled 
Arnaldo Orfila, who was dismissed from his position in the State-owned publisher Fondo de 
Cultura Económica by command of then President Diaz Ordaz. Aricó was the main person 
in charge of its Argentinean branch until his exile in Mexico in 1976. 
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necessity another thing: What is or could be ‘our Gramsci’? What decompositions 
and recompositions must we provoke upon the Gramscian analytical corpus so that 
it is in condition to enlighten our reality or part of it […]?”  (1988: 41) And in a 
conclusive passage of the same book, he added: “There is an obvious necessity to 
confront our own, different realities in Latin America, with those theoretical and 
political paradigms demanding less exceptional, infinitely more cautious 
‘translations’ in order to be used.” (1988: 114) There is no doubt that Aricó here 
makes reference to Marxism (but not only to it) as one of those paradigms and 
theories that need to be patiently translated so as to come to terms with the 
particular reality of Latin America. In this sense, the Gramscian use of translational 
strategies becomes a pathway to both desacralize and reorient (decompose and 
reconstruct, that is) the Marxist conceptual apparatus, so as to serve Latin America’s 
politics in a useful manner. 
 Following Cortés (2015: 32–6; see also 2013), I assume that Gramsci’s and 
Aricó’s understandings of translation were convergent: like the Italian Communist, 
the Argentinean Marxist comprehended this task as related both to the 
translatability among languages pertaining to different disciplinary realms as well as 
to the possibility of comparison of national or regional cultural dynamics. In any of 
these cases, there is no perfect or transparent, but only essential or inessential 
translations. In turn, this brings forth the necessity of an attentive, politically-
informed labour oriented to evaluating the pertinence that one language has in 
enlightening problems belonging to ‘other’ domains. This is what Aricó considers as 
belonging to Marxism’s concerns ‘as early as in 1844. 
 Notwithstanding the more diffuse presence of Walter Benjamin in Aricó’s 
writings, I affirm that one can also find affinities in the conceptions of Marxism 
shared by these intellectuals in their references to the task of translation. This is 
made explicit in Aricó’s intention to read Marx “from the Gramscian-Benjaminean 
perspective” (cited in Cortés, 2015: 86). In his 1921 writing entitled precisely ‘The 
Task of the Translator’, the German thinker referred to translatability as the 
“essential quality of certain works, which is not to say that it is essential for the 
works themselves that they be translated; it means, rather, that a specific 
significance inherent in the original manifests itself in its translatability.” (1996b, 
254) Holding a perspective similar to Gramsci’s about the non-transparency 
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between linguistic corpuses, and consequently the futility to define a somehow 
’essential’ original as the objective reference against which a translation should be 
measured, Benjamin asserted that “no translation would be possible if in its ultimate 
essence it strove for likeness to the original. For in its afterlife […] the original 
undergoes a change.” (1996b: 256) The German Marxist makes his own approach 
clearer towards the end of his article by saying that “[t]he task of the translation 
consists in finding the particular intention toward the target language which 
produces in that language the echo of the original.” (1996b: 258). In sum, the task of 
translation has to do with the conveying of the intentio of the ‘original’ language. 
Consequently, translation does not mean the resource to an original whose alleged 
essence must be retained in the process, but rather a work of reorganization 
whereby the pertinence of a theory or language is evaluated in concrete terms.  
 It is important to bear in mind the twofold dimension entailed in the task of 
translation approached through the prism of Gramsci and Benjamin. On the one 
hand, there is the level of translatability among languages in the more traditional 
sense of linguistic bodies, what is projected further by Gramsci to those disciplinary 
realms that achieve the status of ‘specialized languages’ (i.e., philosophy, 
economics, biology, and so on). At this level, translating a novel or a proverb from 
English into Spanish would be similar (or, at least, would provoke similar caveats) 
to translating, say, the notion of ‘law’ from the realm of physics to history. On the 
other hand, there is the civilization level envisaged by Gramsci, in which a given 
term or conception can find a superior explanation in another term belonging to 
another civilization ‘stage’. Gramsci’s position, let us recall, presupposes the 
historical materialist consideration that a civilization (namely, capitalism) has 
‘basically’ identical cultural expressions in each of its cultural bodies – even though 
these ‘basically’ similar expressions may vary to a great extent. Consequently, the 
task of the materialist historian is situated in the translation “between expressions of 
different stages of civilization, in so far as each of these stages is a moment of the 
development of another, one thus mutually integrating the other, or whether a 
given expression may be translated using the terms of a previous stage which 
however is more comprehensible than the given language etc.” (1995: 451) In this 
second register, the assumption of a common ground is more complex and remains 
open to a historical (hence political) perspective.  
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 Aricó’s understanding of translation retains this twofold dimension. As it was 
already seen, the concern that marked his initial motivations as expressed in Pasado 
y Presente and further accompanied his lifelong efforts was the dialogue between 
Marxism and other contemporary philosophies, theories and worldviews. He used 
the term ‘secular’ – non-religious, that is – to refer to these dialogues aimed to 
invigorate Marxism as a contemporary and operative theory of emancipation that 
does not neglect any of the achievements of ‘bourgeois’ ideologies. This, one may 
say, is the synchronic dimension of translation. Yet Aricó also took into account the 
second, diachronic level of translation: that of negotiating a path for coming to 
terms with dissimilar civilization stages and developmental rhythms. From the 
questions posed by translatability, and through his participation in the promotion of 
Marxist literature in the region, Aricó approached that unique and crucial (at least 
in what concerns our argument) problem: the value and function of Marxism in 
Latin America.  
 Martín Cortés (2015) and Horacio Crespo (2014) refer to the regionalization or 
becoming-continental (‘continentalization’) of Aricó’s Marxism as a process that 
made itself felt during his time of exile in Mexico. This Latin-Americanization was 
expressed in its translational significance by Aricó himself, in a 1986 interview: “For 
the first time, I knew in Mexico what the indigenous peasantry is; for the first time, I 
noticed that the same language does not prevent translation problems, but on the 
contrary it can make them especially difficult.” (cited in Cortes, 2015: 207) This 
observation suggests that the Argentinean experience informing Aricó’s Marxism (a 
Latin American experience, no doubt) allowed for only a partial translation, ill-
equipped to come to terms with those elements that, conversely, were fully 
apparent in Mexico or Peru – chiefly, indigeneity. In other words, this ‘Argentinean’ 
Marxist apparatus – however dialogical its relation to other contemporary 
philosophies may have been – did not afford to be fully translated into dissimilar 
realities such as Mexico’s or Peru’s.  
 This contrast or short-circuit – I argue – signalled the emergence of the 
question of the conditions of possibility for the translation, and consequent 
transformation, of Marxist theory in and from Latin America. In doing so, the 
translational task brings to the fore the interrogation on the modes of making theory 
in Latin America. As Gavin Arnall, Susana Draper and Ana Sabau (2015: 143) argue 
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dealing with the influence of Gramsci, but that can be fairly a consideration about 
Aricó’s Marxism tout court, he never ‘applied’ ideas; rather, ideas were regarded in 
their possibilities to transform the ability for understanding concrete political and 
historical processes. Arguably, the experience of being lost in translation before a 
Spanish-speaking, Latin American country, was an important event insofar as it 
triggered one of Aricó’s more valuable contribution to the reflections on Latin 
American Marxism: his 1980’s Marx and Latin America.  
 
2.  ‘The Virtues of the Backward’ and the Misencounter of Marx and Latin 
America 
In a number of occasions, Aricó made reference to a long-lasting, really ambitious 
project he had entertained from early on: to write the history of communism and 
socialism in Latin America. The project was initially conceived as a composite of 
historical documents and theoretical reflections. He idiosyncratically called it the 
mamotreto, a Spanish word that can be translated as ‘hefty book’ and expresses both 
the large extension and unmanageable nature of the project. It is important to recall 
this plan, to the extent that most of his more important books and writings were 
initially conceived as forming part of the mamotreto. This is the case of Aricó’s 
influential introduction to Mariátegui’s thought from 1979; of Las Hipótesis de Justo 
(‘Justo’s Hypotheses. Writings on Socialism in Latin America’, written in 1981 and 
published posthumously in 1999); and of La Cola del Diablo (‘The Devil’s Tail: 
Itineraries of Gramsci in Latin America’, of 1988). It was certainly also the case of 
Marx and Latin America, of 1980. These and other works, in consequence, must be 
considered as fragments of such an unfinished, perhaps unfinishable project. 
 
On the Misencounter between Marx and Latin America 
In Marx and Latin America, the conceptual locus chosen by Aricó to evaluate the 
conditions of possibility for the translation of Marxism into Latin America dwells on 
the category of ‘misencounter’ (desencuentro).86 The terms of this misencounter are 
                                                          
86  A note on translation: the Spanish term desencuentro can be directly translated as 
mismatch or failed meeting. I prefer to render it as ‘misencounter’, for even though it might 
be a neologism, I think it best grasps Aricó’s meaning: namely, to understand the mismatch 
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Marx (and, by extension, Marxism) and Latin America. Aricó argues that the 
misencounter presents an exterior, “taxonomical” surface in the long-lasting 
classificatory problems the sub-continent has posed to Marxist categorizations: Are 
these societies colonial or semi-colonial? Are they more akin to the West or to the 
East? Are they feudal, semi-feudal, or bourgeois? Did they fit into the so-called 
Asiatic mode of production? Conversely, this taxonomical inadequacy makes 
apparent the region’s evasion of its subsumption into totalizing theories. Latin 
America’s non-conformity to the Marxist “bourgeois type” (2014: 3) emerges 
therefore as the most immediate arena of the mismatch.  
 Nonetheless, the failure-to-meet is considered by Aricó as not merely 
terminological but profoundly conceptual, hence political; and its roots are to be 
found in Marx himself. This observation, on the other hand, could lead to the 
consideration of Marx’s whole oeuvre as partaking of the evolutionist perspectives 
in which development follows the lines of the Western-European trajectory. Of 
course – as Aricó goes on to argue – one can find in Marx this kind of assertion and 
evaluation. Accordingly, Aricó warns against two generalized misconceptions: to 
elide Marx and Engels, insofar as the former was more prone to understand history 
in a non-linear sense; and to neglect the open-mindedness exhibited by Marx’s 
ruminations about non-capitalist realities in his late writings. (Aricó, the editor, was 
indeed highly informed by the manuscripts, articles, letters and drafts whereby such 
disquisitions were carried on. He himself edited, and contributed to the divulgation, 
of this ‘fragmentary’ part of Marx’s oeuvre through the publications he prepared for 
CPyP and Siglo XXI. Finally, he also as well as stimulated both the discussion of this 
corpus and its incorporation into Marxist and socialist debates, a labour for which 
he wrote prologues, introductions, and remarks about these texts.  
 Not surprisingly then, Aricó provides in Marx and Latin America a well-
informed survey of Marx’s texts regarding the Irish question, the Spanish 
revolution, and the Russian commune, among other sources. These texts display a 
rich and complex perspective in which evolutionist historical models come under 
                                                                                                                                                                    
between Marx and Latin America through the Althusserian notion of encounter – and its 
missing or failure. In the recent English translation of Marx and Latin America that I have 
consulted here, conversely, David Broder renders it as ‘disconnection’ (2014, ch. Seven), in a 
translation that I will modify when appropriate. 
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severe questioning. From his settling in London onwards – Aricó explains – Marx 
observed that “the establishment of a ‘colonial’ capitalism in fact meant a 
transformation within the ‘industrial’ capitalist mode of production itself.” (2014: 
19) This perspective will be further developed in his later writings on the Irish 
question, and crucially in his treatment of the Russian commune. Through these 
investigations, the hypothesis of the uneven development of capitalism becomes 
fully apparent in Marx’s method. In particular, Marx’s reflections on Ireland during 
the 1960s (presented by Aricó as the outset of this new perspective) projected an 
embryo “phenomenology of underdevelopment” (2014: 30). 
 By means of these texts and fragments, Aricó exhibits a version of historical 
materialism quite different from the linear, unavoidable sequence of pre-capitalism, 
capitalism, and post-capitalism. It is possible to find in Marx – the author suggests – 
a teleological and stage-ordered conception of history, allegedly valid for any 
country and situation (a philosophy of history, that is) as well as a non-linear account 
of the capitalist world which opens in turn the path to thinking “the question of 
social revolution in concrete terms”  (2014: 36). From the evidence that  “historical 
discontinuity and unevenness was a characteristic proper to capitalist development 
itself” (2014: 35) – and not a sort of atypical, anomalous outcome –, what these 
writings bring to the fore (even though in an implicit manner) is for Aricó “the 
‘autonomy’ of the national sphere, based on which, and only based on which, the 
question of social revolution can be thought of in concrete terms, or, to put it 
another way, the question of the concrete possibilities of a conjunction between the 
fight for national emancipation and the process of class-struggle.” (2014: 36, original 
emphasis) Aricó situates Marx’s way out from the Eurocentric premises of his 
contemporaries in the recognition of the relative autonomy of the national, 
something apparent in the focus on the colonial question. The non-homogeneity of 
capitalist societies in the international scenario, and the relevance that national 
configurations have for the prospects of class struggle, constitute the theoretical 
basis on which Marx built his later perspective.  
 In consequence – Aricó concludes – “[t]he theoretical and political 
presuppositions from which the ‘autonomy’ of the Latin-American region could 
have been understood, then, did exist in Marx’s thought”. (2014: 38) It is precisely 
the evidence of such non-Eurocentric framework that is so disquieting when 
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contrasted with the unfortunate considerations Marx advanced in the scant times he 
discussed Latin America. In this sense, Aricó will propose a ‘symptomatic’ reading 
of what is perhaps the best example of these misconceptions: Marx’s 1858 article 
‘Bolívar y Ponte’. The symptomatic reading proceeds, in my view, along a double 
pathway. On the one hand, it searches in the text not for what Marx ‘says’ on Latin 
America, but for what he remained silent about (an Althusserian procedure, in other 
words; cf. Althusser, 2009: 29ff); on the other, it invites us to consider the article as 
an indication of Marxism’s ‘weakest link’ – namely, the proper consideration of the 
political and national dimensions. Let’s look then into the text in more detail. 
 
A Symptomatic Reading for a Symptomatic Article: Marx’s ‘Bolívar y Ponte’ 
‘Bolívar y Ponte’ (included in Aricó’s book as Appendix Nine) was an article written 
by Marx in 1858 for the New American Cyclopaedia. However, the fact that Marx did 
not choose the subject (it was paid work) does not diminish the worrying form in 
which he outlined the figure of Bolívar and the relevant events led by him in the 
struggles for independence waged during the 1810s and ‘20s. The article portrays 
him as selfish and incompetent individual, whose victories in the independence 
wars were neither the product of his military abilities nor the result of constituted 
popular armies. On the contrary, in Marx’s account these successes are explained by 
the recourse, first, to chance events, and second by the presence of European (chiefly 
British) soldiers and mercenaries who waged the war on the independence side. 
This presence proved for Marx to be crucial, as “like most of his countrymen, he 
[Bolívar] was averse to prolonged exertion” (in Aricó, 2014: 105). These and other 
prejudiced remarks populate the whole article. In it, Bolívar is described not as a 
liberator and nation-maker, but rather as a ruling-class dictatorial character all-too 
obsessed with the prospect of becoming a sort of Latin American Napoleon. In 
private correspondence with Engels, and defending the style of his article, Marx 
displayed in full his antagonism against the one known in Latin America as ‘El 
Libertador’: 
[The] article on Bolivar elicited objections from Dana [Charles Dana was 
one of the New American Cyclopaedia editors] because, he said, it is 
written in a ‘partisan style’ and he asked me to cite my authorities. This I 
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can, of course, do, although it’s a singular demand. As regards the 
‘partisan style’, it is true that I departed somewhat from the tone of a 
cyclopaedia. To see the dastardly, most miserable and meanest of 
blackguards described as Napoleon I was altogether too much. Bolivar is 
a veritable Soulouque. (2010e: 266) 
Marx had already established a similar connection in The Eighteenth Brumaire 
between Louis Bonaparte and Faustin Soulouque (cf. 2010d 11:192),87 a former slave 
who became president of Haiti in 1852 and then self-proclaimed himself as its 
Emperor. Therefore, both Louis Bonaparte and Simón Bolívar are referred to as 
farcical, mimicking characters; however, while Soulouque works in The Eighteen 
Brumaire as a kind of direct mirror-like image of Bonaparte (both being poor 
individuals pretending to be similar to Napoleon), in Bolivar’s article that mirror 
becomes double: by pretending to be Napoleon, the Latin American leader 
anticipated and hence demonstrated to be the ‘veritable’ Soulouque. 
 Marx’s article drew the attention of Aníbal Ponce in 1936, to the point of 
leading him to include it the second issue of his recently founded journal Dialéctica. 
The journal’s section ‘Marginal Remarks’ was the place in which Ponce himself 
commented and discussed the texts comprised in the volume. In the case of Marx’s 
article, Ponce’s remarks are largely of agreement and approbation; Ponce delivered 
his own conceptions using Marx’s words: “‘Bolívar was an aristocrat who under the 
words <Constitution>, <Federalism>, <International Democracy>, wished only the 
conquest of a dictatorship making use of force combined with intrigue’. Separatist, 
yes; democrat, no.” (1983a: 224) Thereby, Marx’s image of ‘El Libertador’ as an 
opportunistic buffoon driven by forces beyond his understanding and capacities 
was reinforced by Ponce. It is worth noticing here that Ponce’s explicit aim in 
republishing and commenting on the article was to undermine the project of 
                                                          
87  For an interesting counter, see Murdo MacLeod (1970). The author concludes his 
account saying that, given the lack of official government records, and despite the 
generalized portray it has been popularized on Soulouque as a dumb black leader put into 
power as puppet for a group of mulattos (a vision of which Marx himself participated), in 
fact "[w]e are left with his policies as they are discernible, with an assessment of the men 
whom he used to govern, and with our evaluation of how correct his appreciation of the 
situation really was. In every case we must conclude that Faustin Soulouque was a man of 
high intelligence, a realist, a pragmatist, and a superb, if ruthless politician and diplomat. 
There is no denying his patriotism and his ability to impose domestic tranquility." 
(MacLeod, 1970: 47) 
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intellectuals such as José Vasconcelos and Haya de la Torre, insofar as they sought 
to construct – in the “manipulative” (1983a: 224) sense of the term – an ‘anti-
imperialist’ tradition based on Bolívar’s figure. Ponce’s target was therefore a 
‘populist’ manipulation of ‘El Libertador’. (Ponce’s remarks are also included in 
Aricó’s book as Appendix Seven) A similar approach to this text was provided by 
Hal Draper (1968) in an article addressed against ‘authoritarian leaderships’ in Latin 
America and elsewhere.  
 Aricó rescued Marx’s article from oblivion in his 1980 book, approaching it as 
a ‘symptomatic’ discourse in order to evaluate the misencounter between these two 
referents of Latin American revolutionary politics. The most common explanations 
for Marx’s attitude towards Bolívar (namely, the lack of materials at hand in Marx’s 
context, and the general negative judgments towards Bolívar made by 
contemporary scholars and writers) are dismissed by Aricó, something which leads 
him to the conclusion that Marx’s viewpoint on Bolívar needs to be considered 
politically. The underpinnings of this ‘political’ stance towards Latin America – Aricó 
explains – are rooted in Marx’s Hegelian heritage (2014: 60–1). This heritage is in 
turn divided into two main components. The first is an implicit Hegelian operation 
that considers some peoples (and Latin America’s in particular) as ‘non-historic’, 
i.e., devoid of historical agency. The second is Marx’s explicitly negative attitude 
towards Hegel’s consideration of the state as the actual producer of civil society. 
Aricó suggests that the former factor would not have been as prominent if the latter 
were absent. This suggestion, in turn, posits the main political determination of 
these judgements about Bolívar in Marx’s inverted Hegelian model, characterized 
by a one-sided determination of the state by civil society. In his own words, Marx’s 
rejection of the Hegelian conception of the state had the contradictory 
effect of clouding his vision of a process characterised by an asymmetrical 
relation between economics and politics, such that, unable to identify 
the ‘rational kernel’ at the heart of the process –the societal ‘law of 
movement’– Marx reduced ‘politics’ to the purely arbitrary, unable to 
understand that it was precisely on this terrain that the process of state-
construction was coagulating. (2014: 61) 
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In Marx’s model, the rationality of society is associated to with the terrain of 
political economy, the material development of economy and of social classes; in a 
context of capitalist underdevelopment, there would be only ‘irrational’ processes 
doomed in the last instance to failure – and here is where the notion of ‘non-
historical people’ makes its appearance. In Aricó’s view, what is surprising in 
‘Bolívar y Ponte’ is the use and abuse of the fortuitous, accidental or external (the 
‘irrational’, in a nutshell) in the description of Bolívar’s struggles against the Spanish 
colonial forces.  
 In this sense, Aricó objects to Marx that his procedure is exactly the same that 
he criticizes in Victor Hugo’s account of Louis Napoleon’s coup, namely, the 
substitution of the real social movement and its forces by a false hero (cf. also Arico 
1983, 83).88 Aricó points out that Marx’s miscomprehension of the Latin American 
independence wars was premised on a narrow understanding of the dialectical 
interplay of politics and economy, to the extent that “his system would ultimately 
exclude any positive theory and analysis of the institutional forms and functions of 
the political.” (2014: 63) The privilege with which the economic (equated by the 
Argentinean author with ‘civil society’) is invested to the detriment of the state (or 
‘political society’) lies thus at the heart of Marx’s misencounter with Latin America: 
“Latin-American singularity escaped comprehension by this movement not because 
of ‘Eurocentrism’, but precisely because it was singular.” (2014: 67) In consequence, 
“it is only natural that societies like those of Latin America where the centre of 
gravity of the construction of civil society was so noticeable ‘from above’, would 
have created a grey area in Marx’s thought.” (2014: 63) As it becomes evident, the 
reference to Gramsci’s ‘passive revolution’ is the conceptual corrective that Aricó 
conveys to come to terms with the misencounter of Marx’s conceptual framework 
and Latin America’s singularity. 
 
 
 
                                                          
88  Aricó’s reference is The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’s Preface to the Second 
Edition, in which Marx argued that Victor Hugo’s Napoleon the Petit comes to describe 
Napoleon III’s coup d’état in fashion in which “[t]he event itself appears in his work like a 
bolt from the blue” (2010: 56–7). 
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 Bonapartism, Passive Revolution, and the Advantages of the Backward 
By means of Gramsci’s category of passive revolution, Aricó explains that what 
Marx rendered as Bolívar’s individual flaws were indeed social and material 
elements at work in the making of Latin American countries. He counts the fragile 
Jacobinism of local elites – largely based on their weak capacity to autonomously 
command the economy – along with the deep fear of the masses exhibited by these 
elites, as the two key factors to explain these processes of national constitution ‘from 
above’. In consequence, the missed factor in Marx’s account is the consideration of 
the presence or absence of a “national-popular will”. (cf. 2014: 66) Aricó seems to 
suggest that the Latin American societies were products more of external impulses 
than of the project of a national class, producing a process that takes place in the 
midst of a social void. These indications are suggestive insofar as they address, on 
the one hand, one of the central elements of the ‘dependency hypothesis’ (in 
Marini’s terms, the subordination of local elites become comprador-classes vis-à-vis 
the increasing power of central economies), and on the other hand a ‘subalternist 
hypothesis’ (the lack of integration of the subaltern classes into the revolutionary 
process, or ‘passive revolution’).  
 In the figure of ‘Bonapartism’, associated with the figure of Louis Bonaparte as 
well as to Gramsci’s ‘passive revolution’, the Argentinean Marxist found the 
explanation of Marx’s political blindness towards Latin America: “it is in Marx’s 
sharp anti-Bonapartism that we can locate the political motives that led to his 
resurrection of this notion [i.e., non-historical peoples] and the blind-spot to which 
his thought was consequently doomed.” (Aricó, 2014: 48, original emphasis) His 
emphasis on the ‘political’ is aimed here at identifying Bonapartism as a particular 
form of political construction in which the revolutionary course takes the route of a 
process ‘from above’. This is the reason for Aricó’s qualification of Bolívar’s 
dictatorship as ‘educative’ and not ‘individual’. (cf. 1983: 83) Gramsci’s binary (or 
‘Centaur’) category of ‘integral state’ (i.e., civil society cum political society) is the 
notion which serves to evaluate the extent to which the strengths of the economic 
classes are expressed as political will and become embodied in a national state. In 
revolutions ‘from above’, a process of revolution-restoration in which the forces of 
revolt are turned back against the subalterns takes place, something which 
ultimately gives rise to conservative and regressive state-forms.  
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 Bonapartism and passive revolution are the Gramscian pathways by means of 
which Marx’s inverted Hegelianism – i.e., Marx’s refusal to provide the state agency 
in the formation of a capitalist society – is challenged in Aricó’s argument. 
Privileging the phenomenon of Bonapartism, Aricó proposed to read Latin 
American processes as characterized by the twofold moment of revolution and 
restoration. In my view, two important elements are brought into relief in this 
argument. The first is related to Marx’s and Marxists’ “resistance” (a Freudian 
diagnosis, one might say) to take into account the potentially active role of the 
‘superstructures’ in the production of the societal ‘basis’, “and, by extension, of the 
nation itself.” (Aricó, 2014: 60) The second element, more implicit but key in my 
view, is the extended explanatory scope that Bonapartism achieves in Aricó’s 
discussion, encompassing the entire history of Latin America’s ‘bourgeois 
revolutions’. Therefore, passive revolution is regarded not as a single event 
concentrated in the independence wars, but rather as a series of processes that have 
seemingly not come to an end –as the phenomena of Peronismo and other national-
populist experiences prove for Aricó.  
 In this sense, Marx and Latin America finds in Marx a way out from Marx 
himself, so to speak. In order to release Marxism from its deterministic and 
evolutionist burdens, the misencounter of Marx and Latin America apparent in 
‘Bolivar y Ponte’ confronts the conception of the political as mere epiphenomenon 
of economic forces or interests, a conception amounting to a simplistic, instrumental 
approach to state power. As Cortés (2015: 171) has put it, the subversion of the base-
superstructure relation is the standpoint from which Aricó departs from Marx’s 
system and begins the voyage whereby Marxism can come to terms with the 
periphery. This voyage, conversely, is in my view oriented back into the model of 
development characteristic of the versions that conceive Marxism as teleology, a 
philosophy of history. This is suggested by Aricó in his remarks on Russian 
populism: “backwardness has its virtues [virtualidades] […] if the backward exist, 
development becomes questioned.” (cited in Cortes, 2015: 159)  
 Backwardness, in other words, becomes for Aricó the epistemological 
touchstone of the model of history held by official Marxism. In doing so, he went 
beyond the conceptual horizon sustained by modernization theory and Stalinism 
alike – and that, as we demonstrated in chapter IV of this thesis, was markedly 
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shared by the dependency school. Conversely, it signallied a potential exit from the 
Marxist theoretical and political crisis. What the misencounter of Marx and Latin 
America demonstrates, in other words, is the collapse of that developmental model 
tout court, and of its economic determinism in the first place. As I will attempt to 
argue in what follows, this is at the heart of the theoretical intervention that Marx 
and Latin America sought to perform in the midst of the ‘crisis of Marxism’. 
 
3. The Crisis of Marxism Approached Through a Latin American Lens 
 
Contours of the Crisis: A Trans-Atlantic Debate 
As noted above, Aricó considered the work of translation as a pathway to both 
dialoguing with, and potentially integrating of, important aspects of contemporary 
culture for the sake of the invigoration of historical materialism’s critical apparatus. 
In a manner similar to Gramsci, the Argentinean Marxist understood this work in its 
double register: of translation between philosophical or specialized languages, on 
the one hand, and between national cultures and their particular linguistic bodies, 
on the other – that is, of linguaggio and lingua, in Fabio Frosini’s (2010: 178) 
rendering of Gramsci’s distinction.  
   A translation, nonetheless, is a kind of work that always brings something 
new out of its procedure. Aricó’s analysis of the misencounter between Marx and 
Latin America, and the mistranslations it has produced, makes it possible a re-
reading of Marxism in a way entirely different from a philosophy of history. The 
destabilization of the translational regime established as ‘official Marxism’ – for 
which economic development, the working-class formation, and the achievement of 
class consciousness follow the lines of a pre-determined trajectory – indicates both 
the pitfalls of this narrative, as well as it opens the consideration towards other, 
subterranean  Marxisms. As it was stated in the passage which serves as epigraph of 
this chapter, for Aricó 
[j]ust as the history of the Church is not identical to the history of 
Christianity and does not wholly define its boundaries, the history of 
Marxism is rather more than the vicissitudes of the vulgate and the 
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‘deviations’ from it. Apart from its specific history as an institution and 
as a dogma, the history of ideas and intellectuals, it is undeniable that it 
also has another discontinuous and decentred history, full of hidden 
expressions, lost paths and diverse temporalities; an esoteric and 
pluralist history expressing the multiplicity of initiatives, goals and 
results of the struggle waged by the subaltern classes. (2014: 119) 
The misencounter and mistranslation of Marxist conceptual apparatus into Latin 
America is traced against the grain of its canonical philosophical edifice, thereby 
disclosing alternative paths through which varieties of Marxism have attempted to 
coming to terms with Latin America in its concrete actuality. By means of providing 
these alternative, subterraneanan, seemingly ‘lost’ paths to contrast the alleged 
universality of official Marxism, Aricó suggest that a Latin American perspective 
can participate in its own right in the necessary reconstruction of Marxism in the 
midst of its theoretical-political crisis.  
   It is important to consider here the connection of Marx and Latin America with 
the contemporary debates aroused during the late-1970s under the label of ‘crisis of 
Marxism’, to the extent that the following remarks made by Aricó about Marx might 
be fairly applied to his own method: “Marx’s questioning historicism, and his 
consequent inversion of the nexus between past and present necessarily 
presupposed subordinating history itself to the ‘historical time’ of the given social 
formation, which in turn implied reconstructing history on the basis of the systematic 
character of the present.” (2014: 42, original emphasis) Applied to Marxism (grasped 
as theory intending to go hand-to-hand with the movement of the real), such a 
methodological-critical orientation allows to go beyond these official registers in 
which theory has become trapped.  
   This method, in turns, help to disclose discontinuous and decentred histories: 
“Marxism as something historical and worldly” – Aricó stresses – “must be seen in 
the secular history of its ‘reconstructions’ – we might also say, ‘productions’ – that, 
as such, were something more than ‘interpretations” (2014: 119). This was, in my 
view, the core of Aricó’s intellectual contribution: to disclose the pluralist history of 
Marxism through an examination of its (productive) ‘reconstructions’ within the 
history of its ‘reception’ – that is to say, its translations and mistranslations. Aricó 
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proposes therefore to read Marx, and hence to revitalize Marxism, in terms of a 
critical, multi-layered, and pluri-temporal perspective on both capitalist 
development and the revolutionary possibilities derived from it.  
 In an important sense, Marx and Latin America deploys a twofold argument 
even formally speaking. On the one hand, there is the main argumentative line 
which analyzes the misencounter between Marx and Latin America already exposed 
in the previous section of this chapter. On the other, the footnotes and marginal 
comments made by Aricó go largely beyond the framework of the critical apparatus 
supporting the main textual body; in it, rather, the Argentinean Marxist presents a 
parallel consideration about the underpinnings of the conceptions of Marxism held 
by the Second and Third International. This indication supports the view of Aricó’s 
book as an intervention in the Marxist realm;89 a realm that was at that time 
undergoing a profound re-evaluation in the midst of the ‘crisis of Marxism’. 
 As the expression of a will to participate in this theoretical and political 
crucible, the Argentinean group to which Aricó belonged established their own 
organ to reflect on the Marxist crisis in their Mexican exile. This was the function of 
the journal Controversias, in which Marxist, socialist, and populist stances met 
together around the problems imposed by the defeat of left-wing projects 
throughout Latin America, in both their theoretical and political dimensions. 
Founded in 1977, Controversias counted with the participation of Aricó, Schmucler, 
Terán, Portantiero, and Del Barco alongside other intellectuals such as Emilio de 
Ípola and Nicolás Casullo, under the direction of Pío García. Alongside this journal, 
Aricó continued to publish, preface and introduce contemporary debates in and 
about Marxism in both the CPyP and Siglo XXI. What is more, he and Portantiero 
funded in 1981 the editorial-house Folios, whose series ‘The Time of Politics’ 
indicated the important place that political theory held in these critical reflections 
about Marxism. Apart from Portantiero’s influential Los Usos de Gramsci (Uses of 
Gramsci, of 1981), Folios edited and published works by Carl Schmitt, Max Weber, 
Karl Korsch, and Hans Kelsen among other authors somehow alien to the Marxist 
tradition. Not an insignificant list, as we will see in what follows. 
                                                          
89  I owe this useful indication to S. Malecki  (2013: 162fn). 
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 The compilation Discussing the State (‘Discutir el Estado’), published in Folios 
in 1982, allows an approach to the trans-Atlantic nature of this perspective on the 
Marxist crisis. The volume was the translation of the ‘77-‘78 Il Manifesto debate, 
which revolved around Althusser’s characterization of the ‘crisis of Marxism’; it 
appeared initially in Italy as Discutere lo Stato. This debate gathered together 
important authors of the Italian and French left. ‘The Crisis of Marxism has Erupted 
at Last!’ was the heading of Althusser’s intervention in the seminar organized in 
Venice by the Italian independent communist newspaper Il Manifesto in November 
1977. It was published later as ‘The Crisis of Marxism’ in the journal Marxism Today 
(1978), and was followed by the article ‘Il Marxismo come teoria “finita”’ (‘Marxism as 
a “finite” theory’), also published in Il Manifesto in 1978.90  
 These interventions held a common concern: the absence of a Marxist ‘theory 
of the State’. This was a matter already addressed in the Italian debate by liberal-
socialist philosopher Norberto Bobbio. But while Bobbio considered that Marxism 
dismissed altogether the field of politics, of volition into history, asserting that this 
theory was too obsessed with how to achieve power but little with how to deal with 
it (cf. Bobbio, 1975), Althusser indicated that these theoretical lacunae can be 
regarded in terms of the open, non-deterministic nature of Marxist theory. (We will 
return to Bobbio.)  
 Althusser proposed this line of reasoning in an article that appeared in Il 
Manifesto on 4 April 1978 where he defined Marxism as a ‘finite’ theory. The French 
term fini can indeed be translated as ‘finite’ or ‘finished’, meaning in each case two 
completely different things. I follow Etienne Balibar’s choice for ‘finite’, that is, 
“Marxism has an outside, this implies that Marxism is not a form of ‘absolute 
                                                          
90  The context of the debate is well-known. During the 1970s, the Communist parties of 
France, Italy and Spain declared the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the 
political goal of the working classes. In Italy the party (the larger organization among these) 
attempted an alliance with Christian Democracy that was famously called ‘historical 
compromise’ by its general secretary Enrico Berlinguer. Largely informed by the defeat of 
the democratically-elected socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973, the 
contents of this compromise were placed in the defense of democracy and liberty as the only 
veritable grounds to prosecute of a socialist horizon. ‘Eurocommunism’ was the label of this 
programme of adaptation of socialist strategy to the conditions of bourgeois democracy, a 
name which projected an organic relation between socialism and liberal institutions. 
Accordingly, some of its ideologues of such as Spanish Ludovio Paramio and José Reverte 
asserted that the crisis of Marxism had to do with a wrong theory (the dictatorship of the 
proletariat) derived from a misleadingly political strategy (revolutionary Marxism). 
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knowing’, is not a totality that could ever close in upon itself.” (2010: 50) It is finite 
because it is embedded into the time in which Marx was writing; therefore, it is a 
theory that, without assessing any eternal truth beyond history, can nonetheless 
project onto the future tendencies already inscribed in capitalist social relations. In 
particular, Althusser focuses in the absence of a theory of the state the central 
element of the crisis: the passage from the critique of political economy to the 
critique of politics. In this sense, the discussion of the state’s theoretical status in 
Marxist thought is demonstrative of the discontinuous history of relation between 
the political and the economic, of which the state-apparatus is a condensed outcome 
and expression. This discontinuity, Althusser concludes, is at the centre of the 
contemporary crisis, demanding from Marxism a reconsideration of the forms of 
social reproduction. Therefore, and in contradistinction to Tronti’s conclusions 
about the ‘autonomy of the political’, Althusser proposes to think in terms of the 
‘primacy of the political’ as a productive route to come to terms with contemporary 
capitalism.91  
 Similar concerns were present in Latin American debates at that time, as the 
defeat of left-wing political strategies, with their outcomes in military regimes 
across the continent, demanded a critical approach to the theoretical pillars that had 
supported these strategies to begin with. Particularly, the journal Controversias (and 
editorial Folios, later on) served as loci for the unfolding of these preoccupations. In 
one of his contributions to the journal, entitled precisely ‘Crisis of Marxism’, Aricó 
outlines the matter in the following terms: 
The Marxist tradition dissolved the harsh problem of the state’s forms 
by means of the utopian design of its inexorable ‘withering away’. 
Communists as well as social-democrats ended up leaving aside what 
actually constitutes the core of the problem, so that without its 
resolution socialism becomes reduced to wishful-thinking. Without 
democratic institutions, state capitalism is not socialism’s precursor but 
an unprecedented, heinous dictatorship over the masses; without an 
actual process of the socialization of property, the social-democratic 
                                                          
91  I follow here Sarah Farris’s (2013) insightful remarks on the differences between 
Althusser and Tronti. 
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project facilitated fascist and neocapitalist responses. (cited in Cortés, 
2014: 150)  
In this passage, both communists and social-democrats are blamed for the 
miscomprehension of the relation between democracy and socialism: the latter, 
because of the neglect of the substantive contents of socialism –namely, the 
socialization of production; the former, because of the reduction of democracy to a 
mere bourgeois instrument. In both cases, Aricó’s argument posits the focus not 
only on theory but on politics, in a political project which has been historically 
rooted in a misleading consideration of the relations between democracy and 
socialism. A misunderstanding that, as Althusser explained, misses the crucial fact 
of the constitutive discontinuity between economy and politics.  
 
The Crisis Translated Back: Aricó’s ‘Epilogue’ to Marx and Latin America 
The debates and exchanges presented in the previous section provided the grounds 
for the theoretical intervention proposed in Marx and Latin America. These grounds 
are somewhat implicit in the 1980 first edition, but become fully apparent two years 
later, with the introduction of an ‘Epilogue to the Second Edition’. The ‘Epilogue’ 
initiates a dialogue that sets out a counter-argument with Carlos Franco’s 1980 
‘Introduction’. This Peruvian intellectual and editor of the Lima journal Socialismo y 
Participación was at least partially responsible for Aricó’s introduction to the debates 
about Mariátegui that led to the compilation Mariátegui and the Origins of Latin 
American Marxism, published by CPyP in 1979. In 1980, in turn, Marx and Latin 
America will appear in Lima with Franco’s ‘Introduction’.92 The ‘Introduction’ 
radicalizes Aricó’s critiques of Marxism (understood as utterly Eurocentric) in the 
following terms: 
Following [Aricó’s] reasoning, the conflict between Latin America and 
Marxism becomes of theoretical concern when practice draws attention 
to a constant misencounter [constante desencuentro], the two fated to a sharp 
mutual repulsion, one that excludes Latin America from Marxism 
(meaning, reality from theory) and the other which excludes Marxism 
                                                          
92  This collaboration will further motivate Franco’s work From Eurocentric to Latin 
American Marxism (1981). 
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from Latin America (meaning, theory from reality). (2014: xxxv–xxxvi, 
trans. modified, emphasis added) 
Given the constant nature of this misencounter, the fact that Aricó’s theoretical 
endeavour was pursued within the boundaries of Marxism remains, for Franco, a 
mere recourse to identity. A more coherent prosecution of Aricó’s line of argument, 
conversely, would conclude that “we only begin to do Marxism when we abandon 
the father and run away from the family home; in other words, when we take back 
or affirm afresh our individual theoretical identity. For Aricó to call this ‘Marxism’ 
is, I believe, simply a means of maintaining a symbolic attachment to his origins” 
(2014: xliii). In what can be considered as an example of what Löwy has 
characterized as ‘Latin American exceptionalism’ (1992: xiv), Franco read Marx and 
Latin America as a way out from Marxism, however Aricó’s argument proves to be 
still trapped in an “emotional resistance to any break.” (2014: xlix)  
 The counter-argument to Franco’s conclusions appeared in the 1982 
‘Epilogue’. In it, Aricó emphasizes that Marxism’s contemporary validity rests on its 
critical judgment of capitalism. It is not – and Aricó stresses here his own 
conclusions, in contradistinction to Franco’s – that Marx was Eurocentric but rather 
‘capitalist-centric’. This is, Marx analyzed first and foremost capitalist society from a 
viewpoint that, however started to take shape from European reality, was 
broadened towards a global perspective. Aricó insists that close attention to the ‘lost 
paths’ in Marx’s work – exhibited, as we saw, in his attention to both uneven 
capitalist development and the autonomy of the political – prevent the projection of 
Marxism as a closed system. In this sense, the Argentinean author borrows 
Althusser’s description of a ‘finite’ theory as an antidote against any belief in 
Marxism as a ‘finished’ one, that is, against its ecclesiastic dogmatization. This 
consideration, Aricó goes on, is “itself a means of shifting reasoning from the level 
of faith onto that of critique”, which is in turn a way to keep reasoning within the 
horizon opened by Marx. Aricó proposes in consequence a work internal to Marxist 
theory in order to release it from the status of dogma: “[o]ccupying the terrain of 
Marx’s fundamental outlook – that is to say, being ‘within’ it – today requires going 
‘beyond’ him.” (2014: 125, 127) 
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 Althusser’s idea of ‘finite’ theory further serves Aricó to dig into the more 
urgent problems that haunt Marxism, on the condition that these limits, blind-spots, 
or ‘lost paths’ are inverted into ‘departure points’. This is the case of the topic that 
dominated the debates on the crisis of Marxism: the extent to which a non-
authoritarian political theory can be derived from a coherent Marxist framework. As 
I discussed in the previous section, the finite nature of the theory was concluded by 
Althusser from the absence of a theory of the state, giving rise to a re-consideration 
of the discontinuous character of the relations between the economic and the 
political, that is, a new turn on the problem of social reproduction.  
 Accordingly, the ‘Epilogue’ deploys an argument in which the problem of the 
political for Marxism is qualified by arguments of Mario Tronti, Giacomo 
Marramao, Norberto Bobbio, and Nicola Auciello – that is, some of the most 
prominent authors in the Il Manifesto debate. Drawing upon Tronti’s ideas on the 
autonomization of the politics, Aricó sees in the antithesis between socialization of 
the production and reduction of working-time an invitation to think politically the 
contemporary crisis, from the viewpoint of the “different rhythm of development 
between the political and the social”, and the acknowledge of the “specificity of the 
political cycle” vis-à-vis the economic cycle (Tronti, Sull’ autonomia del politico, cited 
in Farris, 2013: 189). Consider this passage as an example of Aricó’s argument: 
The commodity, the objectification of a social relation, explodes, […] 
ceases to be a real synthesis […] and labour power becomes free living 
labour. Capitalist dominion, then, would have to re-establish its power 
on another footing, outside of the ‘economic’ relation represented by 
capital, but the ‘crisis of governance’ entailed in such a period would 
reveal the insuperable obstacles posed by the non-assimilability of 
subjectivities separated from the social in this systemic synthesis. (2014: 
128)  
This rather opaque passage indicates, in my view, at least three elements worth 
considering here: first, the claim of the end of the commodity-form as the real 
synthesis of the social; second, the concomitant attenuation, or diminishing in 
importance, of the determination of the economic ‘in the last instance’; and third, the 
crisis of governance generated by unleashed forms of subjectivity that what Aricó 
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calls the ‘explosion’ of the commodity-form has brought about. The passage sounds 
like post-Marxism avant la lettre, if it were not for the fact that Aricó’s insistence 
about a reconstruction underwent through Marx’s theoretical horizon. The epoch-
making transformations of social reproduction identified in Althusser’s and Tronti’s 
arguments, in consequence, release politics from both economic determinism and its 
dependence from major classes upon it.  
 For Aricó, Marx’s last, fragmentary writings (either unknown or disdained by 
twentieth-century Marxism now in crisis already) already displayed a consideration 
of the primacy of the political. Oscar del Barco (1982) had already given an account 
of the asymmetrical character of the theoretical object ‘capital’ in his remarks on the 
fragmentary and of necessity ‘finite’ nature of Marx’s work after Capital, Vol. I. Aricó 
followed a similar line of reasoning, distinguishing in Marx, on the one hand, the 
systematic effort to give a theoretical – hence necessarily abstract – account of 
capital’s determinations at the level of the mode of production; and, on the other, 
the Marx of the concrete analyses which are premised by the standpoint of the 
primacy of revolution – of the political, in Aricó’s view.93 What seems ‘anomalous’ 
at the mode of production level becomes a matter of politics, of inter-state and 
international relations of forces when posited at the level of socio-economic 
formation.  
 And nonetheless, in a Schmittian fashion with owes more to Tronti than to 
Althusser, Aricó’s line of reasoning seems to follow the path from an overestimation 
of Bonapartism to determination of the economic by the political. In his own words, 
the political “now struggles in a confused manner to extend itself and to embrace a 
multiplicity of social subjects who have proven irreducible to the traditional forms 
of tutelage exercised by the prevalent institutional structures.” (2014: 127) It was in 
this precise sense that Aricó praised Carl Schmitt, as one of Marx’s disciples, insofar 
as “Schmitt is situated in the total acknowledgment of what characterizes for us the 
epoch-making contribution produced by Marx: the essentially political 
                                                          
93  On the political, revolutionary Marx, Aricó argues that “[t]he framework of his 
thought was not, then, a consideration of the progressive character of capitalism, but rather 
the possibility of revolution that it might bring about. Revolution is the site – is it really a 
‘site’?; perhaps we might better, if ambiguously, say the ‘point’, to avoid running the risk of 
the word having a ‘geographical’ connotation– from which he characterizes the ‘modernity’ 
or ‘backwardness’ of the movements of the real.” (2014: 141). 
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determination of economy.” (1984: x) From these considerations, Aricó suggests that 
the ‘political Marx‘(who is the Marx of the ‘lost paths’) envisaged that “[t]he ‘time of 
capital’ [tiempo del capital] was clearly distinct and not superimposed on ‘the time of 
societies’ [tiempo del las sociedades]; as such, an explanation of the slow pace and 
complexity of the spread of the capitalist mode of production had to be located on 
the terrain of politics” (2014: 137, transl. modified). This passage makes clear 
evidence of the debt of Aricó to Tronti – a long-lasting debt, if one takes into account 
the early Operaism as well as the late Schmittian framework.  
 
4. A Marxism of Pure Politics? Critical Conclusions  
From the above outlined perspective, Aricó nourished the crisis of Marxism with the 
conclusions of Marxism and Latin America, in what might be considered as a sort of 
corroboration of the ‘virtues of the backward’ at the level of theory. The alleged 
backwardness of peripheral societies (that is, their non-synchronicity to the 
capitalist now, or the denial of coevalness) puts into evidence the opacity existing 
from the outset between capitalist economy and bourgeois politics. As the 
contemporary contours of the ‘crisis of governance’ unleashed by new forms of 
social reproduction makes apparent – Aricó concludes –, this opacity also affects 
those ‘advanced’ or ‘mature’ societies. The symptomatic reading of ‘Bolivar y 
Ponte’, the reading of the silences and lacunae that the text evidences when 
contrasted with the rest of Marx’s ‘fragmentary’ work, is indicative of the 
demonstrated incapacity of Marxist thought to come to terms with both the 
discontinuity between economy and politics and the resulting unbalanced 
relationship between socialism and democracy. In doing so, the actuality of 
peripheral capitalism is channelled so as to confront official Marxism to the point of 
questioning the narrative of capitalist ‘progress’ altogether, extricating hence 
Marxism from its coagulation into another philosophy of history. 
Therefore, the apparent ‘anomaly’ that Latin America has exhibited within 
Marxist reflections is turned upside down and situated at the centre of Marxism’s 
contemporary crisis. Informed by Althusser’s idea of ‘finite theory’ – and the ‘lost 
paths’ this condition necessarily entailed in the work of the German thinker –, in 
Aricó’s account the constant mistranslation displayed by Marx and Marxism 
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rendering Latin America becomes indicative of important, non- or ill-resolved issues 
that haunt Marxist theory tout court. We must understand in this sense his insistence 
on the necessity of coming to terms with the misencounter of Marx and Latin 
America – understood as a theoretical (mis)event – in political terms: once unveiled, 
the ‘political’ kernel of the misencounter further enlightens the nature of the current 
crisis in both its actual contours (crisis of governance; new subjectivities exceeding 
class divisions) and the demands it poses over Marxism as a secular – non-
dogmatic, that is – and politically-oriented critique of capital’s actuality.  
 Nonetheless, a more critical reading of Aricó’s version of Marxism must focus 
on the increasing conflation displayed in his late years between the arguments 
about Marxism’s lack of state theory, the autonomy of the political, and his own 
adoption of liberal arguments. From his return to Buenos Aires in 1984, Aricó’s 
concerns revolved around a conception of hegemony able to come to terms with 
democracy. The latter, in turn, was a notion whose formal, liberal aspects were more 
and more apparent in his writings (cf. Gago and Sztulwark, 2015). Aricó’s 
intellectual trajectory can be depicted as the passage from a (previously Leninist) 
Gramscian conception about the organic unity of society and politics to a purely 
political conception of both politics and the state. In doing so, Marx and Latin 
America’s emphasis on the neglect of the political displayed by Marxist accounts on 
Latin America presages the turning into a liberal concept of democracy, once that 
populism was not the order of the day. Once the explanation is posed on the 
diminished capacity of the dominant classes to build an organic society, the state-
action becomes the explanatory fact marking the difference between European and 
Latin American developmental roads. 
 Álvaro García Linera says in this regard that Marx’s incomprehension of Latin 
America rests more on the latter’s actual dynamics of class struggle than on the role 
assigned to the state in building an organic society – a nation. The lack of 
indigenous uprisings and visible struggles were significant to this respect, and led 
him to consider other scenes such as India, Turkey, or Russia. In contradistinction to 
Aricó, García Linera concludes that “Marx was right, for the nation-state, when is 
not constructed as social act, as deployment of civil society’s energies as a whole, 
was and is an authoritarian, irrational, formal construction.” (2009: 66) In this sense, 
Aricó blurred the central factor of class struggle in his evaluation of Marx’s 
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dismissive consideration of the state-effect, which led him to overestimate the 
historical function of the state – and arguably channelled his late defence of liberal 
democratic in a context of neo-liberal counter-reforms. 
 By and large the direct consequence of military rules in Latin America, 
neoliberal counter-reforms were the road for which David Harvey calls the 
“restoration of class power” (2005, ch. I). In an extremely violent fashion, the 
policies later crystallized in the Washington consensus established newer, more 
flexible forms of capital’s accumulation and reproduction, organizing also the 
political realm for the sake of capital. These transformations in both forms of 
accumulation and institutional dispositions have of course impacted on the material 
and existential forms of subjectivity of the subaltern classes, devoid of the power 
achieved in the ISI period, eliminating hence the historical basis of national-
populism. Harvey argument, of course, remains at the antipodes of Aricó’s 
understanding of the democratic turn opened up in the 1980s, insofar as it the latter 
utterly stopped reflecting in terms on political economy and class analysis. In a 
context in which the aftermaths of the military dictatorships, the prospects of a non-
authoritarian Marxism, and the first manifestations of the neoliberal reorganization 
of power came almost simultaneously into view, the adoption of democracy in its 
more formal meaning was a hallmark of many of leftist intellectuals of the time in 
Latin America (cf. Rollemberg, 1999; see also Couto, 2016).94 As Miguel Valderrama 
(1998) suggests in this sense, Althusser’s lesson to Latin America produced a sort of 
belated ground for post-Marxism, of what the best example is, no doubt, Ernesto 
Laclau.95  
One might contend Aricó’s argument from a different standpoint. Following 
Fredric Jameson, it is possible to argue that the lack of an explicit political theory 
constitutes not a weakness but one of Marxism’s virtues. In Jameson’s argument, the 
political theory allegedly required is premised by the assumption of a relative 
                                                          
94  Among the intellectuals who followed the routes of the ‘socialist renovation’ in the 
sub-continent, one may count Norbert Lechner, Beatriz Sarlo, Roger Bartra, Carlos N. 
Coutinho, José Joaquín Brunner, Juan Carlos Portantiero, and the same Aricó among many 
others. 
95  A scholarly research devoted to the convergences between these Argentinean Marxists 
is still lacking. No doubt, the massive coincidence in the Italian sources informing their 
political conceptions, from Gramsci to Bobbio, plays a role in the appreciation of confluent 
pathways.  
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autonomy of the political and of the state. However, the fact that capital is and has 
been so imbricated in the state apparatus makes it difficult, almost impossible, and 
in any event futile to hold a political theory of such a nature. Jameson concludes 
taxatively saying that “political theory as such has become extinct in capitalism” 
and in consequence “the absence of a political dimension from Marxism – its radical 
disjunction of ‘economics’ (to use that word in a very loose and general way) from 
politics – is one of its great and original strengths.” (2011: 141) 
Drawing upon Harvey’s and Jameson’s arguments, I consider the restoration 
of class power deployed during the late-1970s and ‘80s by neoliberalization 
processes of politically-aid marketization of societies (first in Latin America, then 
elsewhere) as part of the evidence of this pervasive subsumption of the state and its 
institutions by capital’s logic. In consequence, the theoretical encounter of 
democracy and socialism required a deeper revaluation of both terms, so as to 
distinguish a democracy-for-capital from another, post-capitalist form of 
democracy. (As we will see in next chapter, this was also one of the leivmotifs for 
another Latin American Marxist, Bolivian René Zavaleta Mercado). Aricó’s final 
engagement with a liberal conception of democracy might be considered as the 
consequence of a missed translation: the missed consideration of the concrete 
process in which Argentina’s infrastructures of struggles, working-class forces, and 
productive-reproductive relations were transformed during the neoliberal 
dictatorship-democracy continuum. In other words, the critique of the unilineal 
regime of translation established by Stalinism, qualified as a philosophy of history, 
was thus replaced by a liberal-democratic language within Marxism, a replacement 
without translational mediation.  
Perhaps ‘symptomatic’ of this displacement isAricó’s citation of Gramsci in 
the final section of The Devil’s Tale (a quasi-autobiographical essay about the 
function of the Italian Marxist in Latin America). In it, we read: “Being the state [in 
peripheral countries] the concrete form of a productive world […] it is typical of 
intellectuals not anchored to a powerful economic group to present the state as an 
absolute.” (Gramsci, cited in Aricó, 1988: 99) Arguably, Aricó’s overemphasis on 
formal democracy was derived (once again?) from the absence of a political subject 
able to counteract the capitalist restoration carried on in Latin America under the 
name of neoliberalism, which in turn provoked the (idealist?) notion that bourgeois 
206 
 
democracy could set the minimum grounds for the emergence of such socialist 
project. Aricó’s brief but significant role as advisor of the recently-elected President 
Raúl Alfonsín (a Radical politician, aligned with anti-populist policies and hence at 
the antipodes of Peronismo), as well as his final disillusionment with political affairs, 
are perhaps indicative of the void in the middle of which Aricó’s Marxism 
navigated in his late years.   
 To conclude these final remarks, we might say that Aricó participated in a sui 
generis manner of the subalternist hypothesis outlined in this research. First, he 
brings to the forefront the destabilization of a generalized notion of development 
shared by bourgeois and orthodox Marxist conceptions alike. By means of a reading 
of Marx’s fragmentary works in which the perspective of uneven and combined 
development is put at the centre of revolutionary socialism, Aricó found the 
possibility of a more productive encounter of Marxism and Latin America: a 
Marxism with no guarantees, not the custodian of any ultimate truth, but rather a 
politically-oriented critical method of capital and capitalism first and foremost. 
Second, the relative ‘autonomy of the national’ outlined before by Lenin, Gramsci 
and Mariátegui was incorporated in Aricó’s thought through the arguments that 
qualified the late-1970s’ ‘crisis of Marxism’, particularly from the Italian debate of 
the time – that is, in the register of the ‘autonomy of the political’. Along the lines of 
the drifts that characterized the processes of socialist renovation (liberalization, that 
is) occurred throughout the sub-continent in the 1980s, this register derived into a 
non-critical adoption of the liberal concept of democracy, a conceptual gesture that 
ended up leaving unquestioned the (capitalist) nature of the state, the new forms of 
subalterinzation driven by neoliberalization process, and hence undermining his 
own theoretical insights. 
 Last but not least, Aricó’s invaluable contributions in the practice of 
translation of a significant part of the Marxist debates must be recognized 
nonetheless. In a theoretical level, the main outcome of his translational exercises 
was the projection of Latin America as a permanent (however discredited) 
participant of the Marxist crisis. Conversely, in the 1982 ‘Epilogue’ to Marx and Latin 
America, Aricó situates his book in the essayist tradition of the region. In doing so, 
he was bringing to the forefront a dense, complex heritage in which the problem of 
the region’s identity has been traversed by the question about Latin America’s 
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possibilities for cultural autonomy. This encounter of Latin America’s participation 
in the crisis’ debates, on the one hand, and of the quests for the achievement of a 
regional, identifiable cultural character, on the other, envisages in my view the 
question about the forms and conditions for making theory in Latin America. The 
crux of the translational exercise, the hypothetical incommensurability of Marxism 
and Latin America turns out to be a response and hence an intervention within the 
Marxist realm undergoing its own theoretical-political crisis. I suggest that this 
response, if not satisfactory, is at least indicative of an attempt to outline the uneven 
and combined pathways through which Marxist theorizations unfold and develop. 
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VI. Crisis as Method: Zavaleta and the Real Subsumption of Marxism in Bolivia 
 
‘The critical knowledge of society is 
therefore a consequence of the manner in 
which things happen. This should be this 
way every time; the nature of matter 
should determine the nature of its 
knowledge, the manner in which society 
defines its line of knowledge. 
Meanwhile, the pretention of a universal 
grammar applicable to diverse 
formations is but a dogmatization.’  
René Zavaleta Mercado,  
‘Masses in November’, 1983 
 
‘Knowing, in any case, is not a mere 
conceptual composition: it is a vital act, 
an abrasion [desgaste] and, in 
consequence, a hazardous business, an 
act of organization.’ 
René Zavaleta Mercado,  
‘The Apparent Formations in Marx’, 1978 
 
 
1. From Nationalism to Marxism  
Mexican hospitality for political and intellectual exiles also sheltered Bolivian 
politician and sociologist René Zavaleta Mercado (1935-1984), who moved to 
Mexico City in 1973. Zavaleta’s trajectory was that of a nationalist-become-Marxist. 
Indeed, in his youth he formed part of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement 
party (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR). The MNR led the 1952 
Bolivian revolution; however, that event was more a grassroots mass movement 
than a top-down overthrow – in this sense, it is akin to the Mexican revolution. As a 
consequence, Bolivia underwent during the 1950s an agrarian reform, an education 
reform, the nationalization of mines and other strategic resources, the decree of 
universal suffrage, and the reform of the national army, among other important 
transformations. Having studied laws, Zavaleta became part of the Bolivian 
diplomatic body in Uruguay, and his political drive pushed him, first, to be elected 
as national deputy at the age of 24, and later to assume the ministerial post of of 
Secretary of Mining at his 27. Zavaleta’s political thought in this period was marked 
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by a mixture of economic industrialism and cultural nationalism (cf. Tapia, 2002, ch. 
1 to 4). The MNR held power until Barrientos’s 1964 military coup, an event that led 
Zavaleta to a series of exiles, the first of them in Montevideo. Later on, the coup of 
right-wing general Hugo Bánzer in Bolivia in 1971 sent him to Santiago de Chile.  
There, the Bolivian sociologist became part of CEREN (see chapter IV of this 
work). With that institution as his base, he took part in the debates about the 
prospects of the ‘Chilean road to socialism’ along with those that emerged from the 
dependency school. Pinochet’s military coup against Salvador Allende led Zavaleta 
to a third, eventually definitive exile in Mexico City. In his new host-country, 
Zavaleta took active part in academic institutions and public debates. In 1974, Siglo 
XXI published Dual Power, acknowledged as his first Marxist work. Begun in 
Santiago, this book offered an account of the political processes in Chile and Bolivia 
from the viewpoint of the emergence of proletarian power (we will return to this 
book in what follows). Furthermore, he founded and was the first dean of FLACSO-
Mexico (Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences) and taught at the national 
university UNAM. He also joined the editorial board of the journal Cuadernos 
Politicos in 1974, a quarterly publication of the publisher Era in which he worked 
together with Carlos Pereyra, Bolívar Echeverría, Enrique Semo and Ruy Mauro 
Marini, among other Marxist thinkers.96 It is relevant to say that Cuadernos Políticos 
was founded with the explicit aim of filling the gap provoked by the closure of 
many of the leftist journals in Latin America. In parallel, Zavaleta started two 
journals in 1981: Bases (‘Bases: Expressions of Bolivian Marxist Thought’), devoted – 
as its name indicates – to Bolivian discussions, and Ensayos (together with 
Ecuadorian-Mexican philosopher Bolívar Echeverría), dedicated to political, 
economical and historical debates in general.  
Still poorly known in global Marxist debates, and even not much worked on 
in Latin America, Zavaleta’s thought is in my view an important chapter in Latin 
American Marxism for a number of reasons. First, his reflections encompass the 
most significant topics of the period, from nationalism to dependence, from 
populism to democracy, and from the value of historical materialism to the crisis of 
Marxism. Second, and related to this, I argue that the trajectory of Zavaleta’s 
                                                          
96  Like Siglo XXI, Era was a project founded in 1960 by left-wing intellectuals, many of 
them the children of Spanish-born exiles, led by siblings Neus, Jordi and Quico Espresate.   
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political imaginary provides a pathway for coming to terms with the emergence of 
indigeneity as a factor of both Bolivia’s class struggle and its hetero-temporality, 
something that might in turn be extended to other Latin American realities. This 
pathway, finally, is comprised in what is perhaps his more valuable contribution, 
namely the category of sociedad abigarrada, motley or disjointed society. Therefore, 
since his work is still poorly known even in Spanish literature – let alone in English 
–97 this chapter will assume a more reconstructive method, seeking to introduce the 
main underpinnings of Zavaleta’s political imaginary as well as to illuminate its 
pertinence to some contemporary processes. As I hope this reconstruction helps 
grasp, the notion of ‘motley societies’ provides a useful antidote against the 
contemporary reification of multi-cultural as well as pluri-cultural policies, be it 
sustained by neo-liberal or left-wing progressive stances. 
 
2. Capitalism and Knowledge 
 
The Crisis of Marxism Revisited 
In 1983, Zavaleta addressed a salutation to the then-recently established Partido 
Socialista Unificado de Mexico, the fusion of the traditional Mexican Communist 
Party and other socialist groups, slightly inclined to Eurocommunist stances. The 
author offered a view on the much-discussed ‘crisis of Marxism’, with a particular 
focus on the question of democracy. The crisis is considered here as a dimension 
intrinsic to Marxism. For, insofar as it deals with the ‘critical’ nature of capitalist 
societies, the status of crisis belongs to its very movement, not to any particular 
moment or event. Accordingly, it is misleading to talk about the ‘crisis’ of 
something has existed but critically. (Zavaleta, 2013a: 608) In a similar same vein, 
Jameson (1996) has stressed the intrinsic relation of capitalism’s inherent 
contradictions and crises and Marxism as its ‘critical’ science.  
                                                          
97  See, however, Zavaleta’s article translated for New Left Review (Zavaleta, 1972); see 
also Susana Draper (n/d), and Anne Freeland (2014a, 2014b). Freeland’s translation of 
Zavaleta’s Towards a History of the National-Popular in Bolivia is announced by Seagull Books 
for early-2017. 
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 This, however, is not a way to dismiss the problem: as we will see, the relation 
of crisis and knowledge played an important role in, and channelled, the more 
significant contributions of Zavaleta’s Marxism. Tellingly, Zavaleta entitled the 
article as ‘Aproximaciones a Marx: ni piedra filosofal ni suma feliz’ (‘Approaches to 
Marx: neither philosopher’s stone nor happy sum’), a indication of which was his 
conception of Marxism, different from both a template-method for the explanation 
of any phenomenon and a prediction about the forthcoming resolution of social 
contradictions. In contradistinction to Althusser’s definition of the crisis, in 
Zavaleta’s terms it is not the product of Marx’s theoretical voids, but of subsequent 
misunderstandings about the relation between the law of value and the forms of 
intersubjectivity produced by capitalism. As we will see, this consideration was 
crucial in the formation of Zavaleta’s Marxism. Contesting the consideration of 
Marx’s contributions as futile for political theory, Zavaleta asserted in this article 
that the topic of ‘democracy’ cannot be adequately grasped without the scientific 
method provided by Marx. On the contrary, Marx opened what the author calls the 
“horizon of knowability” (2013a: 606) of modern – i.e., capitalist – times.  
 These concerns began to emerge from the very moment in which Zavaleta 
became engaged with Marxist reflections, namely in Dual Power. The appearance of 
the expression ‘motley society’ (sociedad abigarrada) in that book is particularly 
indicative in this respect.98 As Luis Tapia (2002: 121–28) points out, Dual Power – 
which marked Zavaleta’s definitive incorporation into Marxism – brings forth three 
of the ideas that will heretofore be constant in his discourse. First, the definition of 
the law of value as Marx’s fundamental theoretical contribution for the critique of 
capitalism, however not a self-sufficient mastercode as we will see. Second, the 
characterization of Bolivia as ‘motley society’. And, finally, the idea of 
‘accumulation at the heart of the class’ [acumuación en el seno de la clase] as a 
processual descriptor of class consciuousness. What follows shall provide a general 
account of these concepts and of the reflective process through which they were 
produced, so as to evaluate the contributions they offer in the development of Latin 
American Marxism’s subalternist hypothesis.   
                                                          
98  This book was started in Chile in 1972, and finished in Mexico, where it was published 
first in 1974 as Dual Power in Latin America: Studies on the Cases of Chile and Bolivia, and later in 
1979 as Dual Power: Problems of the Theory of State in Latin America. These shifts seem an 
indication of the work-in-progress nature of these reflections.  
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Conceptual Problems of the Duality of Powers 
In a still unpublished article, Susana Draper offers an insightful reading of Dual 
Power. She reminds us that, at the time when Zavaleta was working on it, there 
existed a marked gap between the profuse manner in which the idea was used in 
political discourses of the left, particularly Marxist ones, and the lack of a deeper 
conceptualization on the topic, transcending the mere compilation of passages and 
fragments from Lenin or Trotsky. As Zavaleta understood it, the questions posed by 
dual power remain crucial for revolutionary Marxism, insofar as they deal with the 
transition from one kind of ‘state’ – the bourgeois one – to the proletarian ‘non-state 
state’, to use Lenin’s formulation, which is also adopted by Zavaleta. In Draper’s 
view, the text “places us before a narrative that incites ways of both imagining the 
‘passage’ to another form of goverment and reflecting on their failure to do so.” 
(n/d) If we follow her argumentative line, this failure is provoked by the very 
categories Zavaleta took rather for granted, first and foremost those of proletariat 
and class consciousness, a failure that disturbs the seemingly linear temporality 
involved in the transition evaluated. Let us see this in more detail. 
From the beginning, he book describes dual power – which Zavaleta prefers 
to call ‘duality of powers’ – as a “Marxist metaphor” (1977: 18ff) indicating an 
anomalous situation: the existence of the incommensurable and antagonizing 
powers of the capitalist state, on the one hand, and an emerging social force (the 
proletariat) building its own forms of self-government, on the other. This anomaly is 
expression of the challenge to the state-power’s unity in situations of duality of 
power. And yet the metaphorical nature of the idea is indeed indicative of the 
difficulties in coming to terms with the phenomenon in a forthright manner. 
Referring to the Russian revolution, Zavaleta points out in Dual Power’s Prologue 
the temporal dimension of this difficulty: “the duality of powers consists in that 
what should have occurred successively occurs instead in a parallel manner, in an 
abnormal way; it is the qualitative contemporaneousness of what came before and 
after.” (1977: 22) The duality of the actual and the emergent then comes to disturb 
what would otherwise be a simple transposition of state-phases. Pointing out the 
coeval nature of allegedly sequential   
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Dealing with Trotsky’s general theory of dual power, the author argues that 
there is no linear connection between base and superstructure, that is, the exixtence 
of a capitalist mode of production does not imply a particular superstructural 
formation, e.g., formal democracy. Instead, the connections between base and 
superstructure are relative and depend on concrete historical conditions. It is within 
the considerations about national unity that the adjective of ‘motley’ appears:   
[T]he longer the delay in the formation of national unity, the greater the 
possibilities for leftovers or hangovers, although they remain relatively 
isolated and subsist beneath a dominant mode of production. In this 
sense, it is true that all states possess a kind of duality of powers within them, 
and not only during critical periods. The circumstance of pre-revolutionary 
crisis will do nothing but make the essential doubling of these kinds of motley 
States proliferate.  
The duality of powers conceived as such is utterly linked to the national 
question and, in this way, corresponds as much to Trotsky’s 
observations as to Gramsci’s. (1977: 75–6, emphasis added) 
From a perspective in which no theory of the state is possible, but only partial, 
concrete accounts of the aggregation between structures and superstructures, 
‘motley’ societies are described as lacking national integration: drawing upon 
Gramsci, Zavaleta further contrasts it to ‘integral states’. Yet, in the same breath, the 
situation of duality of power is extrapolated to the ‘normal’ functioning of any state. 
Therefore, the extension of the condition of duality of power to every capitalist 
society, central or peripheral, projects the temporal entanglement as a permanent (if 
surreptitious) conditioning factor of class struggle – a factor present even at 
moments of alleged normality.   
 
The Model of Regularity and the Proletarian Standpoint of Knowledge  
The brief article ‘Crisis and Knowledge’, written in 1975 (immediately after Dual 
Power’s first edition, that is), continues these reflections but in new registers. Let me 
first give a rough outline of its contents, so as to then explore them more carefully. 
The article assumes a viewpoint similar to Lukàcs’s History and Class Consciousness, 
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particularly in the consideration of the proletariat as the ‘Archimedean point’ of 
knowledge-transformation. In Zavaleta’s words, the proletariat “cannot know itself 
without knowing society in its entirety”.99 Now, the epistemological question 
addressed in the article is: What is the ‘margin of knowledge’ [márgen de 
conocimiento] in a ‘backward’ society? The premise of this question is the 
consideration that a society can know itself only to the extent that it can totalize 
itself, that is, inasmuch as its core law of motion reaches and penetrates society 
altogether. In this sense, capitalism is the condition of modern social knowledge, 
and Marxism becomes the “scientific utilization” [explotación científica] of 
capitalism’s “horizon of visibility”. The proletariat is the only class capable to come 
to terms with such a horizon, since the bourgeoisie is prevented from doing so by its 
“ideological compulsion” (2013b: 384–85), something that resonates with Lukàcs’ 
‘antinomies of bourgeois reason’. The capitalist horizon of knowability or visibility 
must be here understood as the making manifest of the inherently contradictory 
structuring of social relations under capital’s logic, which is in turn the point where, 
in Lukàcs’s view, bourgeois thought regresses and becomes distorted, ideological. 
Zavaleta seems to follow a rather simplistic script to explain the manner in 
which the working class accesses this epochal horizon. However, in the 
intermingling of Marxism and the working class standpoint things become more 
complex: “in the subsumption of scientific socialism […] to the concrete reality of a 
socio-economic formation which is capitalist only hegemonically and sometimes 
upholds the capitalist mode of production but as an enclave, one stumbles into a 
number of obstacles.” (2013b: 388) In this sentence, and by means of the sui generis 
formula of ‘subsumption of Marxism’, the author brings to the fore the question of 
the conditions of possibility for the encounter of Marxist theory and the historical 
subject in motley, non-capitalistically totalized societies. 
The premises of this question are formulated in a more patient way in the 
text ‘Apparent Formations in Marx’, from 1978. Here, Zavaleta asserts that “the 
                                                          
99  Zavaleta (2013b: 389). Lukàcs asserted in his influential 1923 book that “‘criticism’ 
advanced from the standpoint of class is criticism from a total point of view and hence it 
provides the dialectical unity of theory and practice. In dialectical unity it is at once cause 
and effect, mirror and motor of the historical and dialectical process. The proletariat as the 
subject of thought in society destroys at one blow the dilemma of impotence: the dilemma 
created by the pure laws with their fatalism and by the ethics of pure intentions.” (1971: 39) 
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simultaneity of base and superstructure is the central fact of social knowledge” 
(2013f: 428) within capitalism. This should not be understood as a transparent, 
merely expressive or mirroring relationship. The idea of a model of regularity is the 
conceptual tool by which the Bolivian theorist explains the contrast between base 
and superstructure: 
[T]he model of regularity we call mode of production is what expresses 
the unity of world history (what is comparable), while superstructures 
mark […] its structural heterogeneity. (2013d: 429–30) 
By model of regularity Zavaleta understands the level of the general, abstract and 
abstracting rule of the law of value – the ‘normal’, ‘ideal’, or ‘average’ occurrence of 
capitalism (2013f: 436; cf. Marx 1976: 90). The homogenization that transpires from 
the terms ‘comparability’ and ‘regularity’ contrasts with the heterogeneity of 
superstructural forms. Furthermore, and insofar as the superstructures have a 
particular manner of “causal aggregation” – in the sense that they do not coincide 
with the ‘regularity’ of the mode of production – the connection or simultaneity of 
base and superstructure must be understood as “deferred”. The Spanish term used 
by Zavaeta is correspondencia diferida, ‘deferred connection’, indicating both a 
diachronic delay and a synchronic incongruence or mismatch (2013f: 429, 430).  We 
will return shortly to this point.  
Reformulating the assertions of ‘Class and Knowledge’ we can say that the 
capitalist mode of production has unified the world, thus providing the terrain of 
comparability between countries and regions – the ‘model of regularity’ – through 
the generalization of the law of value. The problem emerges with the consideration 
of the possibilities of ‘subsumption of scientific socialism’ in conditions where the 
socio-economic formation evidences only a partial presence of capitalism. There 
thus appears an epistemological lag that would, at least theoretically, prevent the 
working class from coming to terms with a scientific comprehension of capitalism, 
something particularly urgent in the capitalist periphery.  
Certainly, the wave of defeats of popular and socialist projects in the region 
brought Zavaleta to re-consider the pertinence of Marxist theory in these terms; 
what is more, the locus of the problem was twofold, to the extent that the very 
capacity of the working class to assimilate Marxism was put into question. In this 
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sense, Aricó’s problem of Marxism’s ability to come to terms with Latin America is 
turned upside down. However, given the acknowledged ‘deferred connection’ of 
base and superstructure, the concreteness of social processes have more analytical 
value than any abstraction, something that comes here in turn to disturb any 
simplistic answer. For, although one may argue – as Zavaleta remarks – that the 
formation of the working class is in its general features more or less similar in any 
situation, nonetheless each of them suffers “its own empirical frustrations.” (2013b: 
388) The article’s final passage is indicative of the conceptual impasse produced 
through these reflections:  
Outside the accumulation at the heart of the working class [acumulación 
en el seno de la clase obrera], the acquisition of the scientific instrument 
(Marxism) is impossible; consequently, the inward development of this 
class is also the key to the knowledge of a motley society (2013b: 389).  
Zavaleta here opens up more questions than he answers, indicating however the 
direction that his reflections will follow. What is interesting in these writings is not 
only the appearance of the categories of motley and class accumulation: as Draper 
(n/d) acutely notes, what was hitherto considered as a tactical issue, situated at the 
level of the concrete social formations, becomes now an epistemological problem 
that lies at the core of Marxism, revealing a destabilization of traditional linear ways 
of thinking the consciousness of the working class. 
 
3. Lo Abigarrado: Subsumption and Temporalities in Motley Societies  
 
Lurking Beneath the Nation: Subsumption and State-Time  
In the writings that followed Dual Power, Zavaleta’s arguments seemed to be more 
and more in necessity of an auxiliary conceptual apparatus to come to terms with 
the intertwined problem of the temporality of power and the kind of social 
knowledge attainable by a working class of the capitalist periphery. This is arguably 
derived from the haunting presence of the ‘national problem’ in his Marxism. 
Indeed, the nation constituted the central element of his pre-Marxist political 
imaginary (cf. Tapia, 2002, ch. I - IV). Accordingly, as in Aricó’s case, it seems to me 
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that the ‘national question’ worked as an antidote to the simple image of Marxism 
as a ready-made general theory of the economic determination of the political. 
Conversely, Zavaleta’s early conviction regarding the actual existence of a national 
substratum mutated altogether with his adoption of historical materialism. In 
particular, Zavaleta’s reflections on the autonomy of the political, the logics of 
formal and real subsumption in the processes of national formation, and what he 
called ‘apparent states’, become crucial to conceptually determine the category of 
‘motley society’. 
 The remarks on the autonomy of the political appear in Zavaleta’s thought 
premised by reflections on Marx and Gramsci, but also on Weber, Habermas and 
Foucault. In what might be regarded as a sui generis mixture (perhaps itself a mark 
of the uneven and combined nature of Zavaleta’s own Marxism), the presence of 
these non-Marxist authors suggests the difficulties of dealing with the ‘national 
state’ from a peripheral region and within Marxism. Let us consider this long passage, 
in which the idea of ‘constitutive moment’ is conveyed: 
A typical constitutive moment is, no doubt, primitive accumulation. We 
must distinguish at least three stages in it. First, the massive production 
of detached men [sic], that is, of legally equal individuals, the negative 
or estrangement [extrañamiento] moment of accumulation which means 
the [production of a] hollowing-out [vaciamiento] or status of availability. 
Later, the time of formal subsumption, which is the actual subordination 
of labour into capital. Here is where interpellation can take place, that is, 
the suppression of the hollowing-out [moment] from a determinate 
viewpoint or character. No doubt, this is the moment of the state’s 
foundation. Third, real subsumption, or the application of the conscious 
gnosis as well as of the masses’ power – and other high-quality powers – 
to the previous factors: capital as effective command and free men [sic] 
in a mass-status. (2013d: 620) 
In this passage, taken from the 1984 article ‘The State in Latin America’, Zavaleta 
departs from Marx’s ‘so-called primitive accumulation’, the constitutive moment in 
which prior modes of production, ways of worlding and worldviews are 
dismantled, provoking both a situation of detachment and a concomitant 
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“ideological vacancy” or availability. The replacement of the previous forms of 
subjectivity is itself a crucial part of the constitutive moment of a society, indicating 
the ability of the bourgeoisie to “interpellate” – a term that Zavaleta borrows from 
Althusser (cf. Althusser, 1977) – from its particular standpoint presented as 
universal. Therefore, real subsumption refers to the ability of this allegedly 
universal gnosis as ‘effective command’ of individuals homogenized by the law of 
value, hence indifferentiated in a mass-status. 
 However, Marx defined formal subsumption as the replacement of the old 
forms in a movement that may still conserve these forms’ concrete manners of 
producing.100 In Zavaleta’s argument, conversely, the importance of this moment 
lies in the homogenization or equalization of individuals by means of their 
dispossession, a process that channels them into the new productive regime 
established under capital’s rule. Drawing upon Weber and Habermas, Zavaleta 
refers to this process as ‘social democratization’, that is, the interpellation (from a 
viewpoint which is in embryo that of the state) of the population in a situation of 
detachment and ideological vacancy as free and equal individuals. In ‘Four Concepts of 
Democracy’ (of 1981), Zavaleta describes social democratization as the rule of the 
‘logic of the factory’: “The logic of the factory or, if you wish, what Weber calls 
‘social democratization’ is, in other terms, what demonstrates the nature of 
bourgeois democracy. That is: you are free to the extent that you respect – perhaps 
sanctify – the logic of the factory.” (2013c: 516) The logic of the factory, social 
democratization, and the subsumption they imply are therefore part of the formal 
                                                          
100  In the writing ‘Result of the Immediate Process of Production’ (also known as Capital’s 
unpublished chapter), Marx defines formal subsumption as “the general form of every 
capitalist process of production; at the same time, however, it can be found as a particular 
form alongside the specifically capitalist mode of production in its developed form, because 
although the latter entails the former, converse does not necessarily obtain [i.e. the formal 
subsumption can be found in the absence of the specifically capitalist mode of production].” 
(1976: 1019). Patrick Murray explains that “the changes to the production process that Marx 
identifies with increasing absolute surplus-value involve simply formal subsumption, while 
those transformations required for relative surplus-value involve real subsumption. Between 
them, formal subsumption and real subsumption under capital bring about a continual 
hubbub of social and material revolution [...]” (2004: 246). Commenting on the same passage 
from Capital, Harootunian asserts that “it is also true that Marx envisaged the operation of 
formal subsumption as an ongoing process, continuing with and alongside the development 
of capitalism. This predisposition for appropriating what was useful from older modes of 
production and those at hand conveyed the copresence of primitive accumulation it 
embodied in some cellular form [...]” (2015: 9). 
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moment in capitalist totalization, a moment that interpellates individuals as 
individuals, not yet engaging them in a new collective. 
 The central objective of the state as a macro-formation is to contain and 
conduct the population in a situation of legal freedom so that it attends to the realm 
of production organized by capital. Described elsewhere as “the fruit of the 
circulation of surplus-value at the heights of the autonomy of the political” (2013f: 
454), the state is itself the existence of the ‘collective capitalist’; in turn, its very 
existence establishes the separation between the society and the political. In a text 
that Zavaleta knew and likely concurred with, Bolívar Echeverría (1981) indicated 
that such a division must be understood as the de-politicization of society and 
economy, on the one hand, and the concomitant politicization of a separate sphere 
embodying now the ‘representation’ of the whole, on the other. In this sense, 
Echeverría considered the res publica as the ideal or ideological figuration of a 
capitalist state, as though it were a simple mercantile state. Zavaleta, in turn, 
evaluates the ‘public’ character of the state thus understood as a feature of its 
“necessary ideology” – he also calls it the “state’s unconscious” (2013f: 428) – 
namely, the promise of representing the totality of private owners, beyond 
particularities or class-situations.  
 The contrast of formal and real subsumption, which in Marx serves to 
distinguish an initial, external command upon the working force from a truly, 
utterly incorporation of labour into capital production and reproduction, allows 
Zavaleta to differentiate the merely formal organization of productive elements 
from a truly ‘national’ moment in the formation of a society. In other words, a 
successful process of nationalization is paralleled to the real subsumption of labour 
into capital. In a number of writings, the Bolivian Marxist points out that nation 
itself must be conceived as a productive force, drawing upon Marx’s ruminations 
made in the Grundrisse’s ‘Formen’ (‘Forms which precede capitalist production’). 
Zavaleta concludes that “[i]t is Marx who recommends to taking into account the 
collectivity itself as the first productive force” (2013e: 421; cf. Marx, 1973: 471ff). In 
‘Notes on the National Question in Latin America’, in turn, he asserts that “insofar 
as it implies a certain degree of homogeneity among decisive elements attending the 
productive regime, the nation itself is a productive force or, if you wish, the 
indicator of the connection between the mode of production and the collectivity in 
220 
 
which it occurs.” (2013j: 539) One might add to this that, if capitalism characterizes 
itself by improving productive forces, the nation – one of such forces – appears as a 
higher form of community when compared to previous, local ones.  
 Following Gramsci, Zavaleta understands the active subject of this process of 
nationalization in terms of a ‘hegemonic will’ ready to spend a portion of the 
economic surplus in the building of a separate political sphere. Therefore, a proper 
bourgeois class is measured, first, by the success in the elimination (or, alternatively, 
reorientation for capital’s sake) of previous modes of productions, authority, and 
culture; and second, by the reorganization of power into a realm supposedly 
existing apart from and over society. To highlight the point, Zavaleta recurs to the 
idea of ‘optimum state’ (which echoes Gramsci’s ‘integral state’) to describe those 
associations placed onto fully nationalized civil societies. This optimum state is 
materialized in a complex set of mediations between ‘political’ and ‘civil’ society.  
 In what seems a combination of Gramsci and Weber, Zavaleta defines 
‘rational bureaucracy’ as of the central among these mediations. Bureaucracy is then 
the embodiment of the ‘surplus at the level of the political’, fulfilling the role of 
securing capital’s expanded reproduction. However, Zavaleta indicates a second, 
more epistemological dimension of this group: to measure or calculate the dynamics 
of civil society. In the metaphor provided in ‘Four Concepts’, the bureaucracy 
“listen[s] [...] to the noise of the social corpus” (2013c: 523) with the aim to translate 
such a noise (i.e. the different languages of class-struggle) into the non-antagonistic, 
allegedly universal language of the state. What seems to be the epistemological 
dimension of the bourgeois state, therefore, is the counterpart of the general 
homogeneization carried through the law of value, the capitalist model of regularity 
upon which the superstructures find particular concreteness, or what Weber and 
Habermas denominate ‘rationalization’.101 
 Interestingly, Zavaleta’s argument on the optimum state appears in ‘The State 
in Latin America’ in contradistinction to the characterization of ‘gelatinous’ societies 
provided by Gramsci. As Anne Freeland argues, Zavaleta seems to disregard here 
                                                          
101  In this sense, Zavaleta thinks the idea of model of regularity (Zavaleta’s concept for 
the mode of production) in terms of the notion of rationalization and becoming-calculable of 
modern society, characteristic of the Weberian tradition within Marxist debates from Lukàcs’ 
History and Class Consciousness to Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis.  
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Gramsci’s opposition between the West and the East, preferring instead the 
distinction between ‘robust’ and ‘gelatinous’. Robust national states are those in 
which a dense system of institutional mediations is established, first and foremost a 
‘rational bureaucracy’ attempting to subsume the dynamics of civil society into a 
general expression. Gelatinous, on the other hand, means lack of mediations, 
obscure zones of social legibility or calculability, disaggregated spaces of influence, 
and different, potentially incompatible interpellations. Freeland (2014b: 296) rightly 
points out that Zavaleta’s use of the adjective ‘optimum’ is not oriented to contrast 
Western societies, but rather those ‘ossified’, traditional forms of sociality that 
remain non-totalized by capital’s logic. In this sense, the opposite from an ‘optimum 
state’ is a state built upon a non-combined, merely overlapped aggregation of 
different modes of production.  
 With the category of ‘apparent state’, Zavaleta refers to those cases of 
nationalization where only a partial subsumption of labour into capital has been 
accomplished, which means that the state does not ‘feel’ (or ‘listen to’, in Zavaleta’s 
metaphor) its components in an organic way.102 It is a form of state that projects the 
unity of what is not unified. The non-totalized nature of these formations does not 
only occur at the level of the mode of productions, but hinders the achievement of 
the kind of superstructure typical of the capitalist model of regularity, formal 
democracy. Furthermore, it also contains in a non-combined manner a number of 
worldviews and structures of temporalization embodied in ‘cultures’, as the 
following passage remarks: it is “as though feudalism pertain to one culture and 
capitalism to another, and nonetheless both happens on the same scene.” (2013i: 
105) The recourse to the very imprecise idea of culture, in my view, compresses here 
the variety of ways of worlding, worldviews, and structures of temporalization 
alien to capital’s temporal matrix as well as to its more classical forms of 
intersubjectivity.  
 In consequence, an apparent state cannot, or can only partially, claim the 
universality of its own ‘time’ insofar as it leaves aside, and is permanently 
                                                          
102  Some years before, Indianista thinker Fausto Reinaga designated Bolivia as a nación 
ficta, a fictitious or false nation, in his political manifest La Revolucion India (1969: 74). See also 
José Antonio Lucero’s ‘Fanon in the Andes: Fausto Reinaga, Indianismo, and the Black 
Atlantic’ (2008: 18). 
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confronted by, different temporalities that pertain to other-than-capitalist modes of 
production. Although the idea of a state-time is not developed for Zavaleta, it seems 
that it refers to the projection of a common history and life-cycle, the representation 
of civil society’s internal dynamics in a political-cultural form of unification – the 
nation-state. In other words, state-time might be comprehended as the temporal 
dimension of the achieved hegemony, its crystallization in the autonomy of the 
political dictating the rhythms of the projected unity of the social, that is, in terms of 
historical narratives cycles of representation, and institutional presence broadly 
speaking. In Zavaleta’s terms, an accomplished state-time concentrates the political 
determination of a society; conversely, the state’s lack of temporal density 
characteristic of an apparent state provokes despair, heterogeneous demands and 
interpellation forces, and non-calculable eventuation of social struggles. Posited at 
the antipodes of the ‘optimum’ connection between mode of production and 
superstructures, the apparent state expresses a lack in the capacity of representation 
in both its political and epistemological meanings.   
 
Lo abigarrado and the Recasting of the Epistemological Question  
In ‘Four Concepts of Democracy’, in dealing with the problem of representation in 
motley societies, Zavaleta asserts that it is necessary to pay attention  
at least to three moments: first, the society’s non-unification or, at least, 
the dissimilar penetration of the unified in its sectors, which is what the 
motley [lo abigarrado] refers to. In its extreme, one can grasp here a 
degree of disconnection between [productive] factors and then talk of an 
apparent state, since civil society is but an enumeration, not an organic 
bind together. Second, the non-unification – either national or classist – 
of the dominant class itself, something that presumes a type of surplus 
circulation which aspires to be retained as rent, not as state-time. Third, 
the nucleus of intensity of the determination is erratically located 
outside state-time. Here society moves in an occasional manner, as if it 
were totalized but around occasional convocations or structural 
moments. It lacks then of continuity as becoming...” (2013e: 521) 
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Zavaleta unpackes here the three moments of disconnection of the productive 
factors expressive of a non-combined overlapping of different modes of production; 
the weakness in the dominant class’ unification; and the different temporalities 
struggling for the determination of social conflicts with the only partially dominant 
state-time. For the characterization of motley societies, this amounts to a seemingly 
random or disjointed distribution of instances of ‘determination’ among structures 
and superstructures. In this sense, Zavaleta argues that abigarramiento103 entails an 
internal limit to the democratic claims of representation and, concomitantly, to the 
efficacy of the state-knowledge. The lack of adequate mediations between state and 
civil society severely hinders the ability of state’s successful interpellation. In motley 
or disjointed societies, a twofold problem derives from this weakness: first, a 
democratic deficit of self-representation of a national state which amounts, second, 
to an internal limitation to the calculability of the society in question. Hence “the 
inability to self-representation is characteristic of peoples that have not become 
nations.” (2013c: 520)  
In another article, Zavaleta indicates an element that further complicates the 
matter: what he calls the “partial transference of state-phases [fases estatales]” from 
metropolis to peripheries (2013g, 410). Understood as a feature of dependence 
situations,104 this sort of transference is an expression of the lack of self-
determination of a nation-state, the nullification of internal power over other forces 
coming from the international setting. This mainly affects those cases of partial or 
failed processes of nation-state formation under imperialism such as Latin 
America’s states, aggravating in consequence their disjointedness. In sum, internal 
heterogeneity of modes of production, multiple interpellations and temporalities, 
and transference of state-phases, are conditions of motley societies.  
                                                          
103  While the adjective abigarrado can be fairly translated as ‘motley’, its nominalization 
has been rendered by Gareth Williams (2015) as ‘disjointedness’. 
104  Regarding dependency theory, Zavaleta questioned the rectification of the 
phenomenon, that is, the aim to arrive to a general theory of the dependence situation. 
Without negating the important contributions made by this school, he nonetheless rejects the 
generalising pretensions that characterised it. In his own words, “each social formation or 
country elaborates a particular type of dependence. Dependence is by nature a particular 
fact; each social formation or country expresses a particular type of dependence” (2013k: 
563).  
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 Thus far, the category of motley has presented itself as a negative definition, 
always in contradistinction to some other (if ideal) opposed sites of normality, 
connection, wholesomeness – in sum, achieved nationalization. I argue however 
that notwithstanding Zavaleta’s definitions of the category in purely negative terms, 
the epistemological problem it posits allowed him to envisage a ‘method’ adequate 
to this otherwise anomalous condition. The motley or disjointed, in my reading, 
emerges in Zavaleta’s writings as both an analytical issue for the materialist 
historian and an epistemological-political inquiry into the possibilities of self-
determination and self-knowledge of the working class. While this is not completely 
apparent in his more theoretical articles, it fully transpires when one approaches his 
more ambitious, ultimately unfinished book: The National-Popular in Bolivia. We will 
return to this work in the following section.  
To recapitulate, the key issue emerging in Dual Power (namely, the 
overlapping of temporalities in the ‘passage’ from capitalism to socialism) 
demanded a thorough reconsideration of the dialectics between structures and 
superstructures. By mean of the translation of formal and real subsumption into the 
process of nationalization of a society, Zavaleta coins the idea of ‘apparent state’ to 
identify the non-totalization of state-time – hence also of legibility and 
representation – marking the periphery. In these regions “we call state to a fraction 
[of society]; actually, the state-embryo is still subsumed into civil society” (2013c: 
527). In a perspective that somewhat echoes the arguments made by subalternist 
scholars on the conspicuous complicities between domination and the subalterns’ 
‘representation’ in modern political regimes (cf. Spivak 1988; Chakrabarty 2000 
Introduction), Zavaleta identifies lo abigarrado as the non-combined superimposition 
of modes of productions and of temporalization, in which pre-capitalist social 
relations remain irreducible to capital’s model of regularity and its correspondent 
superstructure. In this sense, Bosteels, Draper and Freeland correctly argue that 
abigarramiento or disjointedness works against homogeneizing categories and 
policies (cf. Bosteels, 2005; Freeland, 2014a; S. Draper, n/d).  
 Nonetheless, the heterogeneity of motley societies is not as a simple limitation, 
but also works as a potential source of social knowledge. The perception of this 
potentiality becomes attainable for the Zavaleta when considered from the 
viewpoint of the abovementioned idea of ‘accumulation at the heart of the working 
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class’. Luis Tapia (2002: 125) explains that this category functions in Zavaleta’s 
Marxism as the conceptual replacement of his former notion of ‘national 
consciousness’. Moreover, accumulation can also be read as a processual descriptor 
for the Marxist notion of class consciousness. This is important because it refers to 
the problem of endowing the working class with a privileged epistemological 
standpoint, as Lukàcs expressed it in History and Class Consciousness and Zavaleta 
did in ‘Class and Knowledge’. Already in this 1975 article, Zavaleta put the issue in 
the following terms: the proletariat “cannot know itself without knowing society in 
its entirety, consequently invading the remaining, not properly classist groups – that 
is, practicing its own irradiation. Such irradiation is already an ideological 
overflowing, which distorts the distribution of ideological hegemony we call normal 
(that of the dominant class) and, as it is obvious, residing in the moment of 
revolutionary crisis.” A clash of irradiation forces between dominant classes and the 
proletariat is here projected as the outcome of proletariat knowledge, something 
fully apparent only in those critical moments in which revolution emerges as 
possibility. Zavaleta goes on: “[o]utside the accumulation at the heart of the 
working class, the acquisition of the scientific instrument (Marxism) is impossible; 
as a consequence, the inward development of this class is also the key for to know a 
motley formation” (2013b: 389).   
 It seems to me that all the elements of Zavaleta’s understanding of the 
epistemological questions posited by the hetero-temporality of a revolutionary 
politics in motley societies appear in this passage. The passage indicates the 
overdetermination of clashing temporalities, self-knowledge through class-
accumulation, and ‘irradiation’, an overdetermination that compounds a potential 
method emerging in times of crisis – which can be termed ‘crisis as method’. By 
explaining the components interwoven in this very condensed paragraph, the 
following section will attempt to make sense of the particular kind of 
nationalization that Zavaleta’s Marxism operates to the notions of class and class-
consciousness.  
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4. Crisis as Method: Bolivian Masses and the Indianization of the Proletariat 
 
Class Accumulation and Irradiation 
As it was said above, the problematization of the ‘subsumption’ of Marxist theory 
into an allegedly backward working class allowed Zavaleta to put into tension the 
linear conception of class accumulation and class knowledge. At a conceptual level, 
this is evident in the formulation that he gave to this idea in the text ‘Class Form and 
Multitude Form in Bolivia’s Mining Proletariat’. This is an article written in 1982 
and published for the collective volume Bolivia Hoy (that he himself compiled) in 
1983. Conversely, the contributions to this volume (Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and 
Luis Antezana are among the authors) are to be traced to the debate opened up 
within the journal Basis. In one of his few definitions of acumulación en el seno de la 
clase, the multi-layered process encompassed is approached in the following terms: 
“the concept of accumulation at the heart of the class [...] is a metaphor referred to 
the positive and negative selection mechanisms in the movements of collective 
knowledge.” (2013d: 584) Understood as a collective process marked by moments of 
selection, class accumulation refers to the incorporation of both popular tactics of 
struggle and their rationale. Incorporation, or acquisition, means for Zavaleta the 
“becom[ing] part of the general good sense or popular prejudice after the selection.” 
(2013e: 581) It is also referred to as ‘mass-memory’ (memoria de masa), reinforcing the 
collective dimension of the achieved knowledge.  
 Zavaleta further clarifies the distance he takes from a well-defined notion of 
class-formation by saying that “[w]hile by social class one understands a logic-
formal object, the composite milieu [medio compuesto] is already the realm in which 
classes and non-classist strata occur –that is, it makes reference to a hybridity” 
(2013d: 580-81). It is within such a hybrid condition that class accumulation takes 
place in a motley society. This, in turn, signals in my view that the qualification of 
the attained knowledge is not pre-defined in any way, but rather is the product of 
encounters between different types of knowledges 
Furthermore, Zavaleta understands that it is in and through class 
accumulation that the working class comes to know itself ‘knowing society in its 
entirety’ and ‘practicing its own irradiation.’ Irradiation, as we saw above, is the 
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ideological overflowing (rebasamiento) of the ‘normal’, dominant ideology. 
Nonetheless, in ‘Four Concepts’ a reference to Foucault’s ‘Truth and Juridical 
Forms’ indicates that we are not before a mere synonym of Althusser’s 
interpellation. In what is arguably one of the more ‘Marxist’ of Foucault’s writings 
(cf. Toscano, 2014), Foucault conceives a plurality of knowledges as the ground 
upon which a given set of social relations is transformed into a will to power, albeit 
none of these knowledges is in any way pre-determined to become a knowledge-
power (cf. Foucault, 2001). Zavaleta shares Foucault’s multi-dimensional conception 
of knowledge when referring to the irradiation act, as this caveat shows:  
[T]he composite group is what its structural – or productive, if you will 
– location is plus the type of constituted interpellation. This is to say 
that, whether existing or not the centrality [of the working class] as a 
fatum – something that we prefer to leave it outstanding [and here the 
footnote refers to Foucault’s ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’] – nonetheless it 
must be constituted. (2013d: 579, original emphasis)  
If my reading is correct, Zavaleta recurs to the concept-image of irradiation (a 
synonym he also provides is iluminación, illumination or enlightening) and 
suggestively adds to it Foucault’s reflections on the heterogeneous and non-
deterministic nature of knowledge-power. This is a way to transcend the framework 
of the notion of ‘ideology’, particularly in its use as qualifier of a pre-defined central 
subject of knowledge.105 However, along with the incorporation of this plurality of 
knowledges that irradiate one other and thereby bring about the composite milieu, 
Zavaleta refuses to give up attention to the structural class-positioning of these 
elements – hence his insistence on their constituted character.  
 It seems to me that Zavaleta is suggesting that, while the centrality of the 
actual working class needs to be relativized in motley societies, the pluriverse of 
knowledges, memories and ways of resistance becomes precisely the field within 
which the materialist historian must reconstruct the process of class accumulation. 
Zavaleta’s irradiación therefore transcends the worker-centred and ‘diffusionist’ 
                                                          
105  This is what is suggested in his critique of Althusser’s notion of ‘ideological state 
apparatus’ (in ‘The Apparent Formations in Marx’), considered as a reading of Gramsci in 
which a “truly missing in specificity of the state fact” is conveyed. Following Althusser’s 
reasoning – Zavaleta concludes – one could even think that “Lenin’s party was an 
ideological apparatus of the Tsarist state.” (2013f: 450, 453)   
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understanding of an allegedly privileged proletarian knowledge. On the contrary, 
what these formulations convey is a complex, multi-layered, and expanding 
conception of class. 
 
Masses and Structures of Rebellion 
Thus delimited, the notion of class consciousness may appear as a merely rhetorical 
recourse to identity. However, the ruminations opening ‘Apparent Formations’ 
show that as early as 1975 Zavaleta conceived class consciousness in terms of the 
unfolding of intertwined elements: “What is that abstract bundle [bulto abstracto] we 
call consciousness but the destruction of a previous consciousness?”, he asks so as to 
respond that “if consciousness comes from an internal displacement (a 
consciousness is the ruin of its own anteriority), its veracity comes in turn from the 
capacity of ascertainment of the age [capacidad de comprobación de una época].” (2013f: 
427) Zavaleta is pointing out here the processual character of any consciousness, a 
process which leaves behind its own previous ‘bundles’ in a self-critical movement. 
This self-critical movement, conversely, becomes actual only insofar as it 
demonstrates itself to mobilize present-day tasks and demands. This is rather an 
idiosyncratic way to say that the class-knowledge is what its particular history is, 
and that its pertinence depends on both learnings and the ability to situate those 
learnings  in present time – timeliness. This is why class accumulation – a processual 
descriptor for class consciousness – is considered the key for the knowledge of a 
motley society.’ In other words, Zavaleta’s reflections seem to point to the fact that 
class knowledge is attained by looking into class accumulation, i.e. by digging into 
the history of irradiations, encounters and misencounters between subaltern groups 
– a process whereby consciousness itself is de-centred from its.  
 The term ‘masses’ – Zavaleta indicates – draws on Marx’s idea of the force of 
masses or collectives as a productive force, not a mere aggregate of individuals. What 
is more, the mass is constituted as against the state: “[b]y mass, we understand a 
sort of polarisation. The mass is acting civil society, that is, a pathetic [patético], 
sentimental and epic state of unification.” (2013c: 526, emphasis added) This 
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unification, described as emotional and sentimental,106 is attained at the level of civil 
society, which has in my view a double implication. On the one hand, the masses 
form a force-field wider than class, yet one in which class accumulation takes place; 
on the other, it identifies a moment of counteraction that defies state power, a 
moment in which the elements of civil society achieve a unification and, potentially, 
self-determination. This unification puts the isolation of individuals, of territories, 
and cultures into a standstill, suspending at the same time the categorical distinction 
of politics and society.  
 Therefore, we must say that in Zavaleta’s formulation mass is a political 
concept, expressive of an embryo collective will. Mass, also called multitudes in the 
same article (cf. Zavaleta Mercado 2013d), seems to play down the relevance of the 
proletariat’s knowledge as leading force of social struggles: “[t]his is valid [only] for 
certain specific societies already proletarianized, and for certain proletariats”, 
Zavaleta (2013c: 526) points out. To be sure, this is not the case for motley societies. 
Zavaleta understands this counteraction as the unification of determined ‘structures 
of rebellion’ in opposition to the state: “The history of the masses is always a history 
made against the state, so that we are talking here of structures of rebellion and not 
of forms of [state] belonging. Every state, in the last instance, negates the mass” 
(2013c: 526). 
It might seem that Zavaleta parallels here some of Laclau’s formulations, for 
whom the opposition of the people and the ‘dominant bloc’ at the level of the social 
formation is the prominent gap through which the articulation of populist demands 
occurs, an articulation whose contents are always indeterminate, contingent (cf. 
Laclau, 2005, particularly Part III; see also his early 1979). However, in Zavaleta’s 
view the ‘popular’ element embodied by masses or multitudes must be considered 
not in terms of a Manichean distinction of state and civil society, but instead as 
displacement of the class itself: “Multitude” – as he says in ‘Masses in November’ – 
“is understood here as the modified form of the class.” (2013h: 109, original 
emphasis) Masses or multitudes, therefore, are the manifestation of an active 
                                                          
106  In ‘A Note on Translation’ to The National-Popular in Bolivia, Anne Freeland says that 
‘pathetic’ [patético] “should always be read here as the adjectival form of pathos and not in 
the colloquial sense. It does not, however, refer to rhetoric, but to the affective element of 
social identification and collective subject formation.” (2017) 
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moment in which civil society (understood thus in a relational and not merely 
topological sense) finds a certain coherence by means of a displacement. This 
movement, in turn, is actualized in the very interregnum that the apparent state 
necessarily generates given its non-combined nature, and expresses itself in 
different temporalities, interpellations, and structures of rebellion coming together 
so as to give form to a multitude. As structures of rebellion and not of state-
belonging, they bear with them dispositions to collective sovereignty that have 
remained disperse, partially outside the state-time, its knowledges, and forms of 
representation. 
Therefore, when Zavaleta comprehends multitude as acting civil society 
which in turn modifies the class, we can read it as a moment or state of 
synchronization (however partial) of the temporalities embodied in these structures 
of rebellion. The coming together of different temporalities, memories, and struggle 
forms, precipitates a ‘sentimental’ and ‘pathetic’ – affective, that is – unification. It 
seems to me that the emphasis on the affective quality of this encounter is used by 
Zavaleta to prevent the pre-eminence of one of these knowledges or rationales over 
the others. The modification of the concept of class within the composite milieu in 
which ‘mass’ occurs is thus indicative of the interplay of different classes and social 
groups (‘positions’, as they were called with reference to Foucault) in the process of 
becoming multitude. The momentum for this fusion to take place is ‘crisis’. 
 
Crisis as Method and the National-Popular Question 
Sociedades abigarradas, understood as non-totalized entities, appeared in Zavaleta’s 
early writings as a touchstone for both class accumulation and emancipation 
knowledge. If motley societies cannot be “represented” either by state rationality or 
by official science – as Zavaleta (2013k: 562) reiterates in ‘Problems of Dependent 
Determination’ –, then the moments of totalization of motley societies surface not in 
normal times but rather in situations of exception – crises. During these situations, 
the disjointed structures and temporalities populating the social formation 
converge: “[t]he very time of the factors (and the main difference between modes of 
production is the quality of human time) acts in a continuous and confluent mode 
but in its critical manifestation” (Zavaleta, 2013h: 106). This is a very interesting 
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passage, as it stresses the difference between structures of temporalization as an 
important dimension of motley societies. Accordingly, if a motley society is unable 
to experience its own elements, permanent and organic manner, crisis is a 
conjuncture in which those discontinuous temporalities and knowledges reveal 
themselves not only as contemporaneous and coterminous but also co-constitutive, 
composite, and affecting – irradiating – one another.  
The possibility of knowledge in motley societies emerges thus from crisis as 
a singular political event, a moment in which the disjointed elements of the social 
formation bursts forth to a common terrain. The crisis is political not only because it 
puts into question the ‘autonomy of the political’ in its institutionalized 
crystallization; it is also political as it reveals the ‘irradiation’ between subaltern 
classes and groups. This means that crisis are products of the encounters occurring 
in the process of becoming-multitude, at time that such a becoming is revealed in its 
own historicity through such a critical moment. Luis Antezana summarizes the 
point by saying that in Zavaleta’s thought lo abigarrado becomes both the condition 
of crisis and the method of knowledge that emerges through such a crisis (1991: 
128).  
 ‘Crisis as method’ is in my view the procedure framing Zavaleta’s most 
ambitious, finally unfinished project: The National-Popular in Bolivia.107 In it, the 
method is aimed at reconstructing class accumulation in Bolivia: I argue that this is 
the subject of this book. Zavaleta mobilizes here the conceptual tools he developed 
during his more than a decade of thought informed by Marxism. By means of crisis 
as method, the concepts of constitutive moment, motley society, class accumulation, 
                                                          
107  As Anne Freeland (2017) indicates, Zavaleta’s manuscript held the title Elementos para 
una Historia de lo Nacional Popular en Bolivia: 1879-1980 (rendered by herself as Toward a 
History of the National-Popular in Bolivia: 1879-1980); yet it was published by editorial Siglo 
XXI (México) in 1986 under the abbreviated title The National-Popular in Bolivia. The 2013 
(third) edition by Plural (Bolivia) –part of Zavaleta’s Complete Works, Vol. II – constitutes 
an improved version, since the editors worked on the original manuscripts, correcting errata 
and adding further bibliographical references. However, they do not restore Zavaleta’s 
original title. In this sense, this work pertains to the species (almost a genre in itself) of 
‘Marxist non-works’, unfinished manuscripts and works-in-progress never published by 
their authors which are recovered later on and then become milestones for the 
comprehension of the author’s perspectives. This is the case of Marx’s Paris Manuscripts, 
Grundrisse, even Capital in its entirety; also of Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks, Gramsci’s 
Prison Notebooks, Benjamin’s Theses on History, Althusser’s Materialism of the Encounter: and, 
in Latin America, and of Mariátegui’s much-debated book on Politics and Ideology in Peru, 
among many others.  
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and compound milieu are displayed so as to explain the characteristics of the object 
‘Bolivia’. The formal structure of the work envisaged an Introduction which 
summarizes the projected whole and advances some methodological clarifications; 
and four chapters. In the manuscript left by Zavaleta, Chapter I and II reached a 
more finished form than Chapter III, while Chapter I more than II. Chapter IV, in 
turn, which was dedicated to the contemporary period was not even started (more 
on this below).  
The Introduction makes this methodological remark: 
[W]e will proceed by isolating certain events, circumscribed in time, or 
regional situations, circumscribed in space. This is a response to a 
scarcity of information and it undoubtedly entails a symbolic selection. 
In defense of this method it must be said that no social science is 
possible otherwise in a country like Bolivia. (2017) 
These moments are instances of crisis. This is why Chapter I (entitled ‘The Struggle 
for the Surplus’) corresponds to the account of the ‘constitutive moment’ of 1879, the 
Pacific War (Guerra del Pacífico) waged by Bolivia and Peru against Chile, in which 
Bolivia lost access to the ocean as well as the important resources of nitrate and 
cupper. Chapter II (‘The World of the Fearsome Willka’) analyses in turn the civil 
war of 1899, which is known in Bolivian historiography as the Federal Revolution, 
when two fractions of the dominant classes confronted one another. One of them 
mobilized indigenous (particularly Aymara) uprisings as a manner to back its own 
momentum. However, the outcome of these uprisings was indeed the return to a 
newer unity of these dominant classes, due to the fear to these mass-mobilizations 
they themselves initially fostered.  
Another war is the focus of Chapter III (‘The Torpor of Centuries’): the 
Chaco War (Guerra del Chaco) waged against Paraguay between 1930 and 1935, a 
moment in which Zavaleta sees once again the lack of belonging that Bolivian 
population feels towards ‘its’ state. Conversely, Chapter IV (paradoxically, the non-
written part of the book) was the central concern of the whole, as stated from the 
outset: “the subsequent history of Bolivia is but the unravelling of the elements of 
the crisis of 1952. Thereafter, the class subjects only reproduce the conditions of their 
performance at that crucial moment.” As a whole, The National-Popular projects the 
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successive overlapping of critical conjunctures in a manner in which “[t]he history 
of these hundred years in Bolivia will therefore necessarily be the history of a series 
of crises or pathetic social agglutinations.” (2017) Zavaleta’s method qualifies crises 
as objects of knowledge in order to come to terms with Bolivia’s ‘motley’ apparent 
state and class accumulation. As this disarticulation of modes of productions and 
temporalities implies a non-totalization, a non-combined juxtaposition, crises 
become moments of partial or potential totalization.  
‘Crisis as method’ is further qualified by Zavaleta, in consideration of the 
relative minority of the working class: 
Quantification itself, as we shall see throughout this history, plays a 
more limited part in more motley societies [sociedades abigarradas]; on the 
other hand, it is at the moment of crisis or its equivalent (a moment of 
intensity) that can be seen in its results or synthesis, for this constitutes 
the only phase of concentration or centralization in a formation that 
otherwise would appear only as an archipelago [...] (2017, trans. 
modified).  
The period that follows the critical events of the 1952 revolution – the constitutive 
moment of contemporary Bolivia in Zavaleta’s view – was not developed in the 
final manuscript. Nonetheless, the article ‘Masses in November’ from 1983 
(Zavaleta’s last essay) contains what seems to be a veritable stand-in of the projected 
chapter, as Luis Tapia (2002: 336) and Anne Freeland (2017) indicate. ‘November’ 
designates the events that took part in that month of 1979, which marked the fall of 
Hugo Banzer’s dictatorship and opened the horizon of a new democratic period.  
 In Zavaleta’s account, the historical novelty of the event is twofold. On the one 
hand, the working class ascribed for the first time to a democratic platform, leaving 
behind a history of disdain towards the question of democracy. A disdain that – one 
might add –only mirrored the dominant classes’ own disregard towards formal 
democracy, and which was deeply embodied in Bolivia’s fragile institutions – as 
expressed in constant military regimes. As we already saw in Chapter V, democracy 
marked an important chapter of left-wing concerns during the 1980s, for instance in 
Aricó’s turn towards a rather liberal definition of the democratic question. For 
Zavaleta, in contradistinction, the class contents of the democratic question 
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continued to play a role in the political evaluation of the political struggle. And 
while the dominant classes projected a kind of incomplete democracy, the Bolivian 
Marxist qualified the working-class orientation to democracy with what he 
considered the process of class accumulation.  
 On the other hand, and complementing the last point, Zavaleta indicates that 
for the first time in Bolivia’s history a working-class mobilization was joined by 
peasant and indigenous uprisings all over the country. In Zavaleta’s words,  
[i]t is the first time that the peasantry as a whole supports the workers’ 
general strike, so this is the axis in which multitude – or, if preferred, a 
historical bloc – is established. [...] [A]s mass accumulation, it is 
produced the incorporation of the political methods of the classic 
agrarian struggle to the working class’ insurrectional patterns.” (2013h: 
109) 
The consequences of these critical events from the perspective of class accumulation 
are made explicit by Zavaleta: “The masses, always underground [clandestinas] 
regarding representative democracy, currently give form to their uprising at the 
crux [bajo el lábaro] of representative democracy, which is now incorporated to the 
masses’ memory or accumulation at the heart of the class.” (Ibid.) And it is added 
that: “there is no doubt that here the masses have constituted themselves around the 
proletarian interpellation.”(Ibid.) In turn, the peasant-indigenous – the bearers of 
the ‘agrarian class struggle’ – for the first time and on a national scale appears to 
have shaken from its subordination to the structures of clientelism and patronage 
derived from the 1952 revolution (cf. Rivera Cusicanqui, 2010).  
I propose here to maintain the conceptual tension between interpellation and 
irradiation in order to disclose Zavaleta’s formulations. This means reading the 
proletarian interpellation as the form of the event, as it was shaped in the general 
strike. The general national strike proclaiming a democratic programme was 
therefore the catalyzer of the becoming-multitude. Conversely, as the metaphor for 
the history of the encounters, translations, and misunderstandings among varied 
subaltern structures of rebellion placed along different temporalities and forming 
the composite milieu, irradiation indicates the mutual influence that the participants 
of this process exerted to become a multitude. One might say that if the popular 
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element is to be located at the crossroads of the crisis called ‘November’, it is under 
a proletarian form mobilized and expressed through a peasant-indigenous content 
for the democratic struggle.  
Bolivian historian and political activist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui offers a 
complementary account of Zavaleta’s.108 In Oppressed but not Defeated (of 1984) she 
describes the trajectory of struggles of Bolivian peasant-indigenous movements that, 
in a process of slow detachment from the apparatuses of the 1952 revolution, since 
mid-1970s started to give rise to Katarismo. Indeed, what Zavaleta perceived as the 
indigenous-peasant mobilization in support of the working class was the Katarista 
movement coming onto the political stage through a quite autonomous pathway (cf. 
Rivera Cusicanqui, [1984]2010: 186; see also Webber, 2011: 105). Zavaleta indeed 
perceived (from his exile) such autonomy: in The National Popular, he states that 
“[t]he idea of peasantry as a class that receives and of proletariat as the class that 
gives, for example, merely follows a dogmatic line. In reality, there is every reason 
to believe that the peasantry had its own class accumulation and also, as it were, its 
own class history within the history of classes.” (2017) The idea of an autonomous 
pathway of class-accumulation for the peasant-indigenous derives from the non-
combination of these classes and groups vis-à-vis the state-time.  
Rivera Cusicanqui anatomizes this emergent indigeneity in terms of the 
disenchantment of indigenous (Aymara) communities with two ‘national’ utopias 
built upon the 1952 state: the utopia of a patronized and nonetheless ‘harmonic’ 
relation between ‘peasants’ and the state; and the utopia of fair and equal trade in 
the agricultural-industrial exchange at the level of the national market. Furthermore, 
the Bolivian historian points out three dimensions in the making of Katarismo: first, 
the autonomy that it achieved in relation to the peasant trade-unions, characteristic 
of the 1952 institutions; second, the ethno-cultural identification with indigenous 
memories expressed in the claim of the right to “exercise otherness” that configures 
a “decolonizing horizon” (2010: 218); and third, a political autonomy towards the 
working class accompanied by a positive acknowledgment of the points of 
encounter and proximities with it. Katarismo emerged as a social force that, while 
neither homogeneous nor monolithically oriented, certainly pertains to a 
                                                          
108  Zavaleta actually quotes and draws his own analysis based on some of Rivera 
Cusicanqui’s early works. 
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determined structure of rebellion (that of the agrarian community) which 
furthermore carries a particular form of participation in the democratic struggle, as 
Zavaleta himself intuited. 
 
Democracy as Self-Determination 
If the particular synthesis identified by Zavaleta in the event called ‘November’ is 
read from the notion or masses as ‘modification’ of the class – as I propose, 
following his own remarks – then it might be said that such a modification projects 
the potential synchronization of at least two different traditions of struggle. 
Zavaleta’s argument on the incorporation of the democratic horizon as part of the 
‘accumulated’ memory for the Bolivian working class is coterminous with the 
‘encounter’ of this class with these social elements bursting into the political stage as 
indigeneity. Katarismo was the first name and formulation of this multi-faced 
politics.109 Despite his emphasis on the working class (perhaps itself an indication of 
Bolivia’s historical contempt towards the peasants and the ‘indigenous question’, 
particularly from the left), Zavaleta identified in the emergent indigeneity of the 
1979 conjuncture an internal displacement in Bolivia’s political dispositions of the 
subalterns.  
Antezana indicates that ‘Masses in November’ and The National-Popular lead 
to the conclusion that the democratic dimension stems from the peasant-indigenous 
side (1991: 23). However, this is explicitly acknowledged by Zavaleta in ‘Masses in 
November’, when he says that “if the workers escape someday form their 
corporative closure, it will be through the development of a project emerging from 
the peasant movement.” (2013h: 111) In other words, and paraphrasing Zavaleta’s 
own remarks on Gramsci (2013i: 194), the fact that he did not put emphasis on the 
ethno-cultural dimension of the peasant-indigenous masses does not in any case 
imply that he denies it. On the contrary, he found it crucial for the political maturity 
of the working class. The fact that, in the Introduction of The National-Popular, he 
considers the agrarian community to be a permanent, long-lasting structure of 
rebellion remains indicative in this respect: 
                                                          
109  This is also Rivera Cusicanqui’s interpretation (cf. 2010: 216). 
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[t]he persistence of the agrarian form of the ‘community’ [puts into 
evidence] that the defense and reproduction of this form in practice constitutes 
the mode of insertion of the peasantry in the democratic movement. But despite 
the apparent forms of the haciendas and even smallholdings, at least as 
far as the classical Andean habitat is concerned, it is clear that it is 
merely a matter of juridical modalities in which the model of production 
is maintained, in other words, ultimately there is a single agricultural form 
that has persisted over time […] that is to say, there would be a juridical 
subsumption, but never a real subsumption. […]  
In any case, the resistance of the Andean agrarian civilization would 
demonstrate the impenetrability of this universe to the interpellation of 
a nondemocratic state and the incompatibility of the seigniorial elite 
with democratic legitimation. (2017, emphasis added) 
The crucial point in Zavaleta’s argument is that the ‘democratic question’ is not, nor 
it has even been in Bolivia’s apparent state, part of the regular bourgeois hegemony 
‘from above’. On the contrary, it has been unleashed from below, that is, from these 
structures of rebellion and of sovereignty that, in the events of November, flooded 
as multitude into a popular alliance that crystallized in democratic demands against 
the 1952 state. I think this is a pivotal difference to other ‘formalistic’ accounts of the 
national-popular as well as to liberal approaches to the democratization processes of 
the time in Latin America (even when supported by socialist or communist stances).  
What is more, Raquel Gutierrez has proposed to read Zavaleta’s 
formulations more in the register of the “communitarian-popular” [popular-
comunitario] (2014: xxvi) than in national-popular terms. I find this all the more 
pertinent, to the extent that the concept of nation still bears the burden of the state-
time and casts its light upon a projected homogeneized population. In this sense, the 
heterogeneity entailed in lo abigarrado makes it impossible the subsumption of these 
disparate temporalities into capital’s logic of social democratization and its 
nationalization from above, however multi-cultural or pluri-cultural they may be. 
The ‘popular’ elements lie not in the state but rather in the structures of rebellion 
rooted in other modes of production and of temporalization. Conversely, they only 
make themselves visible at the point of becoming part of the multitude’s active self-
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determination at the moment of crisis. ‘Democracy’ emerges then as the 
encountering point of these elements, and the demands it encompasses match in 
their challenge to the ‘apparent’ 1952 state.  
In motley societies, class-knowledge is only possible by means of a 
movement in which the class becomes other than itself, that is, by an active work of 
translation between the subaltern structures of rebellion that converge in the 
eventful process of becoming-multitude. This translational network is what in my 
view is indicated by irradiation; in the November crisis, such a process reached in 
democracy the veritable common horizon of these temporalities and structures. The 
fact that Zavaleta did not give priority to the ethno-cultural elements in this 
translational ‘composite milieu’, does not in my view diminish his contribution to 
an interpretation of Marxism capable of coming to terms with the emergent 
indigeneity. From a materialist standpoint which is also sensitive to other subaltern 
ways of worlding, structures of temporalization and of rebellion (that is, in motley 
societies to structures different from the capitalist model of regularity), Zavaleta 
envisaged the passage from the quantitative inferiority of the working class to its 
epistemological primacy in the moment in which the irradiation of the emergent 
indigeneity displaces and reorients it towards its own becoming multitude. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In a sense, Zavaleta’s turn into Marxism was premised by a concern akin to Aricó’s, 
yet in an inverted manner. For, if the latter problematized the ability of Marxism to 
come to terms with Latin America’s social and political dynamics, Zavaleta shifted 
direction and put into tension the readiness of the proletariat – a class belonging to a 
‘backward’ society – to properly incorporate or subsume, in his terms, the scientific 
apparatus of historical materialism. These contrasting approaches were 
consequences of the diverse considerations they displayed towards the claim about 
the lack of a theory of the state, and of the political, as the heart of Marxism’s crisis – 
such as Althusser’s. While both considered epistemological and political issues as 
part of a unified, entangled problematic for revolutionary theory, Aricó privileged 
the political side of the coin; conversely, Zavaleta understood that self-
determination was indissolubly tied to self-knowledge. Accordingly, his reflections 
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were oriented to evaluate the conditions whereby a class comes to know itself (or 
not) in circumstances of only partial totalization of the capitalist mode of 
production. His core-premise, as we already saw, was that ‘the inward development 
of [the working] class is the key to the knowledge of a motley society.’  
 From his inaugural commitments with Marxism, marked by the writing of 
Dual Power and his stay in Santiago de Chile, Zavaleta was in necessity of 
reconstructing the Marxist conceptual apparatus. The epistemological and political 
dimensions were, in this effort, always considered together, as the two aspects of a 
single problem: the possibility (in a peripheral, underdeveloped, motley society) to 
overcome the quantitative inferiority of the working class in order for it to achieve 
epistemological and political primacy. Therefore, the recourse to notions such as 
model of regularity, apparent state, interpellation/irradiation, composite milieu, 
accumulation at the heart of the class (or mass-memory), and mass/multitude were 
instrumental to answer that question.   
 In the actualization of this reframed-Marxist conceptual apparatus, a number 
of consequences come into view. First, the idea of differed correspondence between 
model of regularity and the always particular, specific forms of aggregation of the 
capitalist superstructures built upon it. This differed correspondence serves to poit 
out that no general theory of the state is possible from a coherent Marxist viewpoint. 
Second, the idea of apparent state as an outcome of non-capitalistically totalized 
societies, in which not only different modes of production remain, but also the 
typical forms of representation (formal democracy, social calculability) are 
hindered, making difficult the determination of the knowledge attainable in motley 
societies. The idea of apparent state finds concretion in the deficiencies to build a 
generalized state-time, a unified and combining narrative able to encompass the 
diversity of a country. In contradistinction to Aricó, Zavaleta held a negative 
consideration of the state as society-builder. Furthermore, he also criticize 
dependentista attempts to derivate a general law of motion for ‘dependent’ countries. 
In this sense, the condition of abigarramiento prevents from both homogeneizing 
templates of class-formation and liberal qualifications of the society’s political will. 
 Third, there is the idea of composite milieu, the heterogeneous, hetero-
temporal social realm in which diverse forms of temporalization, social relations, 
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and structures of rebellion participate in a non-combined, decentralized, and 
uneven manner. Within such a composite milieu, relations among the different 
knowledges embodied in these temporal entanglements take place, determining the 
ways and intensities of the exchanges (irradiations, interpellations) between these 
entities. This is the realm in which the accumulation at the heart of the working 
class (understood as a composite of diverse knowledges, practices, and 
temporalities co-existing in a determinate space) is produced and incorporated as 
mass-memory. And finally, the reference to this accumulation qualifies a complex, 
multi-layered and expanding concept of class (as mass or multitude), far away from 
its reduction to a pre-defined model of proletariat, and which projects a non-
deterministic, inherently pluralistic way to reach class consciousness.   
 One of the most suggestive of Zavaleta’s arguments refers to the implications 
that the ‘motley’ condition conveys. As a non-combined aggregation, lo abigarrado 
indicates the limit in which the confluence of histories, temporalities, memories, and 
knowledges does not form an organic articulation. In this sense, Zavaleta suggest 
the hypothesis of an uneven and non-combined development, in which the 
articulation of these elements occurs but in its more formal level (cf. Ouviña, 2010: 
204). This argument seems to echo Chakrabarty’s (2000; see also the chapter I of this 
work) identification of Histories 2, those structures of temporalization that remain 
outside, non-subsumed to capital’s History 1. In this sense, the claim for a total 
social knowledge is severely put into question, and the reduction of these temporal 
densities to a single matrix – in Zavaleta’s terms, the reductive translation of the 
concrete history of aggregations into the level of the model of regularity – becomes 
invalidated. This is what is dismissed in his writings: the projection of a universal 
grammar of class struggle.  
 However, the Bolivian Marxist understood crisis as a moment in which the 
totalization of society is expressed in a dramatic manner. Crisis is both the tearing of 
a society and the moment of its universalization, to the extent that in crisis these 
non-combined forms are brought together as participating in a common 
temporality. In other words, the moment of crisis reveals the emergence of subaltern 
forces alien to state-time and its forms of representation, at time that it constitutes a 
momentum for potential nationalization. Therefore, the hypothesis of non-
combined uneven development does not assum a merely external or oppositional 
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relation among temporalities, but rather envisages the particular events indicating 
the potential synchronization among them. This is why, in the formulation of ‘crisis 
as method’, Zavaleta assumes that accumulation at the heart of the class (that is, the 
history of encounters and misencounters, of translations and mistranslations, of 
negative and positive selections, between these structures of temporality and 
rebellion) is the index for the maturation of a class-consciousness. A consciousness 
that, while finding ground in the model of regularity, is nonetheless open to the 
concrete history of exchanges with other subaltern forces.   
 As against the mere differentiation of capital vis-à-vis other-than-capital 
temporalizations, crisis (both distortion and unification) becomes a political event of 
the first order. In the context of Bolivia’s apparent state built upon the 1952 
constitutive moment – in continuous (if shaken) functioning during Zavaleta’s 
lifetime –, the non-combined nature of the hetero-temporal entanglement found in 
the November events a moment of potential democratization from below. The 
importance of the autonomy displayed by peasant-indigenous revolts and the 
demands they conveyed, in this sense, is indicative of the incorporation of the 
democratic question in the memory of Bolivian masses. This incorporation, in turn, 
is embodied in the indigenous defense of the agrarian mode of production, 
considered by Rivera Cusicanqui in terms of the right to exercise otherness. In this 
sense, the democratic horizon envisaged by Zavaleta in the November crisis can be 
read in terms of a decolonizing horizon as well. Insofar as it incorporates the 
Katarista contributions to the clarification of the particular grammars of class 
struggle in the country, these structures of rebellion constitute a subaltern qualifier 
of democracy. 
In conclusion, Zavaleta’s idiosyncratic, perhaps baroque (or ‘motley’) 
conceptualizations are an important moment of Latin American Marxism. The crisis 
of Marxism opened up the possibility to rethink Marxist theory in general, and 
particularly its relations with the diversity of social realities it intends to 
comprehend. The translation of the categories of formal and real subsumption into 
the process of nationalization comes to reveal the ‘motley’ nature of Bolivia and 
other Latin American countries. Conversely, crises are revaluated in terms of their 
epistemological potential for a coming to terms with those other-than-capitalist 
temporalities. What transpires from Zavaleta’s account of Bolivian history, in 
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consequence, is the projected hegemony of the working class – the achievement of 
its universal, post-corporative moment – in a non-homogeneizing manner, since the 
very formation of the class as political subject is historically variable, porous, and 
heterogeneous. 
 In other words: insofar as it can but be motley, disjointed, irreducibly 
heterogeneous, a hegemonic working class is constituted over democratic, non-
reductive and dialogical axes. The bursting of indigenous rebellions and the 
incorporation of their forms and contents into mass-memory – and into Zavaleta’s 
Marxism – envisages the incorporation of the democratic question in a decolonizing 
perspective. A perspective in which the co-existence of knowledges does not imply 
a pre-determined hierarchization among them; rather, it demands for the materialist 
historian a concrete account of the transferences, translations, and (mis)encounters 
by means of which a multitude becomes a concrete, historical political subject. 
Therefore, by incorporating indigenous memories and structures of rebellion as 
elements internal to the process of class accumulation and class consciousness, 
democracy becomes qualified by a decolonizing, subaltern perspective.  
 It is not a matter of chance that the decade of the 1980s witnessed (in Bolivia 
and elsewhere) a neoliberal restoration which, on the one hand, dismantled the 
working-places and symbolic grounds of the mining proletariat and, on the other, 
promoted a multi-cultural integration ‘from above’110 which left the material sources 
of unevenness untouched, to say the least. As against this kind of policies, the 
category of motley society, and the crisis as method derived from it, can be read as a 
lucid indication about the need of qualification of both the democratic question and 
its cultural drifts. Following Zavaleta’s insights, what is missed in both neoliberal 
multiculturalism and orthodox Marxism (i.e. the blind faith on the centrality of the 
working class) is a concrete consideration of the complex history of exchanges, 
                                                          
110  This neoliberal, multi-cultural policy was promoted by media campaigns and 
supported by the cooptation of indigenous-peasant leaders, as it was the case of the 
incorporation of former Katarista activist Victor Hugo Cárdenas as vice-president of Gonzalo 
Sánchez de Losada’s first term in office (1993-1997). Jeffery Webber summarizes this period 
saying that “[n]eoliberal political and economic reforms accompanied the shift in state-
policies toward multicultural recognition of indigenous communities, and these reforms are 
well known to exacerbate or sustain existing material inequalities between social classes.” 
(2011: 4-5) 
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encounters, and mistranslations between different, non-combined modes of 
production, structures of temporality and of rebellion co-existing in Bolivia.  
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Afterwords. (Non)Concluding Remarks on Marxism and Latin America 
 
‘[...] detrás del secuestro de esos muertos, 
está el culto por la historiografía, tan de 
arriba, tan incoherente, tan inútil. Eso de 
que la historia que vale y cuenta es la que 
está en un libro, una tesis, un museo, un 
monumento, y en los equivalentes 
actuales y futuros, que no son sino una 
forma pueril de domesticar la historia de 
abajo.’ 
Sub-Comandante Insurgente Marcos,  
Rebobinar 2, 2013 
 
‘The tradition of all dead generations 
weighs like a nightmare on the brains 
of the living.’ 
K. Marx, ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte’, 1852 
 
‘We suffer not only from the living, but 
from the dead.’ 
K. Marx, Preface to Capital Vol. I, 1867 
 
The aim of this research has been to think critically with some of the salient works, 
currents, and authors that compose the constellation I have proposed to call ‘Latin 
American Marxism’. Neither an exhaustive nor all-encompassing account, there is in 
this argument no claim to archival authority. My theoretical sample might be 
considered by some readers as inexcusably incomplete. However, the lineage 
presented this research illuminates the theoretical and analytical problems that the 
placing of Latin America besides Marxism brings about; arguably, all considered the 
apparent mismatch between these two terms as an issue that was not just 
conceptual or theoretical but crucially political, that is, critical to the prospects for a 
genuine socialist politics in the region. It has been the purpose of this work to 
reconstruct these formulations as a contribution to the critical history of Marxism in 
Latin America. 
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 More concretely, what my critical survey and reconstruction has attempted to 
demonstrate is the emergence of a varyingly articulated nexus between the concepts 
of uneven and combined development, hetero-temporality, and translation as 
leitmotifs that informed – sometimes explicitly, sometimes unwittingly – the many-
faced subalternist perspective within Marxism in Latin America. In this sense, the 
constellation of ideas, names and works explored in this thesis portrays a common 
sensibility with respect to problems that haunted Marxist theorizations in the sub-
continent. Nonetheless, as Chapter I demonstrates, these theoretical problems and 
orientations were in no way exclusive to Latin American – nor even Global-South – 
Marxists. On the contrary, as Harry Harootunian (2015) has argued, this intellectual 
sensibility towards the multiverse that grounds world history is already present in 
some non-canonical texts of classical Marxism. To an important extent, the 
problematization of capital’s temporality is present as early as Marx’s ruminations 
on the paradoxical coevalness of anachronic structures, expressed by the politically 
backward but nonetheless philosophically advanced Germany – a line of reasoning 
that continued through Lenin, Trotsky and Luxemburg first, and then with Gramsci, 
Benjamin, and Bloch, up to more contemporary Marxist thinkers. In this 
chronological sequence, Mariátegui is a true contemporary of that inter-war 
generation of European Marxists in his adoption and recreation of a Leninian 
Marxism (to borrow Aricó’s formulation so as to differentiate it from ‘Leninism’). 
 In Chapter II and Chapter III, I offer a reading of Mariátegui’s Marxism that, 
while informed by the enormous amount of secondary literature devoted to his 
oeuvre, attempts to think with Mariátegui and beyond the straitjacket of the 
orthodoxy/heterodoxy polarity that preoccupies so many of his exegetes. Chapter II 
inquires into Mariátegui’s dialectics of the international and the national in order to 
establish a conceptual space for the category of uneven and combined development 
as an implicit but actual operator of his thought. Furthermore, the experience of 
coeval ways of being modern in 1920s Peru – the experience of uneven and 
combined development – triggered a reorientation of Mariátegui’s understanding of 
the working class as the historical subject of a socialist project. Through the 
incorporation of imperialism into the consideration of both nationalism and 
socialism for the post-colony, he introduced the ‘colour line’ as a crucial qualifier of 
Peru’s class struggle – a racialized class struggle. The colour line was thought by 
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Mariátegui in the specific form of the white/Indian distinction In doing so, he 
inaugurated a specific Marxist sensibility towards the national question in Latin 
America, a sensibility that considers racial and ethnical heterogeneity as a major 
characteristic of the deficits these countries have historically displayed, and hence 
projects a non-homogeneizing but overtly plural process of nationalization as both 
socialization of production and cultural decolonization.  
 This sensibility was expressed in the centrality given to the ‘elements of 
practical socialism’ populating Peru’s palimpsest-like economy, immortalized in the 
claim for an ‘Indo-American socialism’. In the matching of socialism and indigenous 
memories, the ‘backward’ Indian elements become anticipatory of a socialist 
solution for the ill-resolved national, democratic tasks. Mariátegui’s Marxism 
envisioned the racialization or ethnicization of class struggle in such a way that the 
very idea of social revolution underwent a transformation. For if the actuality of 
revolution (either ‘passive’ or socialist) demanded a close attention to the affinities 
between the imperialist racialization of struggles and the local history of Peru’s 
colonial and post-colonial superstructures, the dialectical counterpart of such 
affinities was to be found in the potential synchronization of ‘international’ 
socialism and the ‘autochthonous’ myth of Pachakutec. The synchronization of these 
hetero-temporal elements into a concrete ‘national’ conjuncture was, in my view, the 
heart of Mariátegui’s Indo-American socialist revolution.  
 Mariátegui’s incorporation of indigenous cultural memories into his political 
imaginary was accompanied by the singular relevance accorded by him to 
metaphysical disquisitions within Marxism, particularly regarding the work of social 
myths. The otherwise perplexing coupling of Lenin and Sorel (a hallmark of this 
imaginary) is traced in Chapter III back to Bergson’s philosophy of memory and the 
work of the past in the present. The perspective of uneven and combined 
development is translated by Mariátegui into Bergson’s language of creative 
evolution and duration; from these coordinates, he comes to terms with the virtual, 
durational, and contemporary nature of the myth of Pachakutec – the restoration of 
Tawantinsuyu or return of the Inka. The translation of socialist revolution into 
mythical language (the conception of socialist revolution as a living, acting social 
myth) performed a synchronization of subversive, liberatory Indian structures of 
247 
 
temporalization with the prospects of a worldwide classless society. By means of 
this perspectival shift, the Peruvian Marxist populated socialism with rich and 
plural ethno-cultural Andean elements. 
 The focus on Mariátegui in the first part delineates a subalternist perspective 
in which communist politics are rooted in communitarian, popular, and subaltern 
groups, practices, and temporal densities –not in ideal state-forms nor in abstract 
considerations about cultural incommensurability. The conflation of these last two 
elements was arguably at the basis of Haya de la Torre’s political imaginary, 
something that becomes visible in his polemics against Mariátegui and Marxism. It 
is possible to read Haya’s observations on Latin American temporality as 
irreducible to Western history (premised on an idiosyncratic adoption of Einstein’s 
theory of space-time relativity) in terms of an argument about alternative 
modernities avant la lettre. Mariátegui, in contradistinction, defended a multi-level 
version of Marxist dialectics, in which the Amerindian, Andean peoples participate 
in both the contemporaneousness of capitalist modernity and the prospects of a 
world socialist revolution. Instead of abstractly criticizing Eurocentric ideologies, he 
opened up in Latin America a pathway for coming to terms with the 
universalization of the particular and the localization of the universal. 
The second part of this research assembles three versions of Marxism that, 
with different means, continued to work upon the mismatch between Latin America 
and Marxism, this time in the latter’s dominant version of Stalinism. Chapter IV 
revisits the dependency hypothesis, a label through which I aggregate the otherwise 
diverse political and intellectual network around so-called dependency theory. The 
central debate informing the dependency school revolved around possibility for 
coming to terms with the particular law of (under)development of Latin America’s 
capitalism. I argue that this debate outlined a way to critically consider the notion of 
development, notwithstanding the limitations of its positive theoretical 
formulations. 
 A general – however succinct – survey on the context and main events that 
gave momentum to the ‘dependency hypothesis’ is provided in Chapter IV. 
Understood as a heterogeneous debate, the convergences and dissimilarities 
between the approach of the dependency school and the framework of uneven and 
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combined development are conveyed by means of the reconstruction of the debate 
between Brazilians Fernando H. Cardoso and Ruy Mauro Marini. Aimed at building 
a local, potentially Third-Worldist paradigm for the social sciences, the dependency 
hypothesis envisioned a viewpoint to put into question the linear conception of 
capitalist development. In what can be considered as a hallmark of ‘Third-world 
nationalism’, the shortcomings of the dependency hypothesis may be attributed to 
its ‘dependence’ to a non-dialectical conception of capitalist development.  
Conversely, the transformation of the dependency hypothesis into a 
coherent general theory for peripheral capitalism, and the lack of conceptual 
mediations between analytical levels that the Cardoso-Marini debate profusely 
displays, should not lead to a total dismissal of important conceptual achievements 
and approaches forged by this current. Even more so when Latin American ‘states 
of compromise’ – the same that evidenced the weakness and pitfalls of their 
developmental roads during the 1960s and ‘70s – have nowadays by and large been 
dismantled, aggravating the dependence conditions to multi-national corporations 
and neo-imperialist institutions. 
 A comparable destabilization of unilinear conceptions of development was at 
the basis of Aricó’s intervention in the midst of the ‘crisis of Marxism’ during the 
late-1970s and ’80s. Chapter V offers a reading of Marx and Latin America as such an 
intervention. In it, the notion of misencounter (desencuentro) between the hegemonic 
version of Marxist theory and Latin America’s concrete social formations comes to 
the fore. This misencounter, in turn, allows Aricó to explain the history of 
misunderstandings that marked the implantation of communist and socialist 
ideologies throughout the region. In his ‘symptomatic’ reading of Marx’s ‘Bolivar y 
Ponte’, Aricó excavated an all-too Eurocentric conception of development. 
However, these rather unfortunate considerations on Bolívar – and on the 
independence processes of the sub-continent more generally – contrast with 
‘another’ Marx, the Marx of the writings on Ireland, Spain, India, and the Russian 
commune. This late, fragmentary Marx demonstrates a sensibility to both uneven 
development and other-than-Western roads to socialism. For Aricó, it is a 
conceptual sensibility that invites us to reinitiate a productive dialogue which, while 
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beginning in and from Latin America, can be situated within a broader Marxist 
horizon. 
 In a line of reasoning that echoes Cardoso’s version of the dependency 
hypothesis, yet is aimed at re-reading the Marxist canon as a whole, Aricó indicates 
that what Marx was unable to perceive in Latin America – but not in other 
peripheral contexts – was the pivotal role of the political, particularly of the state, in 
the making of these countries. This blindness is read by Aricó as an inverted 
Hegelianism, a theoretical framework that prevented Marx from conceiving the 
state as actually producing civil society. However, the further deepening of these 
critical reflections led Aricó to a conception of the autonomy of the political 
informed first by Althusser and Tronti, and later by liberal conceptions of 
democracy. Aricó participated in the debate about the crisis of Marxism (qualified 
by Althusser as resting on the lack of a theory of the state) from the Eurocommunist 
side. His attempt at a theoretical encounter between democracy and socialism 
brought him closer to the liberal positions characteristic of the process of socialist 
renovation in the sub-continent – that is, to a merely formal conception of 
democracy, deprived of class critique. 
 Despite his late liberal orientation, I consider that Aricó forms part of Latin 
American Marxism in terms of his comprehension of the role that translations and 
mistranslations play in the development of a genuine socialist project. On the one 
hand, his long-lasting non-conformity with dogmatic Marxism was the source of 
different, perhaps zigzagging endeavours, all of them oriented to nourishing 
Marxist theory by means of its dialogue with other contemporary philosophical and 
conceptual coordinates. On the other, his tireless labour as translator and editor of 
numerous key Marxist works remains unparalleled to date. At the crux of the 
translational exercise, the theoretical misencounter of Marxism and Latin America 
outlined by Aricó helps to make visible the unilinear regimes of translation that 
dominated socialist and communist politics in the region. Conversely, this 
misencounter is also revelatory of the uneven pathways through which Marxist 
theorizations can unfold and develop. 
 René Zavaleta Mercado offered a related but alternative approach to both the 
crisis of Marxism and the question of democracy. As reconstructed in Chapter VI, 
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Zavaleta’s Marxism shared with Aricó a number of themes, among them the 
abovementioned crisis of Marxism, its possible encounter with a revolutionary 
subject in the capitalist periphery, the role of the nation under these conditions, and 
the value of the democratic question for a socialist horizon. His work was premised 
on a concern akin to Aricó’s, yet in an inverted manner: while the latter questioned 
the ability of Marxist theory to come to terms with Latin America’s social and 
political dynamics, Zavaleta shifted the approach and problematized the ability of a 
small proletariat from the periphery to incorporate (in his own terms, ‘subsume’) 
historical materialism as part of its own class consciousness.  
 Acknowledging the need to ‘nationalize’ Marx’s apparatus, Zavaleta 
elaborated the category of ‘motley society’ (sociedad abigarrada) to approach Bolivia 
and other Latin American countries. Motley refers to an aggregation of different 
temporal densities, structures of rebellion, and productive relations, indicating the 
irreducibility of social heterogeneity to one-sided, top-down policies of formal 
incorporation of cultural aspects to a national narrative. This conception of lo 
abigarrado lays the ground for a method that finds in the moments of ‘crisis’ the 
theoretical-practical event giving momentum to both social knowledge and class 
consciousness. Crisis as method is the pathway to coming to terms with those 
moments of unification of what is otherwise abigarrado.  
 Zavaleta understood that working-class consciousness is forged through the 
encounters and misencounters among the subaltern groups that make up a motley 
society. In this sense, he positively evaluated the encounter of the mining proletariat 
and the indigenous movement of Katarismo in the events of November 1979. This 
encounter revolved around ‘democracy’, a programmatic element that in Zavaleta’s 
account became incorporated for the first time by the Bolivian working class during 
the 1979 general strike. Zavaleta argues that the democratic element was further 
qualified by the emergent indigeneity struggling in defence of the Andean, agrarian 
structure of temporalization. Notwithstanding the fact that Zavaleta did not live 
long enough to delve deeper into this encounter, in my view he envisioned a 
perspective in which a proletarian conception of democracy can be conceived in 
terms of a decolonizing horizon – one that takes seriously indigenous temporalities, 
structures of rebellion, and knowledges into a historical-materialist account.     
251 
 
 
*          *          *  
 
The central aim of this research has been to provide a processual reconstruction of 
an ensemble of crucial theoretical contributions, showing the presence of a 
permanent mismatch at the heart of Latin American Marxism. The mismatch 
between Marxist theory and the sub-continent’s particularities can be considered as 
the source of permanent theoretical trouble, as expressed in the authors and 
arguments under discussion: implicitly in Mariátegui (but made particularly explicit 
in his debate with Haya de la Torre) and more openly in the formulations of the 
dependency school, Aricó, and Zavaleta. In so doing, this work traces the Marxist 
formulations triggered by this theoretical and political uneasiness, reconstructing 
the argumentative lines it induced, their conceptual and contextual backdrops, and 
reformulating the most significant achievements for the prospect of a 
deprovincialized Marxism.  
 More particularly, this research shows a narrative of Latin American Marxism 
in which a family of themes, concerns, and concepts were arrayed to confront the 
popularized Eurocentrism of mainstream Marxist theorizations. The hypothesis of a 
subalternization of Latin America by a dominant Eurocentric Marxism was 
addressed and confronted in very different ways: Mariátegui’s anti-imperialist and 
socialist indigenism, the dependentistas economic Third-worldism, Aricó’s anti-
developmentalist plea for the virtues of backwardness, and Zavaleta’s lo abigarrado. 
In all of these formulations, there is a common question about how to think in 
universal terms without losing sight of the particular; how to think socialism in, 
from, and for Latin America. Yet more concretely, within this constellation a subset 
of themes is identifiable: in particular, the combination of class and racial/ethnic 
struggles emerges as an important feature of Latin American Marxism. From 
Mariátegui to Zavaleta, there is a marked conceptual sensibility towards the ‘Indian 
question’, more precisely towards the hetero-temporal dimension this question 
demands from Marxism, if a genuinely Latin-American socialism is to emerge. 
Indigeneity, the other-than-Latin site of contestations in which indigenous identities 
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are articulated, constitutes a powerful indication of the subaltern paths followed by 
some Latin American currents of Marxism towards its decolonization. 
 The central hypothesis of the thesis, the existence of an intellectual 
constellation bound together by a subalternist perspective, has been explored and 
confirmed in our interlinked studies of some of its crucial figures. Of course, the 
vague appellation to a ‘perspective’ giving form to a ‘constellation’ is indicative of 
the fact we are dealing with neither strictly unified nor coherent formulations 
among the revised authors and currents. One might speak here of the virtual unity 
and actual differentiation of a perspective that, in its more abstract point of 
convergence, took the referent ‘Latin America’ as a subaltern locus to re-think 
Marxist theory. The willingness to think both the actuality of capitalism and the 
prospects of socialism opened through its theoretical-practical criticism from a non-
Western (and non-provincial) perspective, characterizes the versions of Marxism 
investigated herein. As a whole, they instantiate by different, perhaps divergent 
means what Harootunian has named the deprovincialization of Marxism.  
   History is still the history of class struggle, just as the Communist Manifesto 
asserted more than 150 years ago. This is not to say that history and class, even 
politics, remain the same. Historical materialism is not a universal grammar of class 
struggle, a homogeneous political imaginary and toolkit, but rather a method to 
critique and combat the capitalist present. If the task of the materialist historian 
dwells in the patient-yet-urgent reconstruction of the subalterns’ collective memory 
(as Aricó as well as Benjamin asserted) – if, in other words, this task implies 
negotiating a path between a historical-materialist perspective and a sensibility to 
other-than-capitalist ‘languages’, structures of temporality and of rebellion – then 
these reconstructions must necessarily deal with translations and mistranslations, 
with the equivocations produced as well as with the encounters fostered in the 
realm of class struggle, which is the ground on which emancipatory battles are 
fought. 
253 
 
Bibliography Consulted 
 
Acha, Omar, and Debora D’Antonio. 2013. ‘Cartografia y Perspectivas del Marxismo 
Latinoamericano.’ In Militantes, Intelectuales y Revolucionarios. Ensayos sobre 
Marxismo e Izquierda en America Latina, Carlos Aguirre ed. and intro., 181–228. 
North Carolina: A Contracorriente. 
Aguirre, Carlos, ed. 2013. Militantes, Intelectuales y Revolucionarios. Ensayos sobre 
Marxismo e Izquierda en America Latina. North Carolina: A Contracorriente. 
Althusser, Louis. 1977. ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes towards an 
Investigation).’ In Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays., 85–125. London: New 
Left Books. 
———. 1978. ‘The Crisis of Marxism.’ Marxism Today 22 (7): 215–20. 
———. 2009. Reading Capital. London & New York: Verso. 
———. 2012. ‘On Marxist Thought.’ ViewPoint Magazine. 
https://viewpointmag.com/2012/09/12/on-marxist-thought/. 
Amin, Samir. 1976. Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of 
Peripheral Capitalism. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Anderson, Kevin. 2010. Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-
Western Societies. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Anderson, Perry. 1976a. Considerations on Western Marxism. London: Verso. 
———. 1976b. ‘The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci.’ New Left Review I (100): 5–78. 
———. 1984. ‘Modernity and Revolution.’ New Left Review, I, , no. 144: 96–113. 
———. 1992. ‘The Ends of History.’ In A Zone of Engagement, 279–375. London: 
Verso. 
Anievas, Alexander, and Kerem Nişancıoğlu. 2015. How the West Came to Rule: The 
Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism. London: Pluto Press. 
Antezana, Luis. 1991. Dos Conceptos en la Obra de Zavaleta Mercado. Latin America 
Studies Center Series 1. College Park: University of Maryland. 
Aquézolo Castro, Manuel. comp. 1976. La Polémica del Indigenismo. Lima: Mosca 
Azul Editores. 
Aricó, José. 1978. Mariátegui y los Orígenes del Marxismo Latinoamericano. México: 
Ediciones Pasado y Presente. 
254 
 
———. 1982. ‘Marxismo Latinoamericano.’ In Diccionario de Politica, Norberto 
Bobbio, Gianfranco Pasquino, Nicola Matteuci. Vol. 2. Mexico, D.F.: Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores. 
———. 1983. ‘Marx Y America Latina.’ Nueva Sociedad, 66: 71–89. 
———. 1984. ‘Presentacion’. In El Concepto de Lo Politico. Carl Schmitt, Jose Arico 
trans. and introd. Buenos Aires: Folios Ediciones. 
———. 1988. La Cola Del Diablo: Itinerario de Gramsci en América Latina. Buenos Aires, 
Argentina: Puntosur Editores. 
———. 1999. La Hipótesis de Justo: Escritos sobre el Socialismo en América Latina. 
Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana. 
———. 2014. Marx and Latin America. Translated by David Broder. Chicago: 
Haymarket. 
Arnall, Gavin, Susana Draper, and Ana Sabau. 2015. ‘José Aricó como Lector de 
Gramsci.’ In Gramsci En Las Orillas, Oscar Cabezas ed., 143–70. Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones La Cebra. 
Balibar, Etienne. 1991. ‘The Nation Form: History and Ideology.’ In Race, Nation, 
Class: Ambiguous Identities, Etienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein, 86–106. 
London: Verso. 
———. 2007. The Philosophy of Marx. London: Verso. 
———. 2010. ‘Philosophy and the Frontiers of the Political. A Biographical-
Theoretical Interview with Emanuela Fornari.’ IRIS [S.l.]: 23–64. 
Bambirra, Vania. 1971. Diez Años de Insurrección en América Latina. Santiago, Chile: 
Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana. 
———. 1978. Teoría de La Dependencia: Una Anticrítica. México: Ediciones Era. 
Barco, Oscar del. 1982. ‘Introduccion.” In Karl Marx. Notas Marginales al Tratado de 
Economia Politica de Adolph Wagner. Mexico, D.F.: Cuadernos de Pasado y 
Presente. 
Bartolovich, Crystal, and Neil Lazarus. 2002. Marxism, Modernity, and Postcolonial 
Studies. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bartra, Roger. 1993. Agrarian Structure and Political Power in Mexico. Stephen K. Ault 
trans. Baltimore, Md.; London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Beigel, Fernanda. 2006. La Epopeya de una Generación y una Revista: Las Redes 
Editoriales de José Carlos Mariátegui en América Latina. Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Biblos. 
255 
 
———. 2010. ‘Dependency Analysis: The Creation of New Social Theory in Latin 
America.’ In The ISA Handbook on Diverse Sociological Traditions, Sujeta Patel, 189–
200. London: SAGE. 
Benjamin, Walter. 1996a. ‘Paralipomena to ‘On the Concept of History.’ In Selected 
Writings Vol. 4. Michael Jennings, Howard Eliand & Gary Smith. Cambridge, 
Mass.; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
———. 1996b. “The Task of Translator.” In Selected Writings Vol. 1, Marcus Bullock 
& Michael Jennings, 253–63. Cambridge, Mass; London: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press. 
———. 1998. Origin of German Tragic Drama. John Osborne transl. London & New 
York: Verso. 
———. 1999. The Arcades Project. Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University 
Press. 
Bensaïd, Daniel. 2009. Marx for Our Times: Adventures and Misadventures of a Critique. 
London; New York: Verso. 
Bergel, Martin. 2009. “Nomadismo Proselitista y Revolución. Notas para una 
Caracterización del Primer Exilio Aprista (1923-1931).” Estudios Interdisciplinarios 
de América Latina y El Caribe 20 (1): 41–66. 
Bergson, Henri. 1991. Matter and Memory. New York: Zone Books. 
———. 2001. Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness. 
Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. 
Bhabha, Homi K. 1995. ‘In a Spirit of Calm Violence.’ In After Colonialism: Imperial 
Histories and Postcolonial Displacements, Gyan Prakash, 326–43. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Bloch, Ernst. 1977. ‘Nonsynchronism and the Obligation of Its Dialectics.’ New 
German Critique, 11: 22–38. 
Bobbio, Norberto. 1975. ‘Esiste Una Teoria Marxista Dello Stato?’ Mondo Operaio. 
Boer, Roland. 2009. Political Myth: On the Use and Abuse of Biblical Themes. Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
———. 2011. Criticism of Religion: On Marxism and Theology II. Chicago: Haymarket 
Books. 
Bolivar, Simon. 2003. ‘The Jamaica Letter: Response from a South American to a 
Gentleman from This Island (6 September 1815).’ In El Libertador. Writings of 
Simon Bolivar, David Bushnell ed. intro. & notes, 12–30. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
256 
 
Boothman, Dereck. 2010. ‘Translation and Translatability: Renewal of the Marxist 
Paradigm.’ In Gramsci, Language, and Translation, Peter Ives & Rocco Lacorte eds., 
107–33. Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
Bosteels, Bruno. 2005. ‘Theses on Antagonism, Hybridity, and the Subaltern in Latin 
America.’ Dispositio/n 52 (25): 147–58. 
———. 2012. Marx and Freud in Latin America : Politics, Psychoanalysis, and Religion in 
Times of Terror. London: Verso. 
———. 2013. El Marxismo en América Latina : Nuevos Caminos al Comunismo. La Paz: 
Vicepresidencia del Estado, Presidencia de la Asamblea Legislativa 
Plurinacional. 
Bottici, Chiara. 2007. A Philosophy of Political Myth. New York ; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
———. 2009. ‘Philosophies of Political Myth, a Comparative Look Backwards 
Cassirer, Sorel and Spinoza.’ European Journal of Political Theory 8 (3): 365–82. 
Brenner, Robert. 1977. ‘The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-
Smithian Marxism.’ New Left Review,  no. I/104: 25–92. 
Burga, Manuel. 2005. La Historia y Los Historiadores en el Perú. Lima: UNMSM / 
Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. 
Burgos, Raúl. 2004. Los Gramscianos Argentinos : Cultura y Política en la Experiencia de 
Pasado Y Presente’. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. 
Caballero, Manuel. 1978. La Internacional Comunista y America Latina. 
———. 1986. Latin America and the Comintern, 1919-1943. Cambridge ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cadena, Marisol de la. 2012. ‘Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes: Conceptual 
Reflections Beyond “Politics”.’ Cultural Anthropology 25 (2): 334–70. 
Camacho, Daniel. 1979. Debates sobre la Teoría de la Dependencia y la Sociología 
Latinoamericana : Ponencias del XI Congreso Latinoamericano de Sociología. Ciudad 
Universitaria Rodrigo Facio, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana. 
Caputo, Orlando, and Roberto Pizarro. 1971. Imperialismo, Dependencia y Relaciones 
Economicas Internacionales. Santiago de Chile: Centro de Estudios Socio 
Economicos, Universidad de Chile. 
Cardoso, Fernando H. 1972. ‘Dependent Capitalist Development in Latin America.’ 
New Left Review, no. I/74: 83–95. 
———. 1975. Autoritarismo E Democratização. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra. 
257 
 
———. 1977. ‘The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States.’ Latin 
American Research Review 12 (3): 7–24. 
———. 1979. ‘On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America.’ 
In The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, David Collier ed., 33–59. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Cardoso, Fernando H., and Enzo Faletto. 1978. Dependencia y Desarrollo en América 
Latina : Ensayo de Interpretación Sociológica. México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. 
———. 1979. Dependency and Development in Latin America. Marjorie Urquidi trans. 
Berkeley, California ; London: University of California Press. 
Cardoso, Fernando H., and José Serra. 1978. ‘Las Desventuras de la Dialéctica de la 
Dependencia.’ Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 40 (Special Issue): 9–55. 
Carlucci, Alessandro. 2013. Gramsci and Languages: Unification, Diversity, Hegemony. 
Historical Materialism Book Series, Volume 59. Leiden: Brill. 
Castro Pozo, Hildebrando. 1924. Nuestra Comunidad Indigena. Lima: Editorial El 
Lucero. 
Castro-Arenas, Mario. 1979. ‘Aprismo, Marxismo, Relativismo.’ Nueva Sociedad, no. 
44: 49–60. 
Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2000. Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical 
Difference. Princeton, N.J. ; Woodstock: Princeton University Press. 
Chang Rodriguez, Eugenio. 1983. Poetica e Ideologia en Jose Carlos Mariategui. Madrid: 
Editorial Porrúa Turanzas. 
Chavarría, Jesús. 1979. José Carlos Mariátegui and the Rise of Modern Peru, 1890-1930. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 
Chavez, Daniel, César A. Rodríguez Garavito, and Patrick S. Barrett. 2008. La Nueva 
Izquierda en América Latina. Madrid: Libros de la Catarata. 
Chibber, Vivek. 2012. Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital. London: Verso. 
Chilcote, Ronald H. 1982. Dependency and Marxism : Toward a Resolution of the Debate. 
Epping: Bowker. 
Chilcote, Ronald H., and Dale L. Johnson. 1983. Theories of Development : Mode of 
Production or Dependency? Beverly Hills London: Sage. 
Concheiro, Elvira, Massimo Modonesi, and Horacio Gutiérrez Crespo. 2007. El 
Comunismo: Otras Miradas Desde América Latina. México D.F.: Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México : Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en 
Ciencias y Humanidades. 
258 
 
Coronado, Jorge. 2009. The Andes Imagined: Indigenismo, Society, and Modernity. 
Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Cortes, Martin. 2014. ‘Contactos y Diferencias: la “Crisis Del Marxismo” en América 
Latina y en Europa.’ Cuadernos Americanos 148 (2): 139–63. 
———. 2015. Un Nuevo Marxismo para América Latina. José Aricó: Traductor, Editor, 
Intelectual. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. 
Costigan, Lúcia. 1994. ‘Colonial Literature and Social Reality in Brazil and the 
Viceroyalty of Peru: The Satirical Poetry of Gregório de Matos and Juan Del Valle 
Y Caviedes.’ In Coded Encounters: Writing, Gender, and Ethnicity in Colonial Latin 
America, Francisco J. Cevallos-Candau, Jeffrey A. Cole, Nina M. Scott, Nicomedes 
Suárez-Araúz , 87–100. Amherst: University of Minnesota Press. 
Cotler, Julio. 1988. Clases, Estado y Nación en el Perú. Lima: Instituto de Estudios 
Peruanos. 
Couto, Cristiano Pinheiro de. 2016. ‘The Making of Political and Cultural Hegemony 
in the Context of Transition: Narratives on Democracy and Socialism in 
Encontros Com a Civilização Brasileira, Cuadernos de Marcha (Second Period) 
and Controversia (1979-1985).’ Tempo, Online version, In press. 
Crespo, Horacio. 2014. ‘The Latin-American Marxism of Arico: Undercovering the 
Autonomous Role of Politics in Marx’s Fallacy.’ In Marx and Latin America, José 
Aricó. Translated by David Broder. Chicago: Haymarket. 
Cueva, Agustín. 1990. El Desarrollo del Capitalismo en América Latina : Ensayo de 
Interpretación Histórica. Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. 
———. 2007. ‘Problemas y Perspectivas de La Teoría de La Dependencia.” In Entre 
la Ira y la Esperanza y Otros Ensayos de Crítica Latinoamericana, Bogotá: CLACSO : 
Siglo del Hombre Editores. 
Daniels, Paul Raimond. 2014. Nietzsche and The Birth of Tragedy. London: Routledge. 
Davidson, Neil. 2006. ‘From Uneven to Combined Development.’ In 100 Years 
ofPermanent Revolution. Results and Prospects, Bill Dun & Hugo Radice , 10–26. 
London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. 
Deleuze, Gilles. 1988. Bergsonism. New York: Zone Books. 
Derrida, Jacques. 2006. Specters of Marx: The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and 
the New International. New York ; London: Routledge. 
Dessau, Adalbert. 1971. ‘Literatura y Sociedad en las Obras de Jose Carlos 
Mariategui.’ In Mariategui: Tres Estudios, Antonio Melis ed. Lima: Editorial 
Amauta. 
259 
 
Dodge, Peter. 1966. Beyond Marxism: The Faith and Works of Hendrik de Man. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Domingues, José Maurício. 2011. ‘Revisiting Dependency and Development in Latin 
America.’ Ciência & Trópico 35 (2). 
https://periodicos.fundaj.gov.br/CIC/article/view/905. 
Dorfman, Ariel, and Armand Mattelart. 1971. Para Leer al Pato Donald. Valparaiso: 
Ediciones Universitarias de Valparaiso. 
Dos Santos, Theotonio. 1968. El Nuevo Carácter de la Dependencia. Santiago de Chile: 
Centro de Estudios Socio-Económicos, Universidad de Chile. 
———. 1969. Socialismo O Fascismo : Dilema Latinoamericano. Santiago: Ediciones 
Prensa Latinoamericana. 
———. 1970a. Dependencia y Cambio Social. Santiago: Centro de Estudios Socio 
Económicos, Universidad de Chile. 
———. 1970b. ‘The Structure of Dependence.’ The Latin American Economic Review, 
Eighty-Second Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 60 (2): 
231–36. 
Dotti, Jorge E. 1990. ‘Justo Lector de El Capital.’ In Las Vetas del Texto: Una Lectura 
Filosófica de Alberdi, Los Positivistas, Juan B. Justo. Buenos Aires: Puntosur. 
Draper, Hal. 1968. ‘Karl Marx and Simon Bolívar. A Note on Authoritarian 
Leadership in a National-Liberation Movement.’ New Politics VII (1): 64–77. 
Draper, Susana. n/d. ‘Re-Reading the Heterodox Marxist Canon: René Zavaleta 
Mercado on Dual Power and Other Marxist Metaphors of State Transformation 
in Latin America.’ Unpublished. https://www.academia.edu/7580853/Re-
reading_the_heterodox_marxist_canon_Ren%C3%A9_Zavaleta_Mercado_on_du
al_power_and_other_marxist_metaphors_of_state_transformation_in_Latin_Am
erica. 
Du Bois, W. E. B. 1970. ‘The African Roots of War.’ In W. E. B. Du Bois: A Reader., 
Meyer Weinberg ed. and introd. New York: Harper & Row. 
Dussel, Enrique D. 2001. Towards an Unknown Marx : A Commentary on the 
Manuscripts of 1861-63. London; New York: Routledge. 
Echeverría, Bolívar. 1981. ‘El Problema de La Nación (Desde La ‘crítica de La 
Economía Política’).’ Cuadernos Politicos, no. 29: 25–35. 
Edwards, Theodore. 1957. ‘Review of The Political Economy of Growth, by Paul A. 
Baran.’ Marxist Internet Archive. 
https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/document/swp-us/edonbaran.htm. 
260 
 
Emmanuel, Arghiri, Celso Furtado, and Hartmut Elsenhans. 1982. Appropriate or 
Underdeveloped Technology? Chichester: Wiley. 
Falcón, Jorge. 1978. Anatomía de Los 7 Ensayos de Mariátegui. Lima: Editorial Amauta. 
Faletto, Enzo. 2005. ‘La CEPAL Y La Sociologia Del Desarrollo.’ In Dimensiones 
Sociales, Políticas Y Culturales Del Desarrollo : Antologia, 79–110. Santiago: 
Catalonia : FLACSO-Chile. 
Farris, Sarah. 2013. ‘Althusser and Tronti: The Primacy of Politics versus the 
Autonomy of the Political.’ In Encountering Althusser : Politics and Materialism in 
Contemporary Radical Thought, Katja Diefenbach, Sara R. Farris, Gal Kirn & Peter 
D. Thomas eds., 185–204. London & New Delhi & New York & Sydney: 
Bloomsbury Academic. 
Ferguson, Kennan. 2006. ‘La Philosophie Americaine: James, Bergson, and the 
Century of Intercontinental Pluralism.’ Theory and Event 9 (1). 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/195384. 
Fernández, Osvaldo. 2010. Itinerario y Trayectos Hereticos de Jose Carlos Mariátegui. 
Santiago de Chile: Editorial Quimantu. 
Flores Galindo, Alberto. 1987. Buscando un Inca : Identidad y Utopía en Los Andes. 
Lima, Perú: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario. 
———. 1991. La Agonia de Mariategui. La Polemica con la Comintern. Madrid: Editorial 
Revolucion. 
Flores Galindo, Alberto, and Manuel Burga. 1980. Apogeo y Crisis de la Republica 
Aristocratica. Lima: Ediciones Rikchay Peru. 
Fornet-Betancourt, Rau l. 2001. Transformaciones del Marxismo: Historia del Marxismo 
en América Latina. Nuevo León: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León. 
Foucault, Michel. 2001. ‘Truth and Juridical Forms.’ In The Esential Works of Michel 
Foucault. Vol. 3 Power, Paul Rabinow ed. London: Allen Lane. 
Franco, Carlos. 1981. Del Marxismo Eurocéntrico al Marxismo Latinoamericano. Lima: 
Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Participación. 
———. 2014. ‘Introduction.’ In Marx and Latin America, by Jose Arico. David Broder 
ed., xxxv–xlix. Chicago, Ill.: Haymarket Books. 
Frank, Andre Gunder. 1966. ‘The Development of Underdevelopment.’ Monthly 
Review 18 (4): 17–31. 
———. 1968. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of 
Chile and Brazil. New York & London: Monthly Review Press. 
261 
 
Frank, André Gunder. 1971. Lumpenburguesía: Lumpendesarrollo. Dependencia, Clase y 
Política en Latinoamérica. Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Prensa Latinoamericana. 
———. 1978. World Accumulation, 1492-1789. London: Macmillan. 
———. 1983. Crisis and Transformation of Dependency in the World System. Norwich: 
School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia. 
Frank, André Gunder, and Barry K. Gills. 1993. The World System : Five Hundred or 
Five Thousand Years? London: Routledge. 
Freeland, Anne. 2014a. ‘Notes on René Zavaleta: “Abigarramiento” as Condition of 
Constitutive Power.’ Alternautas. (Re)Searching Development: The Abya Yala Chapter 
1: 65–70. 
———. 2014b. ‘The Gramscian Turn: Readings from Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia.’ 
A Contracorriente. Una Revista de Historia Social Y Literatura de America Latina 11 
(2): 278–301. 
Frosini, Fabio. 2010. ‘On ‘Translatability’ in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks.’ In 
Gramsci, Language, and Translation, Peter Ives & Rocco Lacorte, 171–86. Plymouth: 
Lexington Books. 
Funes, Patricia. 2006. Salvar la Nación: Intelectuales, Cultura y Política en los Años 
Veinte Latinoamericanos. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros. 
Furtado, Celso. 1964. Development and Underdevelopment. Ricardo W. de Aguiar & 
Eric Charles Drysdale trans. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Gaido, Daniel, and Constanza Bosch Alessio. 2014. ‘A Strange Mixture of Guevara 
and Togliatti.  José María Aricó and the Pasado y Presente Group in Argentina.’ 
Historical Materialism 22 (3–4): 217–50. 
García Linera, Álvaro. 2009. Forma Valor y Forma Comunidad : Aproximación Teórica-
Abstracta a Los Fundamentos Civilizatorios Que Preceden al Ayllu Universal. La Paz: 
Muela del Diablo. 
Garci a Linera, Alvaro. 2009. ‘Indianismo y Marxismo. El Desencuentro de Dos 
Razones Revolucionarias.’ In La Potencia Plebeya. Acción Colectiva e Identidades 
Indígenas, Obreras y Populares en Bolivia, 477–500. Buenos Aires: CLACSO : Siglo 
del Hombre Editores. 
Gómez, María Soledad. 1986. El Discurso de Los Partidos Comunistas de América Latina 
y El Caribe en las Publicaciones del Movimiento Comunista Internacional. 
Gourgouris, Stathis. 2006. “The Dream-Reality of the Ruin.” In Walter Benjamin and 
the Arcades Project, Beatrice Hanssen ed., 201–24. London: Continuum. 
Gramsci, Antonio. 1977. Quaderni Del Carcere. Vol. 3. Torino: Einaudi. 
262 
 
———. 1985. Selections from Cultural Writings of Antonio Gramsci. London: Lawrence 
& Wishart. 
———. 1995. Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
———. 2003. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Quintin Hoare & 
Geoffrey N. Smith. London: Lawrence & Wishart. 
———. 2011. Prison Notebooks. Vol. 3. New York ; Chichester: Columbia University 
Press. 
Grigera, Juan. 2015. ‘Conspicuous Silences: State and Class in Structuralist and 
Neostructuralist Thought.’ In Crisis and Contradiction. Marxist Perspectives on Latin 
America in the Global Political Economy, Susan J. Spronk & Jeffery Webber eds., 
193–210. Leiden ; Boston: Brill. 
Grosfoguel, Ramon. 1997. ‘A TimeSpace Perspective of Development. Recasting 
Latin American Debates.’ Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 30 (3/4): 465–540. 
Guadarrama Gonza lez, Pablo. 1990. Marxismo y Anti-Marxismo en América Latina. 
Bogotá: Universidad INNCA de Colombia ; Unversidad Central de Las Villas de 
Santa Clara, Cuba. 
Guha, Ranajit. 1982. Subaltern Studies I : Writings on South Asian History and Society. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Gutie  rrez Aguilar, Raquel. 2008. Los Ritmos Del Pachakuti. La Paz, Bolivia: Ediciones 
Yachaywasi : Textos Rebeldes. 
Harootunian, Harry D. 2015. Marx after Marx: History and Time in the Expansion of 
Capitalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Harris, Michelle, Bronwyn Carlson, and Evan Poata-Smith. 2013. ‘Indigenous 
Identities and the Politics of Authenticity.’ In The Politics of Identity: Emerging 
Indigeneity, Michelle Harris, Bronwyn Carlson & Evan Te Ahu Poata-Smith . 
Sydney: UTSePress. 
Harvey, David. 2009. ‘The “New” Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession.’ 
Socialist Register 40 (40): 63–87. 
Haug, Wolfgang Fritz. 2000. ‘Gramsci’s Philosophy of Praxis: Camouflage or 
Refoundation of Marxist Thought?’ Socialism and Democracy, no. 14: 1–19. 
Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl. 1973. Aprismo : The Ideas and Doctrines of Victor Raúl 
Haya de La Torre. Robert Alexander comp. and transl. Kent, Ohio: Kent State 
University Press. 
263 
 
Haya de la Torre, Victor Raul. 1977a. Obras Completas Vol. 1. Preliminares. Lima: Juan 
Mejia Baca editores. 
———. 1977b. Obras Completas Vol. 4. El Antiimperialismo Y El APRA. Lima: Juan 
Mejia Baca editores. 
Henfrey, Colin. 1981. ‘Dependency, Modes of Production, and the Class Analysis of 
Latin America.’ In Dependency and Marxism, Ronald Chilcote ed., 17–54. Boulder, 
Colo: West-view Press. 
Hinkelammert, Franz J. 1970. Ideologías del Desarrollo y Dialéctica de la Historia. 
Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Nueva Universidad, Universidad Católica de Chile. 
———. 1972. Dialéctica del Desarrollo Desigual. Valparaiso, Chile: Ediciones 
Universitarias de Valparaiso. 
Hobson, John A. 1988. Imperialism: A Study. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Horkheimer, Max. 2005. ‘On Bergson’s Metaphysics of Time.’ Radical Philosophy 131: 
9–19. 
Horowitz, Irving Louis. 1961. Radicalism and the Revolt against Reason : The Social 
Theoris of Georges Sorel. New York: Humanities Press. 
Ives, Peter. 2004. Language and Hegemony in Gramsci. London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto 
Press. 
Ives, Peter, and Marcus Green. 2010. ‘Subalternity and Language: Overcoming the 
Fragmentation of Common Sense.’ In Gramsci, Language, and Translation, Peter 
Ives & Rocco Lacorte, 289–312. Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
James, C. L. R. 1980. Black Jacobins : Toussaint L’ouverture and the San Domingo 
Revolution. London: Allison & Busby. 
Jameson, Fredric. 1979. ‘Marxism and Historicism.’ New Literary History, 
Anniversary Issue: II, 11 (1): 41–73. 
———. 1996. ‘Five Theses on Actually Existing Marxism.’ Monthly Review 47 (11): 1–
10. 
———. 2002. The Political Unconscious : Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. London: 
Routledge. 
———. 2011. Representing ‘Capital’ : A Commentary on Volume One. London: Verso. 
Jay, Martin. 2004. Songs of Experience : Modern American and European Variations on a 
Universal Theme. Berkeley ; London: University of California Press. 
Justo, Juan Bautista. 1914. El Realismo Ingenuo. Buenos Aires: Tip. La Vanguardia. 
264 
 
Kallen, Horace Meyer. 1914. William James and Henri Bergson : A Study in Contrasting 
Theories of Life. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. 
Kaplan, Marcos. 1976. Formación del Estado Nacional en América Latina. Buenos Aires: 
Amorrortu Editores. 
Kay, Cristobal. 2010. Latin American Theories of Development and Underdevelopment. 
London & NEw York: Routledge. 
Kohan, Ne stor. 2003. Marx en su (Tercer) Mundo : Hacia un Socialismo no Colonizado. 
La Habana: Centro de Investigación y Desarrollo de la Cultura Juan Marinello. 
Kolakowski, Leszek. 1978. Main Currents of Marxism: Its Origin, Growth and 
Dissolution. Vol 2. The Golden Age. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Kouvelakis, Stathis. 2003. Philosophy and Revolution : From Kant to Marx. London ; 
New York: Verso. 
———. 2007. ‘Lenin as Reader of Hegel: Hypotheses for a Reading of Lenin’s 
Notebooks on Hegel’s The Science of Logic.’ In Lenin Reloaded: Toward a Politics of 
Truth, Sebastian Budgen, Statis Kouvelakis & Slavoj Zizek eds., 164–204. Durham 
& London: Duke University Press. 
———. 2008. ‘The Crises of Marxism and the Transformation of Capitalism.’ In 
Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism, J. Bidet & S. Kouvelakis eds., 23–38. 
Leiden ; Boston: Brill. 
Kraniauskas, John. 2000. ‘Hybridity in a Transnational Frame: Latin-Americanist 
and Postcolonial Perspectives on Cultural Studies.’ Nepantla: Views from South 1 
(1). 
———. 2004. ‘Laughing at Americanism: Benjamin, Mariategui, Chaplin.’ In Walter 
Benjamin : Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory. Vol. III. Appropriations, Peter 
Osborne ed., 367–78. London: Routledge. 
———. 2005. ‘Difference Against Development: Spiritual Accumulation and the 
Politics of Freedom.’ Boundary 2: An International Journal of Literature and Culture 
32 (2): 53–80. 
———. 2012. Políticas Literarias : Poder y Acumulación en la Literatura y el Cine 
Latinoamericanos. México, D.F.: FLACSO. 
———. 2015. ‘Universalizing the Ayllu.’ Radical Philosophy. 
https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/reviews/individual-
reviews/universalizing-the-ayllu. 
Labica, Georges, and Gerard Bensussan. 1985. Dictionnaire Critique Du Marxisme. 2e 
ed. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 
265 
 
Labriola, Antonio. 1912. Socialism and Philosophy. Ernest Unterman transl. Chicago: 
Charles H. Kerr & Company. 
LaCapra, Dominick. 1983. ‘Marxism in the Textual Maelstrom: Fredric Jameson’s 
The Political Unconscious.’ In Rethinking Intellectual History : Texts, Contexts, 
Language, Dominick LaCapra ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Laclau, Ernesto. 1979. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory : Capitalism, Fascism, 
Populism. London: New Left Books. 
———. 2005. On Populist Reason. London ; New York: Verso. 
Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy : Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 
———. 1987. ‘Post-Marxism Without Apologies.’ New Left Review I (166): 79–106. 
Larrain, Jorge. 1989. Theories of Development : Capitalism, Colonialism and Dependency. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
Larsen, Neil. 2001. Determinations : Essays on Theory, Narrative, and Nation in the 
Americas. London ; New York: Verso. 
Lauer, Mirko. 1997. Andes Imaginarios. Discursos Del Indigenismo 2. Cusco: SUR. 
Centro de Estudios del Socialismo. 
Lazarus, Neil, and Rashmi Varma. 2008. ‘Marxism and Postcolonial Studies.’ In 
Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism, 309–32. Leiden ; Boston: Brill. 
Leibner, Gerardo. 1999. El Mito del Socialismo Indígena: Fuentes y Contextos Peruanos 
de Mariátegui. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. 
Lenin, Vladimir Ilich. 1961. Collected Works. Vol. 38. Philosophical Notebooks. Moscow: 
Progress. 
———. 1996. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. A Popular Outline. London: 
Junius : Pluto. 
Lichtheim, George. 1971. From Marx to Hegel. New York: Herder and Herder. 
Llorente, Renzo. 2012. ‘Georges Sorel’s Anarcho-Marxism.’ In Libertarian Socialism. 
Politics in Black and Red, Alex Prichard, Ruth Kinna, Saku Pinta & David Berry 
eds., 78–95. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lopez Albujar, Enrique. 1976. ‘Sobre La Psicologia Del Indio.’ In La Polemica Del 
Indigenismo, Manuel Aquézolo Castro comp. Lima: Mosca Azul Editores. 
Love, Joseph L. 1996. Crafting the Third World : Theorizing Underdevelopment in 
Rumania and Brazil. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 
266 
 
Löwy, Michael. 1979. Georg Lukács : From Romanticism to Bolshevism. Patrick Camiller 
transl. London: NLB. 
———. 1981. The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development : The Theory of 
Permanent Revolution. London: NLB. 
———. 1992. Marxism in Latin America from 1909 to the Present : An Anthology. 
Atlantic Highlands, N.J. ; London: Humanities Press. 
———. 2005a. Fire Alarm : Reading Walter Benjamin’s On the Concept of History. Chris 
Turner transl. London ; New York: Verso. 
———. 2005b. The Theory of Revolution in the Young Marx. Chicago: Haymarket 
Books. 
———. 2008. ‘Communism and Religion. Jose Carlos Mariategui’s Revolutionary 
Mysticism.’ Latin American Perspectives 35/2 (159): 71–79. 
Lucero, Jose Antonio. 2008. ‘Fanon in the Andes: Fausto Reinaga, Indianismo, and 
the Black Atlantic.’ International Journal of Critical Indigenous Studies 1: 13–22. 
Lukács, György. 1972. Lenin: A Study on the Unity of His Thought. (Translated by 
Nicholas Jacobs.). Nicholas Jacobs trans. London: NLB. 
———. 1980. The Destruction of Reason. London: Merlin Press. 
Luxemburg, Rosa. 2004. ‘The Dissolution of Primitive Communism: From the 
Ancient Germans and the Incas to India, Russia, and Southern Africa.’ In The 
Rosa Luxemburg Reader. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
MacLeod, Murdo J. 1970. ‘The Soulouque Regime in Haiti, 1847-1859: A 
Reevaluation.’ Caribbean Studies 10 (3): 35–48. 
Malecki, Sebastian. 2013. ‘Difundir, Traducir, Producir. Arico y la Difusion del 
Marxismo Como Problematica.’ Nombres. Revista de Filosofia, no. 27: 153–77. 
Marcuse, Herbert. 1961. Soviet Marxism : A Critical Analysis. New York: Vintage 
Books. 
Mariaca, Guillermo. 2007. El Poder de La Palabra : Ensayos Sobre La Modernidad de La 
Crítica Cultural Hispanoamericana. Santiago de Chile: Tajmar Editores. 
Maria tegui, Jose Carlos. 1965a. La Escena Contemporánea. Lima: Editorial Amauta. 
———. 1965b. Siete Ensayos de Interpretación de La Realidad Peruana. Lima: Editorial 
Amauta. 
———. 1970. El Alma Matinal y Otras Estaciones del Hombre de Hoy. Lima: Editorial 
Amauta. 
267 
 
———. 1974. Seven Interpretative Essays on Peruvian Reality. Marjorie Urquidi trans. 
Austin: University of Texas Press. 
———. 1975. ‘Lenin.’ In ‘Fascismo Sudamericano’, ‘Los Intelectuales y la Revolución’ y 
otros artículos inéditos (1923 - 1924). Lima: Centro de Trabajo Intelectual 
Mariátegui,. 
———. 1976. Defensa del Marxismo : Polémica Revolucionaria. Lima: Editorial Amauta. 
———. 1977. El Artista y la Época. Lima: Editorial Amauta. 
———. 1977. Signos y Obras. Lima: Editorial Amauta. 
———. 1984. Historía de la Crisis Mundial: Conferencias, Años 1923 y 1924. Lima: 
Editorial Amauta. 
———. 1986. Peruanicemos al Perú. Lima: Editorial Amauta. 
———. 1987. Ideología y Política. Lima: Editorial Amauta. 
———. 2011. José Carlos Mariátegui: An Anthology. Harry Vanden & Marc Becker  
trans. and intro. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Marini, Ruy Mauro. 1969. Subdesarrollo Y Revolución. México D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores. 
———. 1977. Dialéctica de la Dependencia. México: Ediciones Era. 
———. 1978. ‘Las Razones del Neodesarrollismo (Respuesta a F. H. Cardoso Y J. 
Serra).’ Revista Mexicana de Sociologia 40 (Special Issue): 57–106. 
Martí, José, and Philip Sheldon Foner. 1977. Our America : Writings on Latin America 
and the Struggle for Cuban Independence. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Martin, James. 2002. ‘Performing Politics: Class, Ideology and Discourse in Marx’s 
Eighteenth Brumaire.’ In Marx’s “Eighteenth Brumaire” : (Post)modern 
Interpretations, Mark Cowling & James Martin , 129–44. London: Pluto. 
Marx, Karl. 1973. Grundrisse : Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough 
Draft). Harmondsworth, Eng. ; Baltimore: Penguin Books. 
———. 1976. Capital : A Critique of Political Economy. Volume One. London: Peguin 
Books in association with New Left Review. 
———. 1983. ‘K. Marx. Drafts of a Reply (February/March 1881). The Third Draft.’ 
In Late Marx and the Russian Road. Marx and the ‘Peripheries of Capitalism’, 123–27. 
New York: Monthly Review Press. 
268 
 
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 2010a. Collected Works. Vol.39. London: Lawrence & 
Wishart. 
———. 2010b. Collected Works. Vol. 3. London & New York: Lawrence & Wishart 
Electric Book. 
———. 2010c. Collected Works. Vol. 5. London & New York: Lawrence & Wishart 
Electric Book. 
———. 2010d. Collected Works. Vol 11. London & New York: Lawrence & Wishart 
Electric Book. 
———. 2010e. Collected Works. Vol 40. Letters 1856-59. London: Lawrence & Wishart 
Electric Book. 
Massardo, Jaime. 2001. Investigaciones Sobre la Historia del Marxismo en América Latina. 
Santiago de Chile: Bravo y Allende Editores. 
Mazzeo, Miguel. 2009. Invitacion al Descubrimiento: Jose Carlos Mariategui y el 
Socialismo de Nuestra America. Lima: Viuda de Mariategui e Hijos. 
McGettigan, Andrew. 2009. ‘“As Flowers Turn towards the Sun”. Walter Benjamin’s 
Bergsonian Image of the Past.’ Radical Philosophy 158: 25–35. 
Melgar Bao, Ricardo. 1999. ‘Las Universidades Populares en América Latina 1910-
1925.’ Estudios. Revista Del Centro de Estudios Avanzados, no. 11/12: 41–57. 
———. 2003. Redes e Imaginario del Exilio en México y América Latina, 1934-1940. 
Buenos Aires: Ediciones Libros en Red. 
Menninghaus, Winfried. 2013. Saber de los Umbrales. Walter Benjamin y el Pasaje del 
Mito. Mariela Vargas and Martin Simesen de Bielke transl. Buenos Aires: Biblos. 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1973. Adventures of the Dialectic. Joseph Bien transl. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
Mignolo, Walter. 2005. The Idea of Latin America. Malden, MA ; Oxford: Blackwell 
Pub. 
Modonesi, Massimo. 2014. Subalternity, Antagonism, Autonomy: Constructing the 
Political Subject. Reading Gramsci. London: Pluto Press. 
Moraga, Fabio. 2002. “Nietzsche y los Intelectuales de la Izquierda Latinoamericana, 
1920-1936.” Estudios, no. 64–65: 179–208. 
Moreiras, Alberto. 2001. The Exhaustion of Difference : The Politics of Latin American 
Cultural Studies. Durham, N.C. ; London: Duke University Press. 
269 
 
Munck, Ronaldo. 2007. ‘Marxism in Latin America/Latin American Marxism?’ In 
Twentieth-Century Marxism. A Global Introduction, Daryl Glasser & David Walker 
eds. London & New York: Routledge. 
Murray, Patrick. 2004. ‘The Social and Material Transformation of Production by 
Capital: Formal and Real Subsumption in Capital, Volume I.’ In The Constitution 
of Capital. Essays on Volume I of Marx’s Capital, Ricardo Bellofiore & Nicola Taylor 
eds., 243–73. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Osborne, Peter. 1995. The Politics of Time. Modernity and Avant-Garde. London & New 
York: Verso. 
———. 2000. ‘Small-Scale Victories, Large-Scale Defeats: Walter Benjamin’s Politics 
of Time.’ In Walter Benjamin’s Philosophy: Destruction & Experience, Andrew 
Benjamin and Peter Osborne eds., 57–107. London ; New York: Clinamen Press. 
———. 2015. ‘Out of Sync: Tomba’s Marx and the Problem of a Multi-Layered 
Temporal Dialectic.’ Historical Materialism 23 (4): 39–48.  
Oshiro, Jorge. 1996. “Labriola y Mariátegui o la Cuestión del Marxismo Creador.” 
Anuario Mariateguiano 5 (5): 169–82. 
———. 2013. Razón y Mito en Mariátegui : Siete Ensayos de Interpretación del 
Pensamiento Filosófico de José Carlos Mariátegui (1914-1930) : (La Busqueda de Una 
Nueva Racionalidad). Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso del Perú. 
Osorio, Jaime. 2004. Crítica de La Economía Vulgar: Reproducción Del Capital Y 
Dependencia. México: Miguel Angel Porrua. 
Ouviña, Hernán. 2010. ‘Traduccion Y Nacionalizacion Del Marxismo En America 
Latina.’ OSAL XI (28): 193–207. 
Packenham, Robert A. 1992. The Dependency Movement : Scholarship and Politics in 
Development Studies. Cambridge, Mass ; London: Harvard University Press. 
Palma, Gabriel. 1978. ‘Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a 
Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?’ 
World Development 6 (7–8): 881–924. 
Paris, Robert. 1980. ‘EL Marxismo de Mariategui.’ In Mariátegui y Los Orígenes del 
Marxismo Latinoamericano, Jose Arico ed. and intro. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno 
Editores. 
———. 1981. La Formación Ideológica de José Carlos Mariátegui. México, D.F: Ediciones 
Pasado y Presente. 
———. 1984. ‘Difusion y Apropiacion del Marxismo en America Latina.’ Boletin de 
Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe, no. 36: 3–12. 
270 
 
Parry, Benita. 2004. Postcolonial Studies : A Materialist Critique. London ; New York: 
Routledge. 
Petra, Adriana. 2013. ‘Pasado y Presente: Marxismo y Modernización Cultural en la 
Argentina Postperonista.’ Historia Y Espacio, no. 41: 105–31. 
Petras, James F., and Henry Veltmeyer. 2015. Power and Resistance: US Imperialism in 
Latin America. Studies in Critical Social Sciences, v. 83. Boston: Brill. 
Pike, Fredrick B. 1986. The Politics of the Miraculous in Peru : Haya de La Torre and the 
Spiritualist Tradition. Lincoln ; London: University of Nebraska Press. 
Pinto Santa Cruz, Aníbal. 1959. Chile, un Caso de Desarrollo Frustrado. Santiago de 
Chile. 
Poellner, Peter. 1998. ‘Myth, Art and Illusion in Nietzsche.’ In Myth and the Making of 
Modernity. The Problem of Grounding in Early Twentieth-Century Literature, Michael 
Bell and Peter Poellner eds., 61–80. Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: Editions Rodopi. 
Ponce, Anibal. 1983a. “Bolivar y Marx.” In Aníbal Ponce : El Marxismo Sin Nación?, 
Oscar Teran ed. and intro., 224–27. México, D.F.: Ediciones Pasado y Presente. 
———. 1983b. ‘Henri Bergson y El Premio Nobel de Literatura.” In Aníbal Ponce : El 
Marxismo Sin Nación?, Oscar Teran ed. and intro., 83–85. México, D.F.: Ediciones 
Pasado y Presente. 
Pradella, Lucia. 2013. ‘Imperialism and Capitalist Development in Marx’s Capital.’ 
Historical Materialism 21 (2): 117–147. 
Prebisch, Raul et. al. 1969. El Pensamiento de la CEPAL. Santiago de Chile: Editorial 
Universitaria. 
Rama, Angel. 1996. The Lettered City. John Charles Chasteen ed. and transl. Durham, 
North Carolina ; London: Duke University Press. 
Rauber, Isabel. 2006. América Latina : Poder y Socialismo en el Siglo XXI. Valencia: 
Vadell Hermanos. 
Regalado Álvarez, Roberto. 2006. América Latina entre Siglos : Dominación, Crisis, 
Lucha Social y Alternativas Políticas de la Izquierda. Melbourne: Ocean Press : Ocean 
Sur. 
Reinaga, Fausto. 1969. La Revolución India. La Paz: Ediciones PIB (Partido Indio de 
Bolivia). 
Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia. 2010. Oprimidos Pero No Vencidos : Luchas Del Campesinado 
Aymara Y Qhechwa, 1900-1980. La Paz: La Mirada Salvaje. 
271 
 
Roca, Deodoro. 1918. ‘Liminar Manifesto.’ wikipedia. 
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Liminar_Manifesto. 
Rodó, José Enrique. 1967. Ariel. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. 
Rojas Mix, Miguel. 1991. Los Cien Nombres de América : Eso Que Descubrió Colón. 
Barcelona: Lumen. 
Rojo, Grinor. 2012. De Las Más Altas Cumbres. Teoría Crítica Latinoamericana Moderna 
(1876-2006). Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones. 
Rollemberg, Denise. 1999. Exílios, Entre Raízes e Radares. Rio de Janeiro: Record. 
Rosenberg, Justin. 2007. ‘International Relations - The “Higher Bullshit”: A Reply to 
the Globalization Theory Debate.’ International Politics, no. 44: 450–82. 
Sakai, Naoki. 2006. ‘“You Asians”: On the Historical Role of the West and Asia 
Binary.’ In Japan after Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to 
the Present. Durham & London: Duke University Press. 
Saladino Garci a, Alberto. 1983. Indigenismo y Marxismo en América Latina. Toluca: 
Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México. 
Sanchez, Luis Alberto. n.d. ‘Prologo.’ In Sorel y Mariátegui. By Hugo Garcia Salvatecci. 
Lima: Enrique Delgado Valenzuela ediciones. 
———. 1921. Los Poetas de la Colonia. Lima: Euforion. 
———. 1974. Los Poetas de la Colonia y de la Revolución. Lima: Editorial Universo. 
Savransky, Martin. 2016. The Adventure of Relevance. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. Forthcoming. ‘A Decolonial Imagination: Sociology, Anthropology and the 
Politics of Reality.’ Sociology. 
Sayer, Derek. 1987. The Violence of Abstraction : The Analytic Foundations of Historical 
Materialism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Schutte, Ofelia. 1988. ‘Nietzsche, Mariategui, and Socialism: A Case of “Nietzschean 
Marxism” in Peru?’ Social Theory and Practice 14 (1): 71–85. 
Shanin, Teodor. 1984. Late Marx and the Russian Road : Marx and ‘the Peripheries of 
Capitalism’ : A Case. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Smith, Tony. 1979. ‘The Underdevelopment of Development Theory.’ World Politics 
31 (2): 247–88. 
Sobrevilla, David. 2005. El Marxismo de Mariátegui y su Aplicación a los 7 Ensayos. 
Lima: Universidad de Lima, Fondo de Desarrollo Editorial. 
272 
 
Solomon, Jon, and Naoki Sakai. 2006. ‘Introduction: Addressing the Multitude of 
Foreigners, Echoing Foucault.’ In Traces 4: Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial 
Difference, Naoki Sakai & Jon Solomon eds., 1–38. Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press. 
Sorel, Georges. 1976. From Georges Sorel. Vol 1: Essays in Socialism and Philosophy. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1999. Reflections on Violence. United Kingdom; New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Sotelo Valencia, Adrian. 1994. ‘Dependencia y Superexplotación.’ In La Teoría Social 
Latinoamericana. Vol. 2 Dependencia Y Subdesarrollo, 289–318. México: El Caballito. 
Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988. ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ In Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture, Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Education. 
———. 2006. In Other Worlds : Essays in Cultural Politics. London: Routledge. 
Stanley, John. 1976. ‘Introduction.’ In From Georges Sorel. Vol 1: Essays in Socialism 
and Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. 1981. The Sociology of Virtue : The Political & Social Theories of George Sorel. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Starcenbaum, Marcelo. 2011. ‘El Marxismo Incómodo: Althusser en la Experiencia 
de Pasado Y Presente.’ Izquierdas, no. 11: 35–53. 
Stern, Steve J. 1988. ‘Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the 
Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean.’ The American Historical Review 
93 (4): 829–72.  
Sunkel, Osvaldo. 1972. Capitalismo Transnacional y Desintegración Nacional en América 
Latina. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Visión. 
Tapia, Luis. 2002. La Producción del Conocimiento Local : Historia y Política en la Obra de 
René Zavaleta. La Paz, Bolivia: Muela del Diablo Editores : CIDES- UMSA. 
———. 2013. De La Forma Primordial a America Latina Como Horizonte Epistemologico. 
La Paz: Autodeterminación-UMSA. 
Tarcus, Horacio. 2007. Marx en la Argentina: Sus Primeros Lectores Obreros, 
Intelectuales y Científicos. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. 
Tera n, Oscar. 1985. Discutir Mariategui. Puebla: Universidad Autonoma de Puebla. 
———. 1986. En Busca de la Ideología Argentina. Buenos Aires: Catálogos Editora. 
273 
 
Thomas, Peter D. 2010. The Gramscian Moment : Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism. 
Chicago, Ill.: Haymarket. 
———. 2015. ‘Gramsci’s Marxism: The “Philosophy of Praxis”.’ In Antonio Gramsci, 
Mark McNally ed., 97–117. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Tieffemberg, Silvia. 2003. ‘Dime Cómo Durmió Cuando Vivía : La Controversia 
sobre el Incario.’ http://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/trab_eventos/ev.17/ev.17.pdf 
Consulted by 26/06/2016. 
Toer, Mario, Pablo Martínez Sameck, and Ricardo Romero. 2006. Alternativas en 
América Latina : Los Dilemas de la Izquierda en el Siglo XXI. Buenos Aires, 
Argentina: Ediciones Cooperativas. 
Tomba, Massimiliano. 2009. ‘Historical Temporalities of Capital: An Anti-Historicist 
Perspective.’ Historical Materialism, no. 17: 44–65. 
———. 2013. Marx’s Temporalities. Peter Thomas & Sara Farris trans. Leiden ; Boston: 
Brill. 
———. 2015. ‘Marx’s Temporal Bridges and Other Pathways.’ Historical Materialism 
23 (4): 75–91.  
Tomlinson, George. 2014. ‘Temporalizing a Materialist Concept of History.’ 
Symposium 18 (2): 274–292. 
Toscano, Alberto. 2008. ‘The Open Secret of Real Abstraction.’ Rethinking Marxism: A 
Journal of Economics, Culture & Society 20 (2): 273–87. 
———. 2010. Fanaticism : On the Uses of an Idea. London ; New York: Verso. 
———. 2014. ‘What Is Capitalist Power? Reflections on “Truth and Juridical 
Forms.”’ In Foucault and the History of Our Present, Sophie Fuggle, Yari Lanci & 
Martina Tazzioli eds.. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2015. ‘“America’s Belgium”: W.E.B. Du Bois on Race, Class, and the Origins 
of World War I.’ In Cataclysm 1914: The First World War and the Making of Modern 
World Politics, Alexander Anievas ed. Historical Materialism Book Series. Leiden; 
Boston: Brill. 
Trotsky, Leon. 1967. The History of the Russian Revolution. Three Volumes. Max 
Eastman transl. London: Sphere Books. 
Valcárcel, Luis Emilio. 1976. ‘El Problema Indigena.’ In La Polémica Del Indigenismo, 
Manuel Aquézolo Castro comp. Lima: Mosca Azul Editores. 
Valderrama, Miguel. 1998. ‘Althusser y el Marxismo Latinoamericano. Notas para 
una Genealogia del (Post)Marxismo en America Latina.’ Mapocho. Revista de 
Humanidades Y Ciencias Sociales, no. 43: 167–82. 
274 
 
Vargas Llosa, Mario. n.d. ‘La Dictadura Perfecta’. (The Perfect Dictatorship). 
Intervention of Mario Vargas Llosa in Debate with Octavio Paz. Youtube video. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hTVX2rS8a-o. 
Vasconi, Tomás Amadeo. 1970. Dependencia y Superestructura y Otros Ensayos : Sobre 
Ideologías y Educación en América Latina. Caracas: Ediciones de la Biblioteca, 
Universidad Central de Venezuela. 
Villarías Robles, Juan José R. 1998. El Sistema Económico del Imperio Inca: Historia 
Crítica de una Controversia. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas, Centro de Estudios Históricos, Departamento de Historia de 
América. 
Vitullo, Gabriel. 2001. ‘Transitologia, Consolidologia e Democracia na América 
Latina: Uma Revisão Crítica.’ Revista de Sociologia E Politica, no. 17: 53–60. 
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2004. ‘Perspectival Anthropology and the Method of 
Controlled Equivocation.’ Tipití: Journal of the Society for the Anthropology of 
Lowland South America 2 (1): Article 1. 
Von Vacano, Diego. 2004. ‘Whose Nietzsche for Latin America? Rodó’s or 
Mariátegui’s?’ http://textos.pucp.edu.pe/pdf/2093.pdf. 
VV.AA. 2005. Pasado y Presente. Complete Facsimilar Edition in Two Volumes. Buenos 
Aires: Centro de Documentación e Investigación de la Cultura de Izquierdas en 
Argentina. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1976. The Modern World-System. 1. Capitalist Agriculture and 
the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. 1980. The Modern World System. 2. Mercantilism and 
the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600-1750. London: Academic 
Press. 
———. 1989. The Modern World-System. 3 The Second Era of Great Expansion of the 
Capitalist World-Economy, 1730-1840s. San Diego: Academic Press. 
Webber, Jeffery. 2011. Red October : Left-Indigenous Struggles in Modern Bolivia. 
Leiden ; Boston: Brill. 
———. 2015a. ‘Revolution against “Progress”: Neo-Extractivism, the Compensatory 
State, and the TIPNIS Conflict in Bolivia.’ In Crisis and Contradiction: Marxist 
Perspectives on Latin America in the Global Political Economy, Susan J. Spronk and 
Jeffery R. Webber eds. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers. 
———. 2015b. ‘The Indigenous Community as “Living Organism”: José Carlos 
Mariátegui, Romantic Marxism, and Extractive Capitalism in the Andes.’ Theory 
and Society 44 (6): 575–98. 
275 
 
Wendling, Amy E. 2003. ‘Are All Revolutions Bourgeois? Revolutionary 
Temporality in Karl Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.’ Strategies: 
Journal of Theory, Culture & Politics 16 (1): 39–49. 
Williams, Gareth. 2011. The Mexican Exception : Sovereignty, Police, and Democracy. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
———. 2015. ‘Social Disjointedness and State-Form in Álvaro García Linera.’ 
Culture, Theory, and Critique 53 (6): 297–312. 
Yankelevich, Pablo. 2002. México, País Refugio: la Experiencia de los Exilios en el Siglo 
XX. Pabl;o Yankelevich coord. México, D.F.: Plaza Valdes Editores. 
Zavaleta Mercado, Rene . 1972. ‘Bolivia: Military Nationalism and the Popular 
Assembly.’ New Left Review I (73): 63–82. 
———. 1977. El Poder Dual. Problemas de la Teoria del Estado en America Latina. 
México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. 
———. 2013a. ‘Acercamientos a Marx: Ni Piedra Filosofal ii Summa Feliz.’ In Obra 
Completa. Tomo II. Ensayos 1975-1984, 605–9. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013b. ‘Clase y Conocimiento.’ In Obra Completa. Tomo II. Ensayos 1975-1984, 
383–89. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013c. ‘Cuatro Conceptos de la Democracia.; In Obra Completa. Tomo II. 
Ensayos 1975-1984, 513–29. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013d. ‘El Estado en America Latina.’ In Obra Completa. Tomo II. Ensayos 
1975-1984, 611–36. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013e. ‘Forma Clase y Forma Multitud en el Proletariado Minero de Bolivia.’ 
In Obra Completa. Tomo II. Ensayos 1975-1984, 573–91. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013f. ‘La Burguesia Incompleta.’ In Obra Completa. Tomo II. Ensayos 1975-
1984. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013g. ‘Las Formaciones Aparentes En Marx.’ In Obra Completa. Tomo II. 
Ensayos 1975-1984, 425–57. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013h. ‘Las Luchas Antiimperialistas en America Latina.’ In Obra Completa. 
Tomo II. Ensayos 1975-1984, 391–411. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013i. ‘Las Masas En Noviembre.’ In Obra Completa. Tomo II. Ensayos 1975-
1984, 99–146. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013j. ‘Lo Nacional-Popular En Bolivia.’ In Obra Completa. Tomo II. Ensayos 
1975-1984, 143–379. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
276 
 
———. 2013k. ‘Notas Sobre la Cuestion Nacional en America Latina.’ In Obra 
Completa. Tomo II. Ensayos 1975-1984, 537–47. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2013l. ‘Problemas de la Determinacion Dependiente y la Forma Primordial.’ 
In Obra Completa. Tomo II. Ensayos 1975-1984, 549–71. La Paz: Plural Editores. 
———. 2017. Towards a History of the National-Popular in Bolivia. Anne Freeland trans. 
and introd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
